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Sartre pädagogisch lesen, dies ist bislang versäumt worden. Zu entdecken ist in seinem Denken eine deutliche Nähe zum Bildungsbegriff des frühen Nietzsche und damit auch eine Akzentuierung der Selbstverantwortlichkeit des Subjekts gegenüber allen situativen Einschränkungen seiner Freiheit. In Zeiten einer drohenden Selbstabdankung des Subjekts ist die Anknüpfung an Sartres Verständnis der Authentizität hilfreich für das Bemühen um die Neuformulierung eines tragfähigen Bildungsbegriffs. Die Sportpädagogik gewinnt über Sartres Analysen des Körpers eine bis heute unerschlossene phänomenologische Perspektive auf ihre anthropologischen Grundlagen.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

Stressing the importance of understanding the grounds and the consequences of ethical or normative decision making, this collection of classic essays compiled by Pierce and VanDeVeer, examines disputes surrounding animals, ecosystems, the land, and their own proper place in the ongoing network of lives on this planet. A central question is "how can we live lives that are both personally satisfying but which are also ecologically sound and responsible?".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading Paradise Regained EthicallyRobert B. PierceMuch modern criticism follows a long tradition by attending to the presumed effect of literature on our personal and political lives. Feminists, cultural materialists, new historicists, and postcolonialists frequently remind us that texts are "not innocent," and such analysts seek to make explicit the values and judgments that literary texts encourage in their readers. Whether in the vein of unmasking or of celebrating, we (...) critics often attribute great ethical and political significance to the works we study, but we are inclined to be vague about the mechanisms by which these effects occur. Given that I share this presumption that the texts we love to study matter to our lives, I would like to look more closely at how the process occurs, taking Milton's Paradise Regained as a test case.Does our reading of literary texts affect us ethically, and should it?1 An ancient and powerful critical tradition has taken for granted that the answer to both questions is yes. At the very least, good literature read properly is seen as one among the shaping forces of our education. But, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the theoretical movement to separate esthetics from ethics rendered this assumption problematic. Perhaps the beautiful is a value quite separate from the good. Later the literary school of estheticism brashly proclaimed the triumph of beauty over goodness under the banner of art for art's sake, [End Page 208] and Auden more modestly noted in "In Memory of W. B. Yeats" that "poetry makes nothing happen,"2 presumably including in the denial the moral betterment of its readers. The idea that literature is good for us has been almost embarrassing for the past century or so. On the other hand, many feminists and cultural critics have recently argued in effect that literature is often bad for us, that it is implicated in the ethical and political life of the time when it is produced and also in the time when it is received or consumed, so that it may tend to reinforce the ideology of one period or the other. In their assumption that literature is ethically significant they agree with most ordinary people and with the cultural right, especially in concern about its influence.What does this recent set of contentions entail? The term "implicated" that is characteristically used in such analysis claims at a minimum that the literary text in question has been shaped in production, consumption, or both by larger cultural forces, shaped in such a way as to incorporate certain values. Most such analyses go further to assert or suggest that the text under study helps to reinforce those values in the original audience or in later consumers (sometimes by attacking opposed values).3 The characteristic rhetorical stance in such readings is an implied warning to the reader against the insidious effect of the text lest it instill some fallacious, unethical, or politically harmful attitude or idea. Often the reader is rhetorically invited to share a position of intellectual superiority along with the critic, both of them above the corruption that afflicts an unspecified gullible audience. Thus many modern critics identify a romanticizing of war and the military hero in Shakespeare's Henry V, though they differ among themselves in that some locate both poison and cure in the text itself (suggesting, for example, that Shakespeare subverts the official ideology that he portrays), while some offer a "reading against the text," a cure administered by the critic against the wholly poisonous work.Such critics frequently manifest a reasonable caution about their own ethical and political stance. In an age of widespread pluralism and cultural relativism, we have learned to suspect self-confident proclamations of the ethical and political truth by critics as well as by literary authors, and in particular we are suspicious of official codes of conduct, including our own. Also we are (often at least) less confident than our forebears in purporting to state the meaning of a text. We have learned to heed the ambiguities and self-undermining elements in texts that complicate the capacity of any simple critical statement to reflect adequately what the text means. We no... (shrink)

