This article examines the effect of material evidence upon historiographic hypotheses. Through a series of successive Bayesian conditionalizations, I analyze the extended competition among several hypotheses that offered different accounts of the transition between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age in Palestine and in particular to the “emergence of Israel”. The model reconstructs, with low sensitivity to initial assumptions, the actual outcomes including a complete alteration of the scientific consensus. Several known issues of Bayesian confirmation, including the problem of (...) old evidence, the introduction and confirmation of novel theories and the sensitivity of convergence to uncertain and disputed evidence are discussed in relation to the model’s result and the actual historical process. The most important result is that convergence of probabilities and of scientific opinion is indeed possible when advocates of rival hypotheses hold similar judgment about the factual content of evidence, even if they differ sharply in their historiographic interpretation. This speaks against the contention that understanding of present remains is so irrevocably biased by theoretical and cultural presumptions as to make an objective assessment impossible. (shrink)

Niche Construction Theory has been gaining acceptance as an explanatory framework for processes in biological and human evolution. Human cultural niche construction, in particular, is suggested as a basis for understanding many phenomena that involve human genetic and cultural evolution. Herein I assess the ability of the cultural niche construction framework to meet this explanatory role by looking into several NCT-inspired accounts that have been offered for two important episodes of human evolution, and by examining the contribution of NCT to (...) the elucidation of two “primary examples” mentioned often in the NCT literature. The result, I claim, is rather disappointing: While NCT may serve as a descriptive framework for these phenomena, it cannot be said to explain them in any substantive sense. Especially disturbing is NCT’s failure to account for differing developments in very similar situations, and to facilitate evaluation and discrimination between divergent and contradictory causal accounts of particular phenomena. I argue that these problems are inherent, and they render NCT unsuitable to serve as an explanatory framework for human phenomena. NCT’s value, at least as related to human phenomena, is therefore descriptive and heuristic rather than explanatory. In conclusion, I discuss and reject comparisons made between NCT and the theory of natural selection, and examine several potential sources of NCT’s explanatory weakness. (shrink)

Jacob Talmon and Michael Oakeshott represent two opposite tendencies in the anti-totalitarian world view. Both thinkers share many central features of this broad intellectual trend, such as the equation between the Soviet and Nazi regimes, Anglophilia and the rejection of the utopian quest. Yet this basic agreement should not distract us from significant differences in attitude and temperament. Talmon, like most other critics of totalitarianism, was strongly affected by the atmosphere of a profound intellectual and political crisis in Europe, and (...) he regarded the danger of totalitarianism to be an inherent aspect of modernity itself. His liberalism was that of ‘fear’. By contrast, for Oakeshott, who believed in the strength of liberal, and specifically British, civilisation, totalitarianism was merely a child of resentment, a parasitic force with no positive message of its own. He thus displayed a greater measure of confidence in the fortunes of liberal modernity. (shrink)

Karl Mannheim's contribution to a conceptual framework towards establishing objective knowledge in the social sciences has been overlooked and neglected. The paper discusses and reevaluates particularly Mannheim's concept of relationism which he used for clarifying the possibility of a "dynamic synthesis of perspectives" as the task of sociology of knowledge. One of the functions of Mannheim's conceptual framework was to narrow the gap between the techno-scientific or empiricist paradigm of knowledge and the humanistic-hermeneutical paradigm by a set of mediations which (...) shifted the emphasis from facts to the way of looking at them through concepts and terms which are never purely experiential, i.e. independent of interpretation. The author stresses the epistemological fertility of the relationist model of truth in view of recent insights of sociology of science. (shrink)

Elizabeth Corey suggests that in order to understand Michael Oakeshott's worldview one should pay special attention to two subjects, religion and aesthetics, and analyze the connection between these two realms and the idea of practical life in general and of politics in particular. Her book provides a sympathetic but also critical conversation with Oakeshott's ideas, ultimately offering us a coherent picture of the place of the religious, poetical, and political in the totality of his thought. Corey persuasively shows that the (...) major ideas of the mature Oakeshott originated in his earlier religious convictions and that his philosophy of aesthetics, contrary to what his critics claimed, fit nicely in the general framework of his thought. (shrink)

