Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue (...) of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to (...) the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled. (shrink)

I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle by which we can begin to realize global justice. For instance, eliminating tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes are all important to ensure accountability and to support democracies. I argue that the proposals concerning taxation reform are likely to be more effective in tackling global poverty than Thomas Pogge's global resources dividend because they target some of the central issues more effectively. I also discuss many (...) particular proposals for global taxes that have already been floated and implementation prospects and successes. (shrink)

The facts of global poverty are staggering. Consider, for instance, how 1.5 billion people subsist below the international poverty line, which means about a quarter of the world's current population lives in poverty. There is much talk about how freer markets will help the situation of these people, in particular how it will help the worst off. So far the evidence for this claim is fairly unclear. ‘At any rate, on several accounts, alleviating the worst aspects of poverty would impose (...) fairly small costs on us in more affluent countries, yet we continue to do very little about alleviating this situation. For instance, a 1 per cent tax on world product would make enormous inroads in lifting people out of poverty. Alternatively, simply a shift in priorities could do this without any added taxes: a 1 per cent decrease in military spending in the developed world and a 10 per cent decrease in military spending in the developing world could have the same effect. (shrink)

In this article, we survey some current debates among cosmopolitans and their critics. We begin by surveying some distinctions typically drawn among kinds of cosmopolitanisms, before canvassing some of the diverse varieties of cosmopolitan justice, exploring positions on the content of cosmopolitan duties of justice, and a prominent debate between cosmopolitans and defenders of statist accounts of global justice. We then explore some common concerns about cosmopolitanism – such as whether cosmopolitan commitments are necessarily in tension with other affiliations people (...) typically have and how we should deal with issues concerning a perceived lack of authority in the global domain – and whether these can be addressed. We also look briefly at how the concern with feasibility has led some to take up the challenge of devising public policy that is cosmopolitan in outlook, before offering some concluding remarks on future directions in these debates. (shrink)

The motivations for rural and agricultural development in the twenty-first century are not different from previous centuries, but evolving technologies in the late twentieth century have altered many methods and institutional arrangements for accomplishing development. The internet has facilitated initiatives that in earlier decades would have required large, complex organizations in both donor and developing countries. We will compare the ethical and institutional strengths and weaknesses of two such initiatives in Malawi: a smallholder farmers organization involved in fair trade and (...) the Millennium Village Project. These are two of a large array of institutions which are currently being used to benefit smallholder agricultural producers. We will examine their relative merits through the lenses of various ethical paradigms and show that the institutional arrangements of the two programs are complimentary in the evolution of agricultural trading systems linking the global north and south. (shrink)

Obligations of global justice rest mainly on the global rich but also to a lesser extent on the global poor. The governments of poor countries are obliged to fulfill requirements of non-aggression, good governance and decency, along with all other requirements which facilitate the achievement of global justice. So far, obligations of poor countries seem to be taken as given yet the behavior of governments in poor countries and occurrences therein attest to the contrary;this suggests a need to mainstream these (...) obligations in discussions about global justice. If poor countries do not live up to these requirements obstacles arise to the realization of global justice; and they act unjustly in relation to citizens of rich countries which provide them with aid. Uganda is taken as a case in point. (shrink)

What is »justice« from the perspective of contemporary Arabo-Islamic philosophy? Kaouther Karoui takes a transcultural approach, open to different philosophical traditions, and seeks to decenter Western notions of normativity. She focuses on two thinkers, namely the feminist Fatima Mernissi (d.2015) and Mohammed Arkoun (d.2010), a well-known critic of hegemony and orthodoxy. She situates their thinking within current debates among Arab thinkers and brings their ideas into dialog with Western political philosophy. This study thus challenges stereotypes about the Arab-Islamic world by (...) discussing postcolonial theories of gender justice, political freedom, and religion. (shrink)

