Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 1 Seiten: 51-74.

Busca-se neste artigo fazer alguns breves apontamentos acerca do conceito de modernidade na obra do pensador dinamarquês Søren Kierkegaard. Com efeito, argumentarei que ainda que tal conceito não esteja presente em sua produção enquanto tal, sua presença, não obstante, se faz sentir de diversas maneiras, o que, por sua vez, faz de sua produção um dos constructos teóricos mais importantes em termos de uma reflexão crítica acerca desse mesmo tema.

Hannah Arendt realized through her confrontation with Eichmann in Jerusalem that totalitarian regimes and, in a more general sense, modernity promote “thoughtlessness,” understood as the inability to think from an ethical point of view. As such, I argue that Eichmann’s figure is entirely comprehensible from a Kierkegaardian perspective, inasmuch as Kierkegaard had already comprehended in the mid-nineteenth century that modernity was accountable for the fomenting of “nobodies” characterized precisely by “thoughtlessness.” In this sense, my article seeks to promote an approximation (...) between Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s works (with special reference to Eichmann in Jerusalem) with the intention of discussing the centrality of the Socratic-Augustinian notions of “conscience” and “individuality” in their conceptions of ethics and politics. In sum, I argue that what links both Kierkegaard’s and Arendt’s thought is a form of “Socratic citizenship.”. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) works have as their starting point, aside from a couple of newspaper articles published around the middle of the decade of the 1830s, a literary review of a novel written by a contemporary of his who was to achieve international fame still in life, viz. the writer Hans Christian Andersen (1805-1875). Notwithstanding, I argue that what was meant to be a literary review hides a vigorous anticipation of a problem that was meant to interest Kierkegaard throughout his (...) entire production, that is, the problem of nihilism. In this sense, the present article is based on a reading of both Andersen’s novel as well as Kierkegaard’s review, which leads me to explore the more profound connotations of Kierkegaard’s critique of the former also in terms of the context these works were produced. In sum, my argument is that both Andersen and Kierkegaard were dealing with the first signs of the arrival of nihilism in Denmark. (shrink)

Resumo: Em 1835, Kierkegaard escrevia que “o que de fato falta para mim é encontrar uma verdade que seja uma verdade para mim, encontrar a ideia pela qual eu viverei e morrerei”. Ora, mais de 50 anos antes Rousseau escrevera que “[s]ua filosofia [a dos filósofos sistemáticos] é para os outros; ser-me-ia necessária uma para mim”. O curioso, porém, é que Kierkegaard desenvolveria sua produção independentemente da de Rousseau, com a qual ele viria a ter contato apenas por volta de (...) 1850, quando a maior parte de seus escritos já havia sido produzida e publicada. Assim, diante de tais coincidências, proponho uma confrontação entre alguns dos principais conceitos existenciais presentes nas obras desses pensadores, com o que pretendo não apenas iluminar os laços existentes entre suas obras, como também reavaliar o papel de proeminência de Rousseau em termos do desenvolvimento da chamada filosofia da existência. Palavras-chave: existência; indivíduo; subjetividade; consciência; sistema; filosofia da existência. (shrink)

De novembro de 1833 a agosto de 1834 foi publicado em fascículos no Reino Unido o Bildungsroman de título Sartor Resartus, o qual, escrito em 1830 pelo pensador e crítico social escocês Thomas Carlyle, profundamente influenciado pelo movimento do romantismo alemão, e mais particularmente por Goethe, do qual era correspondente, buscava atrair os leitores britânicos para a tarefa da formação subjetiva tal qual formulada a partir deste. Neste sentido, busca-se neste artigo abordar as compreensões carlyleanas tanto do processo de autoconhecimento (...) ou formação individual tal qual desenvolvida nessa obra, quanto de sua contrapartida, ou seja, a ideologia da modernidade, uma vez que Sartor Resartus se coloca polemicamente como uma obra em oposição a tal ideologia. Assim, argumentaremos que Sartor Resartus se caracteriza por ser uma obra efetivamente existencialista, uma vez que tem como um de seus temas principais precisamente a existência humana. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é trazer à luz os pressupostos românticos que animam o livro de Hannah Arendt de título Eichmann em Jerusalém. De maneira a fazê-lo, explorarei na parte II a concepção romântico-alemã de “cultura” enquanto formação subjetiva da alma ; após isso, abordarei na parte III determinadas teses de cunho romântico articuladas por diferentes pensadores do século XIX relativas ao processo de massificação e, no seu entender, ao esvaziamento dos indivíduos na modernidade; por fim, na parte IV, a (...) sutil reelaboração arendtiana de várias dessas teses. Argumentarei, portanto, que o conceito romântico de “cultura” opera como premissa central na interpretação que Arendt fez do criminoso nazista Otto Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, em suma, teria cometido os crimes que cometeu por não ter sido formado, cultivado, como um verdadeiro ser humano. (shrink)