This article argues that Oakeshott's theory of freedom possesses a greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott's philosophy may be defined as `recognized contingency', combining the notions of a genuine choice of action and of an agent's awareness of having such a choice. Oakeshott employs his notion of freedom in two different contexts. One is the context in which freedom is understood as a concept distinguishing what is conceived as `human' from what is conceived as `non-human'. (...) The other context is that of membership in societies, which under certain circumstances can be characterized either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The article argues that, while at first glance Oakeshott's ideas look counter-intuitive, at a deeper level this understanding of freedom is akin to that prevalent in the consciousness of modern liberal societies. (shrink)

Two ideas lie at the heart of Oakeshott’s philosophy: the notion of the inherent plurality of modern experience and the notion of a modern state as a purposeless civil association. These ideas signify Oakeshott’s rejection of the intellectual tradition of British Idealism by which he was influenced in his twenties. The breaking point was the publication of Experience and its Modes, although, with regard to social philosophy, the process of the abandonment of holistic Idealism lasted longer and was completed only (...) with the publication of On Human Conduct. The main difference between Oakeshott and other British Idealists lies in his radical rejection of methodological holism. It is suggested that this rejection might be an outcome of influences of continental philosophical traditions, and that Oakeshott’s philosophy is especially indebted to the ideas of the fragmentation of experience prevalent in Central European Idealism, and particularly in neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

The following essay is part of a study which aims at grounding the concepts of freedom—personal, sociopolitical, metaphysical—and a variety of their combinations in the unique ontological structure of selfhood and its dialectical unfoldings. The claims of both hard determinism and absolute freedom are rejected.

Several scholars observed that narratives about the human past are evaluated comparatively. Few attempts have been made, however, to explore how such evaluations are actually done. Here I look at a lengthy “contest” among several historiographic narratives, all constructed to make sense of another one—the biblical story of the conquest of Canaan. I conclude that the preference of such narratives can be construed as a rational choice. In particular, an easily comprehensible and emotionally evocative narrative will give way to a (...) complex and mundane one, when the latter provides a more coherent account of the consensually accepted body of evidence. This points to a fundamental difference between historiographic narratives and fiction, contrary to some influential opinions in the philosophy of historiography. Such historiographic narratives have similarities with hypotheses and narrative explanations in natural science. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Introduction Efraim Podoksik; Part I. Oakeshott's Philosophy: 1. Oakeshott as philosopher James Alexander; 2. Worlds of experience: history Luke O'Sullivan; 3. Worlds of experience: science Byron Kaldis; 4. Worlds of experience: aesthetics Elizabeth Corey; 5. Education as conversation Kevin Williams; Part II. Oakeshott on Morality, Society and Politics: 6. Practical life and the critique of rationalism Steven Smith; 7. Oakeshott's ideological politics: conservative or liberal? Andrew Gamble; 8. Rhetoric and political language Terry Nardin; 9. Oakeshott's (...) On Human Conduct Paige Digeser and Richard Flathman; 10. Oakeshott's political theory: recapitulation and criticisms Williams A. Galston; Part III. Oakeshott and Others: 11. Oakeshott in the context of British Idealism David Boucher; 12. Oakeshott in the context of German Idealism Efraim Podoksik; 13. Oakeshott's contribution to Hobbes scholarship Ian Tregenza; 14. Oakeshott and the Cold-War critique of political rationalism Dana Villa; Bibliography; Index. (shrink)

Sovereign Wealth Funds have attracted significant attention over the past few years, as a result of their increasing role in the global economy and their controversial minority investments in distressed financial and infrastructure companies in Western economies. Although SWFs provide important benefits to home, host and global markets, they have been perceived by the Western mind as a growing threat to economic supremacy and national security. While the current legal scholarship provides an incomplete policy response, by either selectively referring to (...) specific legal instruments within the international law framework or proposing an entirely new legal regime, this Article attempts to address this crucial lacuna by providing an original and comprehensive legal analysis of the SWF phenomenon and its interaction with the preexisting framework of international law. The various abovementioned concerns have prompted various Western attempts to block SWF cross-border investments through legislative reforms or ad hoc protectionism of the executive branch. These governmental policies frequently violate international commitments in the international economic law arena and call for a closer look at the nature of such commitments and their respective implementation in the SWF environment. The Article looks at recent practices in Western countries aimed at blocking SWF investments, especially in the context of iconic brands and national champions. It then reviews various relevant provisions in international legal instruments, which are applicable to these potential investments, and examines the question of their violation by capital-importing countries. A proposed innovative adaptation to this new reality is provided. I argue that the existing framework of international investment law can provide adequate solutions to investment protectionism against SWFs. Regarding regulation of SWFs’ investments, since recent experience has underlined that SWFs function largely like any other commercial entities, there is a need to shift the discussion and terminology towards regulation of sovereign activity rather than sovereign funds. Finally, the Article explores the broad consequences of investment law and corporate governance reforms following the debate around SWF investments on maintaining healthy and productive cross-border economic relations in a globalized world. (shrink)

