A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. -/- It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My position thus amounts to an (...) instrumentalist position about theories of epistemic rationality. Since there are different purposes, or goals, for which theories of rationality are proposed, the method of explication leaves room for different characterizations of rationality. I focus on two such (kinds of) purposes: first, the purpose of guiding the formation (or maintenance) of doxastic states and, second, the purpose of assessing (the formation or maintenance of) doxastic states. I conclude by outlining a pluralistic picture concerning rationality. (shrink)

Four- Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four- dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four- dimensionalism include novel arguments based (...) on time travel, the debate between spacetime substantivalists and relationalists, and vagueness. Also included is a comprehensive discussion of the paradoxes of coinciding material objects, and a novel resolution of those paradoxes based on temporal counterpart theory. In conclusion Sider replies to prominent objections to four- dimensionalism, including discussion of the problem of the rotating homogenous disk. (shrink)

Logic begins but does not end with the study of truth and falsity. Within truth there are the modes of truth, ways of being true: necessary truth and contingent truth. When a proposition is true, we may ask whether it could have been false. If so, then it is contingently true. If not, then it is necessarily true; it must be true; it could not have been false. Falsity has modes as well: a false proposition that could not have been (...) true is impossible or necessarily false; one that could have been true is merely contingently false. The proposition that some humans are over seven feet tall is contingently true; the proposition that all humans over seven feet tall are over six feet tall is necessarily true; the proposition that some humans are over seven feet tall and under six feet tall is impossible, and the proposition that some humans are over nine feet tall is contingently false. Of these four modes of truth, let us focus on necessity, plus a fifth: possibility. A proposition is possible if it is or could have been true; hence propositions that are either necessarily true, contingently true, or contingently false are possible. Notions that are similar to the modes of truth in being concerned with what might have been are called modal. Dispositions are modal notions, for example the disposition of fragility. Relatedly, there are counterfactual conditionals, for example “if this glass were dropped, it would break.” And the notion of supervenience is modal.1 But let us focus here on necessity and possibility. Modal words are notoriously ambiguous (or at least context-sensitive2). I may reply to an invitation to give a talk in England by saying “I can’t come; I have to give a talk in California the day before”. This use of “can’t” is perfectly appropriate. But it would be equally appropriate for me to say that I could cancel my talk in California (although that would be rude) and give the talk in England instead. What I cannot do is give both talks.. (shrink)

Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless – a position I term social objectivism. This essay begins by making explicit the (...) motivations for, and central assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the account is consistent with a post-positivist understanding of the classificatory practices employed within the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

RESUMO: Partindo de avaliações retrospectivas de Horkheimer sobre seu percurso intelectual, procuramos mostrar que tanto Schopenhauer quanto Marx constituem uma influência permanente na obra do fundador da teoria crítica: com efeito, a maior evidência de um dos dois autores em certo momento da trajetória de Horkheimer não implica o desaparecimento do outro, mas antes o pressupõe como fundamento, ainda que latente. É que, embora estabeleça uma interlocução com cada um deles considerado isoladamente, o determinante, a nosso ver, é a leitura (...) conjugada que Horkheimer realiza de ambos: por incompatíveis que pareçam, as esperanças de racionalização e emancipação sociais inspiradas em Marx e o pessimismo de Schopenhauer relacionam-se intrinsecamente, donde resultam um materialismo necessariamente pessimista e um pessimismo necessariamente materialista. Pretendemos evidenciar, porém, que, em virtude do modo pelo qual Horkheimer dialoga com a tradição filosófica, bem como em razão de mudanças de configuração histórica e, por conseguinte, teórica, a relação entre o pessimismo de Schopenhauer e o anseio emancipatório animado por Marx assume aspectos diversos e nuançados no decurso de sua obra. ABSTRACT: Starting from Horkheimer's retrospective evaluations on his intellectual trajectory, we try to show that both Schopenhauer and Marx are a permanent influence in his work: indeed, the major evidence of one of the two authors at one point in Horkheimer's trajectory does not imply the disappearance of the other one, but rather presupposes him as a basis, even though latent. For although Horkheimer dialogues with each of them separately, what is determining, in our view, is the combined reading that he performs of both: the social rationalization and the emancipation hopes inspired by Marx and the Schopenhauer's pessimism, even though they may seem incompatible, are intrinsically connected, so that there are a necessarily pessimistic materialism and a necessarily materialist pessimism. We intend to evidence, however, that because of the way Horkheimer dialogues with the philosophical tradition and because of the historical and therefore theoretical changes, the relationship between Schopenhauer's pessimism and the aspiration to emancipation inspired by Marx takes on different aspects and nuances in the course of his work. (shrink)

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.

