Contemporary ethical theorists have sought criteria to identify meaningful lives. A central issue that divides accounts is whether the concept of meaningfulness rests on objective values. My own view is that each side in the controversy is partially right and partially wrong. I believe objective values are needed for the concept of a meaningful life but that no successful account of such values has yet been offered. Lacking such an account, the concept of a meaningful life (...) should be replaced by more useful terminology. I shall contrast my view with that of Susan Wolf though my goal is not primarily critical but, instead, the development of a different and, I believe, more useful approach. (shrink)

Neil Levy has argued that “superlative meaning” can be attained only through “inherently open-ended” projects. This implies a two-tier system of meaning: one for elites, the other for ordinary people. It sets lives characterized by “open-ended” work over and against those that find meaning in commonplace sources, e.g., personal relationships. I argue that Levy’s argument rests on two mistakes. First, it confuses two senses of “superlative meaning”—superlative abundance and superlative safety. Even if his argument succeeds, it merely shows that (...) certain sorts of work produce the most reliably meaningful lives rather than the most abundantly meaningful. Second, contra Levy, who assumes that only work can generate superlative meaning, I build on Thaddeus Metz’s argument that loving relationships can count as superlatively meaningful. I argue that recognition of this point undermines the philosophical basis for Levy’s two-tier system of meaning. Ordinary lives are not doomed to be second-class meaningful lives. (shrink)

Does the rise of artificial intelligence pose a threat to human sources of meaning? While much ink has been spilled on how AI could undercut meaningful human work, John Danaher has raised the stakes by claiming that AI could “sever” human beings from non-work-related sources of meaning—specifically, those related to intellectual and moral goods. Against this view, I argue that his suggestion that AI poses a threat to these areas of meaningful activity is overstated. Self-transformative activities pose a (...) hard limit to AI’s impingement on meaningful human activities. Contra Danaher, I suggest that a wider range of sources for meaning will continue to exist in a world dominated by AI. (shrink)

In this paper we examine how the use of robots in caring for elders can impact the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We present a framework for understanding ‘meaningfulness in life’, and then apply that framework in discussing ways in which the use of robots to assist in activities of daily living can preserve, enhance or undermine the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We conclude with a discussion of if and how having false beliefs about companion robots can affect meaningfulness (...) in the life of the person having those false beliefs. (shrink)

In recent discussions of whether our lives are or can be meaningful, appeals are often made to such things as “a view from nowhere,” or “the viewpoint of the universe.” In this paper I attempt to make sense of what it might mean for a being to possess such a perspective, and argue that common appeals to such perspectives are inadequately developed; crucially, they do not adequately account for the character of the beings taken to possess these viewpoints. (...) In the second half of the paper I turn to an alternative proposal, one that focuses on the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers in determining the normative statuses of our lives and activities, and argue that it provides a plausible account of meaningfulness. (shrink)

Doing Valuable Time considers the interest--and disinterest--we take in our own lives. It explores the nature of meaningful living, the attraction to the future that is lost in depression, the motivating force of hope, the role of commitments, the inevitability of boredom, and the possibilities for contentment with imperfection.