Millions of people in the developing world lack access to curative drugs. Pogge identifies the cause of this problem as a lack of redistribution across borders. In contrast, this article shows that institutional shortcomings within developing countries are the main issue. These different explanations are the result of diverging analytic approaches to ethics: a cosmopolitan approach versus an ordonomic approach. This article compares both approaches with regard to how they conceptualize and propose to solve the problem of providing life-saving pharmaceuticals (...) to the poor in developing countries. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Ubuntu can be construed as a strict form of cosmopolitan moral and political theory. The implication of this is that the duty or obligation that humans owe other humans arises in virtue of humanity or the notion of human-ness. That is, one is a person insofar as he or she forms humane relations and it is this particular way of beingness that makes every person both an object and subject of duty. On this cosmopolitan (...) interpretation of Ubuntu, I therefore, argue that Ubuntu would support the principle of natural resource redistribution according to which all humans fall within the scope of justice and the principles of distributive justice. If this is right, then Ubuntu’s cosmopolitanism has something to contribute generally to cosmopolitanism, as an account of global justice. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate actions that the United States took against Costa Rica during the 1980s in order to argue that current discussions about global justice and its foundations are flawed in three ways. First, it misidentifies the parties of global justice as individual citizens. Second, it conceptualizes global justice as exclusively a distributive justice concern and, as a result, it misidentifies what constitutes a global injustice as being the adverse fate of individuals who live in a poor nation. (...) Finally, the current debate provides no guidance in what must be considered to identify the specific obligations one nation may have to another nation. Given these three problems, I maintain that we conceptualize global injustice as an issue of social justice rather than one exclusively of distributive justice. This will require identifying nations as the parties to global justice, at least in certain cases, and realizing that our goal is to remedy oppressive global structures of power. Utilizing the social justice I propose will put us on the road toward achieving justice across the Americas. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to suggest that most current theories of global justice fail to adequately recognise the importance of global public goods. Broadly speaking, this failing can be attributed at least in part to the complexity of the global context, the individualistic focus of most theories of justice, and the localised nature of the theoretical foundations of most theories of global justice. We argue ? using examples (particularly that of protecting antibiotic efficacy) ? that any truly effective (...) theory of global justice must recognise the importance of global public goods. Global public goods confer significant benefits to individuals yet can only be effectively promoted and preserved through collective action and the restriction of individual choice; something which most theories of justice are structurally unequipped to sufficiently promote. (shrink)

Neoliberal globalization has not yielded the results it promised; global inequality has risen, poverty and hunger are still prevailing in large parts of this world. If this devastating situation shall be improved, economists must talk less about economic growth and more about people’s rights. The use of the language of rights will be key for making the economy work more in favor of the least advantaged in this world. Not only will it provide us with the vocabulary necessary to reframe (...) such pressing global problems and to find adequate economic solutions; it will also deliver the basis for deriving according duties and duty-bearers – the language of rights is congruent with the language of justice and as such it is inevitably and at the same time the language of obligations. The language of obligations exposes the multinational corporation as one of the main agents of justice in the global economy. Taking distributive justice as a starting point for reflection, a consistent derivation of the multinational’s moral obligations must focus on capabilities rather than on causality. This will lead to a shift from merely passive to active duties and accordingly to a stronger emphasis on the corporation’s contribution to the realization of positive rights. (shrink)

Neoliberal globalization has not yielded the results it promised; global inequality has risen, poverty and hunger are still prevailing in large parts of this world. If this devastating situation shall be improved, economists must talk less about economic growth and more about people's rights. The use of the language of rights will be key for making the economy work more in favor of the least advantaged in this world. Not only will it provide us with the vocabulary necessary to reframe (...) such pressing global problems and to find adequate economic solutions; it will also deliver the basis for deriving according duties and duty-bearers - the language of rights is congruent with the language of justice and as such it is inevitably and at the same time the language of obligations. The language of obligations exposes the multinational corporation as one of the main agents of justice in the global economy. Taking distributive justice as a starting point for reflection, a consistent derivation of the multinational's moral obligations must focus on capabilities rather than on causality. This will lead to a shift from merely passive to active duties and accordingly to a stronger emphasis on the corporation's contribution to the realization of positive rights. (shrink)

Pueden identificarse cuatro estrategias principales de tratar la cuestión ambiental de acuerdo al marco rawlsiano. Extender la posición original o el principio de igualdad de oportunidades afecta a la concepción de la justicia. Reconocer límites naturales o ambientales a nivel de esencia constitucional o abrir la fase legislativa a la justicia ambiental afectan al liberalismo político. En cualquiera de ellas, el esquema sólo permitiría ir más lejos cuestionando la visión nacional-estatal de sociedad cooperativa.

