After the three families divided up the state of Jin and the Tian family took over Qi, the political situation in the fourth century B.C.E. appeared even more chaotic. Wei conquered Chu's Luyang and Qin's Xihe, Qin defeated Wei at Shimen , and again at Shaoliang , and Wei moved its capital to Daliang. During the mid-Warring States period, Qin became dominant in the west, Qi in the east, Chu in the south, and Wei in the center. Rapid changes occurred (...) one after another; trickery and conflict were rampant. However, the shi , the intelligentsia, actually managed to expand their spheres of existence and activity accordingly in this state of tension between countries, states, and men. A few major states assembled quite a number of literati; and those men of the villages, who had in earlier times merely waited passively for opportunities to fall into their laps, crisscrossed the various feudal states; literati who previously had no cause to use military force became, one by one, the honored guests of the feudal lords. With the breakdown of the previously simple and obvious order, the gradually dismantling of the common body of the ancestral clan of the past, and the increasing complexities of social relationships after the dissolution of blood ties, social order became a matter of concern. Or, to reword this most practical issue: How could this universally chaotic society go from disorder to order? (shrink)

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Over the past decade, genetically modified organisms have come to be viewed as problematic in Japan, as evidenced by a large number of newspaper articles covering questions ranging from the unknown ecological impact of GMOs to uncertainty about food safety, and by the fact that a number of consumers’ groups have organized activities including demonstrations at the experiment stations and the submission of petitions to the government. Against this backdrop, this article attempts to understand the changing interpretation of the perceived (...) rational social order in the context of the Japanese GMO controversies. Drawing on the French Theory of Conventions, the article will shed light on the conventions that serve as templates enabling actors to interpret what it means to introduce GMOs and what constitutes a rational decision concerning GMOs. The article will argue that rationality is best viewed as an emergent and interpretive process involving interpretation and negotiation by and among actors, and that conventions which may be taken for granted are nevertheless unstable and mutable. (shrink)

In response to Strydom, Nicoll and Gregg's queries, I draw out some further implications of my analysis of theory classrooms. I aim to clarify the theoretical basis of my concepts of social order and fetishism. I end by considering the pedagogical implications of my analysis. It seems to me that the contradiction between critical values and the classroom's forms of authority remain irresolvable.

Central figures in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, drew extensively on gestalt psychology in their writings. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology they began continues today in the field of embodied cognitive science. We take up this conversation starting from Aron Gurwitsch’s rich phenomenological analysis of the perception of the cultural world. Gurwitsch’s phenomenological descriptions of the perception of the cultural world bear a striking resemblance to work in embodied cognitive science that takes (...) its inspiration from Gibson’s ecological psychology. Gibson coined the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action that can be directly perceived by persons [Gibson 1979]. However, Gibson from his earliest writings made a distinction between a universal, strictly individual and nonsocial form of perception and a perception of the world that was subject to social and cultural influences. We use Gurwitsch to argue against Gibson’s individualist understanding of direct perception. Each affordance that can be selected as an object of perception refers to a wider sociocultural context, which Gurwitsch called an “order of existence”. We end our paper by taking up the question of the relation of phenomenological description of the perceptual world and explanations of perceptual experience provided by embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

Central figures in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, drew extensively on gestalt psychology in their writings. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology they began continues today in the field of embodied cognitive science. We take up this conversation starting from Aron Gurwitsch’s rich phenomenological analysis of the perception of the cultural world. Gurwitsch’s phenomenological descriptions of the perception of the cultural world bear a striking resemblance to work in embodied cognitive science that takes (...) its inspiration from Gibson’s ecological psychology. Gibson coined the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action that can be directly perceived by persons [Gibson 1979]. However, Gibson from his earliest writings made a distinction between a universal, strictly individual and nonsocial form of perception and a perception of the world that was subject to social and cultural influences. We use Gurwitsch to argue against Gibson’s individualist understanding of direct perception. Each affordance that can be selected as an object of perception refers to a wider sociocultural context, which Gurwitsch called an “order of existence”. We end our paper by taking up the question of the relation of phenomenological description of the perceptual world and explanations of perceptual experience provided by embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

