This article searches for a way of theorizing the interconnectedness of processes of individuation, relationality and affect, with the aim of clearing the ground for an approach that establishes the basis of this interconnectedness by reference to mechanisms common to all living things. It establishes a number of shifts that enable us to think the categories and concepts like the individual, the subject, the group, the threshold, relationality, co-implication and so on according to a fundamental decentring, finally breaking with both (...) subject-centredness and its privilege of the individual as model or starting point; the same epistemological shift implies the rejection of the anthropocentric divide between humans and animals, while avoiding species of sociobiologism, pre-formationism, geneticism and other monocausal paradigms. What the new problematic of life enjoins us to rethink are the standpoint of singularity rather than that of the individual, coupled to the standpoint of relationality as a principle enabling us to think the self—other, human—animal, nature—culture and human—world in terms of compossibility and complex becoming. This view about the co-constitution of all life has major implications regarding responsibility for the other and responsibility for the world, grounded in the standpoint of the temporality and historicity of being as existential condition circumscribing the relation to the other. This shift at the level of ontology is explored via an engagement with the work of Simondon and his conceptual apparatus, particularly ideas of psychic and collective individuation, the pre-and transindividual, the associated milieu; this perspective is re-articulated by way of the work of Merleau-Ponty, Haraway’s notion of ‘companion species’, Ettinger’s concept of the ‘I—other plurality’, and cognate concepts that point to a new terrain for theorizing affect. (shrink)

Nineteenth-century medical advances were entwined with a conceptual innovation: the idea that many cases of disease which were previously thought to have diverse causes could be explained by the action of a single kind of cause, for example a certain bacterial or parasitic infestation. The focus of modern epidemiology, however, is on chronic non-communicable diseases, which frequently do not seem to be attributable to any single causal factor. This paper is an effort to resolve the resulting tension. The paper criticises (...) the monocausal model of disease, so successful in the nineteenth century. It also argues that a multifactorial model of disease can only be satisfactory if it amounts to more than a mere rejection of the monocausal model. A third alternative, the contrastive model, is proposed and defended on the grounds that it links the notions of disease and of general explanation, while avoiding the philosophical naiveties and practical difficulties of the monocausal model. (shrink)

What are the possible varieties of cognition-artifact relations, and which dimensions are relevant for exploring these varieties? This question is answered in two steps. First, three levels of functional and informational integration between human agent and cognitive artifact are distinguished. These levels are based on the degree of interactivity and direction of information flow, and range from monocausal and bicausal relations to continuous reciprocal causation. In these levels there is a hierarchy of integrative processes in which there is an (...) increasing degree of hybridization. Therefore, from a functional and informational level of abstraction, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between agent and artifact in this hierarchy. Second, a multidimensional matrix for exploring cognition-artifact relations is sketched. The dimensions in the matrix include reliability, durability, trust, procedural and representational transparency, individualization, bandwidth, speed of information flow, distribution of computation, and cognitive and artifactual transformation. Together, these dimensions constitute a multidimensional space in which particular cognition-artifact relations can be located. The higher a particular cognition-artifact relation scores on these dimensions, the more integration and hybridization occurs, and the more tightly coupled the overall system is. It is then better, for explanatory reasons, to see agent and artifact as one cognitive system with a distributed informational architecture. (shrink)

Liberalism sanctifies the values chosen by the sovereign individual. This tends to rule out criticisms of an individual's “preference” for one value over another by, ironically, establishing a deterministic view of the self that protects the self's desires from scrutiny. Similarly, rational choice approaches to social theory begin with previously determined individual preferences and focus on the means by which they are pursued, concentrating on the results rather than the sources of people's values.A striking new attempt to go behind the (...) liberal and rational‐choice starting point in order to understand political preferences is found in Aaron Wildavsky's Cultural Theory. Yet Cultural Theory does not facilitate the criticism of preferences, because its understanding of them is fundamentally liberal. Even while rejecting methodological individualism, Cultural Theory's monocausally social theory of preference formation retains in a new guise the liberal preservation of preferences from criticism by reestablishing a deterministic view of the formation of values, leading it to share with liberalism an a historical view of their origins. (shrink)

This book review outlines and critiques Robert Allinson's book _Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics_ (New York: Prentice Hall, 1993). The reviewer first outlines the structure of the book and then moves on to discussing the main arguments of the book, including but not limited to the distinctions between "monocausality" and "multi-causality" and "scapegoating" and "multiple responsibility" that Allinson highlights. Central to Allinson's argument is the thesis that problems in management (and the disasters that often result from them) are conceptual (...) problems first of all. The review concludes by praising the bold and timely contribution of this volume. (shrink)