Peter Singer argues that we’re obligated to donate our entire expendable income to aid organizations. One premiss of his argument is "If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so." Singer defends this by noting that commonsense morality requires us to save a child we find drowning in a shallow pond. I argue that Singer’s Drowning Child thought experiment doesn’t justify this premiss. I offer (...) my own Drowning Children thought experiment, which should reveal that commonsense morality entails that premiss two is actually false. (shrink)

To date, climate justice has been modeled on global justice, giving rise to such notions as ecological space, ecological debt and carbon debt. I worry that global justice fails to compel compliance and ignores hydrological systems’ role in cooling atmospheric temperatures. I thus opt to tie climate justice to hydrological justice, a form of global environmental justice that requires transparency and kinship, and proves more coercive since both burdens and targets are local. To demonstrate this view, I first distinguish global (...) justice from global environmental justice. I next show the limits of Simon Caney’s forward-looking approach to global justice, which commits diverse parties to just burdens to reach just targets in order to facilitate climate justice. I conclude by noting that modeling climate justice on hydrological justice proves compatible with the goals of the Katowice Climate Package, passed in 2018. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas articulates a system of rights, including human rights, within the democratic constitutional state. For Habermas, while human rights, like other subjective rights have moral content, they do not structurally belong to a moral system; nor should they be grounded in one. Instead, human rights belong to a positive and coercive legal order upon which individuals can make actionable legal claims. Habermas extends this argument to include international human rights, which are realised within the context (...) of a cosmopolitan legal order. The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of law as a mechanism for securing human rights protection. I argue that positive law does make a material difference to securing individual human rights and to cultivating and augmenting a general rights culture both nationally and globally. I suggest that Habermas' model of law presents the most viable way of negotiating the tensions that human rights discourse gives rise to: the tensions between morality and law, between legality and politics, and between the national and international contexts of human rights protection. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge has recently defended additional ways in which to eradicate poverty from the developing world. In this article, Pogge's argument is discussed. First the premises on which Pogge relies are summarized and the logic of 'international borrowing privilege' introduced. Then it is argued that Pogge's solutions to the poverty problem would face similar difficulties to many other solutions - that is, in order to work properly they all must gain extensive international support and political willingness, which they will not (...) easily obtain. The final section looks at how the solutions might gain more support and why people tend to resist new suggestions. (shrink)

The rapid growth of human population and associated industrialisation creates strains on resources and climate. One way to understand the impact of human activity is to quantify the total environmental pressures by measuring the ‘footprint’. Footprints account for the total direct and/or indirect effects of a product or a consumption activity, which may be related to e.g. carbon, water or land use, and can be seen as a proxy for environmental responsibility. Footprints shape climate and resource debates, especially concerning environmental (...) strategies. However, in general, footprints hold a dichotomous producer–consumer perspective that is not unanimously accepted. In addition, the current footprinting system transmits a simplistic message about environmental responsibility that taints the justice debate and jeopardises the validity of policies based on them. Consequently, it is crucial to question who is accountable for adverse environmental effects. It is also critical to investigate how the methodological characteristics of footprints shape and affect the efficacy of policies on climate and natural resources. This article examines these challenges, focusing on negative justice and policy implications resulting from assigning environmental responsibility to a sole agent. The article proposes, and morally justifies, the development of a footprinting method that includes justice parameters in an attempt to render fair results that are more meaningful for environmental action. The second objective is to establish the potential of this new framework to promote environmental responsibility and justice while facilitating policymaking. The suggested justice elements aim at turning footprints into a concrete environmental policy instrument framed under the value of environmental fairness. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical interrogation of the politics of hope in relation to suffering in the world. It begins with a critique of the assumptions and aspirations of ‘philosophies of hope’ that assume a Levinasian responsibility for the suffering-Other. Such approaches to thinking hope reveal an underlying coloniality of ontology, of totality/exteriority, which defines Being and Non-Being, presence and absence, in totality. Consistent with past colonial rationalities, the logics of salvation and rescue define, still, these contemporary envisionings of the (...) ‘white man’s burden’ in relation to the suffering Other. A decolonial ontology of Exteriority, of an incommensurable radical Other-Being against Totality, is instead presented. The focus here shifts from the passive suffering-Other that is the object of rescue, to the Radical Other that is the author of encounter. By returning Exteriority to theory and by opening up theory’s locations of enunciation, the implications of responsibility, in thinking hope, become open also to interrogation and vulnerable to unsatisfactory conclusions. (shrink)

