R M HARE HAS CLAIMED THAT ALL NATURALISTIC ETHICAL\nTHEORIES ARE INCORRECT BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF\nTHE COMMENDING FUNCTION OF ETHICAL TERMS. BUT HARE ASSUMES\nTHE POINT AT ISSUE BY SUPPOSING THAT NO DEFINING\nCHARACTERISTICS COULD THEMSELVES BE TAKEN AS COMMENDATORY.\nIF 'X IS GOOD' IS TAKEN TO MEAN 'AN INFORMED,\nDISINTERESTED, RATIONAL, NORMAL HUMAN SPECTATOR WOULD\nAPPROVE OF X', THEN THE DEFINIENS WOULD BE JUST AS\nCOMMENDATORY AS THE DEFINIENDUM.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Is Hume A "Classical Utilitarian"? The central notion of utilitarianism is that a right kind of action or a virtuous quality of character is one which in the long run promotes the welfare of society or, as it is frequently stated, which promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But when we try to use the utilitarian concept as a guide for evaluating various possible ultimate distributions of (...) goods among the members of a society, we find there are alternative ways of making this goal more precise. I intend to review briefly five different ways in which the utilitarian goal can be stated more precisely. Then I will consider which one of these more precise formulations most accurately reflects what Hume 2 seems to have had in mind when he spoke of "public utility" or "the good of mankind" or "the true interests of mankind" (ICPM, p. 13) or "public interest and utility "(ICPM, p. 34). II The most effective way of illustrating the vagueness of such phrases as "the welfare of society" or "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is to consider which of various specific but simple distributions of goods would be preferred by a utilitarian. This technique also is helpful in displaying the differences among the various ways of stating the utilitarian goal in more precise terms. Let us suppose that there are units of "goodness" or "welfare" all 2. of which are equal to each other. These units of "goodness" or "welfare" can be taken from one individual and given to another. Furthermore, the number of such units is not fixed, nor is the number of individuals among whom the units of value will be distributed. The distribution of goods among individuals is to be considered in a completely abstract way so that no individuals are to be more deserving then any others. In fact, from a utilitarian point of view, various actions and qualities of character are to be evaluated in terms of whether in the long run they hinder or promote the ideal distribution of goods being considered. To illustrate this technique, let us examine two conceivable distributions of goods. Individual Scheme I Scheme II A 5 10 B 5 3 C 5 3 In Scheme I there are fifteen units of goodness divided evenly among the three individuals A, B, and C. In Scheme II there are sixteen units of goodness distributed in such a way that A has twice as many units as he had in Scheme I while B and C have only three units each. Given that the utilitarian wants to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which Scheme would he choose to promote, 4 Scheme I or Scheme II? One variety of utilitarianism, the first of five to be distinguished, opts for Scheme II on grounds that the total number of units of welfare is greater (16 to only 15 for Scheme I). The emphasis here is on the first half of the utilitarian formula of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" ; the aim is to increase the total amount of happiness. This view is usually called "classical utilitarianism " on grounds that it supposedly was the view championed by the classical utilitarians (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 5 Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Sidgwick). A second variety of utilitarianism would opt for Scheme 3. I in the comparison given above on grounds that two individuals (B and C) would be better off with Scheme I while only one individual (A) would be better off with Scheme II. The emphasis here is on the second half of the utilitarian formula ; the aim is to increase the number of individuals who are better off. This view can be called "self-interest-vote utilitarianism" on grounds that the preferred scheme is the one which gets the most votes when each person votes in terms of his own self-interest. (Note that this interpretation of utilitarianism can be used only when the Schemes being compared have the same number of persons sharing the goods. ) A third variety of utilitarianism is that which declares the goal to be maximizing the average units of welfare available per person. As long... (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn April of 2000, Diana Levine went to a clinic in Vermont suffering from a migraine headache. She was given the drug Demerol for the migraine symptoms and Phenergan for nausea. Complications with the administration of Phenergan ultimately resulted in Ms. Levine contracting gangrene, necessitating the amputation of her right arm. Ms. Levine sued the drug maker, Wyeth Pharmaceutical, in state court and prevailed. The lower court's decision was appealed by Wyeth to the state supreme court where the ruling was (...) confirmed. Wyeth next appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which, to the surprise of many observers, affirmed the judgment of the state supreme court. At issue was the fundamental question of the ability of consumers to obtain redress against negligent manufacturers in state courts. Wyeth's arguments to the Court were based upon preemption: Foodand Drug Administration approval of a drug preempts the ability of injured consumers like Ms. Levine to recover in state courts despite years of precedent to the contrary. Ability to recover damages in state courts represents, perhaps, the most important safety net available to consumers injured by defective products. A ruling by the Supreme Court that FDA‐approved labeling of pharmaceuticals preempts the reach of the state courts would have severely compromised the balance of power between consumers and producers. (shrink)