What role did women play in the pre-industrial European economy? Was it brought about by biology, culture, social institutions, or individual choices? And what were its consequences - for women, for men, for society at large? Women were key to the changes in the European economy between 1600 and 1800 that paved the way for industrialization. But we still know little about this female 'shadow economy' - and nothing quantitative or systematic.This book tackles these questions in a new way. It (...) uses a unique micro-level database and rich qualitative sources to illuminate women's contribution to a particular pre-industrial economy: the German state of Württemberg, which was in many ways typical of early modern Europe. Markets expanded here between 1600 and 1800, opening opportunities outside the household for both women and men. But they were circumscribed by strong 'social networks' - local communities and rural guilds with state support. Modern political scientists have praised social networks for generating 'social capital' - shared norms and collective sanctions which benefit network insiders, and sometimes the whole society. But this book reveals the dark side of 'social capital': insiders excluded and harmed outsiders, especially women, to the detriment of the economy at large.Early modern European economies differed widely in their restrictions on the role of women. But the monocausal approaches that dominate the existing literature cannot explain these differences. This book proposes an alternative approach driven by the decision individual women themselves made as they negotiated a wide array of constraints and pressures. We are not only brought closer to the 'bitter living' pre-industrial women scraped together, but find out how it came to be so bitter, and how restrictions on women inflicted a bitter living on everyone. (shrink)

In this article, I will reconstruct the monocausal model and argue that modern 'multifactorial diseases' are not monocausal by definition. 'Multifactorial diseases' are instead defined according to a constitutive disease model. On closer analysis, infectious diseases are also defined using the constitutive model rather than the monocausal model. As a result, our classification models alone cannot explain why infectious diseases have a universal etiology while chronic and noncommunicable diseases lack one. The explanation is instead provided by the (...) nineteenth-century germ theorists. (shrink)

Risk assessment is an evidence-based analytical framework used to evaluate research findings related to environmental and public health decision-making. Different routines have been adopted for assessing the potential risks posed by substances and products to human health. In general, the traditional paradigm is a hazard-driven approach, based on a monocausal toxicological perspective. Questions have been raised about the applicability of the general chemical risk assessment approach in the specific case of nanomaterials. Most scientists and stakeholders assume that the current (...) standard methods are in principle suitable, but point out that experimental aspects and practical guidelines need specific adaptations. Beyond this laboratory level, risk assessment of nanomaterials also faces a number of substantive and procedural limitations, which are intrinsically attributed to the general orthodoxy of the risk assessment concept. Moreover, the developed formalism used to organize scientific knowledge is closely interlinked with the underlying governance design and the mode of interaction between the two spheres of ‘science’ and ‘decisions’. This contribution will provide a closer look at the evolution of different institutional settings for risk assessment in the context of decision-making. Improved risk governance frameworks with different narratives, process designs and procedural elements will be compared. The question of a general principle of enhanced organization of risk assessment will be discussed taking account of the barriers of substantive and procedural limitations in the special case of nanomaterials. (shrink)

Epidemiological studies of chronic diseases began around the mid-20th century. Contrary to the infectious disease epidemiology which had prevailed at the beginning of the 20th century and which had focused on single agents causing individual diseases, the chronic disease epidemiology which emerged at the end of Word War II was a much more complex enterprise that investigated a multiplicity of risk factors for each disease. Involved in the development of chronic disease epidemi-ology were therefore fundamental discussions on the notion of (...) causality, especially the question when causal inferences could be justified. In this paper, I shall analyze the implicit normativity of these de-bates. First, I shall give a brief overview of the historical background on which chronic disease epi-demiology emerged and describe how the pioneer studies on smoking and lung cancer became icon of the major challenge that the emerging chronic disease epidemiology was facing: the impossibility of proving that statistical associations reflected causal relations. Next, I shall describe how the develop-ment from the monocausal enterprise of infectious disease epidemiology to the multicausal enterprise of chronic disease epidemiology gave rise to intense discussions of the possible criteria by which to establish causal relationships between a given factor and a particular disease. I shall show how the necessary and sufficient conditions expressed in the so-called Henle-Koch criteria that had proved useful for the 19th century investigations of infectious diseases remained an ideal, although clearly an unobtainable one. Thus, I shall show how 20th century chronic disease epidemiologists on the one hand were searching for a new set of general principles which would provide a logical framework for their investigations, but on the other hand admitted that they would have to accept something more "pragmatic". I shall analyze the various positions in this debate, arguing that the implacability of the debate was due to unrecognized normative issues. I shall argue that many insisted on a distinction between science and application that was untenable, but that due to this distinction the values in-volved in deciding whether or not to act on the basis of a hypothesis were rarely explicitly discussed and the decision therefore continued to appear as a matter of taste rather than the result of a cogent normative analysis. (shrink)