This paper argues that participants in the subjectivism/objectivism/hybridism debate, a central issue in recent meaning in life research, conflate two different distinctions marked by the terms objective and subjective, one having to do with the question of whether life's meaningfulness depends on factors internal or external to the agent, the other having to do with the question of whether there is any ‘absolute’ as opposed to ‘relative’ truth about the first question. The paper then argues that a distinctive type of (...) hybridism with respect to the first sense is true. To vindicate this type of hybridism, the paper identifies, by using examples and counterexamples, internal and external necessary conditions for having meaningful lives. In this type of hybridism, internal states that are not directed at external factors, such as autonomy, serenity and contentment, are also taken account of, and, more generally, internal and external factors need not relate to each other at all. Further, although the more a combination of internal and external factors is valuable the more meaningful a life is, not any increase in the value of any relevant internal or external factor enhances meaning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism by Bruce P. RittenhouseIlsup AhnShopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism Bruce P. Rittenhouse eugene, or: cascade, 2013. 211 pp. $33.00Are there any theories of consumerism that characterize people’s lives on a global scale? What motivates them to choose a consumerist lifestyle? If possible, how can we overcome this lifestyle that entails (...) destructive consequences? In this new book, Shopping for Meaningful Lives, Bruce Rittenhouse answers these questions by critically appropriating Paul Tillich’s theological insights. He first diagnoses consumerism as “not only a pattern of behavior that characterizes an individual life, but a way in which an individual organizes his or her particular life to seek to give it meaning” (3). It is thus more insidious than the mere acquisition of goods and services in ever-increasing amounts because humans are not meant to be mere consuming animals. [End Page 196]In attempting to deconstruct consumerism, Rittenhouse first points out that it has been poorly understood despite its seeming ubiquity. He launches his own investigation to look for possible theories of consumerism, which he then evaluates according to a consistent set of empirical criteria. In chapter 3 he enumerates five main types that describe Western consumerism: “1, greed, i.e., consumers’ intemperate materialistic hedonism; 2, status signaling, i.e., consumers’ desire to communicate superior social status; 3, manipulation of consumer by the producers of economic goods through marketing and advertising; 4, imaginative hedonism, i.e., consumers’ seeking emotional pleasure through the imaginative identities; 5, parental concern, i.e., parents’ desire to maximize their children’s well-being” (47). According to Rittenhouse, these five theories of the motivations for consumerism provide anecdotal support to demonstrate their practical relevance, but they “fall short of demonstrating their theories’ empirical possibility, let alone their empirical superiority over the rival theories” (95).Rittenhouse’s alternative theory is then developed in chapter 5, after he provides empirical evidence (including economic charts and analyses) for his own critique in chapter 4. His years of experience as a professional economist aptly qualify him to develop his social-scientific argumentation. Rittenhouse’s constructive proposal is hinged upon his critical insight that consumerism’s motivation may best be understood as religious. By religious, he means that it “answers a question posed by the nature of human existence” (132). Consumerism is now newly understood both as existential and as religious matter, and here Rittenhouse critically appropriates Tillich’s ontotheological categories and concepts, such as the three pairs of ontological elements in the self-world structure of being (individuation and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny). Since consumerism’s motivation is existential and religious, Rittenhouse attempts to resolve the moral and religious failings of consumerism by demonstrating the “correlation between the existential question of meaning and the answer of existential Christian faith” (133).Rittenhouse concludes his book by calling for existential conversion through the means of grace—that is, “the means of conversion to existential Christian faith and of ongoing conversion within ambiguous existential Christian faith” (175). The strength of this book lies in his discovery that consumerism is a spurious form of religious life that only destroys those who are intoxicated by its lifestyle. Given that consumerism has taken root everywhere affected by ever rising globalization, Rittenhouse’s existential investigation and theological remedy are definitely a welcome voice in the field of Christian ethics. His expertise in social-scientific study and empirical analysis is also a rare strength in this important pursuit. This book is well suited for upper-level college students as well as seminarians and theological school students. It is also a wonderful text for adult Bible study groups in churches and religious communities. [End Page 197]Ilsup AhnNorth Park UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Because it is significantly unclear what ‘meaningful’ does or should pick out when applied to a life, any account of meaningful living will be constructive and not merely clarificatory. Where in our conceptual geography is ‘meaningful’ best located? What conceptual work do we want the concept to do? What I call agent-independent and agent-independent-plus conceptions of meaningfulness locate ‘meaningful’ within the conceptual geography of agent-independent evaluative standards and assign ‘meaningful’ the work of commending lives. (...) I argue that the not wholly welcome implications of these more dominant approaches to meaningfulness make it plausible to locate ‘meaningful’ on an alternative conceptual geography — that of agents as end-setters and of agent-dependent value assessments — and to assign it the work of picking out lives whose time-expenditures are intelligible to the agent. I respond to the challenge confronting any subjectivist conception of meaningfulness that it is overly permissive. (shrink)

The M → W thesis that a meaningful life must be a worthwhile life follows from an appealing approach to the axiology of life. Yet one of the most prominent voices in the recent philosophy of life literature, Thaddeus Metz, has raised multiple objections to that thesis. With a view to preserving the appeal of the axiological approach from which it follows, I here defend the M → W thesis from Metz’s objections. My defense yields some interesting insights about (...) both a meaningful life and a worthwhile life: a meaningful life should be firmly distinguished from a life with meaning, the value of a meaningful life must outweigh whatever disvalue the life has, a worthwhile life at a given time needn’t be a life worth continuing at that time, and the M → W thesis doesn’t preclude the possibility of something being part of what constitutes the meaningfulness of a life without also being part of what constitutes the worthwhileness of the life. (shrink)

