M. Tulli Ciceronis Ovationes pro P. Quinctio, pro Q. Roscio Comoedo, pro A. Caecina, de lege agraria contra Rullum, pro C. Rabirio perduellionis reo, pro L. Flacco, in L. Pisonem, pro C. Rabirio Postumo, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Albertus Curtis Clark. Oxonii, e typographeo Clarendoniano. - Volume 24 Issue 8.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 119 Der Verf. bedient sieh in Verfolgung seines Ziels der fibliehen historischen Methode, die er mit Meistersehaft handhabt. Doch ist er keineswegs ein typischer Vertreter des modernen Historismus. Als Philosoph ist er gefesselt von den Problemen, die sich in der dreifachen Thematik seiner Untersuehung verbergen. Er begibt sich in die Gesehichte, aber doch nur, um yon Zeit zu Zeit aus ihr herauszutreten und i)berlegungen nachzugehen, die er (...) selbst, anlfifilieh einer methodologisehen Bemerkung in der Einleitung, als eine "Typologie yon LSsungen" (3) bezeiehnet. Aber das ist ein understatement, keine exakte Besehreibung. Die unbefangene und nfiehterne Kfihnheit dieser seiner trans-historisehen Reflexionen durehweht als ein frischer Luftzug die Welt der Gelehrsamkeit und Vielbelesenheit, die sich in diesen Seiten aufbaut. Freilieh, wo der Verf. selbst steht, gibt er uns nur gelegentlieh zu verstehen, so z.B. wenn er mit Entsehiedenheit die averroistisehe Depotenzierung des Einzelnen gegenfiber der Mensehheir zurfickweist. Aber, wiederum im Zusammenhang mit Averroes, legt er Gedanken zu der berfihmten oder auch berfiehtigten Lebre yon der doppelten Wahrheit vor, die uns in Zweifel darfiber lassen, ob und wie weit sich der Verf. hier verbirgt oder d~couvriert. M. gesellt sich nicht zu denen, die Averroes entlasten woUen, indem sie die fatale Lehre als eine spatere Zutat erkl~ren. Vielmehr mSchte er das Anathema dadurch fortnehmen, daB er die grobe und beleidigende Darstellung der Lehre dutch eine subtile Deutung ersetzt, die sie als konsequent, als vernfinftig und schlie61ich als wahr erscheinen l~Bt (107 ft.). Der Mensch, so argumentiert er, drfickt sich in einer Mehrheit yon "Sprachen" (universes of discourse) aus, die sich nieht ineinander fibersetzen lassen--der Sprache der Kunst, der Dichtung, der Philosophie, der Religion usw. So kann ein und derselbe Menseh ohne Selbstwidersprueh oder Unredliehkeit als Philosoph sagen: die individuelleSeele ist sterblich, als Gl~ubigerhingegen: sie ist unsterblich. Denn sowohl "Seele" wie "Individuum" wie aueh "Unsterblichkeit" meinen etwas anderes je nach dem universe of discourse, dem philosophischen oder religiSsen, in welchem sie gebraueht werden. Freilich, man kann den Versueh maehen, in langagestart in einer der vielen langues zu reden, und die Theologie kann nicht umhin, eben dies zu wagen. Ffir die Theologie aber~ so bekennt der Verf., ist kein Raum in seinem "scheme of things" (109). Das ist ein erschreckendes Wort, und nieht blofi ffir den, der die Theologie erhalten mSchte. Denn es besteht begrfindete Sorge, dab der Ruin der zwisehen den versehiedenen langues zerriebenen Theologie auch die Philosophiepulverisiert. Die verschiedenen"Spraehen" miissen doch wohl in der einen mensehlichen Person sinnvoll zusammengeordnet sein. Welche Wissenschaft aber wenn nicht die Philosophie darf sich diese Zusammenordnung zum Gegenstand ihres Forschens und Sagens machen? Wir schliefien also unseren Bericht fiber ein bedeutendes Buch mit einer Frage, nicht aber der Kritik oder gar des Besser-wissen-wollenswegen, sondern um auszudrficken, dab der Autor uns nicht nur als gelehrter Kenner unterrichtet, sondern als Philosoph zum Denken zwingt. Mi~nchen, Germany HELMUT KUHN Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit H. S. Long. 1 vol. in2. (Oxford: 1964.Pp. xx ~ xiv W 597. $11.20.) Der Hg erinnert uns, dass seit der Cobetsehen (1850), leider apparatlosen, keine kritische Ausgabe des Diogenes im ganzen ersehlenen ist. Immerhin gibt es abet die Ubersetzung yon M. Gigante (DiogeneLaerzio, Vite dei filosofi, Bari 1962), die so annotiert ist, dass sie vielfach anstatt einer Edition gebraucht werden kann. Man bedauert, dass der Hg sie offenbar noch nicht benutzen konnte (sein Buch ist wohl 1964erschienen, doch ist die Vorrede 1961datiert). Der Hg schliesst sich der Meinung an, dass nut 3 der existierenden Diogenes-Hss den Wert unabh~ngiger Zeugen besitzen. Vorsichtiger beurteilt den Sachverhalt z.B.H. Erbse in: Geschichte der Text~berlieferung, I. Band (1961), S. 306f., doch wollen wir die These des Hg akzeptieren. Wie allgemein zugestanden, gehen diese drei auf eine gemeinsame Vorlage zur~iek. Unter diesen Ums~nden ist es die Pflicht des Hg, uns verl~sslich und eindeutig fiber den Text dieser drei (BFP aus dem 12.u. 13.Jh.) zu informieren, eine Entscheidung zu treffen, wo diese 120 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nicht tibereinstimmen, darfiber hinaus Textverderbnisse anzuzeigen und womSglich zu emendieren, entweder dureh eigene Vermutungen (in Buch VI und IX, e. 19% des Ganzen, habe ich nur zwei gefunden, beide einleuehtend... (shrink)

