Les interrogations nouvelles des historiens modernistes sur la culture populaire, celles des anthropologues du politique concernant la politique au village ou dans les milieux ouvriers des grandes villes, nous incitent à postuler l'existence dès l'Ancien Régime d'une politique populaire dont on avait jusqu'ici remarqué surtout les manifestations extrêmes : émeutes frumentaires ou anti-fiscales, jacqueries anti-seigneuriales. Cette politique du peuple est fondée sur la survie des communautés de base qui se résignent à l'ordre des choses tant que les seuils de l'intolérable (...) ne sont pas franchis. L'insurrection a donc pour but un retour à l'ordre que le pouvoir doit assurer face aux agressions qui menacent les communautés. En France, La Révolution de 89 a remis en cause cet ordre des choses, les initiatives et exigences de la Nation ont reçu l'assentiment populaire quand elles correspondaient aux impératifs de la politique du peuple et cela jusqu'à l'écroulement du Second Empire. Il semblerait qu'il faille voir dans la politique du peuple, les racines de ce que politologues et historiens appellent le populisme.The new questions of the historians on the popular culture, those of the anthropologists of the policy concerning the policy in the village or in the working classes of the cities, encourage us to postulate the existence as far back as the "Ancien Régime" of a popular policy which one had noticed up to now especially the extreme demonstrations: anti-tax riots or massacres against the nobility. This policy of the people is founded on the survival of the basic communities {parishes, districts) which resign themselves to the established order as long as the thresholds of intolerable are not crossed. The purpose of the rebellion is thus a return to the order which the power must ensure against the aggressions which threaten the communities. In France, the Revolution of 89 doubt this order, the initiatives and requirements of the Nation received the popular approval when they corresponded to the requirements of the policy of the people and that until the collapse of the Second Empire. It would seem that it is necessary to see in the policy of the people, the roots of what political scientists and historians call the populism. (shrink)

the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..

This is the most up-to-date, brief and accessible introduction to Kant's ethics available. It approaches the moral theory via the political philosophy, thus allowing the reader to appreciate why Kant argued that the legal structure for any civil society must have a moral basis. This approach also explains why Kant thought that our basic moral norms should serve as laws of conduct for everyone. The volume includes a detailed commentary on Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant's most widely studied (...) work of moral philosophy. The book complements the author's much more comprehensive and systematic study Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, a volume that has received the highest critical praise. With its briefer compass and non-technical style this new introduction should help to disseminate the key elements of one of the great modern philosophies to an even wider readership. (shrink)

In his bestselling work of popular science, Sir Roger Penrose takes us on a fascinating roller-coaster ride through the basic principles of physics, cosmology, mathematics, and philosophy to show that human thinking can never be emulated by a machine.

In this paper we claim that pragmatist philosophical practice is incompatible with scientistic philosophy. The kind of pragmatism used for making this case follows the spirit and method of philosophical pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and a related pragmatic tradition, Confucian Philosophy. Pragmatism starts from immediate experience, and refuses to cleave off the reality and salience of what is found in such experience in the process of thinking. Pragmatism also concerns itself with social problems, broadly conceived. (...) In contrast to this focus on immediate experience, the influence of science in much philosophizing involves a kind of scientism through which the relevance, value, and even reality of experience is brought into question. It also concerns itself with a narrowly defined set of so-called philosophical problems. In this regard, pragmatist philosophical practice is fundamentally opposed to scientistic philosophical practice. We will start by modelling the kind of philosophical practice that stems from pragmatism, and the role of immediate experience in it. Subsequently, we will introduce two modes of philosophizing that diminish if not negate the role of experience. One is bald naturalist philosophizing, and the other is a priori scientific philosophizing. In the last section, we will show how main commitments of both of these traditions are incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy that remains committed to the original impulse of pragmatism. (shrink)

Book Description: First published in 1980, this contribution to political thought is a statement of the traditional conservative position. Roger Scruton challenges those who would regard themselves as conservatives, and also their opponents. Conservatism, he argues, has little in common with liberalism, and is only tenuously related to the market economy, to monetarism, to free enterprise or to capitalism. It involves neither hostility towards the state, nor the desire to limit the state's obligation towards the citizen. Its conceptions of (...) society, law and citizenship regard the individual not as the premise but as the conclusion of politics. At the same time it is fundamentally opposed to the ethic of social justice, to equality of station, opportunity, income and achievement, and to the attempt to bring major institutions of society such as schools and universities under government control. (shrink)

This book is a fascinating and accessible summary of Roger Penrose's current thinking on those areas of physics in which he feels there are major...