Intensely discussed in the philosophy of science in the 20th and 21st centuries, the themes of realism and anti-realism pervade Feyerabend’s work. However, discerning the author’s position on these subjects poses a problem for scholars. One sign of this is that they attribute to Feyerabend the adherence to (or the rejection of) different conceptions of realism and anti-realism. Despite the divergences, however, scholars approach the topic in a similar way, detecting elements of Feyerabend’s realist and anti-realist positions that are incompatible (...) with each other and that follow one another in the course of his work. Although such studies are of great value, we propose to explore another approach, which also seems pertinent. Examining Feyerabend’s writings, we seek to discern conditions that make it possible for the author to assume, without contradiction, realist and anti-realist positions. Finally, we seek to infer from Feyerabend’s conception of science features of the realism prescribed by the author as well as features of the realism proscribed by him. (shrink)

The most important aesthetics of the century, this is a long-awaited work, the culmination of a lifetime's investigation.

This volume makes available in English for the first time Adorno’s lectures on metaphysics. It provides a unique introduction not only to metaphysics but also to Adorno’s own intellectual standpoint, as developed in his major work Negative Dialectics. Metaphysics for Adorno is defined by a central tension between concepts and immediate facts. Adorno traces this dualism back to Aristotle, whom he sees as the founder of metaphysics. In Aristotle it appears as an unresolved tension between form and matter. This basic (...) split, in Adorno’s interpretation, runs right through the history of metaphysics. Perhaps not surprisingly, Adorno finds this tension resolved in the Hegelian dialectic. Underlying this dualism is a further dichotomy, which Adorno sees as essential to metaphysics: while it dissolves belief in transcendental worlds by thought, at the same time it seeks to rescue belief in a reality beyond the empirical, again by thought. It is to this profound ambiguity, for Adorno, that the metaphysical tradition owes its greatness. The major part of these lectures, given by Adorno late in his life, is devoted to a critical exposition of Aristotle’s thought, focusing on its central ambiguities. In the last lectures, Adorno’s attention switches to the question of the relevance of metaphysics today, particularly after the Holocaust. He finds in metaphysical experiences, which transcend rational discourse without lapsing into irrationalism, a last precarious refuge of the humane truth to which his own thought always aspired. This volume will be essential reading for anyone interested in Adorno’s work and will be a valuable text for students and scholars of philosophy and social theory. (shrink)

Scholars point out contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy. An example would be his po itions on science, object of praise and criticism. If so, Nietzsche would make contradictory remarks about a domain that, on principle, seeks to rid itself of contradictions. From the perspective of Nietzschean philosophy, would attributing contradiction to it mean an objection? Would Nietzsche’s praise and criticism of science be incompatible? After trying to answer these questions, we will aim to show that the philosopher’s considerations on science reveal (...) a way of proceeding that he not only claims for himself but also prescribes to scientific thought: the art of nuance. (shrink)

