Die Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers ist geprägt durch eine konsequente Umkehrung der traditionellen Hierarchie von Intellekt und Wille. Die Deutung der Welt unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Leiblich-Triebhaften sowie das Aufzeigen von Kontemplation, Mitleid und Askese als Wege aus der Leidensstruktur des Lebens bilden die zentralen Elemente seiner Lehre. Das Handbuch gibt einen Überblick über Schopenhauers Leben, präsentiert alle wichtigen Werke und Werkgruppen und legt den philosophischen Kontext dar, in dem sie entstanden sind. Ausführlich wird auch seine Wirkung auf Philosophie, Literatur, Musik (...) und Bildende Kunst dargestellt. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Pure Subject of Cognition The Artist as Pure Subject of Cognition Notes References Further Reading.

I would like to know who of mycontemporaries should be more competent inKantian philosophy than me.(Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 18371)In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is (...) apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition. (shrink)

resumo No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que a concepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada como formalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemas racionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crise na filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de Friedrich Schlegel: "É igualmente mortal (...) ao espírito ter um sistema e não ter nenhum". Fichte e Schopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição e pensamento. palavras-chave Schopenhauer; Fichte; pensamento; intuição. (shrink)

In diesem Band sind Beitrage aus kulturell und disziplinar unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln auf das Thema 'Schopenhauer und die Philosophien Asiens' zusammengefasst: Sie gehen auf Vortrage zuruck, die auf zwei internationalen Tagungen der ...

Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, (...) whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers. (shrink)

Was ist der Mensch? Und welche Bedeutung hat diese Frage fur die Philosophie? Fur die erste Halfte des 20. Jahrhunderts gilt die zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger gefuhrte Davoser Disputation als der paradigmatische Streit um den Menschen und das richtige Verstandnis von Philosophie. Ausgeblendet wird dabei, dass die Protagonisten des Streits ihre Positionen selbst in einer Dreierkonstellation mit der von Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner begrundeten modernen philosophischen Anthropologie sahen. Bezieht man diese dritte, naturphilosophische Alternative mit ein, so eroffnen (...) sich neue Wege der Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers Daseinsontologie und Cassirers Kulturphilosophie. Zugleich wird eine originelle Position kenntlich, die auch fur eine Reihe von Themenkreisen des gegenwartigen Fragens nach dem Menschen von methodisch-sachlicher Aufschlusskraft ist: den Naturalismus, das Tier-Mensch-Verhaltnis, den Personbegriff und das Verhaltnis von menschlicher Lebensform und objektivem Geist. (shrink)

Negative subjective reports such as “I didn’t see the stimulus” can be interpreted as indicating either that the subject didn’t see the stimulus, or as indicating that, while the subject did see the stimulus, the strength of sensory signals associated with the stimulus fell below a conservative criterion for answering “seen”. Determining which of these two interpretations is correct is the criterion problem. I present two ways in which researchers can solve this problem. But there’s more. What I call the (...) “new criterion problem” consists in determining whether criteria effects reflect perceptual changes, or changes in response strategy. Through case studies, I argue that this new version of the problem can be solved as well, although there is currently no systematic way to solve it. I conclude that criterion problems do not constitute good reasons for skepticism about the scientific study of consciousness. (shrink)

Psychiatric research is in crisis because of repeated failures to discover new drugs for mental disorders. Lack of measurement validity could partly account for these failures. If researchers do not actually measure the effects of drugs on the disorders they aim to investigate, one should expect suboptimal treatment outcomes. I argue that this is the case, focusing on depression, and fear & anxiety disorders. In doing so, I show how psychiatric research illustrates a more general phenomenon that I call “validity (...) drift.” A validity drift occurs when, in the course of developing new measurement procedures, researchers end up studying something different from what they originally aimed to study. I analyze the different ways in which scientists attempt to validate procedures for measuring mental disorders for the purpose of testing drugs in animal models. I show how those validation efforts might fail, thereby leading to validity drifts. Overall, this analysis highlights the complex interplay between the development of new measurement procedures, their calibration, and scientific theories of the target phenomena. (shrink)

When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...) a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor. (shrink)

Background Teamwork in emergency medical services is a very important factor in efforts to improve patient safety. The potential differences of staff gender on communication, patient safety, and teamwork were omitted. The aim of this study is to evaluate these inadequately examined areas. Methods A descriptive and anonymous study was conducted with an online questionnaire targeting emergency physicians and paramedics. The participants were asked about teamwork, communication, patient safety and handling of errors. Results Seven hundred fourteen prehospital professionals from all (...) over Germany participated. A total of 65.7% of the women harmed a patient (men 72.9%), and 52.6% were ashamed when mistakes were made (men 31.7%). 19.0% of the female participants considered their communication skills to be very good, compared to 81% of the men. More women than men did not want to appear incompetent (28.4%, 15.5%) and therefore did not speak openly about mistakes. Both genders saw the character of their colleagues as a reason for poor team communication (women 89.4%, men 84.9.%). Under high stress, communication decreased (women 35.9%, men 31.0%) and expression became inaccurate (women 18.7%, men 20.1%). Conclusions Team communication problems and teamwork in rescue services are independent of gender. Women seem to have more difficulty with open communication about mistakes because they seem to be subject to higher expectations. Work organization should be adapted to women’s needs to enable more effective error management. We conclude that it is necessary to promote a positive error and communication culture to increase patient safety. (shrink)

Fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments and debates, the second edition of this highly influential text retains its unique combination of accessibility and originality. Second edition of a highly influential text that has already become a standard in the field, for students and professional researchers alike, due to its impressive line-up of contributors, and its unique combination of accessibility and originality Twenty-six essays in total, covering 13 essential topics Features five new topics that bring readers up to (...) speed on some of the latest developments in the field, and give them a glimpse of where it's headed: Should knowledge come first? Do practical matters affect whether you know? Is virtuous motivation essential to knowing? Can knowledge be lucky? Can evidence be permissive? Substantially updates two other debates: Is there immediate justification? Can belief be justified through coherence alone? (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the French philosopher and historian of science Abel Rey played a more influential role in the formative phase of the Vienna Circle than hitherto supposed. On the whole, it will be argued that Rey's contribution had political impact. His interpretation of "modern physics" in 1907 in the face of the alleged "bankruptcy of science" should be appreciated as a masterpiece of applied enlightenment thought. As such, it was especially paradigmatic for Philipp (...) Frank's "positivist" defense of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics against the irrationalist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

Phänomenologie der Normativität ist der Versuch zu zeigen, wie Normativität in der menschlichen Natur gründet. Im Anschluss an die phänomenologische Anthropologie Max Schelers und Helmuth Plessners stellt der Autor die Strukturen menschlichen Lebens heraus, die alle menschlichen Lebensformen fundieren. Menschen sind Lebewesen, die einen Leib haben, und dieses Phänomen ist ursprünglicher als die Unterscheidung von Körper und Geist. Hält man sich dies vor Augen, werden bestimmte Formen menschlicher Normativität verständlich: Die menschliche Lebensweise ist auf ein Gleichgewicht verschiedener Formen des Miteinanders (...) angelegt, das nur möglich ist, weil es leiblich vermitteltes Ausdrucksverstehen gibt. Mitfühlen mit dem anderen und Liebe zu ihm fundiert das Erkennen, und was menschliche Würde ist, verstehen wir, weil wir wissen, wie die Integrität des Leibes geschützt, aber auch verletzt werden kann. (shrink)

This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. (...) J. Brouwer and D. Hilbert (1899). Part 2 is mainly devoted to Hilbert’s proof theory of the 1920s (1922–1931). I begin with an account of his early attempt to prove directly, and thus not by reduction or by constructing a model, the consistency of (a fragment of) arithmetic. In subsequent sections, I give a kind of overview of Hilbert’s metamathematics of the 1920s and try to shed light on a number of difficulties to which it gives rise. One serious difficulty that I discuss is the fact, widely ignored in the pertinent literature on Hilbert’s programme, that his language of finitist metamathematics fails to supply the conceptual resources for formulating a consistency statement qua unbounded quantification. Along the way, I shall comment on W. W. Tait’s objection to an interpretation of Hilbert’s finitism by Niebergall and Schirn, on G. Gentzen’s allegedly finitist consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic as well as his ideas on the provability and unprovability of initial cases of transfinite induction in pure number theory. Another topic I deal with is what has come to be known as partial realizations of Hilbert’s programme, chiefly advocated by S. G. Simpson. Towards the end of this essay, I take a critical look at Wittgenstein’s views about (in)consistency and consistency proofs in the period 1929–1933. I argue that both his insouciant attitude towards the emergence of a contradiction in a calculus and his outright repudiation of metamathematical consistency proofs are unwarranted. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein falls short of making a convincing case against Hilbert’s programme. I conclude with some philosophical remarks on consistency proofs and soundness and raise a question concerning the consistency of analysis. (shrink)

