El sistema filosófico de Spinoza no puede ser considerado en rigor como panteísta, sino panenteísta. Este artículo intenta reforzar esta tesis analizando los conceptos de Natura naturans y Natura naturata, a veces confundidos en la obra de Spinoza. Se establece además una comparación de ambos conceptos en Spinoza y en David Nieto, autor de una obra titulada De la divina providencia, o sea naturaleza universal o natura naturante, al tiempo que se señalan las diferencias entre las (...) concepciones inmanentes de la divinidad de ambos autores. (shrink)

We seem to be living through an animist revival.1 The term “new animism” first appeared in 2005, in Graham Harvey’s Animism: Respect for the Living World. Harvey’s work draws heavily on Irving Hall...

Спочатку один «голий і самотній» факт: ніхто не бачив, щоб філософія закінчилася. Відтак, принаймні, індуктивно, ми можемо стверджувати, що філософія _ніколи не закінчується_. Не завершується. Вона не завершується, незалежно від того, що протягом усієї історії її існування, її супроводжують підсумкові фінальні об’яви – з середини філософії і ззовні ― про остаточне завершення, про кінець, про кінець кінців, про смерть філософії тощо. З цієї точки зору, Людвіґ Вітґенштайн видається мені не фігурою «минулого», фігурою _архіву_ – фігурою історичної реконструкції. Ба більше, навіть, (...) фігурою професійної концептуальної деконструкції, ― впливової і поважної традиції філософської роботи – аналітичної філософії. Навіть при тому, що це фігура одного з її «отців-засновників». Як раз, навпаки. Людвіґ Вітґенштайн видається фігурою _майбутнього_ філософії, її чистого й простого _просуву_. Фігурою символічною і також актуальною – фігурою «ніколи-не-завершення» філософії. Фігурою, яка підписує не слово сказане у філософії, але точку потенційованої напруженості відбутися і пролунати справжньому філософському слову – не позначенню деяких _речей_, але реєстрації _слідів істини_ у до межі доведених індивідуальних станах... Важливо розуміти, що ця стаття не про філософську традицію аналітичної філософії. І не про самого філософа, чи філософію Вітґенштайна – у плані хронології-доксографії, чи ейдетико-історичного огляду, чи деякої теоретичної реконструкції у контексті деякого, того чи іншого «філософського сьогодення», чи навіть, у самому (ви)значному режимі – як «універсальне з підписом». Хоча певні змісти щодо і першого, і другого, – просто як робоча необхідність, «машинальним чином» – тут, звичайно, є. У цій статті, насправді відкривається намагання показати, що аналітична філософія (як певний спосіб дії щодо реалізації події мислення – спосіб дії, до речі, досить точно ідентифікований, причому, таким чином, що ці ідентифікація і демаркація є не результатом деяких спеціальних теоретичних чи методологічних зусиль, але видається _частиною події_ ) – уся аналітична філософія, як спроба, як запровада, як «рух», як справа, як діяльність, – є феноменальним “natura naturans”. Є таким саме як «топос відтворення мислення» у суто онтологічному сенсі, в обміні з яким, власне, Людвіґ Вітґенштайн, також, унікальний і один-єдиний – як «подія думки» – знов таки, у цілком онтологічному сенсі, «демонструє», тобто, _саме і є_ актуальне, «живе», можливо, незамінне подання, розгортання, місце входження (до) проблеми конечності, доступу, філософського слова, змісту й акту. Можливо, отримати доступ до «самого Саме» і є правильно поставити проблему доступу? Відтак, говорячи за допомогою самого Метра, філософія це робота і вдача правильно підібрати _приклади_. (shrink)

In the course of his studies on Kabbalah, Moshe Idel has written on the influence of Kabbalists on philosophy. He suggests that Spinoza was influenced by the Kabbalah regarding his expressions “Deus sive Natura“ and “amor Dei intellectualis.” The 13th-century ecstatic Kabbalist Rabbi Abraham Abulafia and many authors after him cited the numerical equivalence of the Hebrew words for God and Nature: elohim = ha-teba` = 86. This striking numerical equivalence may be one of the sources of Spinoza’s expression (...) “Deus sive Natura.” The same Kabbalist used the Hebrew expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ (“divine intellectual love”), which may underlie Spinoza’s expression “amor Dei intellectualis.” Abulafia’s expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ is repeated by the popular 15th-century Maimonidean philosopher, Rabbi Abraham Shalom. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende señalar la importancia de la causa inmanente al interior de la doctrina de Baruch Spinoza. La ética es el tratado más importante de Spinoza y reúne el pensamiento maduro del filósofo holandés. La prop. XVIII del libro I tiene un rol fundamental y articula el mundo de la Naturaleza Naturante y la Naturaleza Naturada, mostrando por primera vez la manera en que la causa única se produce y produce todo: de forma inmanente. Intentamos, así, mostrar el rol (...) articulador de la causa immanens en el pensamiento de Spinoza y la importancia de la ética. (shrink)

