Immanuel Kant is, famously, not only the major philosopher of European enlightenment, but also one of the first philosophers to develop a philosophical theory of “human races”. How do these two sides of Kant relate to each other? What is the significance of race in Kant’s philosophy? In this article, we aim to discuss these questions by taking a close look into the conceptual and philosophical presuppositions underlying Kant’s understanding of race; relating them to the concept of teleology as developed (...) by Kant in the Critique of Judgement and to the idea of natural history that can be derived from there. In the last two chapters, we intertwine both perspectives in such a way that, on the one hand, we can determine the philosophical significance of race for Kant, and, on the other hand, show how a race-sensible perspective gives new and critical insight into Kant’s concept of reason. (shrink)

Hermeneutics can be understood on the one hand as the art of interpretation, and on the other hand as a medium for dealing with the past, for conveying events, contexts or even writings in new ways of speaking for new recipients. The interpretation of writings, however, places special demands on hermeneutics: it does not take place in a sterile vacuum, but is rather embedded in a social and cultural context that shapes the interpretation or mediation and is an expression of (...) a time, a fashion or a specific requirement of modernity. The question therefore arises as to what role reason and experience, science and/or social ideas, tradition(s) and/or community play in interpretation. Using Thomas More's masterpiece Utopia as an example, various resulting interpretative approaches to a concrete writing will be presented. Through the hermeneutic design of a historical horizon in relation to Thomas More's time as well as through the development of a historical awareness of the work, the possibility of an understanding of this world-famous, still controversial writing as well as the efficiency of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics will become recognisable. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the ideas in the context of the conception of reason in terms of formal logic according to which it is the faculty of inferring mediately. By this, the impression widespread in secondary literature arises that the pure concepts of reason according to Kant have a syllogistic sense, i. e. are either based on syllogisms or stand otherwise in relation with them. This paper argues instead: that Kant derives the ideas – similar to (...) the pure concepts of understanding – by means of a metaphysical deduction from the functions of all thinking in the so-called table of judgements; that accordingly – as the categories – they demand a consequent judgement-theoretical explanation; yet, that here the thinking functions that fall under the title of relation find a different employment; and that therefore the judgements which result from this possess the status of final principles for human experience wherein the conception of reason in terms of transcendental logic consists. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Heidelberg, 1976, under the title: Elemente zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Kant und Fichte in Teubingen und Bern.

At the end of the chapter on paralogisms in the first edition of his _Critique of Pure Reason, Kant treats the problem of the transcendental illusion in a very detailed way which is not exceeded in the second edition. The essay gives an exhaustive commentary to this passage leading to the result that the unavoidability of transcendental illusion has to be taken seriously in that sense that human reason in his theoretical use cannot conceived other than liable to illusion.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 3 Seiten: 523-527.

Praktische Vernunft, Handlungstheorien und Moralvorstellungen. Ein Interessantes Werk zum Thema Handeln udn Denken.

überall einen richtigen Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft giebt, in welchem Fall es auch einen Canon derselben geben muß, so wird dieser nicht den speculativen, sondernden pr.ntischen Vernunftgebrauch betreffen, den wir also iezt ...