In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. by Samuel WrightAnusha Rao (bio)A Time of Novelty: Logic, Emotion, and Intellectual Life in Early Modern India, 1500-1700 C.E. By Samuel Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xxi + 278. Paper $99.00, isbn 978-0-197568-16-3Samuel Wright's A Time of Novelty examines the discipline of Nyāya, or Sanskrit logic, between 1500 (...) and 1700 CE and argues that novelty, both as an intellectual and affective category, was the structuring principle through which Nyāya intellectuals built a philosophical community in early modernity. Wright uses a set of essays and commentaries by Nyāya philosophers on a range of topics to reflect on how intellectual life in this period was shaped by critical inquiry, emotion, and manuscript culture.The book studies a very fruitful, if contentious, period within the history of Sanskrit intellectual disciplines. Sheldon Pollock's "Sanskrit Knowledge Systems on the Eve of Colonialism" (SKSEC project) was the first to draw attention to this period as early modernity in India. Pollock has pointed to both parallels with and differences from modernity in Europe. Since then, scholarly attention has been directed to how periodizing techniques were used by Nyāya intellectuals, and to the relationship that these "new" Nyāya intellectuals had with the tradition. While Wright is in general agreement with the aims of the SKSEC project, he argues against focusing exclusively on intellectual historical change without understanding the values and sentiments that underwrite intellection. For this reason, the book undertakes the challenging task of linking a set of understudied Nyāya arguments with philosophy of emotions to understand affective novelty. This offers interesting insights into the emotional concerns behind Nyāya intellection in a way that earlier scholarship has been unable to, but it has the disadvantage of imposing frameworks alien to Nyāya philosophers onto their arguments--such as Wright's arguments about how space is produced in chapter 3.The book is organized into six chapters, each of which deals with an important topic within Nyāya arguments in early modern India. While the first four chapters, titled "Doubt," "Objectivity," "Happiness," and "Dying," directly deal with these contentious issues and debates around them by Nyāya thinkers, in the last two chapters, "Space" and "Time," Wright does not take up specific arguments from primary texts, but focuses on how we can best understand the space that Nyāya intellectuals inhabited and how novelty can be conceptualised in time. [End Page 1]In the first chapter on doubt, Wright zooms in on arguments about how doubting cognitions emerge, focusing particularly on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and how commentators present his novel position on the issue. Earlier Nyāya intellectuals argued that speech and other indirect forms of perception could not generate doubting cognitions. Instead, they advanced a theory of apperceptive doubt, where doubt arises in a subsequent, remembering cognition. Raghunātha, on the other hand, argues that doubting cognitions can arise directly from speech, and he substantially changes the definition of doubt, a change which is noted and carefully explained by his commentators. Beginning with the theory of doubt allows Wright to then examine how the new definition of doubt leads to structural changes in the crafting of Nyāya debates, particularly in genres such as the short essay (vāda), where the topic of contention is stated in the newly developed format. Wright also links this debate with the notion of trust. Careful attention to how the debate is framed by commentators also underscores the emotional underpinnings of the argument--the "old" view is not to be trusted, since it does not stand up to reasoning (p. 60). Doubting cognitions are not ignored in Nyāya, but become the beginning point of debates and discussions, demonstrating that Nyāya philosophers in early modern India were fashioning a community that engaged peers through new ways of understanding and caring about critical inquiry.The second chapter focuses on arguments around objectivity and deals at greater length with the periodizing techniques used by Nyāya thinkers in the early modern period. This... (shrink)

Novelty is neither necessary nor sufficient to link curiosity and creativity as stated in the target article. We point out the article's logical shortcomings, outline preconditions that may link curiosity and creativity, and suggest that curiosity and creativity may be expressions of a common epistemic drive.

In this bold book, Samuel Wright traces a “new history for Sanskrit logic” via a deep and comprehensive study of almost 5,000 little-known Sanskrit manuscripts. His thesis is that the ear...

Why do new things happen? Boyle answers through consideration of a conceptual history of the new, logical formalization of how novelty occurs, discussion of the relevance of novelty to scientific questions surrounding Earth, life and consciousness, and integrative reading of the respective philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger.

It is commonly claimed that the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is contained in its premises and says nothing new. In 'Deduction and Novelty,' in The Reasoner 5 (4), pp. 56-57, I refuted that claim. In The Reasoner, 8 (3), pp. 24-25, David McBride criticised my refutation. I show that McBride’s arguments are unsound.

Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view that the temporal relationship between (...) hypothesis and evidence really does matter. More specifically, they advocated the thesis that successful predictions implied by scientific hypothesis H will increase the degree of confirmation of H only if they are novel predictions in the following sense; Evidence E is heuristically novel with respect to hypothesis H if and only if H was not deliberately designed to explain E (if E has already been corroborated) or in anticipation of E (if E is regarded as likely to be corroborated at some future date). Campbell and Vinci argue that the traditional interpretation of Bayes' Theorem misconstrues the significance of predictive novelty by ignoring heuristic novelty. In this paper I review the formal component of their preferred interpretation and demonstrate that it fails to establish that heuristic novelty has any special effect on theory confirmation. That is, even on their revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether H was deliberately designed to explain known evidence E (or in anticipation of suspected E), or whether H was designed without any awareness of the entailment relationship between H and E, Bayes' Theorem will generate the same epistemic probability for hypothesis H. Cases where new evidence was not foreseen at the time a hypothesis first emerged do not carry any more epistemic weight than they would have if such evidence had been foreseen. * Research on this paper was supported by an NEH summer grant. My thanks also to Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci for their reply to my initial evaluation of their position (in private correspondence), which compelled me to reconsider their arguments more carefully. (shrink)

Alain Badiou’s treatment of objects in Logics of Worlds is both rich and highly technical, though its terminological challenges are softened by his use of illuminating examples. This article takes a twofold approach to the topic. In a first sense, the theory of objects developed in Logics of Worlds by way of an imagined protest at the Place de la République in Paris exhibits two questionable aspects: (1) the notion that the object is a bundle of qualities (found proverbially in (...) Hume, but also in Kant’s “transcendental object=X”), and (2) the ultimately idealist assumption of a possible isomorphy between appearance and reality. But in a second sense, Badiou’s transcendental account of worlds leads him to a fascinating theory of exemplary entities, one that is immune to the critiques of onto-theology made by Heidegger and Derrida. This can be found in his account of the “transcendental functor” in Alexander the Great’s decisive victory over Darius III at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 B.C.E. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is contained in its premises. Popper refuted this claim when he showed that an empirical theory can be expected always to have logical consequences that transcend the current understanding of the theory. This implies that no formalisation of an empirical theory will enable the derivation of all its logical consequences. I call this result ‘Popper-incompleteness.’ This result appears to be consistent with the view of deductive reasoning (...) as a process of unfurling the content of the premises; but I suggest that the result about validity impugns this theory of reasoning. (shrink)

Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move (...) simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality. (shrink)