C’est entre deux évocations du soleil que se tient l’œuvre principale de Schopenhauer : le Monde comme volonté et comme représentation. Ces illustrations cernent la conception de la nature que développe Schopenhauer. Si dans l ‘énoncé le plus général on peut dire que la nature n’a pas besoin de l’homme. Celui-ci ne s’impose que dans le principe de raison, par quoi le destin tragique de la nature est scellé. La proposition « écologique » à laquelle se tient alors Schopenhauer est (...) organisée autour de l’éthique et de l’esthétique et aboutit à une extraction hors de la maîtrise illusoire sur le monde, par et dans un jeu sur le principe de raison suffisante. (shrink)

Introduction:Can nature be controlled?. Autonomous nature -- Greco-Roman concepts of nature -- Christianity and nature -- Nature personified : Renaissance ideas of nature -- Controlling nature. Vexing nature : Francis Bacon and the origins of experimentation -- Natural law : Spinoza on natura naturans and natura naturata -- Laws of nature :Lleibniz and Newton -- Epilogue : rambunctious nature in the twenty-first century.

In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant’s proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that (...) transcendental idealism allows him to avoid this conclusion, but in the last section of the paper I argue that there is still one important version of the Spinozistic threat that remains. -/- . (shrink)

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments that he offers which purport to prove God’s existence contribute nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by Malebranche and Leibniz among (...) others. That this is the case is both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non‐ontological proofs. It is unfortunate because these other non‐ontological proofs are both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza’s arguments and argue that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza’s non‐ontological arguments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral SenseRobert A. Greene“Instinct is a great matter.”—Sir John FalstaffThis essay traces the evolution of the meaning of the expression instinctus naturae in the discussion of the natural law from Justinian’s Digest through its association with synderesis to Francis Hutcheson’s theory of the moral sense. The introduction of instinctus naturae into Ulpian’s definition of the natural law by Isidore of Seville (...) in the seventh century posed a problem of definition for medieval commentators. Some said that it meant a universal and providential natura naturans; some defined it as the urge to self and species preservation in animals, degenerating in man into sensual and shameful impulses; some advanced the humanistic and paradoxical notion that it referred to a unique exercise of human reason in coming to know the natural law. The contemporaneous revival in the twelfth century of St. Jerome’s puzzling new term “synderesis,” and its gradual definition as the immediate apprehension of the first practical moral principles of the natural law, brought the two terms into proximity and loose association.A half-century later St. Bonaventure made explicit what had remained latent in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas by relocating synderesis in the affective rather than the intellectual part of man’s nature. Accordingly the moral discoveries of synderesis came to be spoken of as not only non-discursive but instinctive in nature—apprehensions for which no reason could be given, apprehensions somehow rooted in affective human experience. During the bilingual early modern period an increasingly secularized, internalized, and reified instinctus [End Page 173] naturae, together with its abbreviated vernacular cognate, “instinct,” came to serve as a substitute and synonym for the obsolescent synderesis. Edward Herbert’s attention to instinctus naturae in his De Veritate (1624), Sir Matthew Hale’s speculations about the place of rational instinct in the natural law, and Francis Hutcheson’s theory of a moral sense all exemplify this semantic legacy.The first entry in Justinian’s Digest has had a disproportionate influence on later speculation about the natural law. It begins a chapter that gives pride of place to general definitions of justice, law, jus naturale and jus gentium, and it is drawn from the writings of the Roman jurisconsult Domitius Ulpianus (d. 223), whose work constitutes forty percent of the Digest. Ulpian defines the natural law, with insistent repetition, as that which nature has taught to, or is common to, all animals:Jus naturale is that which nature has taught to all animals; for it is not a law specific to mankind but is common to all animals—land animals, sea animals, and the birds as well. Out of this comes the union of man and woman [male and female] which we call marriage, and the procreation of children, and their rearing. So we can see that the other animals, wild beasts included, are rightly understood to be acquainted with this law. Jus gentium, the law of the nations, is that which all human peoples observe. That it is not coextensive with natural law can be grasped easily, since this latter is common to all animals whereas jus gentium is common only to human beings among themselves. 1Justinian’s compilers gave Ulpian’s definition striking prominence at the beginning of the Digest and then in the same short chapter quoted the incompatible and more traditional definitions of his contemporaries Gaius and Paulus. They confined the operation of the natural law to mankind and spoke of reason as its source. 2 The compilers had been charged to eliminate just such conflicts; yet here at the very outset they set a conundrum that perplexed commentators [End Page 174] and invited explanation from Isidore of Seville to Hugo Grotius. Their selection of quotations suggests that as lawyers they regarded such general definitions as “for legal purposes no more than ornament to discussion.” 3 For those of a more speculative bent, however, the dilemmas could not have been more fundamental. How was the natural law to be defined in relation to those appetitive and self-preservative urges that man seemed to share with animals? Or did the term law apply only... (shrink)

