In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein is correct when he says of the Standard Metre stick that we can neither say that it is or is not a metre in length – despite what our intuitions may tell us to the contrary. Specifically, the paper deals with Kripke's criticism of Wittgenstein's claim in Naming And Necessity and with Salmon's attempt to arbitrate between the two views. I conclude that, not only is Wittgenstein correct, but that both Kripke and Salmon (...) (and possibly the majority of philosophers) simply do not understand the concept of measurement. (shrink)

The paper presents a simple but novel argument against the idea of abortion on demand – i.e. the situation where a woman does not need to justify an abortion. Rather than arguing from a theory of the Right to Life of the foetus, which many would regard as controversial, the paper argues from the point of view that the foetus has a certain (intrinsic) value – simply because it is human. Since the destruction of something of value must be justified, (...) it follows that the destruction of a foetus must be justified. This rules out abortion on demand. I believe that shifting emphasis from rights to values could make a major difference to the abortion debate and will make many people rethink their position on the subject. (shrink)

The paper argues that Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell’s Theory of Descriptions where Russell’s theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan’s distinction for Russell’s theory, (...) provided of course that Russell’s theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions. (shrink)

PTEN‐induced kinase 1 (PINK1) is a Parkinson's disease gene that acts as a sensor for mitochondrial damage. Its best understood role involves phosphorylating ubiquitin and the E3 ligase Parkin (PRKN) to trigger a ubiquitylation cascade that results in selective clearance of damaged mitochondria through mitophagy. Here we focus on other physiological roles of PINK1. Some of these also lie upstream of Parkin but others represent autonomous functions, for which alternative substrates have been identified. We argue that PINK1 orchestrates a multi‐arm (...) response to mitochondrial damage that impacts on mitochondrial architecture and biogenesis, calcium handling, transcription and translation. We further discuss a role for PINK1 in immune signalling co‐ordinated at mitochondria and consider the significance of a freely diffusible cleavage product, that is constitutively generated and degraded under basal conditions. (shrink)

Contingencies of the early nuclear arms race Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9495-z Authors S. S. Schweber, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Alex Wellerstein, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Ethan Pollock, Department of History, Box N, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Barton J. Bernstein, History Department, Building 200, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2024, USA Michael D. Gordin, History (...) Department, 305 Dickinson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

The idea that the mass m of an elementary particle is explained in the semi-classical approximation by quantum-mechanical zero-point vacuum fluctuations has been applied previously to spin-1/2 fermions to yield a real and positive constant value for m, expressed through the spinorial connection Γ i in the curved-space Dirac equation for the wave function ψ due to Fock. This conjecture is extended here to bosonic particles of spin 0 and spin 1, starting from the basic assumption that all fundamental fields (...) must be conformally invariant. As a result, in curved space-time there is an effective scalar mass-squared term $m_{0}^{2}=-R/6=2\varLambda_{\mathrm{b}}/3$ , where R is the Ricci scalar and Λ b is the cosmological constant, corresponding to the bosonic zero-point energy-density, which is positive, implying a real and positive constant value for m 0, through the positive-energy theorem. The Maxwell Lagrangian density $\mathcal{L} =- \sqrt{-g}F_{ij}F^{ij}/4$ for the Abelian vector field F ij ≡A j,i −A i,j is conformally invariant without modification, however, and the equation of motion for the four-vector potential A i contains no mass-like term in curved space. Therefore, according to our hypothesis, the free photon field A i must be massless, in agreement with both terrestrial experiment and the notion of gauge invariance. (shrink)