It is often assumed that most people want their life to be “meaningful”. But what exactly does this mean? Though numerous research have documented which factors lead people to experience their life as meaningful and people’s theories about the best ways to secure a meaningful life, investigations in people’s concept of meaningful life are scarce. In this paper, we investigate the folk concept of a meaningful life by studying people’s third-person attribution of meaningfulness. We draw (...) on hypotheses from the philosophical literature, and notably on the work of Susan Wolf (Study 1) and an objection Antti Kauppinen raised against it (Study 2). In Study 1, we find that individuals who are successful, competent, and engaged in valuable and important goals are considered to have more meaningful lives. In Study 2, we find that the perceived meaningfulness of a life does not depend only on its components, but also on how its elements are ordered and how it forms a coherent whole (the “narrative shape” of this life). Additionally, our results stress the importance of morality in participants’ assessments of meaningfulness. Overall, our results highlight the fruitfulness of drawing on the philosophical literature to investigate the folk concept of meaningful life. (shrink)

Sexual experimentation, living together, raising children outside of marriage, remarriage after divorce, and same-sex relationships...These behaviours have become common in the wider society as well as among Christians and Catholic Christians. Not only do they think and act differently than the official Church teaching, but they do so convinced that they are acting rightly. This challenges ethics to respond by what can be called an 'ethics of mercy', by meeting people where they are and helping them to grow towards the (...) fullness of life and love. Such a pastoral and educational ethics of growth should dare to stand within the tension between what is desirable and what is attainable, without surrendering the 'pro-vocative' idea of conjugal covenant as the basis for the family. Mercy is needed not only after ethics but in ethics. In harmony with Pope Francis's plea for a 'gospel of mercy', this book seeks a middle way between merciless rigourism and relativising subjectivism. It proposes an ethics of redemption that accompanies people on their way to meaningful living and loving, grounded in a spirituality that springs from the salvation offered in Jesus. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In his seminal reflection on the badness of death, Nagel links it to the permanent loss “of whatever good there is in living.” I will argue, following McMurtry, that “whatever good there is in living” is defined by the life-value of resources, institutions, experiences, and activities. Enjoyed expressions of the human capacities to experience the world, to form relationships, and to act as creative agents are intrinsically life-valuable, the reason why anyone would desire to go on living indefinitely. As Nagel (...) argues, “the fact that we will eventually die in a few score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live longer. If there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for all of us.” In this paper I want to question whether in fact there is no limit to the amount of life it would be good to have. My general conclusion will be that it is not the case that the eternal or even indefinite prolongation of any particular individual life necessarily increases life-value. Were death thus somehow removed as an inescapable limiting frame on human life, overall reductions of life-value would be the consequence. Individual and collective life would lose those forms of moral and material life-value that form the bases of life’s being meaningful and purposive. (shrink)

What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature is that resultant luck vitiates meaning; that if the relevant state-of-affairs is primarily the result of luck, chance, or happenstance, rather than the person’s actions, then no meaning is conferred. Call this the anti-luck constraint. In this article it is argued that we should reject the anti-luck constraint. Two types of cases, often cited as examples in favour of the anti-luck constraint, are examined: the (...) lucky idiot and the incompetent villain. Such lives, it is contended, can be meaningful even when the relevant states-of-affairs are primarily the product of resultant luck. (shrink)

In my 2002 piece ‘The Meaning of Life’ I argued that Life, meaning the sum of the lives of all living things, had a meaning if and only if it had been purposefully brought about by a designer or creator. Michael Hauskeller has recently criticized this argument, responding that this sense of ‘meaning’ is not the one in view when we are discussing ‘the meaning of life’. In this piece I respond to Hauskeller's argument, and, while I stand by (...) my 2002 argument in terms of one meaning of ‘meaning’, I admit that it does not apply to the different question of what makes a life meaningful. I assert that glorifying God is the activity that contributes the most meaningfulness to a life, though I deny that this is the only activity that can contribute meaningfulness to a life. This makes me, in terms due to Thaddeus Metz, a moderate supernaturalist rather than an extreme supernaturalist. Despite this distinction, Metz has argued in this volume that moderate supernaturalism is vulnerable to the same objection as in his view defeats extreme supernaturalism, and I close by responding to this argument. (shrink)