Max Weber's century old thesis on christian ethics and the spirit of capitalism, has been the object of an endless discussion. This has much to do with the interest of the author: Weber was neither intrigued by the fact of a connection between protestantism and capitalism, nor by the influence of Calvinism on the development of the modern capitalism. His interest, however, was exclusively focused on the question 'how can the relation between protestant ethic and capitalism be conceived and reconstructed'. (...) We try to explain many misconceptions by recovering what Weber really has said. Therefore the concepts of 'spirit of capitalism' and 'protestant ethic' are clarified and discussed. First, the spirit of capitalism is not an economic system, but an ethos. The definition of it in respect with the content, the motivation, the aim, and morality is elaborated in a comparison with the commercial ethos of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This makes clear that Weber's first concern was an analysis of the origin of the modern spirit, not as an intellectual construction, but as an expression of behavior. Second, we investigate what is meant by the terms 'protestantism' and 'ethics' and what the religious roots of the new spirit are: innerworldly ascetism, the notion of calling, and the concepts of wealth and poverty. It is no wonder that there was a lot of criticism because Weber's writings on the above topic were situated on the crossroads of sociology, theology, history and economy. We present and comment on the main criticisms: protestantism rejects capitalism; the spirit of capitalism is much older than the Reformation; there is no monocausal relation between the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism; the role of catholicism in this development was as/more important in the rise of capitalism. Most of these criticisms result from a superficial presentation of Weber's writings and explanations in his own Anticritics, and don't do justice to Weber's 'idealtypische' and 'verstehende' approach. This approach was not intended to give a complete and exhaustive 'last' explanation of the essence of a social phenomenon. (shrink)

Change is the fundamental idea of evolution. Explaining the extraordinary biological change we see written in the history of genomes and fossil beds is the primary occupation of the evolutionary biologist. Yet it is a surprising fact that for the majority of evolutionary research, we have rarely studied how evolution typically unfolds in nature, in changing ecological environments, over space and time. While ecology played a major role in the eventual acceptance of the population genetic viewpoint of evolution in the (...) synthetic era (circa 1918-1956), it held a lesser role in the development of evolutionary theory until the 1980s, when we began to systematically study the evolutionary dynamics of natural populations in space and time. As a result, early evolutionary theory was initially constructed in an abstract vacuum that was unrepresentative of evolution in nature. The subtle synthesis between ecology with evolutionary biology (eco-evo synthesis) over the past 40 years has progressed our knowledge of natural selection dynamics as they are found in nature, thus revealing how natural selection varies in strength, direction, form, and, more surprisingly, level of biological organization. Natural selection can no longer be reduced to lower levels of biological organization (i.e., individuals, selfish genes) over shorter timescales but should be expanded to include adaptation at higher levels and over longer timescales. Long-term and/or emergent evolutionary phenomena, such as multilevel selection or evolvability, have thus become tenable concepts within an evolutionary biology that embraces ecology and spatiotemporal change. Evolutionary biology is currently suspended at an intermediate stage of scientific progress that calls for the organization of all the recent knowledge revealed by the eco-evo synthesis into a coherent and unified theoretical framework. This is where philosophers of biology can be of particular use, acting as a bridge between the subdisciplines of biology and inventing new theoretical strategies to organize and accommodate the recent knowledge. Philosophers have recommended transitioning away from outdated philosophies that were originally derived from physics within the philosophical zeitgeist of logical positivism (i.e., monism, reductionism, and monocausation) and toward a distinct philosophy of biology that can capture the natural complexity of multifaceted biological systems within diverse ecosystems—one that embraces the emerging philosophies of pluralism, emergence, and multicausality. Therefore, I see recent advances in ecology, evolutionary biology, and the philosophy of biology as laying the groundwork for another major biological synthesis, what I refer to as the Second Synthesis because, in many respects, it is analogous to the aims and outcomes of the first major biological synthesis (but is notably distinct from the inorganic and contrived progressive movement known as the extended evolutionary synthesis). With the general development of a distinctive philosophy of science, biology has rightfully emerged as an autonomous science. Thus, while the first synthesis legitimized biology, the Second Synthesis autonomized biology and afforded biology its own philosophy, allowing biology to finally realize its full scientific potential. (shrink)

This article argues that Durkheim's theory of suicide is deficient because of its monocausal reasoning, its conception of suicide as an action without subjects, and its characterization of preliterate societies as harmonious, self-contained, and morphologically static. It shows that these deficiencies can be overcome by including cultural and social-psychological considerations in the analysis of suicide-specifically by including culture as a causal force in its own right and drawing links between social circumstances, cultural beliefs and values, and individual dispositions. The (...) authors make their case by analyzing ethnographic and quantitative data on the preliterate Guarani-Kaiowá of southwestern Brazil, one of the most suicide-prone groups in the world. (shrink)