The Norwegian high-school drama series Skam is produced and published by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, a publicly funded institution distinguished by an explicit obligation to the public interest, not only serving their audience as consumers but even as citizens. Generally, the normativity expressed in Skam may be summarized by treating all with respect, involving not only moral considerations of what is right, but also ethical conceptions of what is good, offered, opened up and obstructed by the living social (...) class='Hi'>order established there. In season three, given attention here, the plot revolves around issues concerning same-sex relationships, mental disorder and religion. Here Skam becomes interesting for the field of moral education, elaborating on how to encounter the challenges of pluralistic societies that undergo continuous changes and in which common values have become open questions. In this paper attention is drawn toward Skam’s ethical dimension, considering Skam as an instance of public moral education. Faced with tensions, hindrances and conflicts, the norm of treating all with respect, irrespective of how trivial it may appear outside of context, becomes loaded with meaning, while the actualization of the good life is at risk. Appalling is the way hegemonic religion is transformed in the living social order. Decisive is the active role taken by the youths in the series, recontextualizing the norm. The social order here is not a static, given condition, but a continuous, moving, cultivating project. In that respect, a certain democratic aspect of the public moral education of Skam also becomes visible. Together, the youths portrayed in the series seem to accommodate a variety of expressions of life emerging within their community. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that though symbolism performs many roles in different cultures, it has a uniquely moral one in Igbo land. That unique role which symbolism performs in the pristine communalistic Igbo society concerns the regulation of human freedoms and actions in order to maintain social order. But is this something that can be sustained in a modern Igbo society that is more individualistic than communalistic? This paper is of the view that through the proper (...) maintenance of such symbolism: social control between individuals and groups shall be more coordinated in the contemporary Igbo world; regulate and checkmate the Igbo moral consciousness of oneness; control some cultural maladjustment and bring more about social unity in Igbo land. Keywords: Symbol, Symbolism, Social Order, Igbo, Oji. (shrink)

Although this book bears a copyright date of 1980, it is obviously the fruit of a lifetime of reflection. One does not have to share the author's perspective or concur in every judgment to recognize the wisdom, both speculative and practical, that is manifest throughout. The first part of the book develops a theory of positive law and its place in the natural order. The last part examines the place of law in the social order and the (...) role of legal action as one form of the social control. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was renowned for his provocative views on education. Considered an educational innovator, Russell attempted to create the perfect learning institution. Despite the failure of this practical vision, it did not stop him from continuing to strive towards inventing and arguing for a system of education free from repression. In _Education and the Social Order_, Russell dissects the motives behind educational theory and practice, and in doing so lays out original and controversial arguments for the reformation of the (...) education of the individual. (shrink)

This is a detailed reply to Kurtuluş Gemici’s article, in this issue of Theory and Society, “Uncertainty, the problem of order, and markets: a critique of Beckert, Theory and Society, May 2009.”.

The generation of redundancy is specific for meaning processing in anticipatory systems. Variation generates entropy; redundancy is generated by selection mechanisms in inter-human communications. ….

Although libertarians typically eschew coercion as a means to political ends, many theorists cannot avoid endorsing the coercion that is entailed by even minimal states when addressing the concerns of individualist anarchists. The dissertation first identifies distinct approaches to libertarian theory, then examines the arguments justifying the minimal level of coercion necessary for the state. I argue that minimal state libertarians implicitly appeal to a particular set of concerns that, despite the general presumption against the state, are taken to justify (...) political authority. I isolate and examine these core worries about the threat of chaos and compare them against anarchist responses to the challenges they pose. Although some economists and game theorists have worked on the problem of coercion and cooperation, this body of work has not yet been brought to bear on the philosophical discussion about the relationship of the individual to the state, at least not with regard to resolving the dispute between libertarian statists and libertarian anarchists. I conclude that the anarchists' conception of legal theory and social order, in light of the work on the evolution of cooperation, is sufficiently plausible to answer the concerns of libertarian statists. (shrink)

