We prove an institutional version of A. Robinson ’s Consistency Theorem. This result is then appliedto the institution of many-sorted first-order predicate logic and to two of its variations, infinitary and partial, obtaining very general syntactic criteria sufficient for a signature square in order to satisfy the Robinson consistency and Craig interpolation properties.

The lack of double negation and de Morgan properties makes fuzzy logic unsymmetrical. This is the reason why fuzzy versions of notions like closure operator or Galois connection deserve attention for both antiotone and isotone cases, these two cases not being dual. This paper offers them attention, comming to the following conclusions: – some kind of hardly describable ‘‘local preduality’’ still makes possible important parallel results; – interesting new concepts besides antitone and isotone ones (like, for instance, conjugated pair), that (...) were classically reducible to the first, gain independency in fuzzy setting. (shrink)

The paper proposes a flexible way to build concepts within fuzzy logic and set theory. The framework is general enough to capture some important particular cases, with their own independent interpretations, like “antitone” or “isotone” concepts constructed from fuzzy binary relations, but also to allow the two universes to be equipped each with its own truth structure. Perhaps the most important feature of our approach is that we do not commit ourselves to any kind of logical connector, covering thus the (...) case of a possibly non-commutative conjunction too. (shrink)

An Internet-based competitive marketing game, FIFA 20, served to investigate the effectiveness of two opposite strategies in soccer-player auctions under semi-naturalistic conditions. Granting the validity of both causal principles, the anchoring principle giving an advantage to starting with a high price (Ritov, 1996) and the traffic principle underlying the starting-low advantage (Ku, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2006), we nevertheless expected starting low strategies to produce higher end-prices under FIFA 20 conditions. Two experiments, each using multiple copies of two players from the (...) lowest price segment (Kramaric, Pizzi) and from an elevated price segment (Laporte, Martial), corroborated these expectations. A starting-low advantage was evident in two utility aspects, enhanced average (profit) and reduced variance (uncertainty aversion) of end prices obtained for player copies offered at lower starting prices. However, when the causal impact of the manipulated starting value was overshadowed by extraneous media influences, these findings were reduced or disappeared but never reversed. (shrink)

We introduce Łukasiewicz-Moisil relation algebras, obtained by considering a relational dimension over Łukasiewicz-Moisil algebras. We prove some arithmetical properties, provide a characterization in terms of complex algebras, study the connection with relational Post algebras and characterize the simple structures and the matrix relation algebras.

We introduce the notion of n-nuanced MV-algebra by performing a Łukasiewicz–Moisil nuancing construction on top of MV-algebras. These structures extend both MV-algebras and Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras, thus unifying two important types of structures in the algebra of logic. On a logical level, n-nuanced MV-algebras amalgamate two distinct approaches to many valuedness: that of the infinitely valued Łukasiewicz logic, more related in spirit to the fuzzy approach, and that of Moisil n-nuanced logic, which is more concerned with nuances of truth rather than (...) truth degree. We study n-nuanced MV-algebras mainly from the algebraic and categorical points of view, and also consider some basic model-theoretic aspects. The relationship with a suitable notion of n-nuanced ordered group via an extension of the Γ construction is also analyzed. (shrink)

Hans-Georg GADAMER, Hermeneutische Entwürfe. Vorträge und Aufsätze ; Pascal MICHON, Poétique d’une anti-anthropologie: l’herméneutique deGadamer ; Robert J. DOSTAL, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer ; Denis SERON, Le problème de la métaphysique. Recherches sur l’interprétation heideggerienne de Platon et d’Aristote ; Henry MALDINEY, Ouvrir le rien. L’art nu ; Dominique JANICAUD, Heidegger en France, I. Récit; II. Entretiens ; Maurice MERLEAU-PONTY, Fenomenologia percepţiei ; Trish GLAZEBROOK, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science ; Richard WOLIN, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas (...) and Herbert Marcuse ; Ivo DEGENNARO, Logos – Heidegger liest Heraklit ; O. K. WIEGAND, R. J. DOSTAL, L. EMBREE, J. KOCKELMANS and J. N. MOHANTY, Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic ; James FAULCONER and Mark WRATHALL, Appropriating Heidegger. (shrink)