P. Papini Stati Thebais et Achilleis recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit H. W. Garrod collegii Mertonensis socius. E Typographeo Clarendoniano Oxonii. [1906.] Crown 8vo. Pp. xii + 396. 5s. paper, 6s. cloth.

Essays on key moments in the intellectual history of the West This book forms a major contribution to the discussion on fate, providence and moral responsibility in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Early Modern times. Through 37 original papers, renowned scholars from many different countries, as well as a number of young and promising researchers, write the history of the philosophical problems of freedom and determinism since its origins in pre-socratic philosophy up to the seventeenth century. The main focus points (...) are classic Antiquity (Plato and Aristotle), the Neoplatonic synthesis of late Antiquity (Plotinus, Proclus, Simplicius), and thirteenth-century scholasticism (Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent). They do not only represent key moments in the intellectual history of the West, but are also the central figures and periods to which Carlos Steel, the dedicatary of this volume, has devoted his philosophical career. (shrink)

t. 1. Livres I à IV -- t. 2. Livres V à VII et Notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues.

Wie sich die Augen der Nachteule zum Tageslicht verhalten, so die Vernunft unserer Seele zu dem was, seiner Natur nach am offenbarsten ist. Dieser Vergleich des Aristoteles am Anfang der Metaphysik (II, 993b9-11) hat in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie Anlass gegeben zu verschiedenen Interpretationen. Was hier zur Diskussion steht, ist die Frage, ob dem Menschen eine Erkenntnis dessen moglich ist, was sich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung entzieht. Kann der Geist, der mit dem Korper verbunden ist, die substantiae separatae erkennen, die ersten Ursachen (...) dieser Welt, die selbst diese physische Ordnung uberschreiten. Es ist die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach der Moglichkeit der Metaphysik. In dieser Lectio Albertina untersucht Carlos Steel am Beispiel der Interpretation des Nachtvogel-Gleichnisses, wie unterschiedlich Thomas und Albert die Frage nach der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage der Metaphysik beantwortet haben. Die Differenz zwischen beide Positionen wird auch die spatere Diskussion bis in die Renaissance kennzeichen. (shrink)

The Commentary on Plato's Parmenides by Proclus is the most important extant document on the interpretation of this enigmatic dialogue in antiquity, and has had a crucial influence on all subsequent readings. In Proclus' Commentary, the Parmenides provides the argumentative and conceptual framework for a scientific theology wherein all mythological discourse about the gods can be integrated. Its exposition was therefore the culmination of the curriculum of the Platonic school. This theological reading of the Parmenides persisted, through the medium of (...) Ficino, until the nineteenth century. Previously this important text was only accessible in the edition of V. Cousin. This new critical edition is based on an exhaustive study of both the Greek tradition and the medieval Latin translation. (shrink)