Logic and Knowledge -/- Editor: Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano Ippoliti Date Of Publication: Aug 2011 Isbn13: 978-1-4438-3008-9 Isbn: 1-4438-3008-9 -/- The problematic relation between logic and knowledge has given rise to some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, from Books VI–VII of Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. It provides the title of an important collection of papers (...) by Bertrand Russell (Logic and Knowledge. Essays, 1901–1950). However, it has remained an underdeveloped theme in the last century, because logic has been treated as separate from knowledge. -/- This book does not hope to make up for a century-long absence of discussion. Rather, its ambition is to call attention to the theme and stimulating renewed reflection upon it. The book collects essays of leading figures in the field and it addresses the theme as a topic of current debate, or as a historical case study, or when appropriate as both. Each essay is followed by the comments of a younger discussant, in an attempt to transform what might otherwise appear as a monologue into an ongoing dialogue; each section begins with an historical essay and ends with an essay by one of the editors. -/- Carlo Cellucci is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. He is currently completing a book entitled, Remaking Logic: What is Logic Really? -/- Emily Grosholz is Professor of Philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University, USA. She is the author of Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathematics and the Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2007). -/- Emiliano Ippoliti is a Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza,’ Italy. His main interests are heuristics, the logic of discovery, and problem-solving. He is currently working on a book, Ampliating Knowledge: Data, Hypotheses and Novelty. -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................. xxv -/- Section I: Logic and Knowledge -/- Chapter One................................................................................................. 3 The Cognitive Importance of Sight and Hearing in Seventeenthand Eighteenth-Century Logic (Mirella Capozzi) Discussion .............................................................................................. 26 (Chiara Fabbrizi) Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 33 Nominalistic Content (Jody Azzouni) Discussion ............................................................................................... 52 (Silvia De Bianchi) Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57 A Garden of Grounding Trees (Göran Sundholm) Discussion.......................................................................................... .. 75 (Luca Incurvati) Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 81 Logics and Metalogics (Timothy Williamson) Discussion.......................................................................................... 101 (Cesare Cozzo) Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 109 Is Knowledge the Most General Factive Stative Attitude? (Cesare Cozzo) Discussion.......................................................................................... 117 (Timothy Williamson) Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 123 Classifying and Justifying Inference Rules (Carlo Cellucci) Discussion.......................................................................................... 143 (Norma B. Goethe) -/- Section II: Logic and Science -/- Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 The Universal Generalization Problem and the Epistemic Status of Ancient Medicine: Aristotle and Galen (Riccardo Chiaradonna) Discussion.......................................................................................... 168 (Diana Quarantotto) Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 175 The Empiricist View of Logic (Donald Gillies) Discussion.......................................................................................... 191 (Paolo Pecere) Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 197 Artificial Intelligence and Evolutionary Theory: Herbert Simon’s Unifying Framework (Roberto Cordeschi) Discussion.......................................................................................... 216 (Francesca Ervas) Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 221 Evolutionary Psychology and Morality: The Renaissance of Emotivism? (Mario De Caro) Discussion.......................................................................................... 232 (Annalisa Paese) Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 237 Between Data and Hypotheses (Emiliano Ippoliti) Discussion.......................................................................................... 262 (Fabio Sterpetti) -/- Section III: Logic and Mathematics -/- Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 273 Dedekind Against Intuition: Rigor, Scope and the Motives of his Logicism (Michael Detlefsen) Discussion.......................................................................................... 290 (Marianna Antonutti) Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 297 Mathematical Intuition: Poincaré, Polya, Dewey (Reuben Hersh) Discussion.......................................................................................... 324 (Claudio Bernardi) Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 329 On the Finite: Kant and the Paradoxes of Knowledge (Carl Posy) Discussion.......................................................................................... 358 (Silvia Di Paolo) Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 363 Assimilation: Not Only Indiscernibles are Identified (Robert Thomas) Discussion.......................................................................................... 380 (Diego De Simone) Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 385 Proofs and Perfect Syllogisms (Dag Prawitz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 403 (Julien Murzi) Chapter Seventeen ................................................................................... 411 Logic, Mathematics, Heterogeneity (Emily Grosholz) Discussion.......................................................................................... 427 (Valeria Giardino) -/- Contributors........................................................................................ ..... 433 Index............................................................................................... ......... 437 -/- Price Uk Gbp: 49.99 Price Us Usd: 74.99. 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This volume offers a wide range of both reconstructions of Nikolai Vasiliev’s original logical ideas and their implementations in the modern logic and philosophy. A collection of works put together through the international workshop "Nikolai Vasiliev’s Logical Legacy and the Modern Logic," this book also covers foundations of logic in the light of Vasiliev’s contradictory ontology. Chapters range from a look at the Heuristic and Conceptual Background of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic to Generalized Vasiliev-style Propositions. It includes works which (...) cover Imaginary and Non-Aristotelian Logics, Inconsistent Set Theory and the Expansion of Mathematical Thinking, Plurivalent Logic, and the Impact of Vasiliev's Imaginary Logic on Epistemic Logic. The Russian logician, Vasiliev, was widely recognized as one of the forerunners of modern non-classical logic. His "imaginary logic" developed in some of his work at the beginning of 20th century is often considered to be one of the first systems of paraconsistent and multi-valued logic. The novelty of his logical project has opened up prospects for modern logic as well as for non-classical science in general. This volume contains a selection of papers written by modern specialists in the field and deals with various aspects of Vasiliev's logical ideas. The logical legacy of Nikolai Vasiliev can serve as a promising source for developing an impressive range of philosophical interpretations, as it marries promising technical innovations with challenging philosophical insights. (shrink)

We introduce proof nets and sequent calculus for the multiplicative fragment of non-commutative logic, which is an extension of both linear logic and cyclic linear logic. The two main technical novelties are a third switching position for the non-commutative disjunction, and the structure of order variety.

Information about the environment is captured in human biological systems on a variety of interacting levels – in distributions of genes, linguistic particulars, concepts, methods, theories, preferences, and overt behaviors. I investigate some of the basic principles which govern such a hierarchy by constructing a comparatively simple three-level selection model of bee foraging preferences and behaviors. The information-theoretic notion of ''''mutual information'''' is employed as a measure of efficiency in tracking a changing environment, and its appropriateness in epistemological applications is (...) discussed at some length. In particular, information accumulated in mid-level preference distributions exhibits suggestive properties for the purposes of naturalistic epistemology. It also appears that the novelty of scientific objects and representations and the rapidity of scientific change relative to genetic change need present no obstacle to the use of such models in explanations of scientific progress and the reliability of scientific judgement. (shrink)