The Schrödinger equation for a particle of rest mass $m$ and electrical charge $ne$ interacting with a four-vector potential $A_i$ can be derived as the non-relativistic limit of the Klein–Gordon equation $\left( \Box '+m^2\right) \varPsi =0$ for the wave function $\varPsi $ , where $\Box '=\eta ^{jk}\partial '_j\partial '_k$ and $\partial '_j=\partial _j -\mathrm {i}n e A_j$ , or equivalently from the one-dimensional action $S_1=-\int m ds +\int neA_i dx^i$ for the corresponding point particle in the semi-classical approximation $\varPsi \sim (...) \exp {(\mathrm {i}S_1)}$ , both methods yielding the equation $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2m}\eta ^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + m + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ in Minkowski space–time , where $\alpha ,\beta =1,2,3$ and $\phi =-A_0$ . We show that these two methods generally yield equations that differ in a curved background space–time $g_{ij}$ , although they coincide when $g_{0\alpha }=0$ if $m$ is replaced by the effective mass $\mathcal{M}\equiv \sqrt{m^2-\xi R}$ in both the Klein–Gordon action $S$ and $S_1$ , allowing for non-minimal coupling to the gravitational field, where $R$ is the Ricci scalar and $\xi $ is a constant. In this case $\mathrm {i}\partial _0\varPsi \approx \left( \frac{1}{2\mathcal{M}'} g^{\alpha \beta }\partial '_{\alpha }\partial '_{\beta } + \mathcal{M}\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} + n e\phi \right) \varPsi $ , where $\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} =\sqrt{g_{00}}$ and $\mathcal{M}'=\mathcal{M}/\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ , the correctness of the gravitational contribution to the potential having been verified to linear order $m\phi ^{(\mathrm g)} $ in the thermal-neutron beam interferometry experiment due to Colella et al. Setting $n=2$ and regarding $\varPsi $ as the quasi-particle wave function, or order parameter, we obtain the generalization of the fundamental macroscopic Ginzburg-Landau equation of superconductivity to curved space–time. Conservation of probability and electrical current requires both electromagnetic gauge and space–time coordinate conditions to be imposed, which exemplifies the gravito-electromagnetic analogy, particularly in the stationary case, when div ${{\varvec{A}}}=\hbox {div}{{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)}=0$ , where ${{\varvec{A}}}^{\alpha }=-A^{\alpha }$ and ${{\varvec{A}}}^{(\mathrm g)\alpha }=-\phi ^{(\mathrm g)}g^{0\alpha }$ . The quantum-cosmological Schrödinger (Wheeler–DeWitt) equation is also discussed in the $\mathcal{D}$ -dimensional mini-superspace idealization, with particular regard to the vacuum potential $\mathcal V$ and the characteristics of the ground state, assuming a gravitational Lagrangian $L_\mathcal{D}$ which contains higher-derivative terms up to order $\mathcal{R}^4$ . For the heterotic superstring theory , $L_\mathcal{D}$ consists of an infinite series in $\alpha '\mathcal{R}$ , where $\alpha '$ is the Regge slope parameter, and in the perturbative approximation $\alpha '|\mathcal{R}| \ll 1$ , $\mathcal V$ is positive semi-definite for $\mathcal{D} \ge 4$ . The maximally symmetric ground state satisfying the field equations is Minkowski space for $3\le {\mathcal {D}}\le 7$ and anti-de Sitter space for $8 \le \mathcal {D} \le 10$. (shrink)

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...) evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way. (shrink)

Two notions from philosophical logic and linguistics are brought together and applied to the psychological study of defeasible conditional reasoning. The distinction between disabling conditions and alternative causes is shown to be a special case of Pollock's (1987) distinction between ‘rebutting' and ‘undercutting' defeaters. ‘Inferential' conditionals are shown to come in two types, one that is sensitive to rebutters, the other to undercutters. It is thus predicted and demonstrated in two experiments that the type of inferential conditional used as the (...) major premise of conditional arguments can reverse the heretofore classic, distinctive effects of defeaters. (shrink)

Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...) carry the day' (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is 'out of step with a very common view on the .. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

