O artigo propõe estudar o papel que a doutrina dos elementos ou princípios materiais fundamentais da natureza, presente na filosofia pré-socrática, desempenha na estética de Gaston Bachelard; ao mesmo tempo, o texto busca assinalar de que maneira essa referência - que, na Antiguidade Clássica, traduzia entre os filósofos gregos uma concepção da physis, do mundo da experiência sensível -, não pôde por outro lado ser apropriada pela epistemologia bachelardiana, cuja elaboração se alimentou da revolução intelectual operada no campo científico (...) entre o final do século XIX e o início do XX. The article proposes to study the role the doctrine of fundamental material elements of nature, present in the pre-Socratic philosophy, plays in the aesthetics of Gaston Bachelard. At the same time, it seeks to point out how this reference, which in Greek Antiquity expresses a philosophical conception of physis - of the world of sensible reality - could have not been appropriated by the epistemology of Bachelard, influenced and formed by the intellectual revolution wrought in the scientific field between the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. (shrink)

Pour Gaston Bachelard, le « non » signifie dépasser et compléter le savoir antérieur, la philosophie de la connaissance scientifique doit englober les contradictions. Il établit le profil épistémologique de l’évolution, du réalisme naïf au surrationalisme en passant par le rationalisme classique et élargit le domaine de l’intuition à ce qu’il appelle une « intuition travaillée»s’exerçant dans un espace non analytique.

In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal (...) explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...) are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call ‘the present character’ and ‘the actual character’. Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value. (shrink)

Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...) sense of bodily ownership hinges on a phenomenal mark of mineness that can not be accounted for in terms of our sensory, interoceptive, agentive, cognitive or affective dispositions and that is psychologically primitive. In short: that mineness is first. (shrink)

House. From cellar to garret. Significance of the hut -- House and universe -- Drawers, chests and wardrobes -- Nests -- Shells -- Corners -- Miniature -- Intimate immensity -- Dialectics of outside and inside -- Phenomenology of roundness.

(2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.

This article offers an overview of Marx’s textual legacy on the subject of the multiplied value-positing powers of skilled labour, and undertakes a critical reconstruction of the history of the subsequent controversies over the so-called ‘skilled-labour problem’. Critical examination of the different Marxist responses to the objections put forward by critics shows that they have failed to develop a solution that is consistent with the foundations of Marx’s value-theory. Thus, the article finally offers an alternative solution grounded in the Marxian (...) analysis of the determinations of value as laid out in Capital. (shrink)

In their target article, Kammerer and Frankish (K&F) wonder what forms introspection could take in non-human animals, enhanced humans, artificial intelligences, and aliens. In this short note, I focus on disordered or neurodiverse minds. More specifically, I assess a claim that has often been made more or less implicitly to the effect that, in virtue of their conditions, people with schizophrenia or depersonalization disorder have superior introspective abilities that allow them to discern some important but normally hidden characteristics of our (...) experiences — call this the superintrospectionitis thesis. In the course of my argumentation, I introduce distinctions and questions concerning the nature of the architecture and the function of introspection that might enrich K&F's framework. (shrink)

Computational reproducibility possesses its own dynamics and narratives of crisis. Alongside the difficulties of computing as an ubiquitous yet complex scientific activity, computational reproducibility suffers from a naive expectancy of total reproducibility and a moral imperative to embrace the principles of free software as a non-negotiable epistemic virtue. We argue that the epistemic issues at stake in actual practices of computational reproducibility are best unveiled by focusing on software as a pivotal concept, one that is surprisingly often overlooked in accounts (...) of reproducibility issues. Software is not only about designing and coding but also about maintaining, supporting, distributing, licensing, and governance; it is not only about developers but also about users. We focus on openness debates among computational chemists involved in molecular modeling software packages as empirical grounding for our argument. We then identify and analyse four epistemic characteristics as key to the role of software in computational reproducibility. (shrink)

