This paper presents a computational model of the way humans inductively identify and aggregate concepts from the low-level stimuli they are exposed to. Based on the idea that humans tend to select the simplest structures, it implements a dynamic hierarchical chunking mechanism in which the decision whether to create a new chunk is based on an information-theoretic criterion, the Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle. We present theoretical justifications for this approach together with results of an experiment in which participants, exposed (...) to meaningless symbols, have been implicitly encouraged to create high-level concepts by grouping them. Results show that the designed model, called hereafter MDLChunker, makes precise quantitative predictions both on the kind of chunks created by the participants and also on the moment at which these creations occur. They suggest that the simplicity principle used to design MDLChunker is particularly efficient to model chunking mechanisms. The main interest of this model over existing ones is that it does not require any adjustable parameter. (shrink)

It is well known that working memory performance changes with age. Two recent computational models of working memory, TBRS* and SOB-CS, developed from young adults WM performances are opposed regarding the postulated causes of forgetting, namely time-based decay and interference for TBRS* and SOB-CS, respectively. In the present study, these models are applied on a set of complex span data produced by young and older adults. As expected, these models are unable to account for the older adult data. An investigation (...) on the effect of the main parameters of these models showed that the poorer performance of older adults does not come from a weaker encoding of item but rather from difficulties during the free time that immediately follows each distractor, as well as from a higher level of confusion between items. These results are discussed with respect to the current theories of working memory and aging. (shrink)

One of the first frameworks developed for understanding the relation of science and technology to the economy has been the linear model of innovation. The model postulated that innovation starts with basic research, is followed by applied research and development, and ends with production and diffusion. The precise source of the model remains nebulous, having never been documented. Several authors who have used, improved, or criticized the model in the past fifty years rarely acknowledged or cited any original source. The (...) model usually was taken for granted. According to others, however, it comes directly from V. Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier. This article traces the history of the linear model, suggesting that it developed in three steps corresponding to three scientific communities looking at science analytically. The article argues that statistics is a main reason the model is still alive despite criticisms, alternatives, and having been proclaimed dead. (shrink)

Kritische bijdragen over ideologisch gekleurde vormen van westerse culturele antropologie.

Actes d’un colloque qui s’est tenu à Copenhague en 2007, l’ouvrage veut combler un manque : traiter du développement de la dialectique de Platon à Aristote, non pas en se focalisant sur la méthode et l’ontologie, mais en se fondant sur le cadre du débat dialectique. Selon J. Fink (p. 2), la dialectique ici signifie d’abord et avant tout argumentation adressée à un interlocuteur. La pratique de l’argumentation dialectique et son extension dans la forme littéraire du dialogue constituent le cœu...

The last sentence of Chapter 10 of the Analects describes a brief encounter between Confucius and a hen-pheasant, and it does so in puzzling terms, ridden with lexical difficulties. At the same time, intertextual references insert this fragment into the context of Confucius’ life mission as well as of Chinese mythological narratives. This contribution assesses the fragment’s meaning and significance: Confucius’ reaction to the hen-pheasant unveils his evolving understanding of the Heavenly Mandate bestowed upon him. The fragment thus forcefully concludes (...) the chapter in which it is inserted. Additionally, I put forward a hypothesis: the focus of this narrative, coupled with its positioning at the end of Chapter 10, induce us to postulate that it may have been purposefully located at the very center of the Analects, a proposition that reverberates on the way we look at the composition of the book. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

La présente étude rassemble les passages de l’Ab Vrbe condita de Tite-Live où un terme lié au rire est associé à un discours ou à une parole rapportée, afin de les confronter aux vues exprimées par Cicéron et Quintilien sur le rire en contexte rhétorique. Si tous les passages étudiés s’insèrent très bien dans la conception rhétorique du rire, l’historien latin s’appuie sur celle-ci pour offrir une répartition originale entre usages acceptables et formes abusives du rire qui participe à la (...) construction des portraits personnages et de l’œuvre. (shrink)

Introduction: the Study of Argumentation Although our overall organization of the readings suggests one way of dividing our selected literature, ...