Sābūr ibn Sahl's al-Aqrābādhīn al-saghīr is the earliest Arabic pharmacopoeia known to have survived. Finding fragments of Sābūr's pharmacopoeia in the Cairo Genizah shows that it was used by the medical practitioners of the Jewish community of Cairo, possibly long after it is supposed to have been superceded by other works. We present here a synoptic edition of two Arabic fragments, T-S Ar. 40.5 and Ar. 41.90. These fragments overlap to a large extent, but are not exactly the same. We (...) suggest that one may be the work of a professional scribe, while the other was copied by a practitioner for his personal use. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 7-8, November - December 2020, Page 882-883.

Although Oakeshott’s philosophy has received considerable attention, the vision which underlies it has been almost completely ignored. This vision, which is rooted in the intellectual debates of his epoch, cements his ideas into a coherent whole and provides a compelling defence of modernity.The main feature of Oakeshott’s vision of modernity is seen here as radical plurality resulting from ‘fragmentation’ of experience and society. On the level of experience, modernity denies the existence of the hierarchical medieval scheme and argues that there (...) exist independent ways of understanding our world, such as science and history, which cannot be reduced to each other. On the level of society, modernity finds expression in liberal doctrine, according to which society is an aggregate of individuals each pursuing his or her own choices. For Oakeshott, to be modern means not only to recognise this condition of radical plurality but also to learn to appreciate and enjoy it.Oakeshott did not think that it was possible to find a comprehensive philosophical justification for modernity, therefore the only way to preserve modern civilisation seemed to be an appeal to sentiment. As a consequence he was a passionate defender of liberal education as the best way to underwrite the ‘conversation of mankind.’. (shrink)

The paper argues that modern political life faces a seemingly irresolvable contradiction. On the one hand, a moral judgement in politics can refer only to the consequences of any policy. On the other hand, in modern society no consequences can be reasonably predicted at the moment a decision is taken. This renders political life unbearable from the moral point of view, because almost any political decision is likely subject to failure in the future. The solution to this dilemma is to (...) understand modern politics as a contract of fallibility, according to which citizens agree to withhold their moral judgements, as long as others do not act as if they assume their own infallibility. The adoption of such a theory might remove the sense of inescapable failure from ethically inclined political actors and emancipate our political discourse from irrational moralistic absolutism. In addition, the contract of fallibility can serve as the most economical justification of modern representative democracy. (shrink)

At first glance it seems to be merely a curious accident that existentialist philosophers, like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre should relate to Husserl's phenomenology as Kierkegaard on the one hand, and Feuerbach and Marx on the other related to Hegel. The latter argued that since the cognitive I is merely a concrete real being, it cannot transcend its spacio-temporal existence and look at the world from the perspective of the absolute Being or God. Neither can human consciousness reveal in itself (...) the “truth” of all Being or develop the “truth” in its own confinement dialectically. Under these attacks the identity-philosophy of German idealism collapsed. (shrink)

The concept of ‘empowerment’ is used frequently in a number of professional areas, from psychotherapy to social work. But even if the same term is used, it is not always clear if the concept denotes the same goals or the same practice in these various fields. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the discussion and to find a plausible and useful definition of the concept that is suitable for work in various professions. Several suggestions are discussed in the (...) paper, for example control over life or health, autonomy, ability, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and freedom, and it is concluded that there are two plausible complementary uses, one as a goal and one as a process or approach. Empowerment as a goal is to have control over the determinants of one’s quality of life, and empowerment as a process is to create a professional relation where the client or community takes control over the change process, determining both the goals of this process and the means to use. (shrink)