Legal scholarship exploring the nature of evidence and the process of juridical proof has had a complex relationship with formal modeling. As evident in so many fields of knowledge, algorithmic approaches to evidence have the theoretical potential to increase the accuracy of fact finding, a tremendously important goal of the legal system. The hope that knowledge could be formalized within the evidentiary realm generated a spate of articles attempting to put probability theory to this purpose. This literature was both insightful (...) and frustrating. Much light was shed on the legal system, but it also quickly became evident that the tools of probability theory were in many ways ill-constructed for the task. Fundamental incompatibilities between the structure of legal decision making and the extant formal tools were identified, and it became evident that many of the purported explanations of legal phenomena were internally inconsistent. As a consequence, interest in this type of formal modeling declined, and attention was directed toward different kinds of explanations of the phenomena. Perhaps under the influence of a recent trend toward various types of formal modeling in legal scholarship, a recent burst of articles, rather than attempting to explain the macro structure of trials, which was the previous object of interest, attempts to quantify the probative value of various items of evidence in ways consistent with the formal features of various probability theories, and then to study decision making from that perspective. For example, the value of evidence is often purported to be its likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given a hypothesis (e.g., the defendant did it) divided by the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant didn't do it). Alternatively, the value of evidence is purported (more contextually) to be the information gain it provides, defined as the increase in probability it provides for a hypothesis above the probability of the hypothesis based on the other available evidence. Both conceptions then assume that all of the various probability assessments conform or ought to conform to the dictates of Bayes' theorem (that maintains consistency among such assessments); empirical studies are then done testing the extent to which this is so and proposing how the law can increase the probability that it is so. The general criticisms of using Bayes' theorem as a formal model of juridical proof are well known and were integral to the last wave of interest in formal modeling of the evidentiary process. This paper thus for the most part puts aside that more general issue, and focuses specifically on mathematical modeling of the value of particular items of evidence. The paper demonstrates that formal modeling has only limited value in explaining the value of legal evidence, much more limited than those constructing and discussing the models assume, and thus that the conclusions they draw about the value of evidence are unwarranted. This is done through a discussion of four recent examples that attempt to quantify evidence relating to, respectively, carpet fibers, infidelity, DNA random-match evidence, and character evidence used to impeach a witness. This article thus makes two contributions. First, and most importantly, it is another demonstration of the complex relationship between algorithmic tools and legal decision making. Second, at a minimum it points out serious pitfalls for analytical or empirical studies of juridical proof. (shrink)

In October of 2009, Trevor Keezer was terminated by Home Depot for refusing to remove a pin from his uniform declaring “One Nation under God, Indivisible.” Mr. Keezer, a cashier with Home Depot, contended that the button he had worn for over one year before any action was taken by his employer expressed his support for American troops and his Christian faith. Were the actions taken by his employer warranted or was Mr. Keezer the victim of arbitrary religious discrimination unrelated (...) to job performance? Religion is becoming an increasingly polarizing issue in the workplace, forcing retail managers to balance the respective interests of employees, coworkers, and patrons of retail establishments. And from all indications, if legislation pending in Congress is enacted, maintaining the balance will become more problematic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFast food chains such as McDonald's, KFC, and Burger King are major players in the production, marketing, and consumption of animal‐derived food throughout the world. Animal rights activists are quick to point out the link between the highly efficient factory farms that supply these chains and extreme animal cruelty and environmental degradation. Strategically, fast food is well positioned to leverage change in the methods by which animals are raised and processed for human consumption. Although progress has been made as the (...) fast food industry has responded to pressure exerted by animal rights organizations, there is little indication of true collaborative efforts that would harness the power of the market to bring about substantive changes in the way the consuming public views the issue of animal welfare and food production. (shrink)