Standard reasoning about Kripke semantics for modal logic is almost always based on a background framework of classical logic. Can proofs for familiar definability theorems be carried out using anonclassical substructural logicas the metatheory? This article presents a semantics for positive substructural modal logic and studies the connection between frame conditions and formulas, via definability theorems. The novelty is that all the proofs are carried out with anoncontractive logicin the background. This sheds light on which modal principles are invariant (...) under changes of metalogic, and provides (further) evidence for the general viability of nonclassical mathematics. (shrink)

This article proposes the meeting of fuzzy logic with paraconsistency in a very precise and foundational way. Specifically, in this article we introduce expansions of the fuzzy logic MTL by means of primitive operators for consistency and inconsistency in the style of the so-called Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). The main novelty of the present approach is the definition of postulates for this type of operators over MTL-algebras, leading to the definition and axiomatization of a family of logics, expansions (...) of MTL, whose degree-preserving counterpart are paraconsistent and moreover LFIs. (shrink)

Sortal concepts are at the center of certain logical discussions and have played a significant role in solutions to particular problems in philosophy. Apart from logic and philosophy, the study of sortal concepts has found its place in specific fields of psychology, such as the theory of infant cognitive development and the theory of human perception. In this monograph, different formal logics for sortal concepts and sortal-related logical notions are characterized. Most of these logics are intensional in nature (...) and possess, in addition, a bidimensional character. That is, they simultaneously represent two different logical dimensions. In most cases, the dimensions are those of time and natural necessity, and, in other cases, those of time and epistemic necessity. Another feature of the logics in question concerns second-order quantification over sortal concepts, a logical notion that is also represented in the logics. Some of the logics adopt a constant domain interpretation, others a varying domain interpretation of such quantification. Two of the above bidimensional logics are philosophically grounded on predication sortalism, that is, on the philosophical view that predication necessarily requires sortal concepts. Another bidimensional logic constitutes a logic for complex sortal predicates. These three sorts of logics are among the important novelties of this work since logics with similar features have not been developed up to now, and they might be instrumental for the solution of philosophically significant problems regarding sortal predicates. The book assumes a modern variant of conceptualism as a philosophical background. For this reason, the approach to sortal predicates is in terms of sortal concepts. Concepts, in general, are here understood as intersubjective realizable cognitive capacities. The proper features of sortal concepts are determined by an analysis of the main features of sortal predicates. Posterior to this analysis, the sortal-related logical notions represented in the above logics are discussed. There is also a discussion on the extent to which the set-theoretic formal semantic systems of the book capture different aspects of the conceptualist approach to sortals. These different semantic frameworks are also related to realist and nominalist approaches to sortal predicates, and possible modifications to them are considered that might represent those alternative approaches. (shrink)

Recent students of late medieval intellectual history have treated Oxford theologians' Sentences lectures from the 1320s to 1330s as revealing the interface of the theological, logical, and scientific thinking characteristic of a historically momentous ‘New English Theology’. Its conceptual achievement, historians generally concur, was the casting off of the speculative metaphysics of such thirteenth-century authors as Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon; its methodological novelty made it akin to twentieth-century analytic philosophy and seminal for the early Scientific Revolution. Yet (...) the metaphysically cast thirteenth-century sciences of perspectiva and astrologia persisted among scholars long into the early modern period. To show how this apparent paradox may be dissolved, this article details the intersection of thirteenth-century metaphysics and fourteenth-century analysis in the lectures of a controversial and influential proponent of the Oxford theology of the 1330s. (shrink)

Four instances of how science fiction contributes to the elucidation of novelty in the context of discovery are considered by extending existing discussions on temporal and use-novelty. In the first instance, science fiction takes an already well-known theory and produces its own re-interpretation; in the second instance, the scientific account is usually straightforward and whatever novelty that may occur would be more along the lines of how the science is deployed to extra-scientific matters; in the third instance, (...) science fiction takes an idea that appears impossible within the delimitations of reality and produces a universe where such a possibility becomes feasible; and in the fourth instance, science fiction extends from an idea already known at the time of the work’s production to simulate a possibility that could emerge should the extension be experimentally viable. However, the article will not end with a mere evaluation of these instances, but also proposes instances on how science fiction could contribute to new ways of experiencing, discerning, and working with scientific knowledge. (shrink)