This paper offers a qualified defence of physician non-compliance with antiabortion legislation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The paper examines two ethically troubling trends of post-Dobbs legislation: narrow and vague maternal health exemption clauses and mandatory reporting of miscarriages in jurisdictions where patients may criminal prosecution for medically induced abortions. It then examines and defends a professional obligation on the part of physicians to comply with the law. This obligation, however, (...) is defeasible. The paper then argues that physicians’ obligations to comply with the law is defeated when the law is illegitimate and following the law would constitute bad medical practice. Finally, it argues that the ethically troubling trends in post-Dobbs antiabortion legislation may meet these criteria. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 151-163 [Access article in PDF] Defining "Poetry" Robert B. Pierce SINCE TERMS ARE THE TOOLS of literary study, it is important to keep these tools in good condition, above all by having clear and functional meanings for them. Notoriously, many critical arguments about texts are in fact differences about terminology, and many confused arguments are built on vague or arbitrarily used terms. Few (...) have been the subject of more critical worrying and infighting than "poetry," 1 and few are more disparately defined. Definitions that are fuzzy or tendentious confuse many a discussion of poetry, and in particular they often narrow our response to the rich variety of the texts in front of us by silently imposing a view of what poetry ought to be. I would like to suggest that a Wittgensteinian approach to meaning can cut through a lot of the difficulty that surrounds the term. The refined understanding of the term "poetry" will result in a certain demystification, but it will dissipate only a false mystery based on confusion, not the real mystery of depth and richness that poetry can offer.What does it mean to approach this issue as a Wittgensteinian? The main principle is that the meaning of a term is its use, the way people deploy it in their speaking and writing, the work that it does. 2 A word does not have an essential core of meaning of which the various social uses are approximations; rather those social uses are the meaning. Thus meaning is a social phenomenon, and the way to determine it is to [End Page 151] look outward at how people use a term, not inward for some presumed mental essence that the term designates. Meaning is conventionally divided into reference and sense. What the term "poetry" refers to is a group of publicly visible things in the social world that we call poems, but there is no distillation in the mind that is the essence of poetry, the sense of the term. Of course we have a sense of the term that controls its range of reference. That sense is made up of our bases for calling one thing poetry and not another: the qualities that incline us to see a text as a poem. Wittgenstein would call these defining qualities criteria. The crucial fact is that they are determined by social processes and so are available to public inspection, not hidden away to be discovered only by introspection.Another observation about what it is to assign meaning to a term is important here. If someone asserts that "poetry" means X, he or she can appropriately be asserting that in fact the offered definition describes how people use the term, or else he or she can be suggesting how the term should or will be used in a specific discourse, that is, offering a definition proposal or stipulative definition. In the latter case the proposer needs to show the utility of the change from ordinary speech for his or her purposes. That is of course what literary critics do when they specify meanings for a term like "tragedy" or "irony" that are different from common usage. It is not that Wayne Booth's way of talking about irony uses the real meaning (both his and the ordinary senses are perfectly real since both are socially used), but that his is more useful for literary criticism than the general usage because it is more precise and nuanced. 3Thus it would make sense to begin defining "poetry" by looking at how people use the term and in particular how it is used in literary discourse. However, though I will pay some attention to what critics actually say and write, I would like primarily to offer certain proposals for refining our use of the term so as to avoid confusion and vagueness. It is not that this investigation will be approaching the real meaning of "poetry," which I have suggested is an imaginary goal, but that it will propose a use of the term constituting a vehicle for talking and writing about poetry that... (shrink)

We consider the influence that John Forrester’s work has had on thinking in, with, and from cases in multiple disciplines. Forrester’s essay ‘If p, Then What? Thinking in Cases’ was published in History of the Human Sciences in 1996 and transformed understandings of what a case was, and how case-based thinking worked in numerous human sciences. Forrester’s collection of essays Thinking in Cases was published posthumously, after his untimely death in 2015, and is the inspiration for the special issue we (...) introduce. This comprises new research from authors working in and across the history of science and medicine, gender and sexuality studies, philosophy of science, semiotics, film studies, literary studies and comparative literature, psychoanalytic studies, medical humanities, and sociology. This research addresses what it means to reason in cases in particular temporal, spatial, or genre-focused contexts; introduces new figures into lineages of case-based reasoning; emphasizes the unfinished and unfinishable character of some case reading and autobiographical accounts; and shows the frequency with which certain kinds of reasoning attempted with cases fail. The special issue opens up new directions for thinking and working with cases and case-based reasoning in the humanities and human sciences. (shrink)

William Wordsworth's Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood is a meditation on the possibilities and limitations of consciousness vis-à-vis the natural world. The child's glow of delighted fascination grays into adult worries, venalities, and fear of death. But the lingering “embers” of our childhood bond with nature can still guide and sustain us.

The critique to which Blumenthal-Barby et al. (2022), respond—that philosophy has little left to do in bioethics—reflects a common assumption that normative theorizing first generates general moral...

In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the (...) liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism. (shrink)

Ecological feminism (or ecofeminism) and feminist bioethics seem to have much in common. They share certain methodological and epistemological concerns, offer similar challenges to traditional philosophy, and take up a number of the same practical issues. The two disciplines have thus far had little or no direct interaction; this is one attempt to begin some conversation and perhaps stimulate some cross-pollination of ideas. The email dialogue engaged an active ecofeminist scholar, Karen Warren, and an active feminist bioethicist, Hilde Nelson, in (...) an exchange of ideas. Jessica Pierce, whose research cuts between environmental philosophy and bioethics, served as moderator. (shrink)

This study examined the impact of perceived ethical culture of the firm and selected demographic variables on auditors' ethical evaluation of, and intention to engage in, various time pressure-induced dysfunctional behaviours. Four audit cases and questionnaires were distributed to experienced pre-manager level auditors in Ireland and the U. S. The findings revealed that while perceived unethical pressure to engage in dysfunctional behaviours and unethical tone at the top were significant in forming an ethical evaluation, only perceived unethical pressure had an (...) impact on intention to engage in the behaviours. Country was also found to have a significant impact, with U. S. respondents reporting higher ethical evaluations and lower intentions to engage in unethical acts than Irish respondents. Implications of the findings and areas for future research are discussed. (shrink)

This study examined the impact of perceived ethical culture of the firm and selected demographic variables on auditors’ ethical evaluation of, and intention to engage in, various time pressure-induced dysfunctional behaviours. Four audit cases and questionnaires were distributed to experienced pre-manager level auditors in Ireland and the U.S. The findings revealed that while perceived unethical pressure to engage in dysfunctional behaviours and unethical tone at the top were significant in forming an ethical evaluation, only perceived unethical pressure had an impact (...) on intention to engage in the behaviours. Country was also found to have a significant impact, with U.S. respondents reporting higher ethical evaluations and lower intentions to engage in unethical acts than Irish respondents. Implications of the findings and areas for future research are discussed. (shrink)