Doing Valuable Time is the kind of book—rarer in philosophy, I think, than one might wish—that invites personal reflection. Boredom, contentment, hope, intention, and decisions about how to spend time (or the lack of freedom to make such decisions) are such familiar pieces of our everyday lives that they can glide by almost without notice. Calhoun’s work equips the reader to contemplate these phenomena as significant consequences and constituents of human nature.

Many philosophers have suggested that lives emerge as meaningless when considered within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time. Landau (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 727–734, 2011, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(3), 457–468, 2014, 2017) has argued that considering a life within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time need not lead to this pessimistic conclusion. Three recent discussions, by Benatar (2017), Hanson (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23, 561–573, 2020), (...) and Kügler (The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2021), offer criticisms of some of Landau’s arguments. The present paper continues to develop the topic by discussing these criticisms. Among other points, the paper rejects Nagel’s claim that standards are unavailable within the cosmic context. In reply to another criticism, it elaborates on reasons for preferring some standards over others. The paper also argues that Blackburn’s, Rescher’s, and Camus’s arguments differ from Nagel’s; that a disproof of the pessimistic argument does not require that we explain the argument’s popularity; and that Hanson’s account of the relation between the cosmic perspective and evaluations of meaningfulness is, at the end of the day, in fact quite similar to Landau’s, so that the difference between them is more terminological than material. Finally, the paper claims that the debate suffers from terminological untidiness and suggests the use of clearer, more precise terminology in future philosophical work on the topic. (shrink)

An authoethnography explores the lived experiences of patients being in control and self-managing their chronic illness among their families and friends. Findings show that the current health discourse narrows down people to mere patients and gives rise to tensions. This article indicates that people with one or several chronic illnesses or disabilities are first of all full citizens with needs, values, and drives seeking a meaningful life. Fair possibilities ought to exist to satisfy their needs to belong, to care (...) for and to matter to others since these constitute an essential aspect of being human. (shrink)

In their essay 'Living Well', Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano argue that to live a meaningful life all we must do is find personal satisfaction and enjoyment. They argue against other philosophers who claim that 'objectively valuable' activities are what make a life meaningful. There are two problems with what they argue in the essay. The first relates to a particular criticism they make of some of those philosophers taking the contrary view, in regards to the difficulty (...) those philosophers have in deeming what is and is not of objective value. The second is more specifically to do with Cahn's and Vitrano's rejection of the idea that objectively valuable activities are what make a life meaningful, worthwhile. But both problems result from their introducing morality as relevant to what makes a life meaningful or not. (shrink)

Duncan Purves and Nicolas Delon have argued that one’s life will be meaningful to the extent that one contributes to valuable states of affairs and this contribution is a result of one’s intentional actions. They then argue, contrary to some theorists’ intuitions, that non-human animals are capable of fulfilling these requirements, and that this finding might entail important things for the animal ethics movement. In this paper, I also argue that things besides human beings can have meaningful existences, (...) but I disagree with Purves and Delon’s theory of meaning, and some of the practical implications they suggest arise from their conclusion. Specifically, I argue that Purves and Delon are wrong to suggest that intentional agency is necessary for one’s life to be meaningful; contributing to valuable states of affairs can be sufficient by itself. Purves and Delon’s objection to such a claim is that it would allow even inanimate objects’ existences to count as meaningful. However, while I accept this... (shrink)

On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, (...) significance, by virtue of our moral choices then making an ultimate difference. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world. An eternal significance would be ‘too big’, reducing any meaning possible during an earthly life to nothing by comparison. I conclude that moderate supernaturalists would be wise to avoid appealing to eternal (or infinite) meaning when spelling out the way God and a soul could alone impart a great meaning to our lives; some other notion of greatness should be considered, perhaps one involving a temporary afterlife. (shrink)