The starting point for the contemporary debate about theories of health should be the holistic theory of Lennart Nordenfelt, claims George Khushf, not the refuted theory of Christopher Boorse. The present paper is an attempt to challenge Nordenfelt and to present an alternative theory to his and other theories, including Boorse’s. The main problems with Nordenfelt’s theory are that it is relativistic, that it leads to counter-intuitive results as to what goals can count as healthy, that it focuses on the (...) wrong kind of abilities, that it makes measuring health extra difficult, and that it does not give us a sufficient account of health, at most a necessary one. The alternative theory proposed is two-dimensional. First, health is to have developed the abilities and dispositions that members of one’s culture typically develop, and be able to use them, in acceptable circumstances; and second, health is to experience positive moods and sensations, the kinds that have internal causes. The theory solves the problems attached to Nordenfelt’s theory by not being individual relativistic, by eliminating the goals in the definition, by giving an alternative interpretation of “ability,” by making health easier to measure, and by adding the dimension of well-being that, together with health as ability, not only gives us a necessary, but also a sufficient, account of health. (shrink)

The terms “health promotion” and “disease prevention” refer to professional activities. But a “health promoter” has also come to denote a profession, with an alternative agenda compared to that of traditional public health work, work that by some is seen to be too medically oriented, too reliant upon prevention, risk-elimination and health-care. But is there really a sharp distinction between these activities and professions? The main aim of the paper is to investigate if these concepts are logically different, or if (...) they are just two extremes of one dimension. The central concepts, health promotion and disease prevention, are defined, and it is concluded that health promotion and disease prevention are logically distinct concepts, although they are conceptually related through a causal connection. Thus, logically, it is possible to promote health without preventing disease, even if this is not so common, in practice, but it is not possible to prevent disease without promoting health. Finally, most health promoting interventions target basic health, not manifest health, and often also thereby reduce future disease. (shrink)

Health-related quality of life is the ultimate general goal for medicine, health care and public health, including health promotion and health education. The other important general goal is health-related welfare. The aim of the paper is to explain what this means and what the consequences of these assumptions are for health work. This involves defining the central terms “health”, “quality of life” and “welfare” and showing what their conceptual relations are. Health-related quality of life has two central meanings: health-related well-being, (...) which constitutes quality of life, and health as ability, which contributes causally to quality of life. Four meanings of health-related welfare are put forward: general well-being, health as ability, other inner properties of the individual, and external factors. States and processes covered by these categories contribute causally to health-related quality of life. Finally, using these distinctions, some more specific goals for medicine and health care, on the one hand, and for public health and health promotion, on the other, are outlined. In the former fields work is primarily directed towards changing the health-related quality of life of the individual through direct measures, “manipulating” the individual, whereas public health work and health promotion primarily use indirect measures and further health through various sorts of health-related welfare changes, e.g. through changing the environment. (shrink)

It appears that there are two distinct practices within public health, namely health promotion and disease prevention, leading to different goals. But does the distinction hold? Can we promote health without preventing disease, and vice versa? The aim of the paper is to answer these questions. First, the central concepts are defined and the logical relations between them are spelt out. A preliminary conclusion is that there is a logical difference between health and disease, which makes health promotion and disease (...) prevention two distinct endeavours. However, since disease is defined in relation to health, as those kinds of internal processes and states that typically lead to ill health, the difference is smaller than it might appear. Second, in order to answer the practical question whether it is possible to promote health without preventing disease, and vice versa, several kinds of public health interventions are discussed. The conclusion is that while health promotion and disease prevention can be distinguished conceptually, they can hardly be distinguished in practice. Most general measures do both at the same time. (shrink)

It is an imperative within health care, medicine, and public health to restore, preserve, and enhance health. Therefore, it is important to determine what kinds of enhancement are increases in health and what kinds are not. Taking as its point of departure two conceptions of health, namely, “manifest health” and “fundamental health,” the paper discusses various means used to enhance ability and well-being, and if those means, such as wheelchairs, implants, medicines, stimulants, or narcotics, enhance health. The fact that some (...) means that enhance ability or well-being are not usually considered health enhancing, for example, narcotics, constitutes a problem. The paper ends with a discussion of some suggestions about how to distinguish between those enhancements that are health related and those that are not. One plausible idea holds that an enhancement is health related when the substance, or aid, increases ability or well-being, is integrated into the body, and does not harm the individual’s fundamental health. (shrink)