Resumo: Lopes dos Santos, ao colocar o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus no que denomina “tradição crítica”, mostra que Wittgenstein delimita o alcance da filosofia ao eliminar sua pretensão de ser um tipo de conhecimento que, como a ciência, possa formular proposições verificáveis sobre objetos. E Wittgenstein faz isso de modo distinto da crítica moderna à metafísica, pois elimina o sujeito do problema: não é preciso recorrer a faculdades subjetivas para fazer essa delimitação, mas apenas à linguagem na qual o pensamento se expressa. (...) Por outro lado, na perspectiva da “tradição lógica”, há na mesma obra uma identificação entre a essência do “logos” que pode enunciar algo verdadeiro sobre o ser e do próprio ser do qual se fala nesse discurso. Nosso objetivo é destacar este vínculo com a “tradição lógica” para defender que, para além de uma “virada linguística”, há no Tractatus uma espécie de “metafísica silenciosa” que coloca problemas tais como o do sujeito e o da “essência” do mundo em seu correto lugar após passá-los pelo crivo da crítica. (shrink)

Em O ser e o nada, para que haja o fenômeno, é preciso o concurso de um ser que seja suaprópria descompressão de ser, um ser que, sendo seu próprio nada, faça com que o mundo sefenomenalize enquanto assombrado (hanté) por este nada, em direção a uma totalização que nuncapode se totalizar, pois o fechamento em uma totalidade compacta seria anular a descompressão de serque é abertura do próprio fenômeno enquanto fenômeno. Este movimento de totalização que nunca sepreenche caracteriza a (...) ipseidade do para-si. O fenômeno, quer o consideremos da perspectiva ôntica doque nos aparece no mundo cotidiano ou da perspectiva ontológica dos modos de ser implicados no queaparece, pressupõe a estrutura ontológica da ipseidade. Além disso, a questão do fenômeno em O ser eo nada não se resume a uma questão ontológica, pois, ao interrogar à gênese do fenômeno, Sartrecircunscreve o problema em uma metafísica que indaga sobre o que teria ocorrido para que o em-si,antes do surgimento da realidade-humana, se descomprimisse para tornar-se para-si. A concepção defenômeno como tendo origem no próprio modo de ser do para-si como ipseidade e a passagem entre aontologia e a metafísica marcam a originalidade do modo como Sartre assimila a fenomenologia em Oser e o nada. Com esta leitura, apoiada em Flajoliet e Bento Prado Jr, reforçamos as linhasinterpretativas que exigem o estudo da obra de Sartre em toda sua variedade de expressões, pois estavariedade não está circunscrita apenas na relação entre filosofia e ficção, visto que na própria obrafilosófica de Sartre há “modalidades” distintas de expressões filosóficas como a ontologiafenomenológica e a metafísica que, ao serem atravessadas, tornam mais profunda a compreensão daipseidade. (shrink)