Resumo: Partindo da análise de O Anticristo, investigamos a função que Nietzsche atribui à ciência, entendida como forma de inverdade, em relação a outras formas de inverdade, como o cristianismo. Primeiro, buscamos mostrar que, nesse escrito, o autor estabelece a incompatibilidade entre ciência e cristianismo atribuindo-lhes características específicas e inconciliáveis. Depois, evidenciamos que qualificativos como “falsa”, “errônea”, “fictícia” e “mentirosa”, aplicados em tom pejorativo à concepção religiosa de mundo em O Anticristo, determinam igualmente, em outros escritos, o conhecimento científico. Ora, (...) se as concepções de mundo cristã e científica têm características semelhantes, por que Nietzsche recorre à ciência para rejeitar o cristianismo?: Starting from the analysis of The Antichrist, we investigate the function that Nietzsche attributes to science, understood as a form of untruth, in relation to other forms of untruth, such as Christianity. First, we seek to show that, in this writing, the author establishes the incompatibility between science and Christianity by assigning them specific and irreconcilable characteristics. Then, we show that qualifications such as “false”, “erroneous”, “fictitious” and “lying”, applied in a derogatory way to the religious conception of the world in The Antichrist, also determine, in other writings, scientific knowledge. Now, if the Christian and scientific worldviews have similar characteristics, why does Nietzsche turn to science to reject Christianity? (shrink)

Resumo Estabelecida em Assim falava Zaratustra, a associação dos conceitos de vida, valor e vontade de potência se revela rica em consequências para o pensamento de Nietzsche. Nosso objetivo é investigar como essas noções operam na sintomatologia nietzschiana, procedimento que consiste em avaliar o valor dos valores, tomando-os como sinais de vida ascendente ou decadente. Esperamos mostrar que um modo de estimar valores só é considerado superior se traduz uma afirmação da concepção nietzschiana de vida ascendente. Por fim, contamos sustentar (...) que esse critério para avaliar o valor dos valores implica, ele mesmo, valores, o que o torna injusto.The association of notions of life, value and will to power established in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra reveals a great amount of consequences to the author’s philosophy. In this paper we propose to investigate how these concepts constitute a necessary condition for the Nietzschean symptomatology, which is a procedure that evaluates the value of the values, considering them as signs of an ascending or declining life. Furthermore, we attempt to demonstrate that the values may solely be regarded as superior and ascending if they translate an affirmation of the Nietzschean conception of ascending life. Finally, this study will support the idea that the criterion to evaluate the values itself implies other values, which renders it unjust. (shrink)

The Ukrainian translation of the work of the German neo-Marxist philosopher Theodor Adorno "Education after Auschwitz" is dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the liberation of prisoners of the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz. In this work, which Theodor Adorno read as a report on Hesse Radio on April 18, 1966, the previous theme of special importance – the cultivation of a new, anti-ideological education in post-totalitarian society as a means of humanistic educational influence on this society – was (...) continued. Adorno suggested that his listeners see as a humanistic need for a post-totalitarian society to spread in its cultural space through the education the each person's understanding of own guilt for the Auschwitz tragedy. According to the philosopher, in this way, it is possible to restore the civilization of the coexistence of man and society, and it will make it impossible to repeat the horrors of the Auschwitz concentration camp. Another factor that should prevent the return of Auschwitz crimes, Adorno called the presence of knowledge about the genesis of an authoritarian character, which is the socio-psychological cause of the suffering of innocent people. Having considered the socio-cultural and anthropological factors of the emergence of an authoritarian character, Adorno identified the undoubted psychological dependence of the bearers of a manipulative character on the authoritarian government. The origins of the authoritarian government German philosopher found in the current state of European culture as one that has lost the spiritual energy needed for its own transformation. In accordance with his basic philosophical and educational beliefs, Adorno postulated the new education as an anti-ideological enlightenment, as knowledge that educates primarily politically aware young citizens, as an effective means of preventing the return of authoritarian government and, consequently, the repetition of Auschwitz. (shrink)

Trata-se de apontar neste artigo que em Heidegger há dois caminhos diferentes para se investigar a questão do niilismo, que não são necessariamente excludentes, mas que por se localizarem em pontos diferentes em relação à sua virada (Kehre) de pensamento, acaba sempre gerando o questionamento de se estamos frente ao mesmo projeto ou não. Procuraremos demarcar a discussão e mostrar que seja tomada como uma empreitada de longo prazo ou não, o niilismo enquanto relacionado ao nada, na visão dos filósofos (...) da Escola de Kyoto, em especial Nishitani, não pode ser superado. Por consequência, passamos a investigação da proposta de superação do niilismo e buscamos os antecessores de sua discussão sobre a Vacuidade em Nagarjuna. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