Kaur (2012) raises the question, how can education be more inclusive and representative when catering to diverse groups and students? Does our entitlement to human kindness cease once incarcerated, and are we to be forever banished to the outskirts of society? The majority of offender education research assesses success or failure through mechanistic, objective and calculated criteria. Statistically, offenders repeatedly underachieve in primary and secondary education; offenders who partake in some form of adult and post-release learning continue this pattern, and (...) face other non-learning barriers that impact on participation and accreditation outcomes (Prison Education Trust, 2018). Departing from conventional modes and methods of teaching, this article examines the transformative journeys of former offenders, and considers the role of education in supporting them to lead more productive and meaningful lives. (shrink)

A brief critical notice of Dan J Stein's new book _Problems of Living: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Cognitive-Affective Science_.

This article seeks to show that death prevents one’s life from being meaningful on balance. Proponents of what has come to be known as the ‘imperfection thesis’ about life’s meaning claim that it is sufficient for one’s life to be meaningful that one relates to only a non-maximal conceivable value. In many, if not all, contexts, holding the imperfection thesis appears to be the sole reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful. (...) Counter to this, it is argued that there is good reason to believe that the imperfection thesis is false, that arguments in favour of the imperfection thesis fail, and that attempts to show that the imperfection thesis can counter the arguments against it in a principled way are unsuccessful. Given this, it can be concluded that the imperfection thesis is false, and so there is no reason for supposing that death need not prevent one’s life from being meaningful. (shrink)

In liberal political theory, meaningful work is conceptualised as a preference in the market. Although this strategy avoids transgressing liberal neutrality, the subsequent constraint upon state intervention aimed at promoting the social and economic conditions for widespread meaningful work is normatively unsatisfactory. Instead, meaningful work can be understood to be a fundamental human need, which all persons require in order to satisfy their inescapable interests in freedom, autonomy, and dignity. To overcome the inadequate treatment of meaningful (...) work by liberal political theory, I situate the good of meaningful work within a liberal perfectionist framework, from which standpoint I develop a normative justification for making meaningful work the object of political action. To understand the content of meaningful work, I make use of Susan Wolf’s distinct value of meaningfulness, in which she brings together the dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity into the ‘bipartite value’ of meaningfulness (BVM) (Wolf, Meaning in life and why it matters, 2010). However, in order to be able to incorporate the BVM into our lives, we must become valuers, that is, co-creators of values and meanings. This demands that we acquire the relevant capabilities and status as co-authorities in the realm of value. I conclude that meaningful work is of first importance because it is a fundamental human need, and that society ought to be arranged to allow as many people as possible to experience their work as meaningful through the development of the relevant capabilities. (shrink)

According to Viktor Frankl, although people are not always free to choose the conditions in which they find themselves, they are always free to choose their attitude towards these conditions and, thus, are always free to find their lives meaningful. This basic tenet of Frankl’s theory is also often repeated approvingly in the secondary literature. I argue that the claim is wrong; not all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Counterexamples include people who suffer (...) from severe depression or people who, due to lack of sufficient intelligence, ability to focus, or determination cannot profit from psychological counseling (including logotherapeutic counseling). I also criticize Frankl’s oft-repeated argument that some people’s success in finding their lives meaningful in the concentration camps shows that all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s discussion of the noetic dimension and its relation to other dimensions of the human personality is also insufficient for defending his claim about all people’s freedom to find their lives meaningful. Frankl’s theory of the noos suggests that all people’s lives are meaningful. But since not all people’s lives are meaningful, Frankl’s claims about the noos seem incorrect: either some people do not have (or are not also) a noetic dimension or the noetic dimension does not always endow life with meaning. Further, the claim that, thanks to all people’s noetic dimension, all people’s lives are already meaningful is in tension with the claim that all people can wrest meaning from life. I suggest that understanding Frankl as only claiming that all people have a potential for meaningful lives is also unhelpful. Finally, I discuss the implications of my criticism for Frankl’s theory at large. I argue that much in this very helpful theory can be retained, but identify those aspects of the theory that need to be modified. (shrink)