O debate contemporâneo nas teoria das relações internacionais é marcado por duas perspectivas: de um lado a perspectiva do realismo político que concebe a paz como um ideal inacessível e a guerra como meio necessário para a aquisição e manutenção do poder; e de outro lado a perspectiva do normativismo ou idealismo que pensa o fim das relações internacionais para além dos conflitos de interesse e da luta por poder. A primeira perspectiva trata as relações internacionais em nível do ser, (...) a segunda em nível do dever ser. Tendo em vista esse cenário, a nossa ideia neste artigo consiste em abordar o problema da guerra e da paz a partir de um estudo interdisciplinar mediante contribuições do Direito Internacional Público e da Filosofia de Kant. Num primeiro momento analisaremos o paradoxo da guerra, em seguida o papel do Direito Internacional Público para a problemática da paz, e por último as contribuições de Kant para a redefinição normativa do direito internacional a partir do seu projeto republicano da liga de paz. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

In recent years, many disciplines have become interested in the scientific study of morality. However, a conceptual framework for this work is still lacking. In The Moral Background, Gabriel Abend develops just such a framework and uses it to investigate the history of business ethics in the United States from the 1850s to the 1930s. According to Abend, morality consists of three levels: moral and immoral behavior, or the behavioral level; moral understandings and norms, or the normative level; and (...) the moral background, which includes what moral concepts exist in a society, what moral methods can be used, what reasons can be given, and what objects can be morally evaluated at all. This background underlies the behavioral and normative levels; it supports, facilitates, and enables them. Through this perspective, Abend historically examines the work of numerous business ethicists and organizations--such as Protestant ministers, business associations, and business schools--and identifies two types of moral background. "Standards of Practice" is characterized by its scientific worldview, moral relativism, and emphasis on individuals' actions and decisions. The "Christian Merchant" type is characterized by its Christian worldview, moral objectivism, and conception of a person's life as a unity. The Moral Background offers both an original account of the history of business ethics and a novel framework for understanding and investigating morality in general. (shrink)

Research on unethical leadership has predominantly focused on interpersonal and high-intensity forms of harmful leader behavior such as abusive supervision. Other forms of harmful leader behavior such as excessively pressuring subordinates or acting in self-centered ways have received less attention, despite being harmful and potentially occurring more frequently. We propose a model of four types of harmful leader behavior varying in intensity and orientation : Intimidation, Lack of Care, Self-Centeredness, and Excessive Pressure for Results. We map out how these relate (...) to other constructs in the unethical leader behavior field in order to integrate the existing work on how leaders can cause harm to followers. Next, in five studies, we develop and test a new survey instrument measuring the four proposed types of perceived HLB. We provide initial validity evidence for this new measure, establish its psychometric properties, and examine its nomological network by linking the four types of HLB to related leadership constructs and soft and hard outcome correlates at the individual and team level. We find that HLB is negatively related to constructive forms of leadership and positively to unethical ones. HLB is also related in the expected direction to job satisfaction, engagement, psychological safety, knowledge sharing, knowledge hiding, deviance, and objectively recorded team-level stress-related absenteeism. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: While Scott’s perspective is an inspiring attempt to unify psychology, much more impact from second-order cybernetics would be needed to build an appropriate and comprehensive cybernetic framework to unify an actor-based field such as psychology. In particular, I identify three aspects that need to be addressed: the problem of levels, the problem of multiple-level dynamics, and the problem of being sufficiently different.

A prova é a medula do processo penal de qualquer sistema jurídico-constitucional. A preservação da sua originalidade e da sua integridade é essencial e vital à realização da justiça assente numa descoberta da verdade processual prática, material, judicial e válida, de modo que possamos afirmar que os direitos e liberdades fundamentais de todos os afetados pelo processo-crime sejam garantidos e, assim, restabelecida a paz jurídica e social. Defendemos, pois e uma vez mais, que a legitimidade, a legalidade e a licitude (...) da prova são nucleares a um processo penal de um Estado constitucional democrático. (shrink)

