Metagenomics is a culture‐ and PCR‐independent approach that is now widely exploited for directly studying microbial evolution, microbial ecology, and developing biotechnologies. Observations and discoveries are critically dependent on DNA extraction methods, sequencing technologies, and bioinformatics tools. The potential pitfalls need to be understood and, to some degree, mastered if the resulting data are to survive scrutiny. In particular, methodological variations appear to affect results from different ecosystems differently, thus increasing the risk of biological and ecological misinterpretation. Part of the (...) difficulty is derived from the lack of knowledge concerning the true microbial diversity and because no approach can guarantee accessing microorganisms in the same proportion in which they exist in the environment. However, the variation between different approaches (e.g. DNA extraction techniques, sequence annotation systems) can be used to evaluate whether observations are meaningful. These methodological variations can be integrated into the error analysis before comparing microbial communities. (shrink)

Metagenomics is a culture‐ and PCR‐independent approach that is now widely exploited for directly studying microbial evolution, microbial ecology, and developing biotechnologies. Observations and discoveries are critically dependent on DNA extraction methods, sequencing technologies, and bioinformatics tools. The potential pitfalls need to be understood and, to some degree, mastered if the resulting data are to survive scrutiny. In particular, methodological variations appear to affect results from different ecosystems differently, thus increasing the risk of biological and ecological misinterpretation. Part of the (...) difficulty is derived from the lack of knowledge concerning the true microbial diversity and because no approach can guarantee accessing microorganisms in the same proportion in which they exist in the environment. However, the variation between different approaches (e.g. DNA extraction techniques, sequence annotation systems) can be used to evaluate whether observations are meaningful. These methodological variations can be integrated into the error analysis before comparing microbial communities. (shrink)

Since its origin, bioethics has attracted the collaboration of few social scientists, and social scientific methods of gathering empirical data have remained unfamiliar to ethicists. Recently, however, the clouded relations between the empirical and normative perspectives on bioethics appear to be changing. Three reasons explain why there was no easy and consistent input of empirical evidence into bioethics. Firstly, interdisciplinary dialogue runs the risk of communication problems and divergent objectives. Secondly, the social sciences were absent partners since the beginning of (...) bioethics. Thirdly, the meta‐ethical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ created a ‘natural’ border between the disciplines. Now, bioethics tends to accommodate more empirical research. Three hypotheses explain this emergence. Firstly, dissatisfaction with a foundationalist interpretation of applied ethics created a stimulus to incorporate empirical research in bioethics. Secondly, clinical ethicists became engaged in empirical research due to their strong integration in the medical setting. Thirdly, the rise of the evidence‐based paradigm had an influence on the practice of bioethics. However, a problematic relationship cannot simply and easily evolve into a perfect interaction. A new and positive climate for empirical approaches has arisen, but the original difficulties have not disappeared. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding (...) no metaphysical weight. The debates between those who favour substantive conceptions of the classical kind and those who advocate minimalist and deflationist conceptions are explored. Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking as some upholders of radical deflationist views have claimed. Questions about truth and realism are examined and the author shows how the realism/anti-realism debate remains a genuine, meaningful issue for a theory of truth and has not been undermined by deflationist views. Even if a metaphysical substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, Engel concludes, truth can keep a central role within our thinking, as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries and practices, in the philosophy of knowledge and in ethics. (shrink)

The field of bioethics is increasingly coming into contact with empirical research findings. In this article, we ask what role empirical research can play in the process of ethical clarification and decision-making. Ethical reflection almost always proceeds in three steps: the description of the moral question,the assessment of the moral question and the evaluation of the decision-making. Empirical research can contribute to each step of this process. In the description of the moral object, first of all, empirical research has a (...) role to play in the description of morally relevant facts. It plays a role in answering the “reality-revealing questions” (what, why,how, who, where and when), in assessing the consequences and in proposing alternative courses of action. Secondly, empirical research plays a role in assessing the moral question. It must be acknowledged that research possesses “the normative power of the factual,” which can also become normative by suppressing other norms. However, inductive normativity should always be balanced out by a deductive form of normativity. Thirdly, empirical research also has a role to play in evaluating the decision-making process. It can rule out certain moral choices by pointing out the occurrence of certain unexpected consequences or effects. It can also be useful, however, as a sociology of bioethics in which the discipline of bioethics itself becomes an object of research. (shrink)

This paper analyses Davidson's conception of the norms of rationality which govern, according to him, the interpretation of mind and action. While I accept Davidson's thesis that there are norms of the mental, I disagree with him on their scope. It is argued that there are much more specific norms for concepts, and that belief in partiuclar is governed by a norm of truth.