Depersonalization consists in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, and his mind, and even from himself. Even though, when it was discovered at the end of the 19th century, this psychiatric condition was widely used to probe certain aspects of bodily awareness, and more specifically the sense of bodily ownership (SBO), it has been strangely neglected in contemporary debates. In this chapter, I argue (...) that because of three specific features, depersonalization raises some important challenges for current theories of the SBO. The first feature — call it “generality” — is that depersonalization does not only affect the sense of bodily ownership but also, typically, the sense of ``mental ownership’’ (SMO), the sense of agency or ``action ownership’’ (SOA), and the subject’s core sense of herself (CSS), that is, her awareness of herself as an I. The second feature is that except for the symptoms of depersonalization, depersonalized patients are hard to distinguish, psychologically, from normal subjects. This makes it hard to find psychological features that might explain their condition. The last feature, call it “fundamentality” is that the psychological features that do seem abnormal among depersonalized patients seem more likely to be explained by depersonalization than to explain it. These three features raise three challenges — the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge, and the grounding challenge. Taken together, I will argue, these challenges suggest that the SBO depends on a form of phenomenal “mineness” that would mark my mental states as mine and that cannot be accounted for in sensorimotor, cognitive, or even affective terms. A phenomenal mineness that indeed seems to be psychologically primitive, and only accountable in neurophysiological terms. (shrink)

According to David Chalmers, the virtual entities found in Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) environments instantiate virtual properties of a specific kind. It has recently been objected that such a view (i) can’t extend to all types of properties; (ii) leads to a proliferation of property-types; (iii) implausibly ascribes massive errors to VR and AR users; and (iv) faces an analogue of Jackson’s “many-property problem”. My first objective here is to show that advocates of virtual properties can deal (...) with each of these objections. The other goal of this paper is to examine the consequences of Chalmers’ theory in the particular case of AR. If we countenance virtual properties, AR highlights that non-virtual objects can possess both non-virtual and virtual properties. With AR, it also appears that a same non-virtual object can have different and even incompatible properties across augmented environments. Lastly, considering properties in light of AR highlights the risk of an “augmented solipsism”, and calls forth interesting questions about the persistence conditions of non-virtual objects in AR environments. (shrink)

Éloignés aussi bien des grandes théories philosophiques de l'éducation que des préoccupations de la recherche scientifique rigoureuse, ces Propos impertinents sur l'éducation actuelle sont ceux d'un observateur attentif, aguerri et plein d'empathie pour son sujet, certes, mais qui essaye de rester toujours lucide et critique. Qu'il soit d'accord ou non avec les positions habituelles ou officielles, Gaston Mialaret veut témoigner, soit à travers quelques textes courts, soit à l'aide de petites scènes de la vie scolaire habituelle, soit à partir (...) de réflexions ou de commentaires plus généraux, du bon sens en éducation... bon sens qui devrait être, comme chacun sait, la chose du monde la mieux partagée. Tous les partenaires des situations d'éducation : élèves, enseignants, administrateurs, parents d'élèves entrent, à un moment ou à un autre, dans le collimateur de cet observateur impertinent. (shrink)

(2005). Noumena and Microphysics1. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 73-78.

The metaphysics of dust -- Realist atomism -- Problems of the composition of phenomena -- Positivist atomism -- Critical atomism -- Axiomatic atomism.

Using emotional film clips is one of the most popular and effective methods of emotion elicitation. The main goal of the present study was to develop and test the effectiveness of a new and comprehensive set of emotional film excerpts. Fifty film experts were asked to remember specific film scenes that elicited fear, anger, sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, as well as emotionally neutral scenes. For each emotion, the 10 most frequently mentioned scenes were selected and cut into film clips. Next, (...) 364 participants viewed the film clips in individual laboratory sessions and rated each film on multiple dimensions. Results showed that the film clips were effective with regard to several criteria such as emotional discreteness, arousal, positive and negative affect. Finally, ranking scores were computed for 24 classification criteria: Subjective arousal, positive and negative affect (derived from the PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1988), a positive and a negative affect scores derived from the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al., 1974), six emotional discreteness scores (for anger, disgust, sadness, fear, amusement and tenderness), and 15 “mixed feelings” scores assessing the effectiveness of each film excerpt to produce blends of specific emotions. In addition, a number of emotionally neutral film clips were also validated. The database and editing instructions to construct the film clips have been made freely available in a website. (shrink)