Hans-Georg GADAMER, Hermeneutische Entwürfe. Vorträge und Aufsätze ; Pascal MICHON, Poétique d’une anti-anthropologie: l’herméneutique deGadamer ; Robert J. DOSTAL, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer ; Denis SERON, Le problème de la métaphysique. Recherches sur l’interprétation heideggerienne de Platon et d’Aristote ; Henry MALDINEY, Ouvrir le rien. L’art nu ; Dominique JANICAUD, Heidegger en France, I. Récit; II. Entretiens ; Maurice MERLEAU-PONTY, Fenomenologia percepţiei ; Trish GLAZEBROOK, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science ; Richard WOLIN, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas (...) and Herbert Marcuse ; Ivo DEGENNARO, Logos – Heidegger liest Heraklit ; O. K. WIEGAND, R. J. DOSTAL, L. EMBREE, J. KOCKELMANS and J. N. MOHANTY, Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic ; James FAULCONER and Mark WRATHALL, Appropriating Heidegger. (shrink)

This article deals with the connection between the anthroposophical practice of meditation and the concept of self-conscious soul, which is developed in the main theoretical work of Andrei Bely, “The History of the Becoming of Self-conscious Soul.” After a brief review of the esoteric practice, in which Bely was introduced by Rudolf Steiner in the years 1912-1914, it examines the topography of the meditative space, according to the descriptions given by Bely in the “Krizisy”. Relevant sources of Steiner on (...) the higher stages of knowledge are involved, from which the concept of Bely differs in a few points. It is considered, how the inner experience of Bely is reflected in the cognitive principles of the self-conscious soul, which he understands as a reflection of the higher cognitive abilities at the lower level of the soul. It is shown, that the cognitive principles of the self-conscious soul, which Bely names “composition of space”, “theme in the variations of time” and “symbol”, are a synthesis of the esoteric practice of Bely with his early reception of the critical philosophy of Kant. He fuses them into a gradational model of multi-stage deepening of knowledge into the construction of the universe and the human cultural evolution. This process is carried out with the creative participation of the cognizing subject and culminates in his deification. (shrink)

The occasion of the 100th anniversary of I. Kant’s death was a colossal impulse for many researchers of Immanuel Kant’s legacy. One of the goals of the paper is to introduce one of the less known anniversary critical texts, which appeared in the Russian intellectual milieu. It attempts to disrupt the usual approach regarding the interpretation of Bely’s comprehension of Kant’s legacy, i.e., Kant as a skeleton of philosophy or a police officer of thinking. The paper points to a more (...) systematically conceived scale of Bely’s reflections of Kant. From Bely’s point of view, Kant is the author of firm grounds for the shaping of thought. On the unstable background of philosophy, which during the historical development of thought succumbed to erosion, it is Kant’s philosophy that serves as the stabilizing base. Bely tries to highlight that Kant’s epistemology forms distinctively outlined the foundations of a knowledge of the world and philosophical comprehension not only of history but also of symbolism. The symbolism of Andrei Bely. (shrink)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence (...) levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...) the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

Οἱ ἀρχαίες τεχνικές συναρμαλόγησης τραβέρσας μέ τους βραχίονες τῆς λύρας δέν περιγράφονται μέ ἀκρίβεια στίς φιλολογικές πηγές. Ή ἐπανασύνθεσή τους εἶναι παρολαυτά δυνατή ἄν μελετήσουμε τίς εἰκονογραφήσεις (ἀττική κεραμεική), πού δείχνουν ὅτι τά τεμάχια αὐτά εἶναι γομφωμένα. Ή μελέτη τοῦ μοναδικοῦ δείγματος ἐλληνικής λύρας, τῆς «λύρας Elgin », μᾶς ἐπιτρέπει νά καταλάβουμε τήν ἐργασία και τή συναρμολόγηση τῶν τεμαχίων πού ἦταν γομφωμένα. 'Ορισμένες ἐνιγματικές λεπτομέρειες πού ἀπεικονίζονται στά ἀγγεία ἐξηγούνται καί αὐτές. Παρατηροῦμε δτι οἱ λεπτομέρειες τῆς λύρας του « θρόνου (...) τῆς Βοστόνης » εἶναι πιστές στίς ἀπεικονίσεις καί ἀντιστοιχούν ἀκριβώς στήν κατασκευή τῆς « λύρας Elgin ». Οἱ ἀναλογίες ὅμως τοῦ ὀργάνου καί ἡ στάση τοῦ λυράρη εἶναι παράλογες. (shrink)

Mainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive power (...) of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all. (shrink)

According to traditional Judeo-Christian-Islamic theism, God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect agent. This volume shows that philosophy of religion needs to take seriously alternative concepts of the divine, and demonstrates the considerable philosophical interest that they hold.

