This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the 'Philosophers into Europe' conference held under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and the British Society for Phenomenology at the University of Southampton in September 1969.

This dissertation offers an account of linguistic practices of Latinx people in the United States through the lens of critical feminist phenomenology. It examines how Latinx people are racialized on the basis of their language use, the normative logics that structure those processes of racialization, and the practices by which Latinx people resist and transform those logics. In this project, I develop a critical feminist phenomenological approach that locates itself within a tradition of Latina feminist phenomenology—a tradition (...) that has prioritized the articulation of situated, embodied experiences of oppressing⇔resisting relations lived by Latinx intersubjectivities in the context of the United States. I propose the concept of “linguistic rupture” in order to name the specific kind of experience at the center of this analysis. The analysis allows for a reconceptualization of language and linguistic practices that constructs Latinx speakers as actively resistant rather than just passively oppressed. While I do argue that linguistic rupture is particularly significant in understanding the racialization of Latinx populations in the United States, the account of linguistic rupture developed in this project has potential for application across a broad range of racializing processes and events not limited to U.S. Latinx experience. It thus invites further examination and critical engagement with the various ways in which ruptures experienced by minoritized and marginalized subjects in general expose hegemonic logics operating in multiple directions, as well as the ways in which linguistic engagements specifically anchor embodied intersubjectivity existentially. (shrink)

이 논문은 20세기 프랑스의 대표적인 철학자 메를로-퐁티(M. Merleau-Ponty)의 현 상학적 언어론에 대해 해명해 보는 것을 근본 목적으로 삼고 있다. 주지하다시피 메를로- 퐁티는 서구 전통철학에서처럼, 언어 문제를 단순히 인간의 이성이나 정신에서 전개하는 것이 아니라 신체의 ‘지각’으로부터 해명해 보려는 새로운 접근 방식을 시도하였다. 그래 서 그는 ‘언어(말)’를 포함한 모든 표현 작용이 신체의 표현적 기능에 근거함을 주장하면 서, 신체에 의한 언어표현은 그 자체가 모종의 ‘의미’를 생성한다고 주장하였다. 말하자면 그에게 있어서 ‘언어’란 단지 이미 결정된 사유나 개념을 전달하기 위한 기호가 아니라 원 초적인 의미를 담고 (...) 있는 생동적인 신체의 표현이라고 할 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 메를로-퐁티의 현상학적 언어론을 해명하기 위해 다음과 같은 순서 로 논의를 전개하였다. 먼저, 경험주의와 주지주의의 입장과 그들의 언어관에 대해 살펴보았 는데, 이것은 전통적인 언어관에서 나타나는 문제점을 메를로-퐁티가 어떻게 극복했는지를 보여주기 위한 예비적 고찰인 셈이다. 이어서 메를로-퐁티의 현상학적 언어론을 구체적으로 해명하기 위해 우선, 메를로-퐁티에 있어서 신체에 대한 개념적 설명과 이러한 신체와 지각 의 관계에 대해 살펴보았고, 또한 이러한 그의 신체 ‘지각’과 신체(몸)의 표현활동인 ‘언어’개 념에 대해서도 함께 검토하였다. 다음으로, 그가 주장하는 언어의 의미와 원초적인 말(파롤)이 무엇인지에 대해 해명해 봄으로써, 그가 주장하는 현상학적 언어론의 본질적 의미를 드러내 보고자 하였다. 끝으로, 메를로-퐁티가 주장하는 현상학적 언어론의 기본내용을 간략히 정리 하면서 본 논의를 마무리하였다. (shrink)

Although the semantic insights about natural language produced so far by neuroscientific research have been meagre, (Pulvermüller 2010) they have provided one important empirical finding which lang...

Frege and Husserl are traditionally regarded as the precursors of the linguistic turn; however, the importance of their ideas for this event still is not fully comprehended. This article contributes to such comprehension: the principles of the linguistic turn in its analytical interpretation provided by Rorty are applied as an indicator revealing the commonality and difference of Frege’s and Husserl’s positions regarding key issues of their concepts. The connection of the philosophers’ ideas with the linguistic turn is (...) viewed in the context of their interpretation of predicativity, propositionality, contextuality of meaning, and ways of categorization. The analysis conducted gives rise to distinguishing between Frege’s and Husserl’s referential schemes. It is based on the differences in the characteristics of the connection between perception and predication. In conclusion, the arguments against Frege’s and Husserl’s involvement in the linguistic turn are emphasized. These arguments stem from the idea of the primacy of sense over language fundamental for both philosophers who proceed from the fact that certain a priori logical relations underlie utterances or other acts. There is a more solid argument which does not allow considering Frege’s and Husserl’s legacies as its source. This argument consists in the fact that they regard sense as an objective, communicable, and universal phenomenon independent of its carriers, not inherently linguistic, and pre-logical which is due to its intentional nature according to Husserl and logical “indecomposability” of concepts according to Frege. (shrink)

The influence of Husserlian phenomenology on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics has been the subject of some analysis in the secondary literature, with scholars emphasizing both Gadame...