This work presents the case of the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil that were the object of US ethnography initiated in the 1960s. The research brought harmful repercussions to the life of the Indigenous people of Brazil for several decades, and it took more than 40 years until the beginning of a process of reparation involving the Brazilian government and American universities. Objective: to discuss the meaning of the return of Yanomami blood samples, as well as contributions from the epistemologies (...) of traditional Indigenous knowledge to the debate about research ethics and the structuring of means for the social control of researchers and the protection of participants in scientific studies, having as an example the Yanomami indigenous people from Brazil, subjected to noxious ethnography in the 1960s and the 1970s. This work used data reports recorded in secondary sources. In this article we argue that Bioethics needs to further diversify its epistemological foundations and to consider epistemologies and cosmologies beyond the frontiers of Western science, as the case of the abusive research involving the Yanomami indigenous people in Brazil reveals. We argue that traditional knowledge, such as those of indigenous and quilombolas, with their epistemologies and cosmologies, are fundamental for the election of less colonized and more efficient principles of research ethics, regarding the protection of the participants' rights in scientific studies. Traditional indigenous populations can teach us a great deal about doing research. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. (...) While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed. (shrink)

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that (...) Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)

The history of the field of business ethics in the U.S. remains understudied and misunderstood. In this article I begin to remedy this oversight about the past, and I suggest how it can be beneficial in the present. Using both published and unpublished primary sources, I argue that the business ethics field emerged in the early twentieth century, against the backdrop of the establishment of business schools in major universities. I bring to light four important developments: business ethics lectures at (...) the University of California and Yale University, Leon Marshall’s curriculum at the College of Commerce of the University of Chicago, and the William A. Vawter Foundation on Business Ethics at Northwestern University. Then, I consider the payoffs of my historical account for business ethics theory, pedagogy, and practice. Specifically, I present four implications of my account under these headings: business ethics as a public problem; the place of ethics in business schools; historicizing business ethics; and historical self-knowledge. (shrink)

A semantics of pictorial representation should provide an account of how pictorial signs are associated with the contents they express. Unlike the familiar semantics of spoken languages, this problem has a distinctively spatial cast for depiction. Pictures themselves are two-dimensional artifacts, and their contents take the form of pictorial spaces, perspectival arrangements of objects and properties in three dimensions. A basic challenge is to explain how pictures are associated with the particular pictorial spaces they express. Inspiration here comes from recent (...) proposals that analyze depiction in terms of geometrical projection. In this essay, I will argue that, for a central class of pictures, the projection-based theory of depiction provides the best explanation for how pictures express pictorial spaces, while rival perceptual and resemblance theories fall short. Since the composition of pictorial space is itself the basis for all other aspects of pictorial content, the proposal provides a natural foundation for further pictorial semantics. (shrink)

Este artigo consiste numa análise interdisciplinar com o auxílio de teorias filosóficas, sociológicas e políticas sobre as contradições da democracia e sua relação com a opinião pública a partir de três perspectivas: num primeiro momento aborda os modelos normativos de democracia diagnosticados por Habermas em Inclusão do Outro, e sua proposta de procedimento deliberativo com vistas a superar os limites dos modelos liberal e republicano; depois de expor um diagnóstico basilar dos modelos democráticos, apresenta alguns pontos concernentes às contradições da (...) democracia contemporânea a partir das análises sociológicas e da ciência política de Charles Tilly. Num terceiro momento, aborda a democracia a partir do conceito hegeliano de opinião pública tendo em vista três componentes: a fenomenologia, a lógica e a política da opinião pública.Palavras-chave: Contradição; Democracia; Opinião Pública. (shrink)

Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. (...) To try to ask an external question is to try, absurdly, to ask a question in no language at all. Finding that so trivial an I/e distinction can’t help to explain Carnap’s deflationary metaontology, Eklund is led to attribute to Carnap a view he calls ontological pluralism. In this paper, I show that Eklund misreads Carnap, and I argue that this misreading obscures fundamental features of Carnap’s philosophy. I then defend an account of frameworks as what Carnap called semantical systems, and I place this account in the context of Carnap’s philosophical program of explication. Finally, I discuss the role that frameworks and the I/e distinction play in ESO, showing that ESO provides no reason to attribute the doctrine of ontological pluralism to Carnap. (shrink)