This book, a history of a religious category of ancient philosophy, is the first synthesis on the notion of daimōn in the Platonic tradition. It focuses on the relationship between demonology and, respectively, cosmology, the philosophical hermeneutics of religion and theories of the soul. Histoire d’une catégorie religieuse de la philosophie ancienne, ce livre représente la première synthèse sur la notion de daimōn dans la tradition platonicienne. Il étudie les relations de la démonologie avec la cosmologie, l’herméneutique philosophique de la (...) religion et les théories de l’âme. (shrink)

The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each citizen’s conscience. In each particular case this approach requires balancing the claims of devout believers against the countervailing claims of other citizens. I contend, firstly, that under the conditions of deep moral and ideological disagreement the balancing procedure proves to be extremely inconclusive. It does not provide an unequivocal solution even in the imaginary (...) case based on the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice, not to speak of real-life cases that are far less suggestive. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to consider demands for religious exemptions respectfully, without even challenging the way they are justified, but still reject them for principled reasons—namely, because these demands cannot be met without arbitrarily bending popular sovereignty to the dictate of religious doctrines. (shrink)

Cultural schemas are a central cognitive mechanism through which culture affects action. In this article, we develop a theoretical model of cultural schemas that is better able to support empirical work, including inferential, sensitizing, and operational uses. We propose a multilevel framework centered on a high-level definition of cultural schemas that is sufficiently broad to capture its major sociological applications but still sufficiently narrow to identify a set of cognitive phenomena with key functional properties in common: cultural schemas are socially (...) shared representations deployable in automatic cognition. We use this conception to elaborate the main theoretical properties of cultural schemas, and to provide clear criteria that distinguish them from other cultural or cognitive elements. We then propose a series of concrete tests empirical scholarship can use to determine if these properties apply. We also demonstrate how this approach can identify potentially faulty theoretical inferences present in existing work. Moving to a lower level of analysis, we elaborate how cultural schemas can be algorithmically conceptualized in terms of their building blocks. This leads us to recommend improvements to methods for measuring cultural schemas. We conclude by outlining questions for a broader research program. (shrink)

It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them are not (...) at odds with Hart’s thesis about the nature of jurisprudence, while the others are wrong, both as expositions of legal positivism or as critiques of it. Legal positivism does not necessarily purport to justify any aspect of its subject matter, nor is it committed to any particular moral or political evaluations. (shrink)

In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.

This paper examines the ability of countries in Central and Eastern Europe to ensure appropriate protection of research participants in the field of increasingly globalizing biomedical research. By applying an analytical framework for identifying gaps in policies and programs for human subjects protection to four countries of CEE—Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, substantial gaps in the scope and content of relevant policies and major impediments to program performance have been revealed. In these countries, public policies on the protection of research (...) participants lack consistency and reliable mechanisms for their implementation. Impediments to program performance most often relate to inadequacies in the national research ethics systems with regard to organizational structure, budgetary support, supervision, and training. The level of research ethics capacity varies from country to country and depends on socio-economic and political factors of post-communist transition. The breadth and depth of the problems identified suggest that the current level of protection for research participants in CEE might be inadequate to the challenges posed by the globalization of biomedical research. In CEE countries, there is a need for strengthening research ethics capacity through modification of relevant policies and improvement of program management. The differences among the countries call for further research on identifying the best approaches for filling the gaps in the policies and programs aimed at ensuring effective protection of research participants. (shrink)

This Element focuses on some core conceptual and ontological issues related to pantheistic conceptions of God by engaging with recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on this topic. The conceptual and ontological commitments of pantheism are contrasted with those of other conceptions of God. The concept of God assumed by pantheism is clarified and the question about what type of unity the universe must exhibit in order to be identical with God receives the most attention. It is argued that (...) the sort of unity the universe must display is the sort of unity characteristic of conscious cognitive systems. Some alternative ontological frameworks for grounding such cognitive unity are considered. Further, the question of whether God can be understood as personal on pantheism is explored. (shrink)