Parole et sexualité sont à la fois modes d’expression et actes, avec des dimensions individuelles et plurielles. Leurs lointaines origines biopsychologiques les enracinent dans les fondements inconscients du psychisme humain, d’où elles émergent en constituant et le Moi individuel de la conscience humaine et la perception moins consciente d’une appartenance groupale, base narcissique d’un Nous, dont la résurgence est sensible au sein de tous les ensembles groupaux, familiaux, sociaux, et bien sûr dans la vie conjugale et sexuelle. Une thérapie approfondie (...) en couple impose à l’analyste cette compréhension psychanalytique double, individuelle et duelle, pour saisir l’intrication des deux dimensions dans tous leurs conflits, notamment à travers l’expression sexuelle. (shrink)

A mass problem is a set of functions $\omega \to \omega $. For mass problems ${\mathcal {C}}, {\mathcal {D}}$, one says that ${\mathcal {C}}$ is Muchnik reducible to ${\mathcal {D}}$ if each function in ${\mathcal {C}}$ is computed by a function in ${\mathcal {D}}$. In this paper we study some highness properties of Turing oracles, which we view as mass problems. We compare them with respect to Muchnik reducibility and its uniform strengthening, Medvedev reducibility.For $p \in [0,1]$ let ${\mathcal {D}}$ (...) be the mass problem of infinite bit sequences y such that for each computable bit sequence x, the bit sequence $ x {\,\leftrightarrow\,} y$ has asymptotic lower density at most p = y$ ). We show that all members of this family of mass problems parameterized by a real p with $0 p$ for each computable set x. We prove that the Medvedev complexity of the mass problems ${\mathcal {B}}$ is the same for all $p \in $, by showing that they are Medvedev equivalent to the mass problem of functions bounded by ${2^{2}}^{n}$ that are almost everywhere different from each computable function.Next, together with Joseph Miller, we obtain a proper hierarchy of the mass problems of type $\text {IOE}$ : we show that for any order function g there exists a faster growing order function $h $ such that $\text {IOE}$ is strictly above $\text {IOE}$ in the sense of Muchnik reducibility.We study cardinal characteristics in the sense of set theory that are analogous to the highness properties above. For instance, ${\mathfrak {d}} $ is the least size of a set G of bit sequences such that for each bit sequence x there is a bit sequence y in G so that $\underline \rho >p$. We prove within ZFC all the coincidences of cardinal characteristics that are the analogs of the results above. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain the processes undergone by the producer of an awoval. The conditions of its possibility and its effects on the subjet itself through the effects on those to whom the avowal is addressed. I finally wonder to what extent it may be considered a moral transformation.

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...) deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative responsedependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions. (shrink)

Nous jugeons les réponses émotionnelles comme plus ou moins raisonnables étant donné leur objet et le contexte. Je soutiens que la légitimité de ces jugements repose sur le caractère raisonnable des désirs ou des dispositions émotionnelles qui expliquent ces réponses émotionnelles. Il est déraisonnable d’être triste de ne pas satisfaire un désir déraisonnable. Mais comment un désir peut-il être déraisonnable ? Je rejette l’idée selon laquelle les désirs seraient raisonnables parce que cohérents. Je suggère que nos désirs et nos dispositions (...) émotionnelles sont raisonnables à deux conditions : premièrement, qu’ils contribuent à une vie subjectivement heureuse ; deuxièmement, qu’ils soient moralement justifiés. (shrink)

This article deals with the nature and the evolution of the relationships between the Belgian French-speaking Green party Ecolo and the new social movements in Wallonia and Brussels, from the larger identified sectors of these movements to various other movements. To start with, the status of these movements in the emergence of the Greenparty is scrutinised. Then, on the basis of a survey conducted amongst members of the party elite, different modalities of the party/movements links are analysed: joint activism, selective (...) communication channels between the elites, structural links. The bottom line is that, altogether, the links are tighter than one might expect, but that the Green party new social movements linkage remains ambiguous in many respects. (shrink)

