O avanço tecnológico envolve e faz parte do cotidiano de todas as pessoas, e a sua influência pode ser direta ou indireta. O que se faz são up-grades com o propósito de conseguir participar deste universo digital. As Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tem provocado alterações na humanidade, no modo de viver, de se relacionar, aprender, pensar e ensinar. Propõe-se um estudo bibliográfico, baseado em duas grandes obras de Pierre Lévy, um dos grandes pensadores da era da informação: O (...) que é virtual? (2011) e Cibercultura (2010). O artigo está estruturado do seguinte modo: discute a definição de virtual segundo o ponto de vista de Lévy; apresenta a inteligência coletiva e sua influência na sociedade; e enfoca uma nova proposta de aprendizagem, que possibilita o aprendizado por intermédio das atividades sociais e profissionais dos indivíduos. Portanto, a virtualização, além de ser a base de dados e informações, quebra as barreiras do tempo e do espaço, aproxima professores e alunos e lhes fornece ferramentas para a construção do conhecimento, colocando-os nesse produtivo processo de ensino e aprendizagem. (shrink)

O presente manifesto pretende apresentar à comunidade cientifica da PUCRS uma visão geral sobre as Ciências Cognitivas e a importância destas dentro das ciências atuais. Aborda brevemente o histórico das Ciências Cognitivas, especificando os diversos campos do conhecimento abrangidos pelo paradigma ou por suas metodologias e técnicas.

Scholars point out contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy. An example would be his po itions on science, object of praise and criticism. If so, Nietzsche would make contradictory remarks about a domain that, on principle, seeks to rid itself of contradictions. From the perspective of Nietzschean philosophy, would attributing contradiction to it mean an objection? Would Nietzsche’s praise and criticism of science be incompatible? After trying to answer these questions, we will aim to show that the philosopher’s considerations on science reveal (...) a way of proceeding that he not only claims for himself but also prescribes to scientific thought: the art of nuance. (shrink)

O presente artigo discute alguns conceitos de linguagem de programação, buscando abrir uma discussão ontológica sobre os seres técnicos. Partindo de uma breve análise histórica e de conceitos da filosofia do séc. XX, problematiza-se as noções de abstrato e concreto dessas entidades, fazendo uma análise do dualismo hardware-software a partir da concepção hegemônica do hilemorfismo aristotélico e usando de exemplos de linguagem computacional para discutir uma certa ontologia desses seres. Fundamenta-se em Gilbert Simondon uma hipótese segundo a qual o computador (...) pessoal de uso geral seria a máquina concreta por excelência com potencial de ampliação das capacidades humanas através de um crescente desenvolvimento tecnológico e da lei de mudança de uso, em direção a uma espécie de transhumanismo. Por fim, discute-se também as possibilidades do computador como instrumento supra-paradigmático pós-kuhniano. (shrink)

Não apenas uma vez Nietzsche escreve que o mundo, junto com tudo que nele há, é tão somente vontade de poder. Por meio dessa teoria ele pensa os diversos níveis da existência, indo desde elementos ínfimos e simples até estruturas complexas, com elevado grau de refinamento. Tudo não passa, segundo esse filósofo, do desenrolar de forças em jogo agonístico por um algo a mais de poder. Neste artigo nós analisamos alguns aspectos da teoria da vontade de poder para mostrar como (...) Nietzsche faz uso de um mesmo arranjo conceitual para qualificar toda a existência. Assim, tanto o microscópico quanto o macroscópico, tanto o orgânico quanto o inorgânico, são tomados como exemplos de entes que, não obstante suas diferenças, são todos vontades de poder. (shrink)

There is not, of course, a one-to-one relation between policy conclusions and the conclusions of positive economics; if there were, there would be no ...

The Bernays-Müller debate was a dispute in the early 1920s between Paul Bernays and Aloys Müller regarding various philosophical issues related to “Hilbert’s program.” The debate is sometimes mentioned as a sidenote in discussions of Hilbert’s program, but there is little or no discussion of the debate itself in the secondary literature. This article aims to fill this gap and to provide a detailed analysis of the background of the debate, its contents, and the impact on its protagonists.

Integrating personality, behavioral, and cognitive theories of change, the author examines the operations, measurement, and evolution of behavioral and ethical standards that distinguish capitalism from other ideologies.