Following a series of national protests in support of an increase in the federal minimum wage, many fast food workers faced retaliation by their employers when they returned to work; schedules were changed, wages and hours were reduced, and some employees were terminated. These retaliatory actions resulted in a number of complaints being filed with the National Labor Relations Board alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act. Several of the complaints were found to have merit and, additionally, in several (...) instances both the immediate employer, the franchisee, and the corporate organization of which it was a part, the franchisor, were named as co‐defendants. This ruling—that franchisors like McDonald’s USA—could be held jointly responsible for the labor violations of independent franchisees reversed a long‐standing precedent, whereby franchisees were regarded as independent contractors solely responsible for day‐to‐day labor practices, including compliance with federal and state labor statutes. Critics of the ruling argue that it will open the door to unionization and may well spell the end of the service‐sponsor franchising format. Supporters of the NLRB argue that the ruling is just and reflects new “industrial realities” in retail labor markets. Further, a case can be made that the NLRB’s position represents a step in the direction of the restoration of more equitable balance of power between labor and management. (shrink)

While ethicists have directed much attention to controversial biomedical issues--including euthanasia, abortion, and genetic engineering--they have largely ignored the less obvious, but more pervasive, everyday ethical problems faced by family physicians. Ethical Issues in Family Medicine addresses these problems, offering an ethics that reflects the distinctive features of family practice, and helping family physicians to appreciate the extent to which ethical issues influence their practice.

This brief essay explores how understanding the treatment of expert evidence requires engaging with its legal and political contexts, and not just focusing on its epistemological aspects. Although the law of evidence and thus its treatment of experts is significantly informed by epistemological considerations, it is also informed by concerns over the organization of trials, larger issues of intelligent governance, social concerns, and enforcement issues. These five aspects to the law of evidence give rise to principles to guide the explicit (...) structuring of the law of evidence that are identified here as well. This complexity helps to explain why the central issue of expert testimony is not the epistemological one of knowledge and belief but instead the conflict between educational and deferential modes of trial. (shrink)

The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.

This article examines some recent work by Berwick and Chomsky as presented in their book Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. As I understand them, Berwick and Chomsky’s overarching purpose is to explain how human language could have arisen in so short an evolutionary period. After articulating their strategy, I argue that they fall far short of reaching this goal. A co-evolutionary scenario linking the mechanisms that realize the language system, both with one other and with cognitive mechanisms capable of (...) exploiting linguistic expressions, is surely unavoidable. And yet this is precisely what Berwick and Chomsky in effect rule out. (shrink)

We revisit Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law evidence. Various alternative explanations of aspects of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. (...) The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory. (shrink)

This introduction sets the stage for the Special Issue and the manuscripts that follow. Interest in work hours, work intensification and work addiction has grown over the past decade. Several factors have come together to increase hours spent at work, the nature of work itself, and motivations for working hard, particularly among managers and professionals. The introduction first reviews some of the known causes and consequences of long work hours and the intensification of work. A case is then made as (...) to why individuals, families, organizations and society should care about hours spent at work and work addiction. Individuals and organizations have some choice here. Most employees would in fact prefer to work fewer hours though few actually realize their preferences. This collection lays out these choices and hopefully encourages thought and discussion of their merits. Long work hours and work addiction harms individuals and their families and does not make organizations more effective. The introduction concludes with a brief summary of the diverse contributions of an international group of leading researchers in this area. (shrink)

Modeling work by Brian Skyrms and others in recent years has transformed the theoretical role of David Lewis's 1969 model of signaling. The latter can now be understood as a minimal model of communication in all its forms. In this article, we explain how the Lewis model has been generalized, and consider how it and its variants contribute to ongoing debates in several areas. Specifically, we consider connections between the models and four topics: The role of common interest in communication, (...) signaling within the organism, meaning, and the evolution of human communication and language. (shrink)

The arbitrariness of a signal has long been seen as a theoretically important but difficult to pin down notion. In this article, we suggest there are at least two different notions of arbitrariness at play in philosophical and scientific debates concerning the use of arbitrary signals, and work towards improved analyses of both. We then consider how these different types of arbitrariness can co-occur and come apart. Finally, we examine the connections between these two types of arbitrariness and the cognitive (...) complexity of signal users with an eye towards better evaluating one possible form of human-nonhuman communicative continuity. We show that each type of arbitrariness bears its own nuanced relationship to cognitive complexity, demonstrating the theoretical importance of keeping these two notions separate. (shrink)