Speaking is so closely associated with making noises that such descriptions as ‘silent soliloquy’ and ‘soundless monologue’ have an air of paradox. Yet people frequently say things to themselves in such a way that not even a close observer has any reason to think they have done so. It is therefore tempting to suppose that on such occasions a sequence of surrogate speech sounds is produced in the person's head which he alone hears or introaudits, as if what distinguishes silent (...) inner speech from normal speech is that the word substitutes are conveniently hidden from all save their producer. (shrink)

What is the connection between a representation, such as a painting, statue or engraving, and its subject? For example, what makes a painting a painting of McX? The problem is not how to paint McX, which belongs to art experts. So the answer is not, for example, ‘The painter starts at the top with an egg-shape for the head …” The question is rather: what makes the results of such efforts a painting of McX? What conditions must a painting satisfy (...) to warrant such a description? What is the force or meaning of the word ‘of’ in phrases like ‘painting of McX’? (shrink)

The popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings or manipulations involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable Causal or Functionalist view is criticised in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in their head they (...) do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a restrained dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence. (shrink)

1. The scientific study of sleep has recently been stimulated by comparisons between people and advanced computers, whose normal activities need to be suspended periodically for reprogramming. I quote from a popular account by Dr Christopher Evans, which appeared in the Sunday Times during 1969: Sleep is of course the state in which the brain-computer is ‘off-line’, during which time the vast mass of existing programmes are sorted, outdated ones revised in the light of recent experiences and useless ones or (...) the remnants of modified ones cleared and eliminated. These processes take place for a substantial part of the night, but because the brain is ‘off-line’ and consciousness suppressed, we are mostly not aware of them. However, if for some reason our sleep is disturbed or when we wake in the morning, as the conscious mind ‘comes to’ it catches the programme operations at work, and for a moment has no way of knowing whether the events are internal or external in origin. It sets to work therefore to try to make sense of the programme or fragments thereof that are being run through, and the result is what we call a dream— though we should presumably call it an interrupted dream. (shrink)

Roger Squires; Discussions: Dream Time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 83–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

Roger Squires; Discussions: Dream Time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 83–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

(1979). Some Observations on the Problems of Grading Examinations with Several Components: a reply to P. J. Squire. Educational Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 225-230.

This volume provides a philosophical introduction to and analysis of the study of metaphor. By proceeding from the concrete analysis of complex metaphors, White is able to identify a range of features which are incompatible with standard accounts of the way words function in metaphor.

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. -/- There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his (...) response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. -/- This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

Introduction: Conversion and the practice of transformation -- The philosophical structure of Jonathan Edwards's religious affections -- Habit, habit change, and conversion in C.S. Peirce -- Reconstructing faith : religious overcoming in Dewey's pragmatism -- Transforming obligation in William James -- Dwelling in absence: the reflective origin of conversion -- Creative transformation : the work of conversion -- The evasion of conversion in recent American philosophy.

Uskali Mäki has offered an innovative scientific realist account of Milton Friedman’s 1953 essay, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, which directly challenges the dominant instrumentalist interpretation. This paper offers critical reflections on Mäki’s approach and interpretation. It is argued that Mäki’s method of rereading-rewriting the text is problematic; that an unforced instrumentalist account of unrealistic assumptions can be extracted from the text itself; and that seemingly realist passages can be plausibly read as expressing an instrumentalist stance.

Feminist critiques of deliberative democracy have focused on the abstraction, impartiality and rationality of mainstream accounts of deliberation. This paper explores the claim, common to many of these critiques, that these features are problematic because they are gendered, and that a more women-friendly account of democracy would embrace corporeality, contextuality and the affective. While acknowledging the merit of such a claim, the paper nonetheless suggests that the pursuit of social justice and democratic inclusion actually leads many feminists to embrace a (...) modified account of deliberative democracy, albeit in a modified account form. This can be explained by the dialogical conception of impartiality offered by theories of deliberative democracy. The paper suggests that the embrace of deliberative democracy by feminist theorists is a positive move, to be more widely acknowledged. Moreover, once acknowledged, feminists have much to offer deliberative democrats in terms of considering what the pursuit of dialogic impartiality might entail. If conceived as demanding both a 'lack of bias' and 'inclusivity', attention needs to be focused squarely on the issue of inclusion, and the institutional and material conditions for securing inclusion in deliberation. (shrink)

We interpret the probability rule of the CSL collapse theory to mean to mean that the scalar field which causes collapse is the gravitational curvature scalar with two sources, the expectation value of the mass density (smeared over the GRW scale a) and a white noise fluctuating source. We examine two models of the fluctuating source, monopole fluctuations and dipole fluctuations, and show that these correspond to two well-known CSL models. We relate the two GRW parameters of CSL to fundamental (...) constants, and we explain the energy increase of particles due to collapse as arising from the loss of vacuum gravitational energy. (shrink)

Two versions of the GRW “hitting” model for explicit wavefunction collapse, which are consistent with preserving the symmetry of the wavefunction, are considered. The predictions of the models for excitation of bound systems are calculated and compared with experiment and with the predictions of other similar models. It is shown that our preferred model strongly supports the idea that collapse, if it occurs, has gravitational origin.

Written descriptions can be no more than passwords to this great game. Guy Debord In every job that must be done, there is an element of fun.Mary Poppins1This article, formerly known to us as “Citi...