Studies of the history of 20th century philosophy usually suggest a sharp antagonism between Martin Heidegger on the one hand and Philosophical Anthropology, as founded by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, on the other. In contrast I will argue that one of Heidegger′s texts, namely his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World – Finitude – Solitude, held in the 1929/30 winter semester is in fact very close to the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology. The measure for determining this proximity (...) is taken from Joachim Fischer′s study Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts . Its main systematic thesis posits that the theoretical approach of Philosophical Anthropology is constituted by a core identity, which can be accurately defined by a set of features. In my paper I use these features heuristically to examine the question whether Heidegger, who prima facie is not an adherent of the theoretical approach, in his lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics actually does argue like an exponent of Philosophical Anthropology. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist tradition as well. (...) As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Vol. I/II; 1893/1903) is a modern classic. Since the 1930s it has belonged to an exclusive class of only eleven works in the history of symbolic logic, which contain the ‘first appearance of a new idea of fundamental importance’ [Church, 1936, p. 122], and its author is the only one whose other major works — Begriffsschrift (1879) and Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) — also belong to this distinguished group. Together with (...) the seminal paper ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ these three monographs represent the essential contributions to one of the most fascinating foundational projects in mathematics, then and now. For decades Frege struggled with the question, ‘how are we to apprehend logical objects, in particular, the numbers? What justifies us in acknowledging numbers as objects?’ [Frege, 2013, ‘Afterword’, p. 265]. His favourite answer, for a long time, was that arithmetic is a complex branch of logic. But since there is no logicism without logic, Frege started in Begriffsschrift with the invention of a nearly perfect formalization of higher-order classical predicate logic. To discover how far we can get in arithmetic by analytic means alone, it was even necessary to clarify the semantic character of the concept of number. This was done in a marvellous way by Frege five years later, in Grundlagen. The next step was nothing less than the complete execution of his logicist project, a monumental undertaking; and it is well known that here Frege failed, due to Russell’s derivation of the antinomy in 1902. But, despite the contradiction, Grundgesetze contains Frege’s legacy to logicism, which became more and more attractive. (shrink)

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...) argue that these counterpossibles don’t just appear in the periphery of relative computability theory but instead they play an ineliminable role in the development of the theory. Finally, I present and discuss a model theory for these counterfactuals that is a straightforward extension of the familiar comparative similarity models. (shrink)

Matthias Smalbrugge compares modern images to plays without a script: while they appear to refer to a deeper identity or reality, it is ultimately the image itself that truly matters. He argues that our modern society of images is the product of a destructive tendency in the Christian notion of the image in general, and Augustine of Hippo's in particular. This insight enables him to decode our current 'scripts' of image. As we live in an increasingly visual culture, we (...) are constantly confronted with images that seem to exist without a deeper identity or reality - but did this referential character really get lost over time? Smalbrugge first explores the roots of the modern image by analysing imagery, what it represents, and its moral state within the framework of Platonic philosophy. He then moves to the Augustinian heritage, in particular the Soliloquies, the Confessions and the Trinity, where he finds valuable insights into images and memory. He explores within the trinitarian framework the crossroads of a theology of grace and a theology based on Neoplatonic views. Smalbrugge ultimately answers two questions: what happened to the referential character of the image, and can it be recovered? (shrink)

Wilhelm Ostwald’s program of a physical energetics is the attempt at a comprehensive description of nature on the basis of the concept of energy. In his book Energetische Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft, first published in 1909, Ostwald applies this conception to the area of culture. His central assumption is that cultural phenomena should be described by the energetic notion of “efficiency relation” (Güteverhältnis). His systematic thesis is that science, when organized according to the Machian “principle of economy,” proves as the highest (...) form of cultural expression, since it instantiates the notion of quality relation most efficiently, that is, “with the lowest energy expenditure.” This view echoes August Comte’s “law of the three stages” and is intended to supply it with a scientific, i.e., energetic foundation. Max Weber regarded Ostwald’s energetic theory of culture as a misguided attempt at an absolutization of the methods of concept formation within the natural sciences. As he wrote in his devastating review essay “’Energetische’ Kulturtheorien” (1909), Ostwald transformed a certain world view (Weltbild) into a scientifically frivolous ideology (Weltanschauung). In particular, Ostwald’s adherence to the Comtean law of three stages and the associated hierarchy of the sciences were criticized by Weber as outdated and completely beside the point. According to Weber, the concepts of the cultural sciences are not at all dependent on natural scientific concepts such as ‘energy.’ In his view, culture cannot be reduced to nature. But exactly this seemed to be the principal aim of Ostwald’s program. In this paper, I will critically investigate Weber’s critique of that program. I shall argue that Ostwald’s assumption of a natural basis of culture can be ‘rescued’ as a methodological device, but that Ostwald’s – thoroughly substantialist – view of energy should be discarded as a metaphysical relict of ancient ‘stuff ontology.’ . (shrink)

Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

Die Fragen "woher kommen wir? Wohin gehen wir?" gehören zu den Fragen, die sich Menschen immer schon gestellt haben. Die Idee des Fortschritts und die feste Überzeugung der Möglichkeit einer besseren Zukunft gehören allen historischen Katastrophen zum Trotz zu den Grundpfeilern eines Denkens, das sich stets auch über seine Herkunft definiert hat: der Geschichtsphilosophie. Das neue Studienbuch erschließt das Thema mit innovativem Blick: Aus der Geschichte lernen? Und wenn ja - was?; die Geschichte des Nachdenkens über Geschichte von der Antike (...) bis zur Gegenwart: Augustinus, Joachim, Machiavelli, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche; das Problem der Säkularisierung, die Herkunft und Wandlung von Ideen und Werten verstehen und beurteilen;affirmative oder kritische Genealogie, zyklische und teleologische Modelle der Geschichte; erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung der Geschichtsschreibung, über die Unmöglichkeit, ohne philosophische Implikationen Geschichte zu denken und zu schreiben. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.