Economics is often believed to be a `value-free' discipline, and even an `a-moral' one. My aim is to demonstrate that homo œconomicus can recover his ethical nature if the philosophical roots of contemporary economics are laid bare. This, however, requires us to look for an alternative foundation for the idea of `social order,' a foundation which economics is ill-equipped to provide because of its exclusive focus on calculative rationality. But a new ethical perspective on homo œconomicus and on (...) the manner in which he chooses his actions is possible. My aim here is to make this new perspective explicit.Two claims lie at the heart of this paper. The first claim is that economics as practised nowadays — that is, as a discipline concerned with the analysis of the interactions between individual decisions and the collective effects of these interactions — is a particular form of metaphysics, based on a particular articulation between self-centredness and other-centredness. The second claim is that, unbeknownst to the vast majority of economists, the basic principle of individual optimization contains the seed of a radical reformulation of what the emergence of `social order' is all about. More specifically, economics will be claimed to be a specific metaphysical discipline based on the monadological worldview inherited from Leibniz and re-arranged to fit the empiricist bias of 18th-century thinkers, and the principle of individual optimization will be claimed to be compatible with a very different metaphysical view of the human subject, a view which `turns subjectivity inside out', so to speak, and treats optimizing calculation as a response rather than as an initiative.The first claim is rather general, and not completely new — it has been hinted at, for example, by Jon Elster in an early book written in French, but it has received precious little attention among economists so far, with the result that economics has become increasingly blind to the philosophical roots of its most fundamental views on individual decision and on social order. The second claim applies to economics and homo œconomicus a general suggestion coming from Alain Renaut, that we ought to make good use of the accusations of incoherence voiced against the monadological scheme in order to re-think the way in which human subjectivity works. Renaut, however, remains at the level of the history of the philosophical concept of subjectivity. Although he does, in passing, make some mention of possible implications for the social sciences, he never goes into the full analysis of what the critique of monadological metaphysics implies for modern theories of society, and for economics in particular. One of my main goals here is to fill this gap.Let me now be more specific about the steps of my analysis. Defending my two claims will require, first of all, a rigorous understanding of the basic methodological stance adopted by economics, namely the idea that social order `emanates' from a bunch of self-centred subjectivities making separate optimizing decisions. Accordingly, in Section 2, I will trace out the analogy that exists between Leibnizian monadology and modern-day economics. The aim there will be to show that economics, unwittingly but for nevertheless deep ethical reasons, has remained `stuck' in a very specific metaphysical position which virtually no contemporary philosophy of subjectivity any longer acknowledges. Section 3, then, will show how the combination of monadology and empiricism which still prevails in contemporary economics can be overcome by entering an altogether distinct philosophical domain characterized by the primacy of Other over Self.While this alternative philosophical stance has experienced a surge of interest in recent decades, it has left the social sciences, and particularly economics, completely untouched. The reason is, I will claim, that this strand of philosophy adopts a form of methodological altruism which stands in contrast both to the methodological individualism of economics and to the methodological holism of various strands of post-Durkheimian sociology. In Section 4, then, I analyze some of the far-reaching consequences for economics which would flow from taking into account `non-I' motives which are not `We' motives, i.e., motives for action which are neither mere holist pastings onto individualism nor mere individualist mitigations of holism.The principle of choice of action through individual optimization will appear as the `hinge' between two worlds: although initially anchored within a worldview where social coexistence is a by-product of individual calculations, the idea of optimization will be seen to be compatible with a very different, and indeed almost reversed worldview, one where individual calculations emerge as by-products of social coexistence — the term `social' being itself radically re-thought in a non-holistic direction.The aim of my analysis, ultimately, is to formulate a challenge for contemporary economics and its implicit view of the interaction between individual and society: Can the combination of monadological and empiricist thinking so strongly ingrained in economics be overcome in the direction of a radically `other-oriented' view of the human subject? Many economists will doubtless believe it cannot; however, they will now, at least, have to explain why they hold to the older view and hence they will have to uncover their often hidden ethical and metaphysical presuppositions. I view this not as an undue disturbance or as mere conceptual hair-splitting, but as a timely opportunity to clarify some deep philosophical issues which haunt economics. (shrink)