We present a single sequent calculus common to classical, intuitionistic and linear logics. The main novelty is that classical, intuitionistic and linear logics appear as fragments, i.e. as particular classes of formulas and sequents. For instance, a proof of an intuitionistic formula A may use classical or linear lemmas without any restriction: but after cut-elimination the proof of A is wholly intuitionistic, what is superficially achieved by the subformula property and more deeply by a very careful treatment of structural (...) rules. This approach is radically different from the one that consists in “changing the rule of the game” when we want to change logic, e.g. pass from one style of sequent to another: here, there is only one logic, which—depending on its use—may appear classical, intuitionistic or linear. (shrink)

This work is divided in two papers (Part I and Part II). In Part I, we study a class of polymodal logics (herein called the class of "Rare-logics") for which the set of terms indexing the modal operators are hierarchized in two levels: the set of Boolean terms and the set of terms built upon the set of Boolean terms. By investigating different algebraic properties satisfied by the models of the Rare-logics, reductions for decidability are established by faithfully translating the (...) Rare-logics into more standard modal logics. The main idea of the translation consists in eliminating the Boolean terms by taking advantage of the components construction and in using various properties of the classes of semilattices involved in the semantics. The novelty of our approach allows us to prove new decidability results (presented in Part II), in particular for information logics derived from rough set theory and we open new perspectives to define proof systems for such logics (presented also in Part II). (shrink)

The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate (...) how the formal machinery of our systems can be used to reconstruct a number of interesting ideas in the Logic of Agency and Action that have been proposed by authors like von Wright, von Kutschera, Belnap and Segerberg. (shrink)

Early 20th century philosopher Henri Bergson posited an initial push that propelled the diversity of life forward into a varied, novel future: The élan vital, a necessary force or impulse that animated life’s progress and development. His idea had largely been abandoned by mid-century. Even so, much of the conceptual and explanatory work this impulse targeted is yet in want of an explanation. In particular, Bergson’s derelict ideas on evolution addressed three areas that have once again become relevant in the (...) effort to unite evolutionary genetics, biological development, and ecological context : the purposeful nature of individual organisms and their parts; the integrative, holistic, non-linear emergent dynamics seen in evolutionary processes; and how genuine novelty emerges into the universe :422, 2016; Simondon et al. in On the mode of existence of technical objects. Univocal series, Univocal Publishing LLC, Minneapolis, 2017; Bang, in: Winther-Lindqvist, Bang, Valsiner Nothingness: philosophical insights into psychology, Transaction Publishers, Somerset, 2016; Moreno and Mossio in Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry. History, philosophy and theory of the life sciences, Springer, Dordrecht, 2015). In this paper I argue that Bergson’s ideas may yet be relevant to these questions, and his work warrants a reexamination in light of current problems in evolutionary biology. This is not a call to ‘return’ to Bergson, nevertheless his notions about complexity suggest ways of looking at current biological problems in ways that offer a heuristic insight worth entertaining. Bergson’s Nobel Prize-winning book, Creative Evolution, provided a strikingly prescient early 20th century framework for understanding how Darwinian evolution acts as an engine for generating new forms, University Press of America, Lanham, Bergson 1911). (shrink)

This paper deals with the algebraization of multi-signature equational logic in the context of the modern theory of categorical abstract algebraic logic. Two are the novelties compared to traditional treatments: First, interpretations between different algebraic types are handled in the object language rather than the metalanguage. Second, rather than constructing the type of the algebraizing class of algebras explicitly in an ad-hoc universal algebraic way, the whole clone is naturally constructed using categorical algebraic techniques.

In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4— our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4— not in the framework of Kirpke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of models but (...) also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. (shrink)

The fundamental assumptions in Dijkstra''s influential article on computing science teaching are challenged. Dijkstra''s paper presents the radical novelties of computing, and the consequent problems that we must tackle through a formal, logic-based approach to program derivation. Dijkstra''s main premise is that the algorithmic programming paradigm is the only one, in fact, the only possible one. It is argued that there is at least one other, the network-programming paradigm, which itself is a radical novelty with respect to the implementation (...) of problems on computers. And, as one might expect of a radical alternative, it shows much of the conventional wisdom concerning computing science, which Dijkstra variously attacks and dispenses, to be special pleading; not universals of computing at all. Finally, we explore what is known of this new paradigm in order to see what light it sheds on the fundamental problems that computing really does present to us. Not surprisingly, some become less problematic, some disappear altogether and others take their place, but, in general, it must be of benefit to modern computer technology to gain a wider perspective on the possibilities instead of seeing everything through the traditional tunnel of programming as formula derivation, and computers as the requisite, special type of symbol manipulation device. (shrink)