It is not intended as some sort of revelation on my part that Greenberg's cultural theory was originally Marxist in its stresses and, indeed in its attitude to what constituted explanation in such matters. I point out the Marxist and historical mode of proceeding as emphatically as I do partly because it may make my own procedure later in this paper seem a little less arbitrary. For I shall fall to arguing in the end with these essay's Marxism and their (...) history, and I want it understood that I think that to do so is to take issue with their strengths and their main drift.But I have to admit there are difficulties here. The essays in question ["Avant-Garde and Kitsch" and "Towards a Newer Lacoön"] are quite brief. They are, I think, extremely well written: it was not for nothing the Partisan Review described Clement Greenberg, when he first contributed to the journal early in 1939, as "a young writer who works in the New York customs house"—fine, redolent avant-garde pedigree, that! The language of these articles is forceful and easy, always straightforward, blessedly free from Marxist conundrums. Yet the price paid for such lucidity, here as so often, is a degree of inexplicitness—certain amount of elegant skirting round the difficult issues, where one might otherwise be obliged to call out the ponderous armory of Marx's concepts and somewhat spoil the low of the prose from one firm statement to another. The Marxism, in other words, is quite largely implicit; it is stated on occasion, with brittle and pugnacious finality, as the essay's frame of reference, but it remains to the reader to determine just how it works in the history and theory presented—what that history and theory depend on, in the way of Marxist assumptions about class and capital or even abase and superstructure. That is what I intend to do in this paper: to interpret and extrapolate from the texts, even at the risk of making their Marxism declare itself more stridently than the "young writer" seems to have wished. And I should admit straight away that there are several point in what follows where I am genuinely uncertain as to whether I am diverging from Greenberg's argument or explaining it more fully. This does not worry me overmuch, as long as we are alerted to the special danger in this case, dealing with such transparent yet guarded prose, and as long as we can agree that the project in general—pressing home a Marxist reading of texts which situate themselves within the Marxist tradition—is a reasonable one.22. This carelessness distinguishes the present paper from two recent studies of Greenberg's early writings, Serge Guilbaut's "The New Adventures of the Avant-Garde in America," October 15 , and Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock's "Avant-Gardes and Partisans Reviewed," Art History 3 I am indebted to both these essays and am sure that their strictures on the superficiality—not to say the opportunism–of Greenberg's Marxism are largely right. But I am nonetheless interested in the challenge offered to most Marxist, and non-Marxist, accounts of modern history by what I take to be a justified though extreme, pessimism as t the nature of established culture since 1870. That pessimism is characteristic, I suppose, of what Marxists call an ultraleftist point of view. I believe, as I say, that a version of some such view is correct and would therefore with to treat Greenberg's theory as if it were a decently elaborated Marxism of an ultraleftist kind, on which issues in certain mistaken views but which need not so issue and which might still provide, cleansed of those errors, a good vantage for a history of our culture.T. J. Clark, professor of fine arts at Harvard University, is the author of The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848-1851 and Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution. His book on impressionist painting and Paris is forthcoming. (shrink)

This book holds classical liberalism responsible for an American concept of beauty that centers upon women, wilderness, and machines. For each of the three beauty components, a cultural entrepreneur supremely sensitive to liberalism’s survival agenda is introduced. P.T. Barnum’s exhibition of Jenny Lind is a masterful combination of female elegance and female potency in the subsistence realm. John Muir’s Yosemite Valley is surely exquisite, but only after a rigorous liberal education prepares for its experience. And Harley Earl’s 1955 Chevrolet Bel (...) Air is a dreamy expressionist sculpture, but with a practical 265 cubic inch V-8 underneath. Not that American beauty has been uniformly pragmatic. The 1950s are reconsidered for having temporarily facilitated a relaxation of the liberal survival priorities, and the creations of painter Jackson Pollock and jazz virtuoso Ornette Coleman are evaluated for their resistance to the pressures of pragmatism. The author concludes with a provocative speculation regarding a future liberal habitat where Emerson’s admonition to attach stars to wagons is rescinded. (shrink)

Several epistemologists (Levi, Harman, Pollock) have recently urged the adoption of what I call a “no-fault” approach to the justification of beliefs. I argue that these views fall prey to objections raised by Alvin Goldman against internalism, specifically: they assume an initial set of regulative principles. It is also suggested that the way to avoid Goldman’s objections is through a psychologistic account of initial warrant.