Despite the fact that many of us live in secular societies, religions are also a factor in our daily lives. New information technologies and highly efficient modes of transportation have made it possible for people from various continents to encounter each other. People of different religions and ethnicities have become neighbors in our cities. Religious dialogue is more necessary in our contemporary world than it has ever been in history. This essay analyzes how the Islamic faith shapes the believers worldview (...) and the way of life. A good understanding of religions is viewed as making dialogue and respect possible, especially between Muslims and Christians in our contemporary societies. Focusing on areas of shared beliefs and practices further promotes collaboration on issues of human flourishing. This essay explores the social-political dimensions of the strict monotheism in the religion of Islam and also argues for its relation to the Christian beliefs and practices. The Islamic understanding of human persons as created by God first before all other creatures is viewed as the foundation of human responsibility. A human being is believed as endowed by God with an inherent responsibility to promote economic and social equality. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, the first translation into English of the ground-breaking 'Normativität und Macht' (Suhrkamp 2015), Rainer Forst presents a new approach to critical theory. Each essay reflects on the basic principles that guide our normative thinking. Forst's argument goes beyond 'ideal' and 'realist' theories and shows how closely the concepts of normativity and power are interrelated, and how power rests on the capacity to influence, determine, and possibly restrict the space of justifications for others. By combining insights (...) from the disciplines of philosophy, history, and the social sciences, Forst revaluates theories of justice, as well as of power, and provides the tools for a critical theory of relations of justification. Translated from German. (shrink)

The paper aims to analyze the potentiality of Schutzian phenomenology to account for the problem of social order. Firstly, we expose the existence of an interpretive scheme of Parsonian roots in contemporary social theory that introduces the dualistic dilemma subjective action versus social order in the analysis of Schutz’s perspective. According to this interpretive scheme, Schutz fails to master the problem of social order. Secondly, and in clear opposition to those interpretations, we show (...) three main contributions which have put forward the argument that it is possible to find in Schutz’s work a theory of social order: Harold Garfinkel’s early writings, the recent Austrian School of Economics’ reception of Schutz and the present-day interpretation in German sociology. In the context of these discussions, our reflections have explored the pragmatic dimension of the order of the life-world based on a phenomenonological constitutive analysis which provides a basis for a comprehensive theory of social order of Schutzian roots. (shrink)

This is a selection of the most important work of Edna Ullmann-Margalit, an unorthodox and deeply original philosopher whose work illuminated the largest mysteries of human life. It centres on two questions: How do people proceed when they cannot act on the basis of reasons, or project likely consequences? How is social order possible?

One does not need to read many pages of this very rich book to realize that it is the fruit of a lifetime of study and that it is both speculatively wise and prudent. Though it may not receive the same degree of attention as other well publicized studies it clearly ranks with studies such as Hart's The Concept of Law and Erlich's The Sociology of Law. The author intends to develop a systematic theory of positive law, with close attention (...) to the circumstances that bring law into being, the purposes that law is designed to serve, and the structure of the legal system itself. He also proposes to apply this theory to an examination of the problems that law faces and the conditions that it must satisfy if it is to be an effective force in society. Nineteen chapters follow. Jenkins is aware that the study of law is but part of the larger study of society from which law receives its tasks and form. To determine the origin, end and functions of law is to search for those objective principles that define the conditions of man's well-being. While the first part of the book is concerned with the formulation of a general theory of law, the second explores the role of law in the social order and the conditions of legal effectiveness. Jenkins provides dramatic evidence that in our day, particularly in the United States, law is being employed for purposes that are unprecedented. "The legal apparatus," he writes, "is being asked to intervene in areas of social and personal life that have hitherto been handled by other agencies in other ways." It is the author's judgment that these nontraditional uses of law have for the most part been disappointing in their results. "We abuse the legal apparatus," writes Jenkins "because we have inadequate notions both of what the law is and how it works." Jenkins is convinced that law supplies the compelling social need for a force that is at once sovereign and principled. As sovereign it is entitled to habitual obedience and to the use of force when necessary. As sovereign, subject to no external control, it must be principled. It must govern itself by self-imposed provisions and mechanisms that determine the use of this power and prevent it from becoming autocratic and arbitrary. (shrink)

Endeavours to map out a piece of the intellectual history of this century which once almost faded from memory. In 1941 William Temple, then Archbishop of York, called for a Christian social philosophy and in so doing voiced a concern that had been gathering momentum all through the 30s, sharpened by the challenge of authoritarian regimes, left and right, and had formed the focus of the Oxford Conference of Church, Community and State in 1937.