This article reviews evidence suggesting that the cause of approach and avoidance behavior lies not so much in the presence (i.e., the stimulus) but, rather, in the behavior’s anticipated future consequences (i.e., the goal): Approach is motivated by the goal to produce a desired consequence or end-state, while avoidance is motivated by the goal to prevent an undesired consequence or end-state. However, even though approach and avoidance are controlled by goals rather than stimuli, affective stimuli can influence action control by (...) priming associated goals. An integrative ideomotor model of approach and avoidance is presented and discussed. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

Four experiments demonstrate category congruency priming by subliminal prime words that were never seen as targets in a valence-classification task and a gender-classification task . In Experiment 1, overlap in terms of word fragments of one or more letters between primes and targets of different valences was larger than between primes and targets of the same valence. In Experiments 2 and 3, the sets of prime words and target words were completely disjoint in terms of used letters. In Experiment 4, (...) pictures served as targets. The observed subliminal priming effects for novel primes cannot be driven by partial analysis of primes at the word-fragment level; they suggest instead that primes were processed semantically as whole words contingent upon prime duration. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo tem por intenção mostrar que o conceito de angústia da psicanálise de Freud consegue avançar apenas na investigação de uma angústia do ser, ou seja, trata da angústia do homem enquanto um ente do mundo. Em contrapartida, procuraremos mostrar que o estudo das angústias impensáveis por parte de Winnicott se preocupa com a questão de como o homem chega a ser um ente no mundo. O resultado da distinção paradigmática entre as duas teorias psicanalíticas para a angústia (...) pode ser iluminada quando se toma como apoio a fenomenologia existencial de Martin Heidegger. Palavras-chaves: Angústia, castração, fenomenologia existencial, Winnicott: This article is intended to show that the concept of anxiety by Freud's psychoanalysis can only be developed in the investigation of an anxiety of being, i.e., it deals with the anxiety of man as a being in the world. In contrast, we aim to demonstrate that the study of unthinkable anxiety by Winnicott is concerned with the question of how man comes to be a being in the world. The result of the pragmatic distinction between the two psychoanalytic theories of anxiety may be elucidated by taking Martin Heidegger's existential phenomenology as a support. Keywords: Anxiety, castration, existential phenomenology, Winnicott. (shrink)

Intensely discussed in the philosophy of science in the 20th and 21st centuries, the themes of realism and anti-realism pervade Feyerabend’s work. However, discerning the author’s position on these subjects poses a problem for scholars. One sign of this is that they attribute to Feyerabend the adherence to (or the rejection of) different conceptions of realism and anti-realism. Despite the divergences, however, scholars approach the topic in a similar way, detecting elements of Feyerabend’s realist and anti-realist positions that are incompatible (...) with each other and that follow one another in the course of his work. Although such studies are of great value, we propose to explore another approach, which also seems pertinent. Examining Feyerabend’s writings, we seek to discern conditions that make it possible for the author to assume, without contradiction, realist and anti-realist positions. Finally, we seek to infer from Feyerabend’s conception of science features of the realism prescribed by the author as well as features of the realism proscribed by him. (shrink)

Trata-se de apontar neste artigo que em Heidegger há dois caminhos diferentes para se investigar a questão do niilismo, que não são necessariamente excludentes, mas que por se localizarem em pontos diferentes em relação à sua virada (Kehre) de pensamento, acaba sempre gerando o questionamento de se estamos frente ao mesmo projeto ou não. Procuraremos demarcar a discussão e mostrar que seja tomada como uma empreitada de longo prazo ou não, o niilismo enquanto relacionado ao nada, na visão dos filósofos (...) da Escola de Kyoto, em especial Nishitani, não pode ser superado. Por consequência, passamos a investigação da proposta de superação do niilismo e buscamos os antecessores de sua discussão sobre a Vacuidade em Nagarjuna. (shrink)

Over the past decades, Patricia Blanchette has developed a sophisticated account of Frege's conception of logic and his views on logical consequence. One of the central components of her interpretation is the idea that Frege's conception of logical consequence is ‘semantically laden’ and not purely formal. The aim of the present paper is to provide precise explications of this as well as related ideas that inform her account, and to discuss their significance for the philosophy of logic in general and (...) Frege's philosophy in particular. (shrink)