It is hardly surprising that the two greatest Kantian philosophers of the twentieth century's second half would, at some point of time, reflect and comment on one of the most famous writings of the Königsberg sage, namely on Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Of course, in recent decades, and especially around the celebration of the 200th anniversary of its publication, many commentary articles and books have been published on Kant's little essay, but it makes a difference when Jürgen Habermas and (...) John Rawls make an effort to get to an appropriate understanding of Kant's text in the present-day world. Here I will describe some of the main features of their understanding of Kant's peace proposal. I will first briefly recall the main scheme of Kant's essay, anticipating the writings of Habermas and Rawls by employing their new vocabularies and schemes in describing Kant's position. The main purpose of my outline of Kant's essay is to investigate how much of Kant's proposal has remained alive in Habermas and Rawls. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, je tente de répondre à quelques-unes des objections habituellement adressées au cosmopolitisme, en prenant en considération la perspective de ceux que cette doctrine risque d’affecter, à savoir, les immigrants. J’argue que certaines de ces objections se fondent sur des conceptions simplifiées à l’excès et empiriquement inexactes de ce que sont la communauté et l’identité culturelle. J’examine aussi en détail la controverse entourant les possibles implications autoritaristes — ou impérialistes — des propositions visant à faire d’un système moral-légal (...) un modèle pour le monde. L’objectif général de cet article est d’explorer les conditions permettant l’établissement d’une règle de justice cosmopolitique, dans un contexte mondial marqué par des différences culturelles et une extrême inégalité dans l’accès aux ressources et au pouvoir décisionnel. Certaines questions relatives à la motivation morale sont aussi abordées. (shrink)

Public health ethics in the future will be distinguished from public health ethics in the past by this new subfield being labeled as such, acknowledged, and called upon for service. Ethical dilemmas have been present throughout the history of public health. The question of whether to force Henning Jacobson to be immunized in 1905 in accordance with the 1902 Massachusetts smallpox vaccination law was one of ethics as well as law. How Thomas Parran, Surgeon General in 1936, chose to respond (...) to a raging syphilis epidemic in the United States in the early part of the 2W century raised considerable moral debate in determining the appropriate public health response for a government? More recently, questions have arisen concerning the appropriate reach of government in controlling HIV banning smoking, or promoting healthy lifestyles. Debates over government infringement, morality, and justice recur throughout the history of public health. (shrink)

The question of who has the burden of proof is often important in practice. We must frequently make decisions and act on the basis not of conclusive evidence but of what is reasonable to presume true. Consequently, it happens that a given practical question must be solved by referring to principles that explicitly or implicitly determine, at least partly, where the burden of proof should rest. In this essay, I consider the role of the logic of the burden of proof (...) in a debate on global justice. In particular, I ask how the logic of the burden of proof is seen by those who defend conservative positions in a debate and deny our obligations to reduce poverty beyond borders. I argue that defenders of conservative positions tend to shift the burden of proof in an unjustified way. (shrink)