In order to present the incidence of the dynamic turn in the logic of scientific research, we begin with a section, in this article, that deals with logical games as triggers of this dynamic turn in contemporary logic, together with the program of logical dynamics of information and interaction. We briefly introduce the main characteristics of the logic favorable to independence and the game-theoretical semantics, of dialogical logic, as well as the essential elements of this program. Although from (...) any of these points of view we have a list of logical tools to deal with more clearly epistemological issues, we highlight the role of dynamic epistemic logic, to which we dedicate the following section. There follows another one in which we enter the logical studies of abduction as one of the fundamental problems of contemporary epistemology and, in a new section, in terms of the theoretical constructs of the preceding sections, we present and explain a phenomenon that emerged in the field of linguistics, the case of the discovery of the Amazonian language pirahã, which should be considered an anomaly within the framework of the Chomskian theory. (shrink)

This paper rereads John Dewey's works in the light of complexity theory and self‐organising systems. Dewey's pragmatic inquiry is posited as inspirational for developing a logic of education and learning that would incorporate novelty and creativity, these artistic elements being part and parcel of the science of complexity. Dewey's philosophical concepts are explored against the background of such founders of dynamical systems theory as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Ervin Laszlo, and Erich Jantsch. If, in this process, Dewey's thought appears to (...) undergo some transformation, this would only confirm Jim ) belief that Dewey would welcome, in accord with his own philosophical project, the reconstruction of his own ideas so as to better respond to contingencies and challenges of new times, places and contexts. The paper introduces some elements of non‐linear dynamics, relating them to the problematic of learning and the transformation of habits. Finally, the paper addresses a delicate balance between novelty and confirmation in a self‐organised system, positing it as an issue of pedagogical significance. (shrink)

In part one of this paper we shall elucidate an operational concept of logical simplicity as it seems to function in natural science. Although this is a tentative and exploratory formulation, its novelty, relative to the great European philosophical tradition, seems to require a preliminary warning about misunderstandings.In Part Two we shall apply the formulation to social inquiry and make a positive suggestion for further development of the proposal.

Although written in Japanese, this book becomes a landmark of my works so far: that on Zangwill (Kaneko, 2011), that on Utilitarianism (2013), and so on. The novelty shown in it is a formalization of traditional philosophy including Kant (its practical philosophy), Utilitarianism (Hume, Bentham, and Mill), and furthermore, Descartes. I try to locate these traditional thoughts within modern forms which I make in the name of "practical syllogism." This attempt would open up a new approach to ethical motivation.

In this paper we consider an intuitionistic variant of the modal logic S4 (which we call IS4). The novelty of this paper is that we place particular importance on the natural deduction formulation of IS4 -- our formulation has several important metatheoretic properties. In addition, we study models of IS4 -- not in the framework of Kripke semantics, but in the more general framework of category theory. This allows not only a more abstract definition of a whole class of (...) models but also a means of modelling proofs as well as provability. (shrink)

This article provides the foundation for a new predictive theory of animal learning that is based upon a simple logical model. The knowledge of experimental subjects at a given time is described using logical equations. These logical equations are then used to predict a subject’s response when presented with a known or a previously unknown situation. This new theory suc- cessfully anticipates phenomena that existing theories predict, as well as phenomena that they cannot. It provides a theoretical (...) account for phenomena that are beyond the domain of existing models, such as extinction and the detection of novelty, from which “external inhibition” can be explained. Examples of the methods applied to make predictions are given using previously published results. The present theory proposes a new way to envision the minimal functions of the nervous system, and provides possible new insights into the way that brains ultimately create and use knowledge about the world. (shrink)

We introduce and study a new approach to the theory of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) that explores the use of many-sorted behavioral logic in the role traditionally played by unsorted equational logic. Our aim is to extend the range of applicability of AAL toward providing a meaningful algebraic counterpart also to logics with a many-sorted language, and possibly including non-truth-functional connectives. The proposed behavioral approach covers logics which are not algebraizable according to the standard approach, while also bringing a new (...) algebraic perspective to logics which are algebraizable using the standard tools of AAL. Furthermore, we pave the way toward a robust behavioral theory of AAL, namely by providing a behavioral version of the Leibniz operator which allows us to generalize the traditional Leibniz hierarchy, as well as several well-known characterization results. A number of meaningful examples will be used to illustrate the novelties and advantages of the approach. (shrink)