IN THE DISCUSSION on education in the Republic, Socrates lays down the principles which those who speak about the gods must follow if they want to avoid the errors of traditional mythology. The first typos of this rational theology is this: "God is the cause, not of all things, but only of the good." For "God, being good, cannot be responsible for everything happening in our life, as is commonly believed, but only for a small part. For we have a (...) far smaller share of good than of evil, and while God must be held to be the sole cause of good, we must look for some other factors than God as cause of the evil." Rightly celebrated, this passage has set the agenda for ages of reflection in Western thought on the cause of evil. In contrast to traditional mythology where the gods are seen as the origin of both good and evil--as Homer says, "Zeus has two jars standing on the floor of his palace, full of fates, good in one and evil in the other"--the divinity is now freed of all responsibility for evil. God, who is entirely good, can only be the cause of well-being. If this answer sets God free of all responsibility for evil, it seems to be at the cost of limiting God's power: for God is no longer responsible for "most things in human life," since most of them are evil. What, then, may be the cause or causes of evil? Do bad things have a cause? Or do they just happen? Plato's formulation seems to suggest that he favours a dualistic solution to the problem of evil: God is the cause of all good, but for evil we have to find other causes. What could those causes be: matter, cosmic necessity, an evil soul? Various answers of this type were developed in later Platonism and in later mythological philosophies. Without denying that Plato often uses a dualistic discourse and uses elements of it in his cosmology, I do think that Plato had something different in mind. After all, he was not primarily interested in the problem of theodicy. For in this passage of the Republic, he is not concerned with the problem of evil in the universe as a whole, which is really the theodicy question, but with evil in "human life," that is, evil insofar as human beings experience it and suffer from it: the fact that we are not at all living well but are instead miserable and unhappy. (shrink)

In Summa log., I, 5-8 and Quodlib., V, 10-11 Ockham formulates the semantic that lies behind the syntactical distinction between abstract and concrete names and describes the different modes of signification corresponding to them. Sometimes concrete and abstract names stand for different things. For example, 'whiteness' signifies a quality inhering in a subject, whereas 'white' signifies the subject exhibiting that quality and, obliquely, the quality itself. There is a temptation to conclude from such cases that all abstract and concrete names (...) function in the same way. This interpretation, however, seems to imply a 'Platonic' ontology by accepting the existence of universal forms in re. To avoid this conclusion, O. contends that, in the category of substance, abstract and concrete terms are synonymous and simply signify the same thing. Thus nothing is signified by the term ' man' which is not also signified by 'humanity' and vice versa. If we do not take into account that abstract terms may incorporate some syncategorematic elements not included in concrete terms, we must grant that the proposition „man is humanity” is literally true, and we have to reject propositions such as „humanity is in man” or „Socrates is man by his humanity”. For this individual cannot be understood as a bare substrate sustaining a universal essence. Nevertheless, even though this is true from a philosophical standpoint, secundum veritatem fidei it would be false to say that ' man' and ' humanity' are synonymous. As a matter of fact, in theological language these terms can stand for different things. Here a distinction is made between 'humanity' signifying human nature and 'man' which signifies the same nature but connotes also something about the sustenance of that nature. This distinction must be rejected in the case of Socrates. Here humanity coincides with man so that the proposition „Socrates is a substrate sustaining a human nature” is false. But the same proposition is true when it is said of the divine Person united with the human nature in Christ. It follows that O. accepts in theology a semantic distinction between abstract and concrete names and also the existence of an essence different from the subject, both of which he opposes from a philosophical standpoint. He schrinks from applying his original logical insights to the theological dogmas which are often formulated in terms that involve a realistic ontology of essences. But even when he limits the results of his semantic analysis to the realm of pure philosophy, it seems difficult to maintain the equivalence in signification of abstract and concrete names. (shrink)

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)