Resumen: A través de la asimilación de la contingencia y la complejidad, la teoría general de los sistemas sociales de Niklas Luhmann propone una conceptualización del orden social que se muestra sensible a aquellos fenómenos que desafían a las lógicas institucionales establecidas. Dicha apertura ha permitido integrar teóricamente a la variación, al cambio y al conflicto como posibilidades siempre abiertas en la reproducción de los sistemas sociales. Es decir, como fenómenos no antagónicos con el orden social. El objetivo (...) de este artículo es analizar, específicamente, el tratamiento del conflicto que se desprende de esta maniobra conceptual. Nuestra hipótesis es que, si bien el conflicto se encuentra formalmente integrado en esta teoría del orden, el mismo es explicado de un modo deficiente puesto que solo pueden reconocerse parcialmente aquellas condiciones sociales que lo viabilizan. Sostenemos que la causa probable de este déficit se halla en la reproducción de una concepción regulativa de orden social que no se encuentra suficientemente problematizada en relación con los supuestos de contingencia y complejidad.: Through the assimilation of contingency and complexity, Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory proposes a conceptualization of social order that is sensitive to those phenomena that challenge established institutional logics. This opening allows the integration of variation, change and conflict as possibilities always open in the reproduction of social systems as phenomena that are not antagonistic to social order. The purpose of this article is to analyse, specifically, the treatment of conflict that emerges from this conceptual manoeuvre. Our hypothesis is that, although the conflict is formally integrated in this theory, it is weakly explained as it partially recognizes the social conditions that make it viable. We argue that the probable cause of this deficit lies in the reproduction of a regulative conception of social order that is not sufficiently discussed regarding contingency and complexity. (shrink)

This article seeks to situate the athletic activities of Spartiates and their unmarried daughters during the Classical period in their broader societal context by using theoretical perspectives taken from sociology in general and the sociology of sport in particular to explore how those activities contributed to the maintenance of social order in Sparta. Social order is here taken to denote a system of interlocking societal institutions, practices, and norms that is relatively stable over time. Athletics was (...) a powerful mechanism that helped to generate consensus and to socialize and coerce individuals. It thus induced compliance with behavioral norms on the part of both females and males and thereby contributed meaningfully to the maintenance of social order in Sparta. Athletics inculcated conformity to norms that called for females to be compliant, beautiful objects of male desire. Athletics had an equally profound effect on Spartan males because it inculcated compliance with norms that valorized subordination of the individual to the group, playing the part of the soldier, and meritocratic status competition. Athletics may well have also to some degree empowered both Spartan females and males, but its liberatory dimensions can easily be unduly amplified. There is an ever-present dialectic in athletics, between its ability to reinforce norms that underpin the prevailing social order and its ability to foster individual autonomy. In the case of Sparta, the balance in that dialectic always inclined very much toward the former. (shrink)

Forty-three years ago Max Weber observed that “the belief in the value of scientific truth is not derived from nature but is a product of definite cultures.” We may now add: and this belief is readily transmuted into doubt or disbelief. The persistent development of science occurs only in societies of a certain order, subject to a peculiar complex of tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints. What is for us a normal phenomenon which demands no explanation and secures many ‘self-evident’ (...) cultural values, has been in other times and still is in many places abnormal and infrequent. The continuity of science requires the active participation of interested and capable persons in scientific pursuits. This support of science is assured only by appropriate cultural conditions. It is, then, important to examine those controls which motivate scientific careers, which select and give prestige to certain scientific disciplines and reject or blur others. It will become evident that changes in institutional structure may curtail, modify or possibly prevent the pursuit of science. (shrink)

There is a well-worn image and phrase for libertarianism: "atomized individualism." This hobgoblin has spread so thoroughly that even some libertarians think their philosophy unreservedly supports private persons, whatever the situation, whatever their behavior. Smith's Self-Interest and Social Order in Classical Liberalism, corrects this misrepresentation with careful intellectual surveys of Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Butler, Mandeville, and Hutcheson and their respective contributions to political philosophy.