John Rawls argued in The Law of Peoples that we should reject any principle of international distributive justice, whether in ideal theory or nonideal theory. Instead, he advocated a duty of assistance on the part of well‐ordered societies toward burdened societies. I argue that Rawls is correct that we should endorse a principle with a target and cut‐off point rather than a principle of international distributive justice. But the target and cut‐off point he favors is too undemanding, because it can (...) be met by assisting a burdened society to become a decent people. Instead, only a society that respects the right to an adequate standard of living, and not simply a right to subsistence, can be an acceptable target. Rawls is prevented from drawing this conclusion by a failure to disentangle issues of intervention and assistance, a failure bound up with his flawed, intervention‐driven account of human rights in defining a decent people. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, je tente de répondre à quelques-unes des objections habituellement adressées au cosmopolitisme, en prenant en considération la perspective de ceux que cette doctrine risque d’affecter, à savoir, les immigrants. J’argue que certaines de ces objections se fondent sur des conceptions simplifiées à l’excès et empiriquement inexactes de ce que sont la communauté et l’identité culturelle. J’examine aussi en détail la controverse entourant les possibles implications autoritaristes — ou impérialistes — des propositions visant à faire d’un système moral-légal (...) un modèle pour le monde. L’objectif général de cet article est d’explorer les conditions permettant l’établissement d’une règle de justice cosmopolitique, dans un contexte mondial marqué par des différences culturelles et une extrême inégalité dans l’accès aux ressources et au pouvoir décisionnel. Certaines questions relatives à la motivation morale sont aussi abordées. (shrink)

Approaches to global ethics have drawn on a number of diverse theoretical traditions, such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. While emerging frameworks contribute to a growing awareness of and interest in ethics within a global society, the values that they prioritize are not adequate for realizing a just, equitable and fair system of global governance. This article considers the possibilities of an alternative ethic - a feminist ethic of care - and explores how it can bear on present circumstances, including global (...) inequity and injustice. This care ethic has been put forward as a viable normative approach to politics and policy. Little attention, however, has been paid to the potential of a care ethic within the globalization and ethics debate. This article illustrates how the values and corresponding principles of care, grounded in relationships and responsibilities, are essential to responding adequately to the current challenges of globalization. By examining the relevance of care in this context, the article seeks to broaden dominant ethical worldviews and contribute to the articulation of normative tools for examining globalization while at the same time avoiding the trappings of conventional universality - the abstract and a priori thinking typically associated with conceptions of global ethics. (shrink)

This article addresses the theoretical difficulty of justifying the use of penal coercion in circumstances of marked, unjustified social inequality. The intuitive belief behind the text is that in such a context—that of an indecent State—justifying penal coercion becomes very problematic, particularly when directed against the most disfavored members of society.

In his 2014 paper entitled “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty”, Lydenberg ventures into the field of the moral and political philosophy dealing with distributive justice in search of fresh perspectives on fiduciary duty. Simply by doing this, Lydenberg makes the very important contribution of drawing a little more attention to the potential that this huge field of study might have in relation to understanding socially responsible investment. There are however difficulties with Lydenberg’s paper. I describe three in particular that I (...) believe warrant critical attention. The first emerges out of Lydenberg’s treatment of the central concepts of reasonableness and rationality. The second lies in his apparent suggestion that at some earlier time fiduciary duty was somehow more generally other-considering than it is today. And finally, the third is associated with the place that impartiality occupies in Lydenberg’s storyline, and the implications of this in terms of his call for a reconciliation between reasonableness and rationality. This critical scrutiny clarifies theoretical and practical implications of the transition Lydenberg is suggesting. In doing this, it makes the realization that what Lydenberg is attempting is more than likely nothing short of resolving “The fundamental problem of ethics and politics” in the specific context of fiduciary action. (shrink)

Gillian Brock develops a model of global justice that takes seriously the moral equality of all human beings notwithstanding their legitimate diverse identifications and affiliations. She addresses concerns about implementing global justice, showing how we can move from theory to feasible public policy that makes progress toward global justice.

Welche Zukunft erwartet die Menschheit? Oder müsste man fragen: Welche möglichen Zukünfte liegen im Gestaltungsbereich des Menschen? Was passiert, wenn wir eine superintelligente Maschine erfinden, die uns sogar ermöglicht, der Vergänglichkeit zu entrinnen? Welchen Einfluss haben die Technologien auf die Arbeit oder auf unsere Wahrnehmung der Zeit?