It is a commonplace that philosophical doctrines, like old soldiers, are not vanquished, but merely fade away. It might have been added that, like old soldiers, they occasionally return. What is sound in the commonplace, aside from whatever merit it may have as sociological comment, is found in its underscoring the peculiarities of philosophical refutation. Did Aristotle refute Plato? Did Ockham refute Scotus? Did Reid refute Locke? Did Moore refute Bradley? Did Strawson refute Russell? Part of what I wish to (...) show in this paper is that there are ways of posing questions like these so that they are at least answerable; it is not, however, so to pose them, much less to answer them. My chief concern is with the fact that one of the peculiarities of philosophical refutation is that it commonly contains a metaphilosophical component. Indeed, after considerable stage-setting, I shall argue that some important doctrines of Linguistic Analysts and Phenomenologists rest upon metaphilosophical mistakes and that, even where some of their doctrines are sound, the intellectual ambiance in which they are placed invites confusion. It is visionary to expect the ending of the intellectual embarrassment constituted by the coming and going of philosophical styles and fads; the attempt to expose metaphilosophical mistakes and confusions may, nevertheless, help to wither the exuberant cynicism of the commonplace. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the 'Philosophers into Europe' conference held under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of ...

The present study pursues three objectives. First, to expose and discuss the contributions of the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset to the phenomenological study of gestures and emotive gesture. Secondly, to critically review one of the central theses defended by Ortega, according to which “every expressive phenomenon”—including, therefore, the emotive gesture—involves “a transposition, that is to say, an essential metaphor.” This thesis invites us, in the third objective, to establish a dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive linguistics (as developed by (...) Lakoff, Langacker and Talmy), assuming an experientialist position vis‐à‐vis human reason and language, in opposition to the objectivist and formalist position of Chomsky's generative linguistics. In this interdisciplinary context, we will study the phenomenon of emotive gesture, in particular the expression of the emotion of anger, as analyzed phenomenologically by Ortega y Gasset. (shrink)

This book draws on recent developments in research on Ferdinand de Saussure's general linguistics to challenge the structuralist doctrine associated with the Course in General Linguistics and to propose a phenomenological interpretation of Saussure's study of language.

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 27 Heft: 4 Seiten: 559-572.

Surprise is treated as an affect in Aristotelian philosophy as well as in Cartesian philosophy. In experimental psychology, surprise is considered to be an emotion. In phenomenology, it is only addressed indirectly (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas), with the important exception of Ricoeur and Maldiney; it is reduced to a break in cognition by cognitivists (Dennett). Only recently was it broached in linguistics, with a focus on lexico-syntactic categories. As for the expression of surprise, it has been studied in connection with (...) evidentiality in languages that encode surprise morphosyntactically. However, how surprise is encoded in languages that lack an evidential morphosyntactic system has been largely unexplored. This book provides new insights into the dynamics of surprise based on a heuristic hypothesis tested against the investigation of time, language and emotion. It is intended to arouse the interest of a multidisciplinary audience keen on crossing the disciplinary borders of phenomenology, cognitive sciences, and pragmatics. The theoretical approaches adopted in this collection of articles rely on experiments and corpus data. They advance knowledge by building on robust empirical results coming from psychology, microphenomenology, linguistics and physiology. (shrink)

Stawarska considers the ambiguities surrounding the antagonism between the phenomenological and the structuralist traditions by pointing out that the supposed foundation of structuralism, the Course in General Linguistics, was ghostwritten posthumously by two editors who projected a dogmatic doctrine onto Saussure’s lectures, while the authentic materials related to Saussure’s linguistics are teeming with phenomenological references. She then narrows the focus to Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Saussure’s linguistics and argues that it offers an unusual, if not an uncanny, reading of the Course, (...) in that it identifies a phenomenological dimension within the text, against the grain of the dominant structuralist claim. This phenomenological dimension is corroborated by the authentic sources of Saussure’s linguistics, even though the latter were beyond the philosopher’s own power to know. Merleau-Ponty’s unorthodox reading of the Course as being broadly compatible with the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology has been dismissed as an error and a contresens , but Stawarska proposes that such deviant appropriations of foundational texts are the ones to cherish the most, since they effectively dismantle the received dogmas and official doctrines stuffing the cabinets of canonical philosophy. She argues specifically that Merleau-Ponty’s contested distinction between “a synchronic linguistics of speech ” and “a diachronic linguistics of language ” , which gives primacy to la parole over la langue, and raises the possibility of a systematic study of la parole, contains a more faithful response to Saussure’s own project than the received structuralist view that la langue alone constitutes the proper object of linguistic study. (shrink)