I use Jonathan Bennett’s, Gilles Deleuze’s and Pierre Macherey’s interpretations of Spinoza to extract a theory of time and duration from Spinoza. I argue that although time can be considered a product of the imagination, duration is a real property of existing things and corresponds to their essence, taking essence (as Deleuze does) as a degree of power of existing. The article then explores the relations among time, duration, essence and eternity, arguing against the idea that Spinoza’s essences or Spinoza’s (...) eternity are atemporal. Essences and eternity both involve necessary references to time, but the time involved is not that of the “fortuitous sequence of events” apprehended through sensory experience. Rather, the “time” is that implicit in the necessity of God’s self-determination through God’s differentiation into natura naturans and natura naturata, which is involved in the production and differentiation of eternal essences. (shrink)

INSPIRED by a dynamist Naturphilosophie and looking for a mathematics of the natura naturans, the founders of modern mathematics in Germany made some lasting contributions in the attempt to go beyond perceptible space. Hermann Grassmann’s extension theory, Johann Benedict Listing’s topology, Bernhard Riemann’s non-Euclidean manifold theory, Carl Gustav Jacob Jacobi’s approach to non-mechanistic theory and last but not least Georg Cantor’s transfinite set theory were all influenced by the tradition of Naturphilosophie. One central motivation for the new mathematics (...) was to decipher the so-called “inner side of nature” which was thought to be invisible but nonetheless physical. As a result, mathematics was understood not only in terms of quantity but of morphogenetic quality and as a tool to recognize the intrinsic possibilities of structuring and organizing nature. This essay focuses on the philosophical viewpoints of Christian Samuel Weiss, Justus and Hermann Grassmann, Bernhard Riemann and their reception of Schelling’s philosophy. Riemann deconstructed empiricist theories of space so as to glean the fundamental constitution of space. One result was that a given, fixed and static metric is not necessary for the understanding of space. The underlying topological substratum has no specific metric but is capable of exhibiting any possible metric. Riemann’s claims are compared with Schelling’s theory of space in his “Darstellung des Naturprocesses”. My thesis is that Schelling’s philosophy of the emergence of space can be read in Riemannian terms and that it is an interesting model in the context of modern questions. (shrink)

The article considers L.N. Tolstoy not only as a thinker who represents but also accomplishes Enlightenment. Through a comparison of his ideas with philosophy of Spinoza and Diderot, the author clarifies the aspects of the transition from Enlightenment to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. A special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview of Tolstoy and Diderot. The contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of (...) life of the three philosophers is revealed. The author also researches their philosophical interpretations of the nature of creative thought. Diderot describes the nature through the concept of paradoxism, Spinoza describes it with the concept of integrity, and Tolstoy uses the method of cohesion that he founds in literary works. If for the philosophers of European Enlightenment, the way of thinking is directly related to human nature, which is presented as a unity of natura naturans and natura naturata, then Tolstoy considers that the most important is a certain a priori sense of life, which is imbued with faith in God and with an instinct of self-giving that is love for the Supreme and other people. The method of cohesion leads Tolstoy away from the direct continuation of educational ideas, stressing the significance of appealing not only to reason but also to creative intuition. Tolstoy gradually moves away from rational perception of Life to its religious and existential foundations. Tolstoy’s worldview undergoes transition from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a human being who lives by commandments of Christ. Starting from the worldview of Enlightenment, Tolstoy comes to the creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which is relevant to early 20th century. (shrink)

This article presents the stance taken by José Ortega y Gasset in the debate that took place in early-twentieth-century Spain regarding the convenience of reading Don Quixote in schools. To this end, we start by describing, albeit briefly, the state of Ortega y Gasset’s thought in 1920, when he writes Biología y pedagogía, the essay with which we shall concern ourselves. According to Ortega y Gasset, Don Quixote must not be read in the classroom because it does not contribute to (...) the development of the students’ spontaneous life, or natura naturans. In order to foster this development, Ortega y Gasset suggests leaving Don Quixote aside and resort to myths such as Odysseus or Heracles because their exploits would excite the students’ vital pulse. However, we suggest several reasons why the aim stated by Ortega y Gasset —and several other highly valuable educational benefits— could be reached resorting to the reading of selected passages of Don Quixote instead of the feats of Odysseus and Heracles. (shrink)