These seventeen lectures given in 1963 focus largely on Kant, 'a thinker in whose work the question of morality is most sharply contrasted with other spheres of existence'. After discussing a number of the Kantian categories of moral philosophy, Adorno considers other, seemingly more immediate general problems, such as the nature of moral norms, the good life, and the relation of relativism and nihilism. In the course of the lectures, Adorno addresses a wide range of topics, including: theory and practice, (...) ethics as bad conscience, the repressive character, the problem of freedom, dialectics in Kant and Hegel, the nature of reason, the moral law as a given, psychoanalysis, the element of the Absurd, freedom and law, the Protestant tradition of morality, Hamlet, self-determination, phenomenology, the concept of the will, the idea of humanity, The Wild Duck, and Nietzsche's critique of morality. (shrink)

There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and (...) marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences. (shrink)

O avanço tecnológico envolve e faz parte do cotidiano de todas as pessoas, e a sua influência pode ser direta ou indireta. O que se faz são up-grades com o propósito de conseguir participar deste universo digital. As Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) tem provocado alterações na humanidade, no modo de viver, de se relacionar, aprender, pensar e ensinar. Propõe-se um estudo bibliográfico, baseado em duas grandes obras de Pierre Lévy, um dos grandes pensadores da era da informação: O (...) que é virtual? (2011) e Cibercultura (2010). O artigo está estruturado do seguinte modo: discute a definição de virtual segundo o ponto de vista de Lévy; apresenta a inteligência coletiva e sua influência na sociedade; e enfoca uma nova proposta de aprendizagem, que possibilita o aprendizado por intermédio das atividades sociais e profissionais dos indivíduos. Portanto, a virtualização, além de ser a base de dados e informações, quebra as barreiras do tempo e do espaço, aproxima professores e alunos e lhes fornece ferramentas para a construção do conhecimento, colocando-os nesse produtivo processo de ensino e aprendizagem. (shrink)

Não apenas uma vez Nietzsche escreve que o mundo, junto com tudo que nele há, é tão somente vontade de poder. Por meio dessa teoria ele pensa os diversos níveis da existência, indo desde elementos ínfimos e simples até estruturas complexas, com elevado grau de refinamento. Tudo não passa, segundo esse filósofo, do desenrolar de forças em jogo agonístico por um algo a mais de poder. Neste artigo nós analisamos alguns aspectos da teoria da vontade de poder para mostrar como (...) Nietzsche faz uso de um mesmo arranjo conceitual para qualificar toda a existência. Assim, tanto o microscópico quanto o macroscópico, tanto o orgânico quanto o inorgânico, são tomados como exemplos de entes que, não obstante suas diferenças, são todos vontades de poder. (shrink)

A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs.' Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis.

There is broad agreement among social researchers and social ontologists that the project of dividing humans into social kinds should be guided by at least two methodological commitments. First, a commitment to what best serves moral and political interests, and second, a commitment to describing accurately the causal structures of social reality. However, researchers have not sufficiently analyzed how these two commitments interact and constrain one another. In the absence of that analysis, several confusions have set in, threatening to undermine (...) shared goals for the responsible modeling of social kinds of humans. This essay first explains the source and substance of these confusions. Then, by distinguishing different value-laden investigative questions into the classification of social kinds of humans, it sets out specific relations of dependence and constraint between empirically-driven investigations and value-driven investigations into social kinds of humans. The result is a more detailed and fruitful framework for thinking about the classification of social kinds that respects both normative interests and mind-independent causal regularities. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo tem por intenção mostrar que o conceito de angústia da psicanálise de Freud consegue avançar apenas na investigação de uma angústia do ser, ou seja, trata da angústia do homem enquanto um ente do mundo. Em contrapartida, procuraremos mostrar que o estudo das angústias impensáveis por parte de Winnicott se preocupa com a questão de como o homem chega a ser um ente no mundo. O resultado da distinção paradigmática entre as duas teorias psicanalíticas para a angústia (...) pode ser iluminada quando se toma como apoio a fenomenologia existencial de Martin Heidegger. Palavras-chaves: Angústia, castração, fenomenologia existencial, Winnicott: This article is intended to show that the concept of anxiety by Freud's psychoanalysis can only be developed in the investigation of an anxiety of being, i.e., it deals with the anxiety of man as a being in the world. In contrast, we aim to demonstrate that the study of unthinkable anxiety by Winnicott is concerned with the question of how man comes to be a being in the world. The result of the pragmatic distinction between the two psychoanalytic theories of anxiety may be elucidated by taking Martin Heidegger's existential phenomenology as a support. Keywords: Anxiety, castration, existential phenomenology, Winnicott. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a moralidade para Freud está determinada por um aparelho psíquico que tem por função justamente reprimir a única coisa que no homem apontaria para uma liberdade de ação, a saber: o desejo. O problema é que se todos os homens decidissem realizar todos os seus desejos, não haveria, para Freud, a possibilidade da civilização. Não haveria espaço nas teorias psicanalíticas para se pensar uma moralidade não determinada filogeneticamente? Tentarei apresentar como contraponto uma possibilidade (...) de resposta a essa questão com a teoria psicanalítica de Winnicott. (shrink)