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

The book introduces Ramsey's main doctrines and assesses their contemporary significance. In particular, Jérôme Dokic and Pascal Engel are interested in Ramsey's thoughts on truth and belief, and his pragmatic thesis that the truth of one's beliefs guarantees the success of one's actions. From this, it is a short step to what may be called "Ramsey's principle": the content of a belief is constituted by the success of one's actions. This principle finds its current expression in the work of (...) philosophers who offer evolutionary conceptions of mental states, according to which the success conditions of a belief are constituted by its biological functions. (publisher, edited). (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

Je soutiens dans cette étude que la notion de connaissance de soi introspective est au centre du Cogito de Descartes. À la suite de Hintikka, de nombreux commentateurs, dans la tradition analytique, se sont concentrés sur la justification de l’énoncé « j’existe », en lien avec l’énoncé « je pense », sans chercher à proposer une explication unifiée mettant en évidence la structure de l’argument cartésien ni son lien essentiel avec la connaissance de soi introspective. Par ailleurs, certaines des théories (...) de la connaissance de soi aujourd’hui les plus influentes, en particulier celle de Gareth Evans, se sont développées en réaction à une image supposée « cartésienne » de l’introspection héritée de Gilbert Ryle. Dans ce contexte, l’interprétation du Cogito proposée par Christopher Peacocke pourrait se révéler un jalon essentiel dans l’histoire des lectures de Descartes. Selon Peacocke en effet, on peut défendre résolument le Cogito tout en rejetant l’idée d’un accès privilégié à un monde intérieur. Je soutiens que l’approche rationaliste de Peacocke permet de reconstruire le Cogito d’une façon cohérente et satisfaisante, mais que s’il donne une explication particulièrement convaincante du passage de « je pense » à « j’existe », il échoue à fonder une théorie cartésienne unifiée de la connaissance de soi introspective. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to defend the inferentialist conception ofqualiaintrospection against some apparently decisive objections. According to inferentialism, a self-attribution of a qualitative state is to be understood as the conclusion of an inference, rather than as issuing from an experience of a specific kind. It has been objected that formally correct inferences warranting introspective conclusions are simply not to be found. I concede this point, but maintain that inferentialism should not be abandoned. Some deductive inferences are correct (...) because of the contents of the concepts which occur in them, rather than in virtue of their logical form. I claim that this is what happens for introspective inferences: they are materially correct because ofa prioriconceptual liaisons linking the concept of a conscious experience with a certain class of demonstrative concepts. (shrink)

The paper surveys the main issues raised by doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief in contemporary epistemology. It argues that the deontological theory of justification fails.

Various hermeneutical theses in Gadamer and Davidson are compared. The differences between the two approaches are stressed. But both share a view, which I call the priority thesis, according to which language and meaning have in some way to be pre-understood. The view is wrong.

Cette revue critique marque un contraste entre deux ouvrages récents sur les concepts : une approche psychologique cohérente qui met l'accent sur le développement des concepts et une approche philosophique superficielle qui se veut « contextualiste » et débouche sur l'affirmation que tous les concepts sont vagues et indéterminés. A critical review of two recent books on concepts. A contrast is made between a powerful psychological approach, which emphasises the developmental profile of concepts, and a shallow philosophical approach which calls (...) itself « contextualist » and implausibly leads to the claim that all concepts are vague or indeterminate. (shrink)

Je suis trés reconnaissant à Michel Seymour d'avoir soumis mon livre à un examen détaillé, pénétrant, et charitable et d'avoir, par ses objections, mis le doigt sur un certain nombre de présupposés des thèses défendues dans ce livre, qu'il a souvent articulés bien mieux que je n'ai été capable de le faire. Le principal de ces présupposés est mon rejet implicite de la thése quinienne de l'indétermination de la traduction, qui m'engage, selon Seymour, à défendre une conception conservatrice de la (...) logique et à insister sur une détermination de son domaine qui lui paraît injustifiée. Seymour soutient au contraire qu'il faut admettre cette thése, qui «commande une tout autre perspective» que la mienne. Je voudrais à la fois résister à la prémisse et à la conclusion de cette inférence. (shrink)