Le fragment d'épinétron 907 du Musée d'Eleusis représente une Amazone sonnant de la trompette et appelant ses compagnes aux armes ; elle est entourée de lettres jusqu'à présent considérées comme dépourvues de sens : TOTOTETO(T)H. Ces syllabes appartiennent en réalité à une notation musicale de type « solfégique » qui ne nous était connue jusqu'ici que par des théoriciens postérieurs au IIe siècle ap. J.-C, qui la faisait cependant remonter à Damon. Cette inscription constitue le plus ancien document musical grec (...) parvenu jusqu'à nous : œuvre du peintre de Sappho, l'épinétron est daté des débuts du Ve siècle. Elle atteste l'ancienneté de la notation solfégique, la première qu'aient connue les Grecs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...) consequences of the distinction between belief and acceptance, and the model of belief control sketched are then applied to the recent case made by Carl Ginet in defense of the conceptual and psychological possibility of agents exercising direct voluntary control over their beliefs. n. (shrink)

The article analyzes the possibilities and limitations of artificial intelligence. The article considers the subjectivity of artificial intelligence, determines its necessity for solving intellectual problems depending on the possibility of representing the real world as a deterministic system. Methodological limitations of artificial intelligence, which is based on the use of big data technologies, are stated. These limitations cause the impossibility of forming a holistic representation of the objects of cognition and the world as a whole. As a tool for deterministic (...) description of the universe it is proposed to use empirical-metaphysical general theory of systems, which is an extension of existing general theories of systems due to ontological justification of the phenomenon of isomorphism and definition of a limited set of laws, rules, patterns and primitives of forms and relations of objects in the universe. The distinction of natural (human) and artificial intelligence is considered, including the realization of multisystem integration of intelligence in physical, biological, social and spiritual systems. A philosophically grounded approach to ensuring the evolutionary properties of artificial intelligence is formulated, based on the inclusion of non-equilibrium mechanisms through which stability is realized. (shrink)

Annie Bélis, À propos de la coupe CA 482 du Louvre. P. 53-59 Sur la coupe CA 482 du Louvre, le Peintre d'Hésiode a figuré, avec son élégance et son raffinement habituels, une jeune femme qui tient une cithare en berceau : sur ses genoux est posé un objet qui a résisté jusqu'à présent à toute tentative d'identification. Plusieurs hypothèses, peu satisfaisantes, ont été formulées. Schéma et mesures à l'appui, on montre qu'il s'agit en réalité d'une deuxième cithare en berceau, (...) posée à plat et donc vue de profil. Le a pris soin de lui donner exactement les mêmes dimensions et les mêmes au détail près, que l'autre. Reste une inconnue : le nom antique de la cithare en. (shrink)

A partir des témoignages littéraires et des représentations figurées les plus précises, on décrit cet accessoire que portaient les aulètes et certains joueurs de σάλπιγξ, et l'on détermine dans quelles limites chronologiques le port de la φορβειά est attesté. Le problème principal concerne son utilité ou sa fonction, question débattue depuis l'Antiquité, tant par les scholiastes que par Plutarque, et sur laquelle les modernes sont en désaccord. D'autre part, comme la φορβειά ne se conçoit que pour des instruments à anches, (...) et comme on voit des joueurs de trompette la porter, entre la fin du VIe s. et le début du Ve, il apparaît que des trompettes à anches ont été jouées en Grèce, ce que des témoignages écrits confirment. Il est sûr que cet instrument a été en usage chez les Romains : il en existe un témoignage archéologique (inédit), découvert à Pompéi. (shrink)

Πρόκειται γιά διπλό ξύλινο αὐλό, ἐξαιρετικά καλά διατηρημένο. 'Αποτελεῖται ἀπό δυό σωλῆνες πού σχηματίζονται ἀπό ἕνα στόμιο καί ἕναν ὅλμο, καί ἀπό τόν « βόμβυκα » · ἔχουν 7-9 τρύπες, ἀπό τίς ὁποῖες μιά γιά τόν ἀντίχειρα στό κάτω μέρος καί τῶν δυό σωλήνων. Ἡ θέση τους ποικίλλει σημαντικά ἀπό σωλήνα σέ σωλήνα καί μπορεῖ κανείς νά ἀποκατάσταση τῆς μουσικῆς κλίμακας τοῦ ὀργάνου, σύμφωνα μέ ὑπολογισμούς πού χρησιμοποιοῦσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες θεωρητικοί. Μ' αὐτό τόν τρόπο ἀποδεικνύεται ὅτι ὁ διπλός αὐλός δέν (...) ἐπινοήθηκε γιά ἐκτέλεση ἐτεροφώνων μελωδιῶν : ὁ ὀργανοποιός ἀνοίγει τρύπες σέ δυό σωλῆνες, ἐκεί πού θά τοῦ ἦταν ἀδύνατο νά τό κάνει μόνο στον ἕνα χωρίς νά χαλάσει τό ὄργανο. Στό διπλό αὐλό τοῦ Λούβρου μπορεῖ νά ἐκτελεσθούν 16 νότες · πρόκειται γιά ὄργανο ἐξαιρετικῆς κατασκευῆς πού προορίζεται γιά δεξιοτέχνη. Μπορεῖ νά χρονολογηθεῖ στά τέλη τοῦ 4ου αἰώνα. (shrink)