Pretende-se mostrar, a partir do pensamento de Keiji Nishitani, os pressupostos para a discussão sobre o “vazio-saber” e que passa pela questão do niilismo e da vacuidade em sua filosofia. O problema do niilismo em Nishitani, diferente da perspectiva adotada pelos filósofos ocidentais, não está ligada à ideia de que o Eu frente ao Nada perde seus fundamentos e sua existência, deixando de ter sentido. Pelo contrário, é no encontro com o Nada que o homem pode descobrir e entrar em (...) contato com sua verdadeira essência, uma vez que, é nesse encontro que sua existência se revela. Isso só seria possível caso o Eu realizasse um processo de auto abertura, um salto para dentro da Vacuidade, para que aí sua verdadeira face se revele e ele possa encontrar seu verdadeiro ser. Pretende-se desenvolver esses desdobramentos ao longo do artigo. (shrink)

In domains like stock brokerage, clinical psychiatry, and long‐term political forecasting, experts generally fail to outperform novices. Empirical researchers agree on why this is: experts must receive direct or environmental learning feedback during training to develop reliable expertise, and these domains are deficient in this type of feedback. A growing number of philosophers resource this consensus view to argue that, given the absence of direct or environmental philosophical feedback, we should not give the philosophical intuitions or theories of expert philosophers (...) greater credence than those of novice philosophers. This article has three objectives. The first is to explore several overlooked issues concerning the strategy of generalizing from empirical studies of non‐philosophical expertise to the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. The second is to explain why empirical research into a causal relationship between direct learning feedback and enhanced expert performance does not provide good grounds for abandoning a default optimism about the epistemic superiority of expert philosophical theories. The third is to sketch a positive characterization of learning feedback that addresses developmental concerns made salient by the empirical literature on expert performance for specifically theory‐driven or “armchair” domains like philosophy. (shrink)

The adaptation-by-binding account and the arousal-biased competition model suggest that emotional arousal increases binding effects for transient links between stimuli and responses. Two highly-powered, pre-registered experiments tested whether transient stimulus-response bindings are stronger for high versus low arousing stimuli. Emotional words were presented in a sequential prime-probe design in which stimulus relation, response relation, and stimulus arousal were orthogonally manipulated. In Experiment 1 (N = 101), words with high and low arousal levels were presented individually in prime and probe displays. (...) In Experiment 2 (N = 170), a high arousing affective word was presented simultaneously with a neutral word during the prime display; in the subsequent probe display, either the arousing or the neutral word repeated or a different high versus low arousal word was shown. Data from both experiments did not demonstrate a modulation of SRBR effects by stimulus arousal and SRBR effects were of equal magnitude for word stimuli of high and low arousal levels. These null results are not in line with binding accounts that hypothesise a modulatory influence of emotional arousal on perception-action binding. (shrink)

Adorno's efforts to salvage the contemporaneity of Hegel's thought form part of his response to the increasingly tight net of social control in the aftermath of ...