Several epistemologists (Levi, Harman, Pollock) have recently urged the adoption of what I call a “no-fault” approach to the justification of beliefs. I argue that these views fall prey to objections raised by Alvin Goldman against internalism, specifically: they assume an initial set of regulative principles. It is also suggested that the way to avoid Goldman’s objections is through a psychologistic account of initial warrant.

Knowledge has been a subject of philosophical study since ancient times. This is not surprising since knowledge is crucial for humans to control their actions and the appetite for acquiring it seems innate to the human race. Philosophy, therefore, has always occupied itself with the question as to the nature of knowledge. This area of philosophy is generally referred to as epistemology from the Greek word for knowledge: episteme. Plato defined knowledge as “justified true belief,” and this definition has influenced (...) philosophers ever since; cf. Gettier and Pollock. Although sensible, this definition does not yet explain the nature of knowledge, since all of the three notions of ‘justification’, ‘truth’, and ‘belief’ are not yet clear and still subject to discussion. It would go beyond the scope of our purposes here to go into this at this moment, but it is touched on later in this chapter. (shrink)

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.

This book is addressed to readers who have laid the foundation of a liberal education & are beginning the special study of law.

The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and epistemic justification by examining irrationality. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about and redirect some aspects of our own cognition. One consequence of this is that one cannot give a theory of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously giving a theory of practical rationality. A further consequence is that practical irrationality can affect our epistemic cognition. I argue that practical irrationality (...) derives from a general difficulty we have in overriding built-in shortcut modules aimed at making cognition more efficient, and all epistemic irrationality can be traced to this same source. A consequence of this account is that a theory of rationality is a descriptive theory, describing contingent features of a cognitive architecture, and it forms the core of a general theory of “voluntary” cognition — those aspects of cognition that are under voluntary control. It also follows that most of the so-called “rules for rationality” that philosophers have proposed are really just rules describing default (non- reflexive) cognition. It can be perfectly rational for a reflexive cognizer to break these rules. The “normativity” of rationality is a reflection of a built-in feature of reflexive cognition — when we detect violations of rationality, we have a tendency to desire to correct them. This is just another part of the descriptive theory of rationality. Although theories of rationality are descriptive, the structure of reflexive cognition gives philosophers, as human cognizers, privileged access to certain aspects of rational cognition. Philosophical theories of rationality are really scientific theories, based on inference to the best explanation, that take contingent introspective data as the evidence to be explained. (shrink)

Princeton University Press, 984. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (3.9 MB).

THE NATURE OF JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL SCIENCE. Professor Holland of Oxford is to be congratulated on ...

Princeton University Press, 1982. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

John Pollock aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents--not ideal agents. Pollock argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. Thinking about Acting aims to provide a theory of "real rationality.".

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

J.L. Schellenberg offers a path to a new kind of religious outlook. Reflection on our early stage in the evolutionary process leads to skepticism about religion, but also offers a new answer to the problem of faith and reason, and the possibility of a new, evolutionary form of religion.

Franz Rosenzweig's near-conversion to Christianity in the summer of 1913 and his subsequent decision three months later to recommit himself to Judaism is one of the foundational narratives of modern Jewish thought. In this new account of events, Benjamin Pollock suggests that what lay at the heart of Rosenzweig's religious crisis was not a struggle between faith and reason, but skepticism about the world and hope for personal salvation. A close examination of this important time in Rosenzweig's life, the book (...) also sheds light on the full trajectory of his philosophical development. (shrink)