From Peirce, a sign represents something other than itself, an object, for some third; from Deleuze, a sign can create and erase an object, for some third. He makes this claim in the cinema books, without detailed explication. It is a fleeting reference to the Peircean triad developed in his semiotics; moreover, references to “objects” in Deleuze’s discussions of signs in his other work are often generic. In this essay, I explain what it means in Deleuze’s semiotics for a sign (...) to create and erase its object. My method is to use the perspective of the object in the semiotic triad to compare Deleuze and Peirce’s semiotics. Deleuze’s sign that creates and erases its object marks a clear departure from Peirce’s semiotics. For Deleuze, like Peirce, an acquaintance with the object independent of the action of the sign is necessary for semiotics. Of most significance is that for Peirce, thinking with signs necessarily involves modifying prior knowledge of the object – meaning one’s conception of the object is a version of what was already known; while for Deleuze, thinking with signs can involve producing ideas at a second remove from the object – in turn, creating and erasing new object(s). Ultimately, this essay contributes to research on Deleuze’s cinema books by undertaking a detailed reading of a part of his discussion that has not been analyzed. Furthermore, in producing Deleuze’s concept of a sign that creates and erases its object, this essay reminds us how we think – andcouldthink – with signs, reaffirming the importance of semiotic analysis for discussion about thinking with signs. Finally, this essay contributes to scholarship on Deleuze’s and Peirce’s semiotics. (shrink)

What is it for the same word or expression to occur in two different contexts? One is inclined to say that the word “rat” does not occur in “Socrates loved Plato,” but it is harder to justify this statement than might be thought. This issue lies in the midst of a tangle of issues, a number of which are investigated in an important but little-discussed article of Anscombe’s, in which she considers the question whether the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (...) can be read as proposing a “micro-reductionist” theory of language: i.e., a theory which states non-circular conditions for any given sound’s having a meaning. Anscombe answers the question negatively; and indeed there are obstacles faced by any such theory of language. Our investigation turns out to have implications not only within philosophy of language, but also within philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

In her book Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle argues that Montaigne’s thought is dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Unlike Hegel’s progressive dialectic, however, Montaigne’s thought is, according to Hartle, circular in that the reconciliation of opposed terms comes not in the form of a newly emergent term, but in a return to the first term, where the meaning of the first is transformed as a result of its dialectical interaction with the second. This analysis motivates Hartle’s claim that (...) Montaigne is not a skeptic at all, let alone a Pyrrhonian skeptic. In this paper, I argue that Hartle’s circular-dialectical interpretation of Montaigne is not only compatible with Pyrrhonism, but is in fact an ideal model for understanding Sextus Empiricus’s skeptical therapy. (shrink)

Roger Crisp presents a comprehensive study of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, a landmark work first published in 1874. Crisp argues that Sidgwick is largely right about many central issues in moral philosophy: the metaphysics and epistemology of ethics, consequentialism, hedonism about well-being, and the weight to be given to self-interest. He holds that Sidgwick's long discussion of 'common-sense' morality is probably the best discussion of deontology we have. And yet The Methods of Ethics can be hard to (...) understand, and this is perhaps one reason why, though it is a philosophical goldmine, few have ventured deeply into it. What does Sidgwick mean by a 'method'? Why does he discuss only three methods? What are his arguments for hedonism and for utilitarianism? How can we make sense of the idea of moral intuition? What is the role of virtue in Sidgwick's ethics? Crisp addresses these and many other questions, offering a fresh view of Sidgwick's text which will assist any moral philosopher to gain more from it. (shrink)