Research on sexual orientation attempts to reduce it to a monocausal phenomenon, whether that be biology (genes, hormones) or social environment (parenting patterns). None of these fully accounts for the diversity of erotic attraction and behavior, and indeed these reductionist strategies either misrepresent many forms of sexual behavior or erase them from our ontology. Understanding is better served by first acknowledging the variety of roles of sexual interaction in human life, rather than treating sex as a single kind of (...) phenomenon. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to clarify some basic features of historical materialism insofar as it is a philosophic conception of history. Every serious philosophy of history must give an answer to at least three questions: What is the nature of historical reality? How is historical change being accomplished? What are the possibilities, the scope and the limits of historical knowledge?In historical materialism not one of these questions is sufficiently resolved. Contrary to Marxist-Leninist assertions, there is no necessary and (...) inseparable connection between dialectical and historical materialism. A materialist conception of history is compatible with many non-materialist metaphysical views. Further, historical materialism uses a superseded monocausal model of historical flux. Moreover, it is based upon a notion of historical causality which simply reproduces mechanical causality; but mechanical causality is inapplicable to historical events. Finally, the critique of historical knowledge isterra incognita for historical materialism. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to clarify some basic features of historical materialism insofar as it is a philosophic conception of history. Every serious philosophy of history must give an answer to at least three questions: What is the nature of historical reality? How is historical change being accomplished? What are the possibilities, the scope and the limits of historical knowledge? In historical materialism not one of these questions is sufficiently resolved. Contrary to Marxist-Leninist assertions, there is no "necessary" (...) and "inseparable" connection between dialectical and historical materialism. A materialist conception of history is compatible with non-materialist metaphysical views. Further, historical materialism uses a superseded monocausal model of historical flux. Moreover, it is based upon a notion of historical causality which simply reproduces mechanical causality; but mechanical causality is inapplicable to historical events. Finally, the critique of historical knowledge is terra incognita for historical materialism. (shrink)

In this article I seek to say what it is for something to count as a neglected disease. I argue that neglect should be defined in terms of efforts at prevention, mitigation and cure, and not solely in terms of research dollars per disability-adjusted life-year. I further argue that the trend towards multifactorialism and risk factor thinking in modern epidemiology has lent credibility to the erroneous view that the primary problem with neglected diseases is a lack of research. A more (...) restrictive contrastive model of disease is endorsed as better suited to the definition of neglected disease. (shrink)

(The interpretation of contemporary religious phenomena from Weber’s point of view: some notes inspired on a critical reading of The New Map of Religions ) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n23p674 Resumo Dentre alguns usos equivocados recorrentes das contribuições teóricas de Weber apresentadas em A Ética Protestante e o Espírito do Capitalismo , podemos citar: tratar suas interpretações como conhecimento nomotético e não ideográfico, como o pretendido pelo autor; o tratamento dos tipos ideais de capitalismo e das éticas das religiões puritanas, bem como (...) o do catolicismo analisados no livro citado, como se fossem realidades empíricas, e não construtos conceituais abstratos; a busca da replicação contemporânea da relação, inclusive concebida como monocausal, encontrada entre a ética protestante e o surgimento e o desenvolvimento do capitalismo que surgiu na Inglaterra e Alemanha. Nesse artigo pretendemos apresentar parâmetros para a interpretação de fenômenos religiosos contemporâneos a partir das contribuições teórico-metodológicas de Weber, chamando a atenção para equívocos comuns ligados ao entendimento inadequado da proposta epistemológica weberiana apresentada e exercitada no livro citado . Fazemos isso seguindo a estrutura básica de um ensaio, no qual apresentamos uma leitura crítica da análise apresentada no artigo intitulado Novo Mapa das Religiões . Palavras chave : Weber. Metodologia. Religião no Brasil.This article aims to provide parameters for the interpretation of contemporary religious phenomena from the theoretical and methodological contributions of Weber, drawing attention to common misconceptions related to inadequate understanding of his theoretical and epistemological proposals presented in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism . Among some of the recurring misuses of the theoretical contributions made by Weber are: a) the treatment of his interpretations as nomothetic knowledge rather than ideographic, as intended by the author; b) the treatment of ideal types of the capitalism, of the puritan religious beliefs, and of the Catholicism as if they were empirical realities and not abstract constructs; c) the search for the contemporary replication of the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the emergence and development of Capitalism in England and in Germany. In short, this essay presents a critical reading of the analysis presented in the article titled New map of religions . Keywords : Weber. Methodology. Religion in Brazil. (shrink)