Running back then, we can collect a few salient facts about the Invisible World:While things in it are visible, the World itself upon which they are conditioned is not and can not be in principle.Among things in the world, contingency or surprize is a central feature, making possible both the content of perception and the possibility of action, and is in effect some sort of synonym for life. The contingency means both the nondeducibility of what happens as well as the (...) dependence of each thing upon the others in varying degrees of relevance.The World of events and things, certainly ourselves, is composed of singulars, unrepeatable and unique occurrences or things; singularity also derives from the World Itself, the invisible singular condition of Fact.Within the world, each thing appears within a horizon, a last limit of visibility for us wherever we are, but that horizon is itself movable as we move our existential point of view. Beyond one horizon there are other things not too unlike ontologically the ones we see, and so emerges what Jaspers calls a ‘horizon of horizons.’ In short, we remeet that famous ‘etc.’ almost invariably bound up with what the world of things is for us. This ‘horizon of horizons’ itself derives from another aspect of the World as Invisible: its absolute self-enclosed infinity. How else could such an absolute cause or condition express itself seriatim except through endlessness?The last feature we noted was the fracture within the world of things: to wit, that while complete in one sense, in another our world is far from constituting a whole. We are there, too, and are not members of it no matter how much some would like to be so.Singular, unique condition of what is in the world, a world of essential surprize, interdependence, increasingly the Invisible World begins to take on the characteristics of the old philosopher's God, something of the order of Spinoza's God, natura naturans, the world of things being the same substance but taken bit by bit, natura naturata. And if this identity of God and the World seems and has always seemed slightly blasphemous, since God is usually opposed to the World, to soften the blow we might only consider their point of resolution: the Soul, or Transcendental Ego, has the possibility of knowing all this, or at least exploring their unity. To revert to Spinoza again, each Attribute, in his case Extention and Thought, is infinite, but infinite in its own kind. The world of things appears to us indeed infinite, but then it is only a ‘kind’; there is also Thought, or infinite Subjectivity, also infinite in its own kind. And what does thought think about? Well, most usually the world into which it was born; but then it is not long before it perceives the absolute condition of that, and then also there is its reflexivity upon itself. Together, though not by way of summation, the Absolute Source as described is the philosopher's God. Spinoza also said that our Idea of God is identical with God's idea of Himself. (shrink)

Les énoncés philosophiques spéculatifs matérialistes de Diderot constituent une ontologie que Diderot expose dans une métaphysique où se nouent trois plans. Le premier est dominé par la catégorie de possible. Diderot pense le possible en termes de possibilité non téléologique : elle concerne le mode de manifestation de l'être. Le deuxième, portant sur la natura naturata et sa connaissance scientifique, s'adosse à la nécessité. Le troisième, s’inscrivant au cœur de la natura naturans et concernant le statut de (...) l'existence des êtres, est l’aléatoire. Comment ces trois plans et ces trois catégories s'articulent-ils rationnellement ? Comment se réalisent-ils dans l’écriture même de la philosophie ?Diderot’s philosophical pronouncements are both speculative and materialist. They make up an ontology and Diderot sets this out in a metaphysics which has three levels. The category of the possible dominates the first level. Diderot thinks the possible in terms of a non-teleological possibiliy, one concerned with the mode in which being manifests itself. The second level, concerned with « natural naturata » and the scientific knowledge that can be had of it, relies on necessity. The third, operating at the very heart of « natura naturans » is concerned with the status of the existence of beings, and is random. How do these three levels and these three categories relate to each other rationally ? How are they realised in the very way that philosophy is written ? (shrink)

La homogeneidad de la Naturaleza, concebida como un todo racional y la universalidad del método se implican en Spinoza. Del principio de la unidad de la sustancia, o sea de la unidad de la Naturaleza tomada como natura naturans y natura naturata, se sigue que no puede existir un método que preceda al conocimiento filosófico. Ahora, si el carácter indisociable de la filosofía y del mos geometricus es efectivo, se debe a la total inteligibilidad para el hombre (...) de la esencia de Dios y de las cosas, ya que de ella se sigue que el conocimiento verdadero, es decir, adecuado, procede del todo a las partes. Con Spinoza, el racionalismo absoluto quiere acabar con el misterio que rodea la razón o que le subyace, misterio que hacía afirmar a Descartes en su tercera meditación que “es propio de la naturaleza de lo infinito que yo,siendo finito, no pueda comprenderlo”. La filosofía de Spinoza se presenta como un intelectualismo íntegro, una doctrina de la necesidad y de la libertad. Mas, podemos preguntarnos: ¿no hay aquí una contradicción entre necesidad y libertad? ¿Será que la filosofía de Spinoza es incoherente? O, dicho en otros términos, ¿es posible para el hombre actuar dentro de un determinismo tan estricto? (shrink)

German theologian F. D. E. Schleiermacher's doctrine of God-the first to be developed in the post-Kantian era-fundamentally changed the course of Christian theology. The degree to which his doctrine of God was influenced by the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza remains in dispute, however. This study examines the ways in which Schleiermacher actively adopted elements of Spinoza's thought in the development of his own theological doctrine of God. Julia Lamm's analysis of little-known but seminal essays by Schleiermacher reveals his young (...) creative genius in daring to go beyond the neo-Spinozism of Herder and the post-Kantianism of Fichte by developing his own post-Kantian Spinozism. Schleiermacher's unique simultaneous appropriation of Kant and Spinoza is characterized by four themes: an organic monism, an ethical determinism, a critical realism, and a nonanthropomorphic view of God, which Lamm traces through his two major theological works, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith. Ultimately, Lamm finds that Schleiermacher departs from Spinoza in significant ways. Most notably, he talks about "the living God" who is best expressed through the divine attributes of love and wisdom. This living God is what Schleiermacher refers to as the "third alternative" to, on the one hand, the anthropomorphized God of orthodox Protestantism and, on the other hand, Spinoza's natura naturans. (shrink)