The experience of evil in all its aspects has always been a challenge for the project of philosophy as a search for meaning. From the beginning philosophers have tried to explain evil, but they could only do so by making this brutal fact somehow intelligible so that it could enter rational discourse. Out of respect for the victims of horrible evil, we may now be inclined to stop all attempts at explanation, which all end up as justifications of evil. But (...) by this refusal to discuss what concerns us humans most, philosophy shows how marginal and futile its intellectual activity is. This is the torture of philosophy: either giving up its own project of making sense or trying to understand evil without justifying it, whereby philosophical arguments always tend to become edifying and quasi-religious. For Kierkegaard this torture shows the impossibility of the philosophical project. All philosophical explanation of evil is "a glossing over of sin, an excuse of sin". Only religion seems to offer meaning for evil, though, as Nietzsche said, it makes suffering worse by bringing it within the perspective of guilt. Philosophers, he argues, should give up this desperate quest for meaning, which always ends with new versions of the ascetic ideal. There is a long tradition wherein philosophy is seen as a therapy and a consolation for those confronted with suffering. The most influential view was the Neoplatonic, which also incorporated many Stoic arguments. In the second part of this paper, some arguments on evil from that tradition are proposed, without, however, a desire for consolation. We may learn from Neoplatonism ways to discuss evil without making it an intelligible object. As Augustine said, we understand evil by not understanding it, as we may see darkness by not seeing it. Evil is not a being, a property, a function, an attribute. It is a perversion, failure, mistake, that is a non-being parasiting upon a being. In a discussion with Spinoza it is argued that it is not possible to give up altogether a normative concept of reality. The Neoplatonic concept of evil is also linked to the acceptance of contingency in the world. Only when things are not absolutely determined, is it possible to understand that something can go wrong. The notion of accidental causality makes it also possible to understand the tragic aspect of evil. However, this notion becomes problematic when applied to moral evil. It is in its explanation of moral evil that the limitations of the Neoplatonic approach to evil become clear. In particular its basic axiom that all agents act for some good, is questionable. (shrink)

Since its origin, Greek philosophy has made an attempt to rationally determine what the 'divine', object of myth and religious practice, really is. In the present article we examine Proclus's project of a philosophical theology. First, by determining its object (theion) : the absolute One and the henads, secondly by distinguishing its method (logos) from other forms of theological discourse : symbolic-mythological, eikonic and oracular. Finally, we explain how Proclus came to understand the logical discussion in the Parmenides of Plato (...) as the perfect system of scientific dialectical theology, a philosophical 'hymn of the generation of the gods'. (shrink)

The centenary of the Louvain Institute of Philosophy (which was founded to contribute to a renewal of philosophy within the Christian community „by adhering as closely as possible to the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas”) is the occasion for a critical examination of the particular form of Thomism developed by Désiré Mercier, the first president of the Institute. In Mercier's view, the appeal to Thomas can not be a submission to tradition or authority. Since philosophy is always a personal, free, rational (...) investigation, the only reason for adhering to a certain doctrine, is its intrinsic philosophical value. The mean argument for preferring Thomas „in philosophicis” is the fact that he „combines observation and rational-speculation, analysis and synthesis”, whereby all empirical facts are integrated and made intelligible in a larger metaphysical frame. By so doing Thomas avoids the extremes of empiricism, which leads to materialism, and idealism, which goes hand in hand with dualistic spiritualism. One may doubt whether this is a good characteristic of the „essence of Thomism”. However, Mercier follows Thomas, not so much for any original doctrine, but because he best represents the great scholastic tradition starting from Aristotle. This tradition should not be admired as an ideal of perfection that cannot be improved upon, but should be further developed and renewed, especially by integrating the achievements of modern experimental investigations within it. (Besides the sciences, we should expect not too much from modern philosophy, except in the discussion of the „critical problem”). Mercier thus bases his philosophical option for Thomism on his judgment that it better than any other philosophy offers a metaphysical synthesis within which the investigations of the modern sciences can be integrated, while at the same time being in concordance with the Christian view on man and world. However, when one studies the Thomism as elaborated in Mercier's manuals, it turns out that his attempt at integration fails. For there is no intrinsic link between the scientific findings he considers and the philosophical theses he develops. Herein lies the inherent weakness of the neo-scholastic construction as it was advocated by Mercier. When one defends Thomism by arguing that it offers a „comprehensive synthesis of all knowledge”', and at the same time one stresses the autonomy of scientific inquiry without apologetic intentions, one can expect that as these sciences develop, there will also arise the need for new conceptual schemes and new philosophical models which better fit these new findings. At that moment Thomistic doctrine also seems to fall away as a superfluous superstructure. One can argue that Mercier too easily understood philosophy as a „natural complement” of the sciences and that for that reason he could not really succeed in renewing Thomism. Most neothomists will try to base their option for Thomas upon the originality of his metaphysics. But this search for the „essence of Thomism” is problematic. At the end of the paper it is argued that no intrinsic philosophical arguments can be given for a normative preference for Thomas. The demand to philosophize „ad mentem Thomae” only makes sense when the relation of reason to faith is considered. As É. Gilson has shown, most neothomists were reluctant to develop this argument, except in a negative way : to argue for the autonomy of their philosophical (thomistic) arguments (although they were, in fact, motivated by a religious interest). (shrink)