I develop an interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, one that emerges out of a reading of his presentation of a now classic case study in neuropathology—patient Johann Schneider—in Phenomenology of Perception. I begin with Merleau-Ponty's prescriptions for how we should use the pathological as a guide to the normal, a method I call triangulation. I then turn to his presentation of Schneider's unusual case. I argue that we should treat all of Schneider's behaviors as pathological, not only (...) his abstract movements, as is commonly acknowledged in the secondary literature, but also crucially his concrete movements. Using these facts of Schneider's illness, I reconstruct a ‘fundamental function’ of consciousness, as Merleau-Ponty called it, in which there are two kinds of bodily agency: the power of the body to be solicited by a situation and the power of the body to project a situation. I propose that these powers became dissociated in Schneider's case, as evidenced by his abstract and concrete movements, while in the normal case, these powers comprise a dynamic unity, enacted as motor intentionality. I also discuss how my interpretation complements Merleau-Ponty's assertion that motor intentions exist between mind and matter. (shrink)

There has recently been much debate about the idea of levying a tax on particular transactions on international financial markets. Economists have argued about how much revenue such an international financial transaction tax would raise and they disagree about what effects it would have on trade volumes, financial stability, and overall growth. Politicians have argued about the feasibility of introducing such a tax internationally and they disagree on its adequacy as a policy response to the current financial and economic crisis. (...) This article contributes to the debate about international financial transaction taxation by bringing the perspective of political philosophy to bear on the politicians’ and economists’ arguments about policy. I shall outline a framework for thinking about justice in finance, and defend the idea of an international financial transaction tax as an instrument for making the international financial system more just. (shrink)

Adam Smith é considerado um dos fundadores do liberalismo clássico. Ele é apresentado, com razão, como o organizador da nova ciência da economia, que tem por objetivo compreender, prover e maximizar as riquezas e os confortos de uma sociedade. Descreveu em certa medida uma nova sociabilidade engendrada nas transações econômicas, emergindo a partir disso uma sociedade comercial, materialmente próspera dentro da ordem política. A riqueza advém da oportuna e correta divisão do trabalho. O trabalho se vê e se faz, a (...) partir da obra smithina, autêntico substrato da ordem econômico-social. Mas Adam Smith não limitou exclusivamente a vida em sociedade às relações econômicas, notadamente as comerciais. Também não reduziu a motivação humana ao estrito autointeresse, vinculado ao amor-próprio. Como filósofo moral, ele nunca se declarou economista, e considerou que a sensibilidade, a consciência e as virtudes morais têm papel primordial na constituição de uma sociedade humana genuinamente desenvolvida. A apropriação que seus seguidores atuais e a abordagem econômica neoliberal fazem de Smith desfigurou o seu legado. Neste artigo, depois de introduzirmos brevemente a apropriação neoliberal do pensamento smithiano, apresentamos a crítica de Noam Chomsky e de Amartya Sem a esta perspectiva, desvelando o processo de redução e distorção dos conceitos originais do pensador escocês, buscando ao mesmo tempo resgatar um pouco de sua rica contribuição à compreensão do agir e da vida social humanos, notadamente o modo pelo qual estes se manifestam em nosso tempo. (shrink)

Diante de inúmeras consequências que a Covid-19 trouxe sobre a educação básica, destaca-se a desigualdade social e educacional, especialmente para populações que não têm acesso ao ensino remoto. Diante de inseguranças e incertezas que as novas configurações de ensino estão passando, a logoteoria pode ser pensada como uma possibilidade de enfrentamento de realidades adversas pela busca do sentido, auxiliando na busca de fatores de proteção e resiliência. A Partir de um estudo bibliográfico filiados ao estudo qualitativo conseguimos ir em busca (...) do objetivo primário do presente estudo que se estabelece como compreender a partir de uma abordagem fundamentada na logoteoria qual o sentido da vida na educação básica e os desafios da pandemia. O que por sua vez se mostrou pertinente como se vê no estudo. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar, à luz da teoria das emoções de António Damásio, em que sentido “o erro de Descartes” traduz um equívoco do racionalismo ético na medida em que despreza o papel do corpo, da matéria e das paixões para a aquisição e o florescer de uma vida virtuosa no campo da filosofia moral ou mesmo para um conhecimento indubitável no campo epistemológico.