«No hay nada como un estudio de las palabras que nos permita penetrar mejor en el conocimiento de las ideas. No hay nada de lo que se pueda obtener un mayor beneficio ni que presente un interés semejante». En esa declaración hay todo un método muy útil para la historia de la filosofía, y en consecuencia para la filosofía misma. Lo que Gaston Boissier nos propone en este trabajo divido en dos partes es el recorrido por la historia de (...) la idea de Humanidad (humanitas). Una historia esencialmente ligada a la penetración del helenismo en la Roma victoriosa de la República, y en su seno, de la filosofía académica en sentido estricto. La que aquí se enfoca es la que se modula a través de la Stoa media, con Panecio a la cabeza y su alianza con el círculo de Escipión Emiliano. Una historia que recibe su molde en Cicerón. (shrink)

According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is somehow shallow and lacking in reality. For all we knwo, the intuition goes, we could be living in a cave facing shadows, in a dream or even in a computer simulation, This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it (...) seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the "problem of reality." At the turn of the nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on the study of these patients to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism. (shrink)

Examines the changes during the twentieth century in the views of mathematics, physics, and the scientific method and discusses the role of the mind in science.

Consider an infinite series whose items are each explained by their immediate successor. Does such an infinite explanation explain the whole series or does it leave something to be explained? Hume arguably claimed that it does fully explain the whole series. Leibniz, however, designed a very telling objection against this claim, an objection involving an infinite series of book copies. In this paper, I argue that the Humean claim can, in certain cases, be saved from the Leibnizian “infinite book copies” (...) objection, and that this provides an interesting way to defuse some cosmological arguments for the existence of God and to give a non-theistic but complete explanation of the Universe. In the course of my argumentation, I also show that circular explanations can be “self-explanatory” as well: explaining two items by each other can explain the couple of items tout court. (shrink)

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...) the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self-reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito. (shrink)

Leonardo Bruni’s De intepretatione recta has recently produced a growing body of literature which has improved our knowledge of the genesis, background and content of the work, as well as its pivotal role in the early history of translation and the humanist intellectual agenda. This article focuses on the conceptual metaphor which shapes Bruni’s understanding of the art of translation: the ‘Translation as Painting’ model. Drawing on a theoretical framework which stresses the cognitive value of metaphors, this article highlights the (...) structural function of the ut pictura metaphor in Bruni’s treatise, eliciting both its classical sources, its resonance in the early fifteenth century and its semantic-pragmatic force in characterising translation. Bruni’s novel conceptual template maps onto the larger cultural background of early humanist thought on interpretatio, imitatio and the visual arts. (shrink)

Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...) I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self-awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self-awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self-aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to identify general characteristics attributed to ethical business cultures by executives from a variety of industries. Our research identified five clusters of characteristics: Mission- and Values-Driven, Stakeholder Balance, Leadership Effectiveness, Process Integrity, and Long-term Perspective. We propose that these characteristics be used as a foundation of a comprehensive model that can be engaged to influence operational practices in creating and sustaining an ethical business culture.