Societies change; and sociology has, since its inception, described and evaluated these changes. This article proposes a revised theory of collective learning processes, a conceptual framework which addresses ways in which people make sense of and cope with change. Drawing on Habermas’ classic proposal, but shifting the focus from argumentation towards storytelling, it explains how certain articulations allow for collective learning processes (imagining more inclusive orders), while others block learning processes (imagining more exclusive orders). More specifically, the article points to (...) narrative genres (romance, tragedy, comedy and irony) which organize feelings and shape the social bond, proposing that ironic and tragic stories have the potential to trigger collective learning processes, while romantic and comic stories tend to block them. (shrink)

The symmetries between points and lines in planar projective geometry and between points and planes in solid projective geometry are striking features of these geometries that were extensively discussed during the nineteenth century under the labels “duality” or “reciprocity.” The aims of this article are, first, to provide a systematic analysis of duality from a modern point of view, and, second, based on this, to give a historical overview of how discussions about duality evolved during the nineteenth century. Specifically, we (...) want to see in which ways geometers’ preoccupation with duality was shaped by developments that lead to modern logic towards the end of the nineteenth century, and how these developments in turn might have been influenced by reflections on duality. (shrink)

This volume provides the first complete edition of the third and final surviving draft of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, dating from 1685, four years before the publication of the Essay itself (December 1689). There is a General Introduction that gives a detailed account of the content and circumstances of composition of this draft, and a Textual Introduction that provides a full description of the manuscript and its0history.

The public sphere is the site where the collective will of the people is formed. The thesis is that to the extent that the people are constructed as entities that pre-exist their collective will, the public sphere contributes to fostering the evil among a people and between the people. This is discussed using the cases of nationalism, sovereigntism and populism. The narrative of Pandora’s box provides the analytical leverage for retelling the theory of the public sphere. The story is that (...) after the evils escaped Pandora’s box, hope remained. This leads to two propositions: hope as preventing the closing off of the future of a people and hope as fostering collective learning processes that rectify the evils. These propositions provide the ground for a critical theory of the public sphere in which the force of the better argument is insufficient to explain the capability of a people to rectify the bad. It is a theory in which social relations matter that turn individuals into a people beyond national, statist or populist containers, making a people that is open to define and redefine itself in collective learning processes. (shrink)

Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution (`change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued (...) that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. (shrink)

This article argues for a robust notion of collective identity which is not reduced to a psychological conception of identity. In the first part, the debate on the concept of identity raised by several authors is taken up critically with the intention of defending a strong sociological conception of identity which by definition is a collective identity. The basic assumption is that collective identities are narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors. This theory (...) is then applied to the case of Europe, showing how identity markers are used to control the boundaries of a common space of communication. These markers are bound to stories which those within such a space of communication share. Stories that hold in their narrative structures social relations provide projects of control. National identities are based on strong and exclusive stories. Europeanization (among other parallel processes at the global level) opens this space of boundary constructions and offers opportunities for national as well as sub-national as well as transnational stories competing with each other to shape European identity projects. The EU — this is the hypothesis — provides a case in which different sites offer competing opportunities to continue old stories, to start new stories or to import old stories from other sites, thus creating a narrative network on top of the network of social relations that bind the people in Europe together. European identity is therefore to be conceived as a narrative network embedded in an emerging network of social relations among the people living in Europe. (shrink)

I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total (...) evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, I argue that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support. (shrink)

A pragmatic (communication-discursive) cognitive sociology beyond observationism (Luhmann, Turner, Conein) and individualistic reductionism (Esser, Boudon) as a way to do sociology as a critical theory and as a positive science is proposed, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action and its radical continuation in Luhmann's concept of the (cognitive) autopoiesis of social systems.

Influential theories on affect and emotion propose a fundamental differentiation between emotion and cognition, and research paradigms designed to test them focus on differences rather than similarities between affective and cognitive processes. This research orientation is increasingly challenged by the widespread and successful use of cognitive research paradigms in the study of affect and emotion—a challenge with far-reaching implications. Where and on what basis should theorists draw the line between cognition and emotion, and when is it useful to do so? (...) Should researchers build more global, integrative models of cognition and emotion, or should they rely on local, content-specific models that draw attention to a differentiation between affective and cognitive processes? This special issue compiles different viewpoints on fundamental issues in the relationship between affect and cognition. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)