This paper revisits the Kantian concept of law, observing principally its moral groundwork and then brings to the discussion the Habermas’ concept of law, culminating in some appreciations on the content and validity of the critique of Habermas to Kant, namely, the hypothesis of a dilution of Kantian law in the moral. For Habermas, the law is an autonomous sphere and should not be based on moral a priori, but must perforce draw support in the ethics of discourse and in (...) consensus. (shrink)

A filosofia contemporânea tem investigado variadas temáticas como linguagem, epistemologia social, justiça, estética, dialética, revisitado temas vinculados à metafísica, mas pouco tem discutido um tema simultaneamente especulativo e prático e, consequentemente, tão essencial para os rumos da sociedade atual: a sociabilidade. Na contramão desta tendência, este ensaio pretende abordar o problema da sociabilidade de um ponto de vista filosófico defendendo a tese que o mundo atual sofre de um déficit de intersubjetividade, algo que estes estudos cognomina de “alterofobia”.

O presente artigo tangencia o conceito de tensor esgueirando-se pelos platôs linguísticos de Mil platôs, agenciando o que Deleuze e Guattari potencializam em o que passou?, e que buscamos atualizar em o que passa? Nesse sentido, buscamos a articulação entre o que ambos os conceitos movimentam: isso, que acontece na relação entre dois ou mais estratos. Percebemos que o tensor transversa a obra de Deleuze e Guattari e, mesmo que não exerça um relevo, está lá, estrategicamente em funcionamento. Destarte, desejamos (...) articular com esses conceitos de partida, uma possibilidade para poder inventariar os deslocamentos imanentes de escrileitura, como forma de aproximar procedimentos didático-tradutórios, que possam vir a ser envolvidos em uma pesquisa, que deseja experimentarse em momentos de invenção. Para tanto, problematizamos uma tríade conceitual – tensor, o que passa?, e escrileitura, de modo a possibilitar perspectivas de composição e de funcionamentode uma máquina abstrata escrileitora de invenções. Com o Método Maquinatório de Pesquisa, afirmamos a busca por dar vez e voz a um processo de maquinações, que possam vir tensionar uma crítica sintomatológica, duplamente articulada a uma clínica maquinatória; um Plano de Organização tensionado por um Plano de Invenção; e, no intermezzo desses encontros, algo passa, algo pode passar; e, assim, persistem os rastros de uma escrileitura, envolta e revolta em um contínuo recursivo: escrever-ler-escrever. Nesse percurso, jogamos os dados em um tabuleiro desejante; procuramos abrir um caminho para a passagem de procedimentos escrileitores de invenção, e ensaiamos uma aposta: poder tensionar a transitividade atual-potencial do fazer linguístico, literário e escritureiro. Palavras-chave: Educação. Filosofia da diferença. Método Maquinatório de Pesquisa. Escrileitura. Tensor. (shrink)

Gabriele Taylor; VIII*—Love, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 147–164, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/76.1.

Concepts of decision, choice, decision-maker, and decision-making are common practical tools in both social science and natural science, on which scientific knowledge, policy implications, and moral recommendations are based. In this article I address three questions. First, I look into how present-day social scientists and natural scientists use decision/choice concepts. What are they used for? Second, scientists may differ in the application of decision/choice to X, and they may explicitly disagree about the applicability of decision/choice to X. Where exactly do (...) these disagreements lie? Third, I ask how scientists should use decision/choice concepts. What are they correctly and incorrectly used for? I argue that scientists must responsibly attend to a methodological demand: you have to have a principled, non-ad hoc, well-argued-for way of telling where decision/choice applicability ends. Thus, I aim to minimize the risk of conceptual stretching and foster responsible conceptual practices in a large body of scientific work. (shrink)