This contribution explores the reciprocal links between the organisational transformation of Western European Green parties and the access of some of these parties to national government participation. On the one hand, a series of hypotheses with regard to the possible link between prior organisational adaptation and eventual access to governmental participation are examined. On the other hand, the opposite question is addressed : that of the potential impact of governmental participation on further organisational adaptation. Following both a qualitative and Qualitative (...) Comparative Analysis, one does ultimately identify a link between prior organisational adaptation and eventual access to government, but a much more indirect and contrasted link between governmental participation and further organisational adaptation. (shrink)

En quel sens le scepticisme causal de Hume permet-il la solution qu’il revendique au problème de la liberté et de la nécessité? D’abord, on soutient qu’une interprétation épistémologique (et non sémantique) de ce scepticisme suffit au nécessitarisme proposé. Ensuite, on soutient que, parce qu’il s’accompagne d’une explication naturaliste de l’inférence, ce scepticisme rend raison de l’imputation morale requise par la défense d’un compatibilisme. Le caractère sceptique de ce naturalisme permet de qualifier l’ensemble du propos humien de solution sceptique de réconciliation.

We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard's answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I (...) do so by showing that mere true beliefs have no epistemic value at all. I sketch the consequences of this point concerning the epistemic value of knowledge, and answer some objections to the thesis that mere true beliefs do not possess epistemic value. (shrink)

My main intention in this article is to settle the question whether having the ability to \ is, as Ryleans think, necessary for knowing how to \, and to determine the kind of role played by procedural knowledge in knowing how to \ and in acquiring and possessing the ability to \. I shall argue, in a seemingly anti-Rylean fashion, that when it comes to know-hows that are ordinarily categorised as physical skills, or—to be, for the moment, philosophically neutral—as enabling (...) one to possess such skills, it is necessary to have procedural knowledge of how to \ in order to possess those know-hows. However, I shall contend that this knowledge cannot be acquired without acquiring the kind of ability to \ in which having the skill to \ consists. And that having acquired the ability to \ is not only necessary but also sufficient for having acquired procedural knowledge of how to succeed in \-ing. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

This article considers the origins of alphabetic writing, tracing its probable source to ancient Egypt, southern Levant or the Sinai during the Egyptian Middle Kingdom (17th century BCE). It supports the view that the earliest scripts were acrophonic representations of a West-Semitic language, whose use developed under the rule of the Hyksos in Egypt but was arrested there with the expulsion of this foreign dynasty at the end of the 16th century BCE. The development is then traced through the Levant, (...) with particular attention given to the emergence of cuneiform alphabetic scripts in Ugarit (c. 1300 BCE). This form of writing disappeared with the fall of Ugarit, but linear alphabetic scripts were preserved in a variety of Near-Eastern languages, notably Aramaic and Phoenician. These two languages, by becoming linguae francae respectively of the Syria-northern Mesopotamia and the Anatolia-Eastern Mediterranean regions, brought about the spread of alphabetic writing up until the 8th century BCE. The article concludes by examining the influence of the Phoenician script on Greek, Etruscan and ultimately Latin forms of writing. (shrink)

The infinite pigeonhole principle for 2-partitions asserts the existence, for every set A, of an infinite subset of A or of its complement. In this paper, we study the infinite pigeonhole pr...

In his most recent books, Piketty offers a global history of inequality in its economic, social, political, and intellectual dimensions, arguing that history is moved by the struggle of ideologies. To take part in this battle of ideas, he conceives a new ideal model of society, ‘participative socialism’, as an egalitarian alternative to the dominant neoproprietarian ideology and to the dangerous resurgence of nationalism and populism. This paper provides a new interpretation of Piketty’s view of history and of his participatory (...) socialism in light of Paul Ricoeur’s study of the dialectics of ideology and utopia. First, I present Ricoeur’s singular analysis of ideology and utopia, which he sees as two inseparable facets of social imagination. Then I show how Ricoeur’s concepts can be fruitfully applied to Piketty’s conception of history and to his conception of a new form of socialism for the 21st century, drawing lessons from history and forming a ‘good’ or ‘realist’ utopia. Finally, I demonstrate that this interpretation of Piketty’s socialism can help to better understand some of the criticisms he has received. (shrink)

Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...) to collapse into the Perception View or any other view according to which emotions are evaluative at the level of content. In the latter case, the Attitudinal View does not stand up to an obvious alternative, namely that emotions can only be assessed with respect to extrinsic norms or conditions of correctness. (shrink)

Il n'y a plus d'évidence aujourd'hui dans le fait de vivre sur Terre. Effondrement général de la biodiversité, accélération du réchauffement climatique, catastrophes sanitaires et sociales, les faits sont innombrables et bien d'autres cataclysmes sont à venir. Il ne suffit - pas d'en avoir conscience. Il faut aussi savoir comment vivre si chacun de nos gestes compte et si nous n'avons presque plus de temps. L'Anthropocène réclame un souci infini de la terre et des vivants, qui risque à chaque instant (...) de se retourner en ressentiment contre la vie. L'écologie menace de nous rendre fous ou malades. C'est pourquoi, du fond de notre détresse, nous avons besoin qu'elle puisse devenir un "gai savoir". Peut-on concevoir ainsi une pensée écologique qui soit aussi une philosophie de la puissance, ne se résumant ni à sa célébration prométhéenne, ni à son déni ascétique? Si la vie est volonté de puissance, alors il s'agit de chercher à dégager les conditions auxquelles l'accroissement de la puissance peut aussi prendre la forme d'un retour vers la terre. En quête d'une telle philosophie, ce livre chemine en compagnie de Nietzsche. Car il est peut-être encore temps de répondre à ce mystérieux appel de Zarathoustra : "Que le surhumain soit le sens de la terre!""--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This is a critical essay of Claude Gamel's theory of social justice and liberal utopia exposed in his book "Esquisse d'un libéralisme soutenable".

In this book, Benoît Dubreuil explores the creation and destruction of hierarchies in human evolution. Combining the methods of archaeology, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience and primatology, he offers a natural history of hierarchies from the point of view of both cultural and biological evolution. This volume explains why dominance hierarchies typical of primate societies disappeared in the human lineage and why the emergence of large-scale societies during the Neolithic period implied increased social differentiation, the creation of status hierarchies, and, eventually, political (...) centralisation. (shrink)

Benoit Mathot À partir du cadre théorique de la décoïncidence proposé par le philosophe François Jullien, cet article explore les enjeux d’humanisation des soins médicaux, ainsi que l’introduction de la dimension spirituelle dans la prise en charge des patients. Il revient enfin sur le dialogue possible entre ces réflexions contemporaines et les considérations du théologien luthérien Paul Tillich sur la santé.

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Throughout the manuscript of the Pensées and in other writings, Pascal crisscrosses his research on what the art of writing achieves and entails, on the one hand, and on the way to read and interpret the Holy Scriptures, on the other hand. Reading and writing practices are critically interwoven. This article offers a synthesis on Pascal’s reflexive account of such practices. After a summary of previous findings on the subject, it examines Pascal’s approach to (a) the rules that govern scriptural (...) interpretation; (b) the techniques of persuasion; and (c) the way to ground an instituted body, an expression by which we refer to a textual corpus, a political society, or a community of believers. (shrink)

Guidé par l’extension de l’usage et des acceptions du signifiant « ex », l’auteur, à partir d’une longue expérience clinique auprès des couples et des familles, met en correspondance des phénomènes psychiques peu conscients des individus, enfants ou parents, et des groupes familiaux qu’ils constituent, avec des transformations sociales ou sociétales modifiant les bases historiques des sentiments d’identité. L’ensemble souligne la fréquence de troubles narcissiques et notamment du sentiment de la constance et de la valeur de soi, essentiel à ce (...) qui fait, au-delà du désir, la dimension « conjugale » du choix amoureux et du choix de type de lien. L’évolution perceptible de la temporalité y joue un grand rôle, déplaçant les identifications vers une adolescence modélisée. S’agit-il d’un ébranlement passager du sentiment identitaire, du renouvellement d’une pluralité de modalités identitaires ou d’une évolution anthropologique? (shrink)