Some philosophers have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is no God. For Sartre and Nagel, for example, a God of the traditional classical theistic sort would constrain our powers of self-creative autonomy in ways that would severely detract from the meaning of our lives, possibly even evacuate our lives of all meaning. Some philosophers, by contrast, have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is a God. God and the Meanings (...) of Life is interested in exploring the truth in both these schools of thought, seeking to discover what God could and couldn't do to make life meaningful (as well as what he would and wouldn't do). Mawson espouses a version of the 'amalgam' or 'pluralism' thesis about the issue of life's meaning – in essence, that there are a number of different legitimate meanings of 'meaning' (and indeed 'life') in the question of life's meaning. According to Mawson, God, were he to exist, would help make life meaningful in some of these senses and hinder in some others. He argues that whilst there could be meaning in a Godless universe, there could be other sorts of meaning in a Godly one and that these would be deeper. (shrink)

Some lives are more meaningful than others. Some lives are more important than others. What is the relationship between meaning in life and importance? Because both can be described as relating to significance, the two are often conflated. But these are rather different concepts and the meaningful and the important can easily come apart. They do, however, interact in important ways. When importance also meets the conditions for meaningfulness, it amplifies it, and importance on a large (...) scale is a key, and perhaps the only, source of superlative meaningfulness. When contrasted with the quest for meaning, the desire for importance can seem shallow and egocentric. But the desire to make an important contribution reflects a legitimate existential concern. And, in their best form, both the desire for importance, and that for meaningfulness, similarly combine outward-looking and self-regarding aspects. (shrink)

What makes a life meaningful and how do we know when our lives have meaning? This paper provides an answer to these questions drawing on the experience of grief. Grief, I argue, is a unique kind of personally and epistemically transformative experience. The experience of grief provides a subject with new insight into what-it-is-like to experience a transformative loss. But not only does one learn what-it-is-like to be personally transformed by loss in the way that one is, in (...) the dynamic process of grieving one often gains retrospective access to facts about the meaningfulness and value that even the most seemingly mundane aspects of their day-to-day lives have had all along. These are facts that can go underappreciated and even unrecognized until the source of that meaning is lost. I propose an explanation for why these facts aren’t more easily known through a simple process like introspection or reflection, and instead require an experience as disorienting as loss. I end by discussing what the epistemic account suggests about a theory of life’s meaningfulness. (shrink)

IntroductionThe Managing Cancer and Living Meaningfully therapy for patients with advanced cancer was tested against a supportive psycho-oncological counseling intervention in a randomized controlled trial. We investigated whether CALM was delivered as intended ; whether CALM therapists with less experience in psycho-oncological care show higher adherence scores; and whether potential overlapping treatment elements between CALM and SPI can be identified.MethodsTwo trained and blinded raters assessed on 19 items four subscales of the Treatment Integrity Scale covering treatment domains of CALM. A (...) random sample of 150 audio recordings were rated on a three-point Likert scale with 1 = “adherent to some extent,” 2 = “adherent to a sufficient extent,” 3 = “very adherent.”ResultsAll 19 treatment elements were applied, but in various frequencies. CALM therapists most frequently explored symptoms and/or relationship to health care providers and allowed expression of sadness and anxiety about the progression of disease. The exploration of CALM treatment element SC_1 was most frequently implemented in a satisfactory or excellent manner, whereas the treatment element SMP_4: Therapist promotes acknowledgment that some life goals may no longer be achievable was not implemented in a satisfactory manner. In terms of treatment differentiation, no treatment elements could be identified which were applied significantly more often by CALM therapists than by SPI therapists.ConclusionResults verify the application of CALM treatment domains. However, CALM therapists’ adherence scores indicated manual deviations. Furthermore, raters were not able to significantly distinguish CALM from SPI, implying that overlapping treatment elements were delivered to patients. (shrink)

There can be no such thing as the meaningful life, but only a meaningful life for a particular life as it is lived. Thus, there are meaningful lives, which are lives that make sense and are sufficiently aligned, these two characteristics being honed successively by the limits of a particular contingent form of life, a particular individual of that form of life, and a particular time in the life of that individual. Only the form of (...) a meaningful life may be given, which is sense and alignment, whereas its content may only be determined by the individual whose life it is. (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only (...) if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals. (shrink)