No social life is possible without order. Order being the most constituent element of society, it is not surprising that so many theories have been developed to explain what social order is and how it is possible, as well as to explore the features that social order acquires in its different dimensions. The book leads these many theories of social order back to a few main matrices for the use of theoretical (...) and practical reason, which are defined as 'paradigms of order'. The plurality of conceptual constructs regarding social order is therefore reduced to a manageable number of theoretical patterns and an intellectual map is produced in which the most significant differences between paradigms are clearly outlined. Furthermore, the 'paradigmatic revolutions' are addressed that marked the most relevant turning points in the way in which a 'well-ordered society' should be understood. Against this background, the question is discussed on the theoretical and practical perspectives for a cosmopolitan society as the only suitable possibility to meet the global challenges with which we are all presently confronted. (shrink)

The author, seeing science as a social activity, directs our attention to the problems of the social control of science. He discusses the sense in which science as a social activity is planned and unplanned.

Transparency International has consistently maintained two prominent assertions: that corruption remains a global threat because no human society in the world has a clean record, and that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. These assertions raise some fundamental philosophical concerns. The former assertion re-opens the need to ascertain whether corruption is an essence of humans, or an acquired disposition. Howsoever this is resolved forms the fulcrum of concerns on the second assertion. This paper engages these philosophical concerns. (...) The paper takes two paths to achieve this goal. The first draws from Aristotle’s essentialism and Thomas Hobbes’ accounts on human nature to engage the debate on the relationship between human nature and corruption. The second derives and discusses the plausibility and fundamental implications of the claim that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. It was found that neither on the basis of Aristotle’s nor Thomas Hobbes’, nor even a possible African cosmology as discussed, can it be said that official corruption is essential to humans. The paper concludes that what is at issue concerning corruption as measured by Transparency International pertains to different African expectations of recompense in a protective communalism from which relatives in public offices must have drawn care, now termed “corruption” by Transparency International, which is not so regarded in the African social order. (shrink)

In this paper, we undertake a genealogical study to illustrate how Karl Marx derives his concept of class conflict from Adam Smith’s theory of social order. Based on these findings, we argue that both Smith’s and Marx’s political economies should be interpreted in relation to each other – from the perspective of social philosophy, in particular their shared concepts of social order and necessary opposition of class interests. By appeal to process philosophy, we also argue (...) that this reinterpretation needs to take into account two other ideas shared by Smith and Marx, namely the social individual as person-in-community, and the pursuit of desirable social forms from a humanistic perspective. We conclude by contending that business management practice would benefit from understanding the role of class tensions and social order in stakeholder relations. Specifically, management and organization scholarship should focus on philosophical examinations of the influence of social order on economic activities in an organization in a way that is far more appreciative of the social relations of individuals as being the primary, rather than a secondary, concern. (shrink)

In this article, the importance of ritual as a collective response to death is discussed. A case example, taken from a larger ethnographic study, is used to explore the responses and reactions of a group of Italian nurses to death as it occurs within an intensive care unit in Rome, Italy. The material presented is used to analyse the significance that cultural, religious and social beliefs and quasi‐beliefs can have in nursing practice. The issues highlighted in this examination of (...) the place of ritual in death are located and discussed within their highly specific cultural context and suggest that, where emphasis remains on nurses as a collective rather than on the individual nurse, ritual acts to ensure that social and moral order prevails. (shrink)

Central to most intellectual debates on political organization is the issue of human nature, for one’s understanding of it influences one’s prescriptions on how best society can be governed. This paper examines the contractarian theories of Hobbes and Locke in their attempts to identify the conditions for social order. Deploying a critical and comparative method, the paper identifies the failure of the two theories to recognize the complexity of human nature, a complexity which forecloses the plausibility of a (...) descriptive straitjacket. The paper further argues that contrary to Hobbes’ pessimism and Locke’s optimism towards human nature, the individual has qualities which point to a delicate balance of both. Consequently, the paper highlights the imperatives of social order in a manner that accommodates the complexity of human nature. It concludes that it is on the basis of the appreciation of these dimensions of human nature that we can hope to evolve an enduring social order. (shrink)