Meaning and nature are this book’s principal topics. They seem an odd couple, like raisins and numbers, though they elide when meanings of a global sort—ideologies and religions, for example—promote ontologies that subordinate nature. Setting one against the other makes reality contentious. It signifies workmates and a coal face to miners, gluons to physicists, prayer and redemption to priests. Are there many realities, or many perspectives on one? The answer I prefer is the comprehensive naturalism anticipated by Aristotle and Spinoza: (...) "natura naturans, natura naturata." Nature naturing is an array of mutually conditioning material processes in spacetime. Each structure or event—storm clouds forming, nature natured—is self-differentiating, self-stabilizing, and sometimes self-disassembling; each alters or transforms a pre-existing state of affairs. This surmise anticipated discoveries and analyses to which neither thinker had access, though physics and biology confirm their hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the question this book considers: Is reality divided:nature vrs. lived experience? Or is experience, with all its meanings and values, the complex expression of natural processes? (shrink)

Existence has its own essence. A grasp of that essence is of course not yet a grasp of Existence itself. The fact that a grasp of an essence is not yet a grasp of that of which it is the essence is not peculiar to Existence. Nothing--not only Existence--is identical with its essence. The essence of an Actuality is distinct from the Actuality, and he who, with Aristotle, holds that knowledge is confined to a grasp of eternal essences is forced (...) to hold that the Actuality, as over against these, is possessed of non-graspable accidents. Nor is the essence of an Ideal identical with that Ideal. The Ideal is normative, intrudes on other modes of being, and has a temporal role. He who with Hegel views the Ideal as an essence, is forced to distinguish it from itself as working through time to constitute history. There is for Hegel a "cunning" to reason which makes it operate as an agency and foil for itself; but this is but to say that there is a real distinction for him between reason as an unchanging essence, and reason as a changing, effective, historically significant Ideal. And finally the essence of God is distinct from God himself. God is active, a judge and preserver, whereas his essence is but his unity as distinct from him, the being who has unity. He who, with Spinoza, tries to identify God and his essence must, in order to take account of what has been termed God's will, providence, creative activity, and his footstool the world, distinguish between God in himself and God's multiple transitory modes, or between natura naturans and natura naturata, the essence of God and the being of God. (shrink)

Ecstatic naturalism believes that a rich conceptualization of nature should emphasize the reality of a basic ontological difference between a ground that is responsible for generating the world and the encompassing yet incarnate processes of the world. The ontological difference mentioned here is a difference between "nature naturing" (natura naturans) and "nature natured" (natura naturata).1 Ecstatic naturalism takes seriously the difference between nature naturing and nature natured because it is a philosophy that recognizes nature's immanent or incarnate (...) processes of semiotic generation as well as the reality of nature's transcendental generative ground (a ground that "natures" via sign processes).2 Thus .. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza makes a distinction between the constitutive essence of God (the totality of His attributes) and the essence of God per se (His power and causal efficacy). Using this distinction, I explain how Spinoza can conceive of God as being both an immutable simple unity and a subject for constantly changing modes. Spinoza believes that God qua Natura Naturans is immutable, while God qua Natura Naturata is not. With this point established, Curley’s claim (...) that Spinozistic modes are causally dependent on but not properties of God loses much of its attraction. In conclusion, I suggest how God’s essence is related to His attributes and His modes. (shrink)

Comment Bacon, à travers le détournement de thématiques caractéristiques de l'humanisme renaissant, construit-il une philosophie qui place en son centre non plus l' homme, mais l' outil, dont la promotion s'accompagne d'un effacement des termes qu'il commande et unit — la nature et l'esprit? Le transfert le plus significatif de l' homme à l' outil est celui du langage de la négativité, langage qui culmine dans la définition de la forma – objet dernier atteint par la méthode inductive –, comme (...) natura naturans, fons emanationis, actus purus, etc. L'épistémologie baconienne ne nous met-elle pas dès lors en face d'une sorte de nihilisme de l'activité pure réifiée en un dispositif? Les textes sur Fexperientia litterata tentent de résoudre cette aporie, marquant non un retour au « réel », mais plutôt une tentative de conciliation entre, d'une part, la rationalité mise en place par l'organum, et, d'autre part, l' homme et son ingenium. How did Bacon, through the leading astray of themes of Renaissance humanism, build a philosophy placing in its center no longer man but the « tool » whose promotion goes along with a wiping out of terms both ordering and uniting nature and the mind. The most significant transference of man towards the tool is that of the language of negativity, a language culminating in the definition of the forma, i.e. the object reached when all is said through the inductive method, as a natura naturans, fons emanationis, actus purus, etc. Hence doesn't Baconian epistemology confronts us to some kind of a nihilism of plain activity reified into some device? The texts dealing with the experientia litterata try to solve such an aporia, indicating not so much as a return to the real as rather an attempt at reconciling between rationality as erected by the organum on the one hand and man in his ingenium, on the other. (shrink)