On expose et discute dans cet article la théorie instrumentante de l'intentionnalité de Dennett. Ce dernier a tenté récemment de montrer que cette théorie n'avait pas les conséquences antiréalistes qu'on lui prête habituellement, en recourant à la notion de « trames » sous tendant les attributions en « posture intentionnelle ». On montre cependant que cette notion ne permet pas d'accomplir le travail que Dennett entend lui faire accomplir. Elle est trop indéterminée pour satisfaire les intuitions réalistes, parce que Dennett (...) refuse d'envisager systématiquement les relations entre les niveaux intentionnel et physique. Davidson a aussi employé une notion de « pattern » dans sa théorie de l'interprétation, qui semble plus satisfaisante, mais qui ne lève pas les difficultés du « patternalisme » en philosophie de l'esprit.This paper discusses Dennett's instrumentalist theory of intentionality, and his recent attempt to account for our realist intuitions about the mind by using the notion of "patterns" underlying our intentional ascriptions. But the notion is too weak and indeterminate to do the job that Dennett intends to confer to it. He systematically refrains from discussing the exact relationship between the intentional level and more physical levels. Davidson's notion of pattern is more realistic, but is still wanting, if our realistic intuitions are to be maintained. (shrink)

This paper tries to integrate a psychological account of propositional reasoning and a realistic conception of logical constants. I argue that the harmony between the norms of reasoning given by the semantics of ordinary logic and the psychology of reasoning holds good.

Raisons de croire et éthique de la croyance -- L'éthique première de la croyance. Le problème de Clifford ; Trois défis pour l'éthique de la croyance -- Raisons de croire et raisons d'agir. Y a-t-il un "agir épistémique"? ; Bons et mauvais types de raisons ; Nos croyances ont-elles un but? ; Croyances correctes et raisons de croire ; Deux sortes d'"agir épistémique"? -- Croyances religieuses et certitudes primitives. Les croyances religieuses ont-elles besoin d'être justifiées ? ; Le pragmatisme en (...) matière de croyance religieuse et ses difficultés ; Réfutation du pragmatisme : l'incommensurabilité entre raisons pratiques et raisons épistémiques ; La foi échappe-t-elle aux normes de la croyance ? -- Les prospérités du vice intellectuel -- Ethique seconde de la croyance et vertu intellectuelle. De l'éthique première à l'éthique seconde de la croyance ; Des raisons de croire aux vertus intellectuelles -- Trois défis pour l'éthique seconde de la croyance. Les valeurs et les normes épistémiques sont-elles simplement sociales ? ; Les vertus dépendent-elles des circonstances ? ; Quelle taxinomie pour les vertus et les vices intellectuels ? -- Descartes et la vertu intellectuelle -- Vices ordinaires. Curiosité, foutaise et snobisme. La valeur de la connaissance ; Curiosité ; Impertinence et foutaise ; Snobs ! ; L'attitude correcte -- Bêtise, sottise et esprits faux. La bêtise et ses formes ; La conception intellectualiste de la bêtise ; La bêtise comme défaut du comprendre ; Bêtise et sottise ; Les esprits faux -- Vices politiques. Peut-il y avoir des vices intellectuels collectifs ? ; La fabrique de l'ignorance ; L'injustice épistémique. (shrink)

La philosophie de tradition analytique, née à la fin du siècle dernier des critiques de l'idéalisme en Allemagne et en Grande-Bretagne, a connu des développements très variés au vingtième siècle, du réalisme à l'empirisme logique et à la philosophie linguistique. Aujourd'hui elle semble avoir éclaté, aussi bien dans ses méthodes que dans ses doctrines, en de multiples tendances. Le but de cet ouvrage est de présenter cette diversité non seulement dans les domaines " classiques " comme la philosophie de la (...) logique et du langage, la philosophie des mathématiques ou la théorie de la connaissance, mais aussi dans ceux où la contribution de la philosophie analytique est moins connue, en métaphysique, en philosophie de la religion, en philosophie de l'esprit, en éthique, en esthétique, en philosophie politique ou en histoire de la philosophie. Mais il s'agit aussi de révéler, à travers ces développements, la continuité d'une tradition et d'un style, qui incarne, au sein de l'espace pluriel de la philosophie contemporaine, l'une des figures du rationalisme. (shrink)

On essaie ici de defendre l’idée que la production de foutaise est responsable en grande partie, et peut être centrale pour ce que nous appelons la post-vérité. La production de foutaise est basée sur l’attitude qui consiste à ignorer les normes de l‘assertion. Les conséquences de l’extension de cette attitude peuvent expliquer le défiance et le mépris pour la vérité et a connaissance qui envahissent nos sociétés, quand bien même on les appelle des « sociétés de connaissance ».

An analysis of the first/third person asymmetry and in the light of Moore's paradox and Shoemaker's views on first person perspective.