A pesar de que la teoría rawlsiana de la justicia ha sido reivindicada con fuerza por liberales verdes, lo cierto es que su análisis se ha limitado a la distribución de bienes ambientales entre generaciones y según el principio de ventaja mutua. Por el contrario, si se amplia la reflexión a casos intrageneracionales y se asume la tesis fuerte de la existencia de recursos limitados, la obra de Rawls es inadecuada para siquiera plantear la cuestión ecológica con cierto rigor. Although (...) certain environmentalist liberals have fiercely defended Rawls's theory of justice, their analysis has limited to distribution of environmental resources between generations in accordance with the principle of mutual benefit. In contrast, if this reflection is extended to intra-generational distributive cases while assuming the thesis of scarcity in natural resources, Rawls's work is inadequate even to approach the environmental challenge. (shrink)

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)

We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?

Natural disasters are social disruptions triggered by physical events. Every year, hundreds of natural disasters occur and tens of thousands of people are killed as a result. I maintain that everyone would want to be provided with assistance in the aftermath a natural disaster. If a national government is not providing post disaster assistance, then we expect that some other institution has the responsibility to provide it. Unfortunately, that is not the case currently. Therefore, in this thesis I argue that (...) in some situations the international community is required to intervene on behalf of those affected by the disaster caused by a natural hazard. Natural disaster intervention is a moral requirement: because the international community has a duty to provide the goods we are entitled to as per the human right to welfare, even in natural disaster scenarios. After making my argument as to why a natural disaster intervention policy should be developed I explain the basic principles of such a policy by applying the Just War criteria to natural disaster scenarios in which a national government is unable or unwilling to provide assistance to its people. (shrink)

Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...) her attempt to restrict subjectivism primarily to “urgent” situations like self-defense contradicts her own point of departure and is either incoherent or futile. Finally, the only actual whole-heartedly objectivist account she criticizes is an easy target; while those objectivist accounts one finds in certain Western European jurisdictions are immune to her criticisms. Those accounts are also clearly superior to hers in terms of action-guidingness. (shrink)

This article focuses on the current trends and initiatives in human capacity building in Africa. It takes as it starting point that human capacity development is essential for Africa to become an information and know-ledge society and therefore an equal partner in the global sharing of knowledge. Four knowledge areas are identified and discussed. These are education, research and development, brain drain and information and documentation drain. The paper concludes that there is a clear understanding in Africa that its future (...) lies with education and that most African leaders have a strong political will to invest in human capacity building on the continent. It is also clear that much has been done, particularly primary education. Africa will most defi-nitely benefit from this in the long run. Problem areas remain however. These are in the needed growth of research and development and how to address the brain and information drain phenomena. (shrink)

Today’s societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, (...) either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi. (shrink)

Water is recognized to pose some very urgent questions in the near future. A significant number of people are deprived of clean drinking water and sanitation services, with an accordingly high percentage of people dying from water borne diseases. At the same time, an increasing percentage of the global population lives in areas that are at risk of flooding, partly exacerbated by climate change. Although it is increasingly recognized that adequate governance of water requires that issues of “equity” or “social (...) justice” are taken into account, political philosophers or applied ethicists have so far not or only barely been involved in the debate on water governance. In this paper, it is argued that political philosophers or applied ethicists should become more involved in the debate on water governance. Their role can be twofold: clarifying the debate; and help analyzing some urgent distributive questions related to water governance. The paper is concluded with an outline for an ethics of water governance. (shrink)

This paper aims to address two seemingly independent issues in the field of moral and political philosophy, namely the problem of global justice with elements regarding research ethics. The first section of the paper will be concerned with a short overview of the problem at hand, highlighting the particular way in which research is carried out in the 21st century. While admitting that the matrix of moral issues linked to the current topic is more diverse, I will limit the scope (...) of my analysis to only two elements. First of all, in the second section of my paper I will try to identify an answer to the following question: are researchers from non-native English speaking countries who seek to publish in academic journals from abroad in a position of inequality in relation to their peers from Australia, Great Britain or USA? I will explore the moral relevance of this question at a global level by presenting Philippe Van Parijs’ conception of linguistic justice. My argument will rest upon the fact that the emergence of English as a lingua franca in research publishing has had more positive than negative externalities in relation to researchers from developing countries. The third and final part of my paper will be a critique of the current Intellectual Property system which, in my opinion, hinders the access of researchers from developing countries to new research available in journals indexed in international databases like Wiley-Blackwell, SAGE or JSTOR. (shrink)