This article examines Baruch Benedictus Spinoza conceptual understanding of the proofs for the existence of God. It traces the evolution of this theme pursuant to the metaphysical studies of Moderns Philosophy. Тhe concept of God in the philosophy of Spinoza is considered by exploring the nature of the relations between the transcendent sphere of God and the spiritual world of the human person. Spinoza argues from the possibility of God's existence to God's necessary existence. God is an absolutely infinite substance, (...) necessarily exists, qua Natura Naturans is immutable. God or Nature. The universe is an expression of God's nature, qua Natura Naturata - God is its immanent cause. Spinoza's God is synonymous with Nature. Substance is defined as "in itself". Spinoza understands a substance to be something that is self-caused and self-explained. The transcendence is understood as an ontological category, being discussed in connection with the key themes of Christian philosophy, such as time and eternity, person and history, creation and God etc. Spinoza's concept of God is referring to the God of the monotheistic religions, God as One Substance, pertains to a concept of the oneness of God, is transcendent and therefore "unknowable". Spinoza's definition of God found on the first page of the Ethics: Being absolutely infinite. From the point of view of historiography, the role of the book "Ehtics" by Spinoza is highlighted. (shrink)

Nature and Spirit: An Essay in Ecstatic Naturalism develops an enlarged conception of nature that in turn calls for a transformed naturalism. Unline more descriptive naturalisms, such as those by Dewey, Santayana, and Buchler, ecstatic naturalism works out of the fundamental ontological difference between nature naturing(natura naturans) and nature natured (natura naturata). This difference underlies all other variations within a generic conception of nature. The spirit operates within a generic conception of nature. The spirit operates within a (...) fragmented nature and has its own unique locations. Ecstatic naturalism does not eulogize spirit nor impose a process theodicy upon nature as a whole but carefully describes the ways in which spirit emerges from finite locations within the world. Methodologically, the text radically regrounds phenomenology so that it can work more closely with a metaphysics seeking the most generic forms of nature. The move from a transcendental phenomenology, which rests upon a profound misconception of the parcel of a radicalized naturalism, makes it possible to show how all orders of relevance are related to nature and to the spirit. This, in turn relocates the human process, with its dialectical tension between finitude and transendence, and places the self fully within the emergent structures of the community of interpreters as that community lives out of hope. The concept of worldhood is regrounded in pragmatic and semiotic terms, thus putting pressure on Heidegger's formulations. Peirce's pragmatic categorical structure is used to show how worldhood differs from any other order within the world. The correlation of the potencies of nature, which are presemiotic and preordinal, wit the orders of the world itself, is possible only through an ordinal phenomenology that remains attuned to the fundamental difference between nature naturing (the potencies) and nature natured (the orders of the world). Finally, the text redefines the divine natures in the light of an ecstatic naturalism that sees god as an order within the world that experiences the fragmented quality of nature. Process theology is challenged for its inability to grasp the tensions between god and the encompassing. Four divine natures are laid bare as they relate to nature and to each other. The work concludes with a description of the divine life in the face of the encompassing. (shrink)

German theologian F. D. E. Schleiermacher's doctrine of God-the first to be developed in the post-Kantian era-fundamentally changed the course of Christian theology. The degree to which his doctrine of God was influenced by the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza remains in dispute, however. This study examines the ways in which Schleiermacher actively adopted elements of Spinoza's thought in the development of his own theological doctrine of God. Julia Lamm's analysis of little-known but seminal essays by Schleiermacher reveals his young (...) creative genius in daring to go beyond the neo-Spinozism of Herder and the post-Kantianism of Fichte by developing his own post-Kantian Spinozism. Schleiermacher's unique simultaneous appropriation of Kant and Spinoza is characterized by four themes: an organic monism, an ethical determinism, a critical realism, and a nonanthropomorphic view of God, which Lamm traces through his two major theological works, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith. Ultimately, Lamm finds that Schleiermacher departs from Spinoza in significant ways. Most notably, he talks about "the living God" who is best expressed through the divine attributes of love and wisdom. This living God is what Schleiermacher refers to as the "third alternative" to, on the one hand, the anthropomorphized God of orthodox Protestantism and, on the other hand, Spinoza's natura naturans. (shrink)

The human is a microcosm, a child of Natura naturans; and so the human is primordially not only a creature but also a creative being: Homo creans. The predestination of philosophy consists in co-clarifying and co-creating the essence (logos) of being. One of the main purposes of philosophical education is to affirm and develop an original thinking of a personality. -/- .