Τό λατινικό scabellum, οι ελληνικές «κρούπεζαι» είναι βοηθητικά αντικείμενα πού χρησιμοποιούν οί αυλητές : αποτελείται άπό Ινα διπλό ξύλινο πέλμα ενισχυμένο ενδεχομένως μέ μέταλλο πού ό οργανοπαίχτης κινεί μέ τό πόδι · γιά νά γίνει πιό ηχηρό καμμιά φορά υπάρχουν δύο κύμβαλα ανάμεσα στά δύο πέλματα · μελέτη τών ελληνικών δρων · προέλευση καί λειτουργία τοΰ οργάνου, ειδικότερα στή Βοιωτία · σχέσεις μέ τόν Βάταλο πού αναφέρεται στην επιγραφή τοΰ Διονυσίου της Θάσου · σχέσεις μεταξύ αύλου, ρ* υθμοΰ καί εργασίας (...) " συμπεράσματα πάνω στους μουσικούς ^υθμούς στην Ελλάδα καί στή Τώμη. (shrink)

In their paper exploring patient ambivalence in the context of medical decision-making Bryanna Moore, et al. state, “While bioethicists have not paid much attention to ambivalence and related menta...

The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...) respect to the agent’s actions and omissions that constitute her dieting behavior and in achieving the intended outcome of losing weight. In our mental lives we exercise intentional agency both in performing mental actions and when we intentionally produce certain outcomes at which our mental actions are aimed. The nature and scope of our intentional agency in our mental lives with respect to controlling the acquisition of mental states such as belief, desire, and intention is a topic that is of interest in its own right. In this essay, I will focus solely on our control over coming to believe. Understanding what sort of control we have our beliefs has far-reaching implications. For instance, theorizing about self-deception and wishful thinking is aided by theorizing about what if any intentional agency we can exercise with respect to acquiring beliefs. Another often mentioned concern that motivates thinking about doxastic agency comes from religion (when conversion requires a change of belief). We also hold persons morally and epistemically responsible for beliefs they have or fail to have. Finally, some deontological theories of epistemic justification require that agents be able to exercise a robust form of doxastic control. Fruitful work on any of these problems requires that we have an account of our intentional agency in acquiring beliefs. There are at least three loci of doxastic control. The first is over acquiring beliefs. The second is over maintaining beliefs. The third is over how we use our beliefs. I am chiefly concerned with the first locus of doxastic control in this essay, but I will say something about the second locus along the way. Also, I will only consider one way we might exercise control over acquiring beliefs. Specifically, I will present an argument against direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV). By “DDV” I mean to refer to the thesis that it is conceptually possible for agents to consciously exercise the same sort of direct voluntary control over coming to acquire a doxastic attitude—such as belief, suspension of belief, and disbelief—that they exercise over uncontroversial basic actions. If DDV is correct, then coming to believe can be a basic action-type. DDV, or something very close to it, was Bernard Williams’ target in his 1973 paper, “Deciding to Believe.” Williams’s argument is widely regarded as having been a failure. But I think that Williams was on to something in his paper. Hence, in this paper, while I do not attempt to resurrect Williams’s argument, I develop and defend a revised argument for a thesis that is quite close to Williams’s. I will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss Bernard Williams’ (1973) failed attempt at showing that DDV is conceptually impossible. This will be followed by a discussion of some constraints on our belief-forming activities. I will then clarify my target a bit more than Williams does in his original paper. Finally, I will present my own argument against the conceptual possibility of DDV. (shrink)