A number of paradigms have been proposed to understand the sources of meaningful work, but a non-Western approach has attracted little attention. Because some authors have argued that meaningful work has positive valence that has eudaimonic rather than hedonic content, a virtue-ethics approach to meaningful work has been used. Virtue ethicists acknowledge that our work and places of employment have a profound influence in shaping our character and living a fulfilled life. This study aims to make a (...) theoretical contribution toward an understanding of meaningful work from a virtue-ethics framework that is culturally meaningful and ethically relevant to Filipino realities and their distinct national heritage. It develops a conceptual model for a Filipino view of meaningful work that could guide both researchers and practitioners in business ethics by explaining what makes work meaningful, justifying why this is important, and presenting some examples of concrete measures that management can utilize to promote meaningful work in the Philippine workplace. By integrating Filipino virtues in conceptualizing meaningful work, I believe that a theoretical advancement is made toward a pluralistic and multicultural understanding of the concept, especially through the lens of virtue-ethics. (shrink)

This article aims to offer a refined way of understanding what we mean by the concepts of meaningfulness and meaning in life. The first step is to separate worthwhileness, as the broadest evaluation of life taking all types of values into account, from meaningfulness, which is seen as one type of intrinsic value along with, for example, well-being, moral praiseworthiness, and authenticity, which I argue are also separate types of intrinsic value. After discussing why we should not settle with the (...) currently popular fitting attitudes analysis of meaningfulness, I argue that the meaningfulness of a life should be seen to be about the positive contribution beyond itself that this particular life is able to make. I show how this analysis is different from previous similar accounts and how it is able to avoid a number of challenges that have troubled these previous accounts, such as the pleasure machine challenge, the results machine challenge, and the doing good unintentionally challenge. I also demonstrate how it is able to account for prototypical examples of meaningful and meaningless lives and how it is compatible with subjectivism, supernaturalism, and objective naturalism, which is seen as a merit. Finally, I conclude with some notes about what could make life meaningful, given the current analysis of meaningfulness itself. (shrink)

It is only in the last few decades that analytic philosophers in particular have begun to pay any serious attention to the topic of life’s meaning. Such philosophers, however, do not usually attempt to answer or analyse the traditional question ‘What is the meaning of life?’, but rather the subtly different question ‘What makes a life meaningful?’ and it is generally assumed that the latter can be discussed independently of the former. Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the two (...) questions are indeed connected, and that identifying and expanding upon the most plausible analysis of the former will provide the resources necessary to determine the most plausible answer to the latter. Specifically, this paper will argue that the traditional question is simply a request for the information which constitutes a coherent answer to one or more of a certain set of questions regarding human existence that were salient to the asker. In simpler language, the meaning of life itself is the information a person needs to make sense of it. This analysis can then also be applied to individual lives, such that asking for the meaning of X’s life is an analogous request for the information necessary to make sense of that life in particular. Running with this concept of the ‘meaning’ of something as its ‘sense’, the paper then outlines an accompanying theory of ‘meaningfulness’ as ‘sensefulness’: a measure of the richness of certain aspects of the life, multiplied by their intelligibility. (shrink)

Meaningful work refers to the idea that human work is an integral part of the way we think of our lives as going well. The concept is prevalent in sociology and business studies. In philosophy, its discussion tends to revolve around matters of justice and whether the State should take steps to eradicate meaningless work. However, despite the breadth of the recent, general literature, there is little to no discussion about how it is in fact the case that (...) work is meaningful. There is a basic assumption that certain facts about work make it meaningful. After noting the shortcomings in the literature, this essay argues that we can better understand the production of meaning in work by an analogy to speech acts. Using Paul Ricoeur’s theory of action as discourse, one can see how meaning is predicated in the performance of work in ways that are locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. (shrink)

The question I seek to answer is what the relationship is between judgments of people’s lives as meaningful, on the one hand, and as worth living, on the other. Several in the analytic and Continental literature, including the likes of Albert Camus and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and more recently, Robert Solomon and Julian Baggini, have maintained that the two words mean the same thing, in that they have the same referents or even the same sense. My primary aim is (...) to refute such a position, and instead to provide conclusive reason to believe that, while a meaningful life shares many properties with a worthwhile one, they are not one and the same thing. Differentiating the meaningful from the worthwhile is essential for making accurate and complete appraisals of the value of people’s lives; they are distinct aspects of a good life, with both being necessary for the best one. (shrink)