El objetivo de este trabajo es avizorar una posible articulación entre ethos trágico y ethos barroco. Para ello, se parte de la hipótesis de Echeverría sobre el barroquismo del Quijote unamuniano. Se sostiene que dicho ethos barroco, como actitud, como comportamiento, como estrategia vital, tal como lo define el filósofo ecuatoriano, se extiende más allá de dicha obra y se articula con el ethos trágico de la agonística unamuniana. Se toma la hipótesis de Sáez Rueda, quien entiende que la agonística (...) unamuniana está estrechamente vinculada a la actitud barroca y que, por otra parte, hay al menos dos lazos de unión entre lo barroco y lo trágico. A estos dos lazos, se sugiere, se pueden sumar dos más: uno de ellos parte de la concepción compartida por Echeverría y Unamuno respecto a la acción, la elección por el tercero que no puede ser; el otro parte de la hipótesis de que esa comunidad de actitud, de ethos, entre lo trágico y lo barroco, se puede establecer desde la función pedagógica moral de las obras trágicas y de las barrocas. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar cuenta de la fecundidad que el pensamiento de Unamuno (1864-1936) presenta en torno al problema hermenéutico. Para ello se tomará como eje la obra Cómo se hace una novela (1926-7), donde el pensador bilbaíno expone sus ideas en torno a la cuestión de la escritura y la recepción de la obra literaria. El estudio de la obra en cuestión y la referencia a muchas de sus otras obras estará atravesado por las nociones que (...) acuñara Ricoeur de “distanciamiento” y “apropiación” del mundo del texto . La importancia que cobra en Unamuno el receptor de la obra, anticipándose a las ulteriores teorías de la recepción, nos lleva a ver qué entiende éste por “comprensión”, y cuál es el papel que esa noción juega en sus concepciones filosófico-literarias. Finalmente, a partir de este “distanciamiento” y “apropiación” de la obra que propone Unamuno al lector, le será posible al receptor, la proyección de un mundo. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Knowledge and Technology — Approximate Realization TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND INEXACT KNOWLEDGE: BACHELARD'S NON‐CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND INEXACT KNOWLEDGE: BACHELARD'S NON‐CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND INEXACT KNOWLEDGE: BACHELARD'S NON‐CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND INEXACT KNOWLEDGE: BACHELARD'S NON‐CARTESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY Objective Method.

ResumenEn este trabajo queremos indagar sobre algunas cuestiones epistemológicas que se discuten en torno al fenómeno del big data. Como principal herramienta de análisis epistemológico utilizamos a la noción de Marco Epistémico formulada por Piaget y García, y revisada por nosotros en trabajos más recientes, para problematizar los condicionamientos de los valores éticos y políticos, así como de otras regulaciones, en el desarrollo del conocimiento científico. Para ello, proponemos ordenar los debates que se registran en la literatura reciente sobre big (...) data a través de diversas dualidades, tales como dato/interpretación, automático/no-automático o causalidad/correlación, en torno a las cuales vamos a argumentar que es posible pensar dos marcos epistémicos específicos tendientes a la escisión de estos términos o a su integración. Abogando por esta última manera de focalizar los debates, hacia el final del trabajo identificamos algunos desafíos epistemológicos de la investigación con big data, especialmente en las ciencias sociales computacionales.Palabras clave: big data; marco epistémico; constructivismo; computación. (shrink)

En la segunda parte de su trabajo, Boissier trata en profundidad el carácter y constitución del círculo de los Escipiones y su modulación de la humanitas al compás de sus relaciones con el helenismo. Si bien primero se detiene en deslindar las herencias y distancias entre el teatro de Terencio y el de Plauto y su tratamiento de la intimidad romana. Abordará a continuación el problema del cosmopolitismo de filiación helénica y su relación con el patriotismo romano de la mano (...) de Cicerón para terminar con una reflexión presentista que dice tanto de la Roma clásica como de la visión que Boissier tenía de su presente. (shrink)

Si l'on veut bien définir le rationalisme comme une pensée d'organisation, on devra lui accorder une matière à organiser, des éléments à assembler, des expériences à ajuster. On devra le juger au terme même de cette organisation, après son effort synthétique, après son travail de mise en ordre. Il y a peu de justice à le taxer d'incapacité à propos d'une analyse de ce qu'il prend comme éléments de sa construction. Autant dire que le rationalisme est une philosophie fonctionnelle, une (...) philosophie d'opérations - ou plutôt, comme nous le montrerons plus explicitement dans notre livre sur la Mécanique ondulatoire, une philosophie d'opérateurs. Ce n'est pas une philosophie existentielle. Le rationalisme ne prétend pas pénétrer dans l'individualité d'une existence. Il ne commence à penser qu'en établissant des relations. (shrink)

Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...) I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self-awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self-awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self-aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection. (shrink)