Why indeed? Yet the postulation of just such nonconceptual states of consciousness is crucial to Professor Sellars’s account of the way in which sensing is essential to perceiving.

This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.

You and I reach for a dollar bill on the floor, each saying “I saw it first.” The content of what we say is identically the same. How then is your claim referred to you and mine to me? We argue that the reference of self-ascriptions is effected by the occasion of the occurrence of the first-person indexical rather than by the content of the thought or assertion which then occurs. That this is true has further implications for exotic, self-fulfilling (...) self-ascriptions, like the Cartesian Cogito ; for views like those of Geach and Anscombe, who hold that ‘I’ is not a singular referring expression at all; and for views which hold that the first-person indexical is a singular referring expression with a very special, “systematically ambiguous” content. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.

This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.

This paper is concerned with Chisholm's "adverbial theory of sensing". An attempt is made to give a literal statement of what it means "to sense redly" which is consistent with what Chisholm says about sensing and also meets various objections to adverbial theories. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of why it is that Chisholm does not offer an adverbial theory of perceiving, or of thinking in general, as well as of sensing.

Depuis quelques années, les sciences sociales françaises – la sociologie en tête – connaissent une période de vive tension caractérisée en particulier par des attaques concernant le caractère « idéologique » – et donc non scientifique – de la discipline et sa vulnérabilité face à l’invasion du « décolonialisme » venu des États-Unis. Pourtant, la plupart de ces accusations reposent sur des approximations, des erreurs et des méconnaissances qu’il est nécessaire de corriger pour bien faire la différence entre par exemple (...) le « décolonialisme » dénoncé par les néo-républicains – politiques ou universitaires – et la « pensée décoloniale » qui est le résultat d’une histoire complexe et dont le caractère critique provient d’une opposition épistémologique à l’universalisme abstrait de type occidental. Un rapide panorama de certains mouvements académiques non occidentaux montre d’ailleurs qu’une grande partie des pensées contre-hégémoniques ont adopté une posture critique afin de pouvoir envisager un nouvel universalisme. (shrink)

Models are of central importance in many scientific contexts. The centrality of models such as inflationary models in cosmology, general-circulation models of the global climate, the double-helix model of DNA, evolutionary models in biology, agent-based models in the social sciences, and general-equilibrium models of markets in their respective domains is a case in point (the Other Internet Resources section at the end of this entry contains links to online resources that discuss these models). Scientists spend significant amounts of time building, (...) testing, comparing, and revising models, and much journal space is dedicated to interpreting and discussing the implications of models. In short, models are one of the principal instruments of modern science. (shrink)

Editorial: the second phenomenology, by A. T. Tymieniecka.--Roman Ingarden, critique de Bergson, par J. M. Fataud.--Some remarks on the ego in the phenomenology of Husserl, by C. van Peursen.--The empirical and transcendental ego, by M. Natanson.--Rencontre et dialogue, par E. Minkowski.--Quelques thèmes d'une phénoménologie de rêve, par J. Héring.--Man and his life-world, by J. Wild.--Die Verwirklichung des Wesens in der Sprache der Dichtung: Gustave Flaubert, von F. Kaufmann.--Le langage de la poésie, par J. F. Mora.--L'analyse de l'idée et la participation, (...) par A. T. Tymieniecka. (shrink)

It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semantic view (...) of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation might be sought. (shrink)

Roman Darowski. Philosophical Anthropology: Outline of Fundamental Problems. Translated from Polish by Łukasz Darowski SDS. Wydawnictwo Ignatianum [Editions of Ignatianum, The Jesuit University of Cracow, Wydawnictwo WAM: Cracow, 2014.—Author’s summary The translation of this book into English we are dealing with here is a somewhat changed and revised version of the 4th edition of Filozofia człowieka in Polish. The last section has been expanded, while the “History of Philosophical Anthropology” chapter and the Anthology of Texts section have both been omitted.