The concern of this work is with developing an alternative to standard categories in theology and philosophy, especially in terms of how they deal with nature. Avoiding the polemics of much contemporary reflection on nature, it shows how we are connected to nature through the unconscious and its unique way of reading and processing signs. Spinoza's key distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata serves as the governing framework for the treatise. Suggestions are made for a post-Christian (...) way of understanding religion. Robert S. Corrington's work represents the first sustained attempt to bring together the fields of semiotics, depth-psychology, pragmaticism, and a post-Monotheistic theology of nature. Its focus is on how signification functions in human and non-human orders of infinite nature. Our connection with the infinite is described in detail, especially as it relates to the use of sign systems. (shrink)

In this contribution, we shall examine how Valéry leaves Descartes, and the paradigm of sight, in favor of the dancer Athiktè, typical of the paradigm of hearing and touch. If Descartes offers the pattern of an analytic mapping, that method reveals itself irrelevant to take into account what Valéry calls the C.E.M (Corps Esprit Monde). On the other side, a dancer, like Athiktè appears as the model of poiesis, showing the natura naturans in progress.

Comment Bacon, à travers le détournement de thématiques caractéristiques de l’humanisme renaissant, construit-il une philosophie qui place en son centre non plus l’homme, mais l’outil, dont la promotion s’accompagne d’un effacement des termes qu’il commande et unit – la nature et l’esprit? Le transfert le plus significatif de l’homme à l’outil est celui du langage de la négativité, langage qui culmine dans la définition de la forma – objet dernier atteint par la méthode inductive –,comme natura naturans, fons (...) emanationis, actus purus, etc. L’épistémologie baconienne ne nous met-elle pas dès lors en face d’une sorte de nihilisme de l’activité pure réifiée en un dispositif? Les textes sur l’experientia litterata tentent de résoudre cette aporie, marquant non un retour au « réel », mais plutôt une tentative de conciliation entre, d’une part, la rationalité mise en place par l’organum, et, d’autre part, l’homme et son ingenium.How did Bacon, through the leading astray of themes of Renaissance humanism, build a philosophy placing in its center no longer man but the « tool » whose promotion goes along with a wiping out of terms both ordering and uniting nature and the mind. The most significant transference of man towards the tool is that of the language of negativity, a language culminating in the definition of the forma, i.e. the object reached when all is said through the inductive method, as a natura naturans, fons emanationis, actus purus, etc. Hence doesn’t Baconian epistemology confronts us to some kind of a nihilism of plain activity reified into some device? The texts dealing with the experientia litterata try to solve such an aporia, indicating not so much as a return to the real as rather an attempt at reconciling between rationality as erected by the organum on the one hand and man in his ingenium, on the other. (shrink)

One of the most peculiar features of Spinoza’s philosophy is his radical interpretation of the notion of freedom. Even though it plays a significant role in his metaethics and political philosophy, freedom is, for Spinoza, a deeply metaphysical notion, rooted in the most fundamental features of his ontology. In this paper, I analyze the internal structure that identifies a being as “free” within Spinoza’s metaphysics. I argue that this structure leads to an internal paradox, entailing that the very component that (...) allows a being its freedom – its essence or nature – is itself externally determined. I further proceed to resolve this issue indicating how Spinoza’s metaphysics of freedom can accommodate this paradox. I conclude by presenting possible solutions for both Natura naturans and Natura naturata, attempting to integrate the notion of metaphysical freedom with more familiar images of ethical and epistemological freedom. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta três teses fundamentais desenvolvidas por Friedrich Schelling em seu sistema de Filosofia da Natureza : A primeira responde à questão levantada por Kant sobre a possibilidade da construção na filosofia; a segunda baseia-se na interpretação do jovem Schelling sobre a teoria platônica sobre a criação da natureza; a terceira afirma a produtividade da natureza, com inspiração no conceito spinosana de natura naturans.

Although equal in power to other facets of the rich cultural ferment of modern Russia that have profoundly influenced Western civilization—such as painting, literature, drama, and politics—the authentic legacy of twentieth-century Russian philosophy has until recently been eclipsed by Soviet ideological dominance. Of the important philosophers drawing upon the characteristically Russian synthesis of Ancient Neoplatonism, German Idealism, and Byzantine spirituality, Sergei Bulgakov is outstanding, and his work has important implications for our contemporary thinking about the relationship between humanity and nature (...) in an age of environmental crisis. Overcoming the objectivist stance toward nature consolidated by Descartes and ensconced by Kant, Bulgakov anticipates not only many existential and phenomenological thinkers in the West—especially Heidegger—but also current ecological sensibilities, by showing the ontological status of humanity and nature as profoundly interconnected, especially through his understanding of nature as “household.” Beyond this, he elucidates a normative, “thoesophianic” character of nature corresponding to Plato’s “world soul,” the Renaissance natura naturans, and Heidegger’s “divinely beautiful nature” which is best revealed not by science and technology, but by the aesthetic and contemplative energies of a humanity whose essential interconnection with nature is shown most profoundly by means of this mode of revealing itself. (shrink)