Hybrid logics are extensions of standard modal logics, which significantly increase the expressive power of the latter. Since most of hybrid logics are known to be decidable, decision procedures for them is a widely investigated field of research. So far, several tableau calculi for hybrid logics have been presented in the literature. In this paper we introduce a sound, complete and terminating tableau calculus T H(@,E,D, ♦ −) for hybrid logics with the satisfaction operators, the universal modality, the difference modality (...) and the inverse modality as well as the corresponding sequent calculus S H(@,E,D, ♦ −) . They not only uniformly cover relatively wide range of various hybrid logics but they are also conceptually simple and enable effective search for a minimal model for a satisfiable formula. The main novelty is the exploitation of the unrestricted blocking mechanism introduced as an explicit, sound tableau rule. (shrink)

Physics depends on “physical intuition”, much of which is formulated in terms of Mathematics. Mathematics itself depends on Logic. The paper presents three latest novelties in Logic which have major consequences in Mathematics. Further, it presents two possible significant departures in Mathematics itself. These five departures can have major implications in Physics. Some of them are indicated, among them in Quantum Mechanics and Relativity.

We introduce a notion of the Kripke model for classical logic for which we constructively prove the soundness and cut-free completeness. We discuss the novelty of the notion and its potential applications.

Brilliantly elaborating and defending his doctrine of "neoclassical metaphysics," for which reality is a process containing necessary, unchanging features as well as contingent particulars whose advent involves novelty, Hartshorne has contributed a work of permanent value to philosophical theology. The book contains a long defense of Anselm's ontological argument, interpreted in neoclassical terms. Hartshorne deals with some twenty standard objections, and argues that Anselm's proof is not that God must have the predicate "existence," but rather that perfection cannot be (...) contingent. The conclusion is that perfection is necessary, for otherwise it is meaningless. The other chapters are largely drawn from previously published papers, and lack unity, though they cast additional light on neoclassical metaphysics.--R. C. N. (shrink)

This article analyzes the historical development of the philosophical logic syntax from the standpoint of the unity of historical and logical methods. According to this perspective, there are three types of logical syntax: the elementary subject-predicate, the modified definitivespecificative, and the standard propositional-functional. These types are generalized in the grammatical and mathematical styles of logical syntax. The main attention is paid to two scientific revolutions in elementary subject-predicate syntax, which led to the emergence of modified definitive-specific and (...) standard propositional-functional syntaxes and created the syntactic conditions for the development of contemporary philosophical logic. The specifics of contemporary philosophical logic and the methodological possibilities of its application to philosophical discourse are studied. The article aims to reevaluate the undeservedly forgotten systems of philosophical logic of the continental tradition, created by such prominent representatives as Aristotle, G.W.F. Hegel, and E. Husserl, and to actualize these logics in the context of contemporary philosophical culture. The potential of the above-mentioned logics is not fully involved in the philosophical discourse of modernity, primarily because they primarily used an imperfect elementary subject-predicate syntax and modified definitive-specificative syntax as its slightly improved version. Both syntaxes have one thing in common: the grammatical style of sentence structure. Nevertheless, they also have one common flaw – a high dependence on grammar formalism. As a result, the interaction between these syntaxes and Frege’s standard propositional-functional syntax is impossible, because the latter is based on mathematical formalism, which operates on the philosophical logic of the analytic tradition. The article substantiates the way to solve this problem by constructing a modified subject-predicate syntax of contemporary philosophical logic. This syntax provides information interaction between Aristotle’s elementary subject-predicate syntax, and Frege’s standard propositional-functional syntax based on Hegel’s modified definitive-specificative syntax. The proposed solution to this problem can create new opportunities for complementarity and mutual enrichment between the philosophical logic of continental and analytical traditions. The theoretical basis for the construction and study of contemporary philosophical logic is a functional analysis of contemporary symbolic logic, which improves the grammatical analysis of traditional formal logic. Functional-grammatical analysis is a way to rehabilitate the philosophical logic of the continental tradition. The novelty of this paper lies in the substantiation of the modified subjectpredicate syntax of contemporary philosophical logic. It makes it possible to establish a dialogue between continental and analytical traditions, which is designed to promote the further development of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic (CIFOL; Belnap and Müller (2013)). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events (extending all the way into the future) that that moment (...) is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