Experimental philosophy involves subjecting philosophical methods and judgments to empirical scrutiny. I begin by exploring conceptual, confirmational, and empirical factors that limit the significance of experiment-based and survey-based approaches to the evaluation of philosophical epistemic activities. I then consider specific criticisms of experimental philosophy: its experimental conditions lack ecological validity; it wrongly assumes that philosophers rely on psychologized data; it overlooks the reflective and social elements of philosophical case analysis; it misconstrues the importance of both procedural and evaluative forms of (...) philosophical expertise; it incorrectly views psychological bias as incompatible with reliability; and it generalizes to a global, self-defeating skepticism about case judgment. I explain why these criticisms should be understood as converging and interdependent. I also set out a three-level model of philosophical case judgment that frames the criticisms. (shrink)

Stephanie Morain and Emily Largent’s (2023) target article “Think Pragmatically: Investigators’ Obligations to Patient-Subjects When Research is Embedded in Care” identified a number of important c...

We call affective brainocentrism the tendency to privilege the brain over other parts of the organism when defining or explaining emotions. We distinguish two versions of this tendency. According to brain-sufficient, emotional states are entirely realized by brain processes. According to brain-master, emotional states are realized by both brain and bodily processes, but the latter are entirely driven by the brain: the brain is the master regulator of bodily processes. We argue that both these claims are problematic, and we draw (...) on physiological accounts of stress to make our main case. These accounts illustrate the existence of complex interactions between the brain and endocrine systems, the immune system, the enteric nervous system, and even gut microbiota. We argue that, because of these complex brain–body interactions, the brain cannot be isolated and identified as the basis of stress. We also mention recent evidence suggesting that complex brain–body interactions characterize the physiology of depression and anxiety. Finally, we call for an alternative dynamical, systemic, and embodied approach to the study of the physiology of emotions that does not privilege the brain, but rather aims at understanding how mutually regulating brain and bodily processes jointly realize a variety of emotional states. (shrink)

Modularity theorists have challenged that there are, or could be, general learning mechanisms that explain theory-of-mind development. In response, supporters of the ‘scientific theory-theory’ account of theory-of-mind development have appealed to children's use of auxiliary hypotheses and probabilistic causal modeling. This article argues that these general learning mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the modularist's challenge. The article then explores an alternative domain-general learning mechanism by proposing that children grasp the concept belief through the progressive alignment of relational structure that (...) occurs as a result of structural-comparison. The article also explores the implications of the proposed account for Fodor's puzzle of conceptual learning. (shrink)

One of the most eminent Heidegger scholars of our time, Theodore Kisiel has found worldwide critical acclaim, his particular strength being to set Heidegger's ...

A certain conception of Hell is inconsistent with God's traditional attributes. My argument is novel in focusing on considerations involving vagueness. God is in charge of the selection procedure, so the selection procedure must be just; any just procedure will have borderline cases; but according to the traditional conception, the afterlife is binary and has no borderline cases.

How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...) to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement. (shrink)

Allow me to preface my remarks today by saying that I am not going to give a lecture in the usual sense of communicating results or presenting a systematic statement. Rather, what I have to say will remain on the level of an essay; it is no more than an attempt to take up and further develop the problems of the so-called Frankfurt discussion. I recognize that many uncomplimentary things have been said about this discussion, but I am equally aware (...) that it approaches the problem correctly and that it would be wrong always to begin again at the beginning. (shrink)

The kinds of real or natural kinds that support explanation and prediction in the social sciences are difficult to identify and track because they change through time, intersect with one another, and they do not always exhibit their properties when one encounters them. As a result, conceptual practices directed at these kinds will often refer in ways that are partial, equivocal, or redundant. To improve this epistemic situation, it is important to employ open-ended classificatory concepts, to understand when different research (...) programs are tracking the same real kind, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to interact causally with real kinds to focus reference on those kinds. A tempting view of these non-idealized epistemic conditions should be avoided: that they signal an ontological structure of the social world so plentiful that it would permit ameliorated classificatory schemes to achieve their normative aims regardless of whether they defer to real-kind classificatory schemes. To ground these discussions, the essay appeals to an overlooked convergence in the systematic naturalistic frameworks of Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan. (shrink)