Este artigo pensa as contingências decorrentes das máquinas autônomas da natureza no universo das utopias concretas. Pensa como artefatos podem ganhar autonomia diante da irracionalidade da matéria? É sabido que as máquinas utópicas podem exteriorizar um poder desconhecido do ser humano e alcançar uma condição autárquica diante do descaso de seu criador. Ernst Bloch situa tais utopias no 3.º nível da categoria, um ainda-não-ser, que na sua ontologia responde a “possibilidade conforme estrutura do objeto real”. Contingências e imprevisibilidades advindas neste (...) nível determinam a dimensão autônoma das utopias técnicas. A evolução do processo dinâmico e complexo da matéria – natura naturata que se acha velada, uma vez desperta assume a dimensão de natura naturans. A natureza que produz natureza revela que a ação do homem sobre a matéria transforma sonhos utópicos acordados em pesadelos distópicos acordados, determinando uma diversidade de utopias autárquicas que ameaçam a humanidade. Esse contexto recepciona o alvorecer de novas utopias técnicas, que aponta uma não conformidade na geração das máquinas autárquicas bem como, a ausência de uma linguagem ética entre homo utopicus e natura naturans. (shrink)

The version of religious naturalism sketched here is called naturism to distinguish it from conceptions of religious naturalism that make fundamental appeal to some idea of deity, deities, or the divine, however immanental, functional, nonontological, or purely valuational or existential such notions may be claimed to be. The focus of naturism is on nature itself as both metaphysically and religiously ultimate. Nature is sacred in its own right, not because of its derivation from some more–ultimate religious principle, state, being, beings, (...) or order of being. Humans, their cultures, and their histories are conceived as integral parts of nature, manifestations of potentialities that lie within it and have been actualized by biological evolution. While there is no purpose of nature, the natural order contains beings capable of purposive behavior. With this purposive behavior, and the goals and ideals implicit in it, humans have the capacity to give significant direction to their ongoing cultural evolution and to discover and maintain their appropriate place within the community of creatures. (shrink)

The biblical image of Wisdom as the power who “orders all things well” in nature and in human life can be read in the light of contemporary information theory. Some current scientific speculation offers an interpretation of reality as a vast information‐processing system, in which informational situations are continuously transformed through algorithmic operations. This interpretation finds a metaphysical counterpart in the distinction between “nature natured” and “nature naturing” in the philosophical theology of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. This confluence of religious, metaphysical, (...) and scientific imagery suggests a picture of the world in which the processes of “nature naturing,”“human humaning,” and “God Godding” inform and recur in each other. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende señalar la importancia de la causa inmanente al interior de la doctrina de Baruch Spinoza. La ética es el tratado más importante de Spinoza y reúne el pensamiento maduro del filósofo holandés. La prop. XVIII del libro I tiene un rol fundamental y articula el mundo de la Naturaleza Naturante y la Naturaleza Naturada, mostrando por primera vez la manera en que la causa única se produce y produce todo: de forma inmanente. Intentamos, así, mostrar el rol (...) articulador de la causa immanens en el pensamiento de Spinoza y la importancia de la ética. (shrink)

The present volume contains Part Four, "The Great Shift," of Susanne Langer’s projected six-part magnum opus entitled, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. The first volume dealt with three parts: "Problems and Principles," "The Import of Art," and "Natura Naturans;" Volume II rests squarely on these three foundational parts. The balance of the work will be concerned with "The Moral Structure," and with "Knowledge and Truth." In this reviewer’s opinion, Professor Langer’s essay is easily the most significant theory (...) of mind yet developed in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The central task of her essay is to establish the total qualitative difference that divides human from animal mentality by showing that the nature and origin of that difference is explicable in terms of a continuous course of biological development. "The great shift" to human being as a mode of life typified by all that we understand as culture is accomplished, according to the conceptual framework extended throughout Volume II of the work, without recourse to metaphysical assumptions of nonzoological factors. By carefully locating a vast amount of exact psychobiological information in a conceptual structure that extends scientific definitions by modification, she makes the biological concept of human mentality adequate to the extraordinary reality it is intended to make comprehensible. Through the incorporation of highly sophisticated detail, she investigates repertoire and instinct; animal acts and ambients; animal values; interpretation of animal acts; the specialization of man; symbols and the evaluation of mind; and, finally, symbols and the human world. It is difficult to imagine that a reader could find fault with Susanne Langer’s method, because she never expands her conceptual structure by metaphorical extension, but only by modifying definitions in scientific terms so as to comprehend domains wider than those conventionally assigned to the sciences themselves. Her study, however, is not only eminently adequate methodologically, it is immensely satisfying in helping us understand that the uniqueness of human being can be fully articulated and intellectually sustained without resorting to a vitalistic discontinuity of any order. If, as Susanne Langer herself contends, the value of a philosophical outlook rests ultimately on its "serviceability," then this masterwork will serve all manner of investigators for a long time to come.—C.F.B. (shrink)