The idea of a 'logic of quantum mechanics' or quantum logic was originally suggested by Birkhoff and von Neumann in their pioneering paper [1936]. Since that time there has been much argument about whether, or in what sense, quantum 'logic' can be actually considered a true logic (see, e.g. Bell and Hallett [1982], Dummett [1976], Gardner [1971]) and, if so, how it is to be distinguished from classical logic. In this paper I put forward a simple and natural semantical framework (...) for quantum logic which reveals its difference from classical logic in a strikingly intuitive way, viz. through the fact that quantum logic admits (suitably formulated versions of) the characteristic quantum-mechanical notions of superposition and incompatibility of attributes. That is, precisely the features that distinguish quantum from classical physics also serve, within this framework, to distinguish quantum from classical logic. Some light is shed on the question of whether quantum logic is a genuine logical system by introducing a natural entailment relation for quantum-logical formulas with the implication symbol. The novelty is that, although implication behaves as it should (i.e. the 'deduction theorem' holds), the order of introduction of premises is significant. The fact that a reasonable entailment relation can be formulated for quantum logic supports the view that it is a genuine logical system and not merely an algebraic formalism. (shrink)

. The purpose of this paper is to assess Bacon’s proclamation of the novelty of his Novum Organum. We argue that in the Novum Organum, Bacon reshapes the traditional representation of logic as providing tools for the building of philosophical discourse. For he refuses both an understanding of logic in terms of an ars disserendi, and an approach to philosophy in terms of a discourse of a certain type of necessity and universality. How can Bacon articulate a logic, that (...) is, a set of rules with formal features, on the basis of a distrust of the paradigm of discourse? This seemingly paradoxical definition of logic follows from Bacon’s rejection of the conception of the scientific reasoning provided by the Organon. It also stems from his reworking of Aristotle’s semiotics, in an effort to deal with the gap between what reality consists in and what the mind perceives of it. (shrink)

In this paper we present BTC, which is a complete logic for branchingtime whose modal operator quantifies over histories and whose temporal operators involve a restricted quantification over histories in a given possible choice. This is a technical novelty, since the operators of the usual logics for branching-time such as CTL express an unrestricted quantification over histories and moments. The value of the apparatus we introduce is connected to those logics of agency that are interpreted on branching-time, as for (...) instance Stit Logics. (shrink)

This paper follows Part I of our essay on case-intensional first-order logic ). We introduce a framework of branching histories to take account of indeterminism. Our system BH-CIFOL adds structure to the cases, which in Part I formed just a set: a case in BH-CIFOL is a moment/history pair, specifying both an element of a partial ordering of moments and one of the total courses of events that that moment is part of. This framework allows us to define the familiar (...) Ockhamist temporal/modal connectives, most notably for past, future, and settledness. The novelty of our framework becomes visible in our discussion of substances in branching histories, i.e., in its first-order part. That discussion shows how the basic idea of tracing an individual thing from case to case via an absolute property is applicable in a branching histories framework. We stress the importance of keeping apart extensionality and moment-definiteness, and give a formal account of how the specification of natural sortals and natural qualities turns out to be a coordination task in BH-CIFOL. We also provide a detailed answer to Lewis’s well-known argument against branching histories, exposing the fallacy in that argument. (shrink)

We describe an extension to our quantifier-free computational logic to provide the expressive power and convenience of bounded quantifiers and partial functions. By quantifier we mean a formal construct which introduces a bound or indicial variable whose scope is some subexpression of the quantifier expression. A familiar quantifier is the Σ operator which sums the values of an expression over some range of values on the bound variable. Our method is to represent expressions of the logic as objects in the (...) logic, to define an interpreter for such expressions as a function in the logic, and then define quantifiers as "mapping functions." The novelty of our approach lies in the formalization of the interpreter and its interaction with the underlying logic. Our method has several advantages over other formal systems that provide quantifiers and partial functions in a logical setting. The most important advantage is that proofs not involving quantification or partial recursive functions are not complicated by such notions as "capturing," "bottom," or "continuity." Naturally enough, our formalization of the partial functions is nonconstructive. The theorem prover for the logic has been modified to support these new features. We describe the modifications. The system has proved many theorems that could not previously be stated in our logic. Among them are. (shrink)

Normal texts and courses in logic are usually so preoccupied with the teaching of techniques that there is little opportunity to discuss some of the interesting and provocative issues in logical theory and the philosophy of logic. This book of readings is designed to supplement a course in symbolic logic. While there are few surprises or novelties here, there is a helpful selection from the writings of Frege, Russell, Strawson, Quine, Carnap, Von Wright, and others. The short introductions to (...) the various selections by the editors are all too brief.—R. J. B. (shrink)

This article concerns the metatheory of a class of modal logics whose language includes propositional constants of various kinds. The main novelties are the use of general frames with specific restrictions and the definition of the strict range of a formula. Many examples from the literature are treated within the framework provided and some traditional model-theoretic issues such as preservation results concerning the validity of formulas and definability results concerning frame properties are addressed.