According to current cognitive linguistic theory, the abstract notion of TIME in many languages of the world is expressed through a metonymic relation involving direc-tion, irreversibility, continuity, segmentation, and measurability and one of two possible versions of the TIME AS ORIENTATION IN SPACE metaphor: either the observer moves or time does. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues for the possibility of understanding what he calls 'our primordial experience'of time through an exploration, analysis, comparison, and evaluation of the (...) different metaphors for time, not as they exist in themselves but as they are grounded in what other cognitive linguists have explored with respect to subjectivity, concept formation, and conceptual integration. This 'primordial experience' of time is possible because of the embodiment of ourselves in the world and gives rise to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of an ontology of the flesh; the fact that we are 'of' rather than 'in' the world gives rise to his theory of time as depth. In this paper, I show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of time might 1) clarify the picture Lakoff and Johnson give of the existence of time and 2) provide a philosophical foundation that integrates various contemporary cognitive linguistic theories. (shrink)

This chapter establishes the concept of a “symbolic system of representation“ to make clear how it is possible that humans use not only the language-based system of representation for cognitive contents but also a many layered non-linguistic system, a system which we probably share with other species. A symbolic system of representation denotes a general concept of a performance of which our language is only one single case, but which nevertheless is most easily explained through the case of language. (...) A system of representation should enable us to form and manipulate an idea of a state of affairs or of an event without having the appropriate intuition of it. We usually think that we do this only using linguistic expressions, but this is not the whole truth. Language is one system of representation, but we can in principle conceive of other systems of representation with the same performance. Husserl’s theory of meaning already reveals this possibility. A phenomenological analysis reveals that a non-linguistic system of representation is in fact still functioning in our own consciousness. We simultaneously use different means of representation, the most prominent of which are language, gestures, feelings and scenic images. It is especially fruitful to investigate the scenic mode of daydreaming as a central form of non-linguistic thinking. Through a close comparison of alternative systems of representation, the systematic difference of usual semantics in normal language systems based on convention and the more natural similarity semantics of some non-linguistic systems of representation is revealed. (shrink)

Stawarska considers the ambiguities surrounding the antagonism between the phenomenological and the structuralist traditions by pointing out that the supposed foundation of structuralism, the Course in General Linguistics, was ghostwritten posthumously by two editors who projected a dogmatic doctrine onto Saussure’s lectures, while the authentic materials related to Saussure’s linguistics are teeming with phenomenological references. She then narrows the focus to Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Saussure’s linguistics and argues that it offers an unusual, if not an uncanny, reading of the Course, (...) in that it identifies a phenomenological dimension within the text, against the grain of the dominant structuralist claim. This phenomenological dimension is corroborated by the authentic sources of Saussure’s linguistics, even though the latter were beyond the philosopher’s own power to know. Merleau-Ponty’s unorthodox reading of the Course as being broadly compatible with the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology has been dismissed as an error and a contresens, but Stawarska proposes that such deviant appropriations of foundational texts are the ones to cherish the most, since they effectively dismantle the received dogmas and official doctrines stuffing the cabinets of canonical philosophy. She argues specifically that Merleau-Ponty’s contested distinction between “a synchronic linguistics of speech ” and “a diachronic linguistics of language ”, which gives primacy to la parole over la langue, and raises the possibility of a systematic study of la parole, contains a more faithful response to Saussure’s own project than the received structuralist view that la langue alone constitutes the proper object of linguistic study. (shrink)

The paper presents a phenomenological approach to recent debates in the philosophy of language about rule-following and the normativity of meaning, a debate that can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations but that was given new life with Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Taking a cue from Hannah Ginsborg’s recent work on “primitive normativity,” I use some of Husserl’s own comments about meaning and the status of rules to sketch a solution to Kripke’s rule-following paradox by (...) appealing to a kind of normativity at the level of perception and intersubjective embodiment. This level of normativity arises, like Ginsborg’s, via a primitive kind of judgment that does not presuppose linguistic or conceptual mastery. Unlike for Ginsborg, however, for Husserl this level should still be understood in terms of meaning—just not in the standard linguistic or conceptual senses prominent in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition in which the rule-following debates have occurred. My interpretation thus also demonstrates how Husserl’s account bypasses certain presuppositions about meaning common in the period of the linguistic turn—presuppositions also questioned, in different ways, by Wittgenstein, by Kripke, and by Ginsborg. (shrink)