Since the introduction of the computer in the early 1950's, the investigation of artificial intelligence has followed three chief avenues: the discovery of self-organizing systems; the building of working models of human behavior, incorporating specific psychological theories; and the building of "heuristic" machines, without bias in favor of humanoid characteristics. While this work has used philosophical logic and its results may illustrate philosophical problems, the artificial intelligence program is by now an intricate, organized specialty. This book, therefore, has a quite (...) specialized audience of its own although it can be very valuable to those philosophers who are interested and competent in using this pioneering material. Five scientific papers report attempts to solve five different kinds of problems. Bertram Raphael describes an attempt to build a memory structure that converts the information input into a systematic model by "understanding" the informational statements as they are made. Daniel Bobrow's machine can set up algebraic equations from informal verbal statements. M. Ross Quillan asks: "What sort of representational format can permit the 'meanings' of words to be stored?" Thomas Evans' machine, Analogy, serves as a model for "pattern-recognition" rather than the "common-property" method of semantic memory. Fischer Black has developed a logical deduction mechanism for question-answering which keeps track of where we are and avoids endless deduction. The editor and John McCarthy contribute more general chapters, providing the historical background of cybernetics, and dealing with the problem of formalizing a concept of causality. Minsky ends the volume with his view that our convictions on dualism, consciousness, free will, and the like are used in the attempt to explain the complicated interactions between parts of our model of ourselves.--M. B. M. (shrink)

When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. (...) Study 3 confirms the importance of a fifth component, namely, skill. In light of these findings, the authors propose a model of the folk concept of intentionality and provide a further test in Study 4. The discussion compares the proposed model to past ones and examines its implications for social perception, attribution, and cognitive development. (shrink)

People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept (Study (...) 1) and by confronting them with a neuroscientific claim that free will is an illusion (Study 2), which invited them to either reconcile or contrast free will with determinism. The results suggest that the core of people’s concept of free will is a choice that fulfills one’s desires and is free from internal or external constraints. No evidence was found for metaphysical assumptions about dualism or indeterminism. (shrink)

This article gives an overview of the mereological thought of the medieval philosopher and theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas. Until the 20th century mereology—the study of the relationship of whole and part—was not generally recognized as a distinct domain of philosophy and so Aquinas, like most of his contemporaries, has no single systematic treatment of it as a topic in its own right. However, a cohesive account of part‐whole relations can be pieced together from the various metaphysical, ethical and theological contexts (...) in which Aquinas deals with mereological issues. In this article, I give an account of both Aquinas's conceptual understanding of composition and his taxonomy of the different kinds of wholes and parts that there are. I end with comments on three marginal cases of mereological relationships in Aquinas's philosophy. (shrink)

In this fascinating exploration of justice, eminent philosopher D. D. Raphael presents the culmination of a lifetime's study of its evolution, from ancient times to the late twentieth century. His aim is not just historical but philosophical: to illuminate our true understanding of justice. His unique approach examines not only classic texts by such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Mill, and Rawls but also the Bible and Greek tragedy, as well as some neglected but important thought from the modern (...) era. Lucid and stimulating, this work can be enjoyed by anyone interested in moral and political thought, even by those with little to no knowledge of political theory or philosophy. (shrink)

In this new and enlarged edition of a standard introduction to moral philosophy, Raphael shows in clear and simple language the connections between abstract ethics and practical problems in law, government, medicine, and the social sciences in general. Moral Philosophy deals with six main areas. First, it looks at the two opposed traditions of naturalism and rationalism, and considers more recent discussion in terms of logic and language. Next, it explores the attractions and defects of Utilitarianism, and then turns (...) to its main rival, Kantian ethics, which Raphael favors in a modified form. The third section shows how different moral views are related to different theories about justice and liberty. The fourth examines the problem of free will and determinism in the context of the presuppositions of science, especially in the social sciences. This second edition enlarges the relation of moral philosophy to other concerns, with two new chapters: one on ethics and evolution, the other on medical ethics. (shrink)

1. The theory of classes presented in this paper is a simplification of that presented by J. von Neumann in his paper Die Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre. However, this paper is written so that it can be read independently of von Neumann's. The principal modifications of his system are the following.(1) The idea of ordered pair is defined in terms of the other primitive concepts of the system. (See Axiom 4.3 below.)(2) A much simpler proof of the well-ordering theorem, based on (...) von Neumann's equivalence axiom (Axiom 2.2 below) is given. (More exactly, the theory of ordinal numbers, on which the proof of the well-ordering theorem is based, is simplified—see §8.)(3) Functions are not assumed to be defined for all arguments. In place of “ = A” we have “is undefined.” This makes possible a constructive interpretation of the system. (See §2.)2. We wish first to give a rough picture of the system which we are trying to construct. Suppose that we have the idea “class,” but no material from which to construct classes. Nevertheless, we can construct the class 0 having no elements. And then the class 1 having 0 as its only element. And then the classes {1}, and {0, 1}, etc., using always the previously constructed classes as elements. To extend this method to infinite classes, we must give rules telling what elements are to be included. Since the nature of the rules which we can use is not altogether clear, we try to formalize the whole system; that is, to set up a system of axioms which seems to characterize this system of classes. Now in this set of axioms we find it necessary to use the idea of function (in the “Axiom of Replacement”). (shrink)

Recently, individualized or personalized medicine (PM) has become a buzz word in the academic as well as public debate surrounding health care. However, PM lacks a clear definition and is open to interpretation. This conceptual vagueness complicates public discourse on chances, risks and limits of PM. Furthermore, stakeholders might use it to further their respective interests and preferences. For these reasons it is important to have a shared understanding of PM. In this paper, we present a sufficiently precise as well (...) as adequate definition of PM with the potential of wide acceptance. (shrink)

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an (...) alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of (...) distinct actorobserver asymmetries in explanation, each stemming from a distinct psychological process by which explanations are generated. (shrink)

We extend Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) arguments to the question of whether implicit evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. We argue that correspondence to explicit evaluations fails to meet the criteria of relevance and sensitivity. When awareness is measured adequately and in line with N&S's criteria, there is compelling evidence that people are consciously aware of their implicit evaluations.

This book explores new territory at the interface between semantics and pragmatics, reassessing a number of linguistic phenomena in the light of recent advances in pragmatic theory and presenting stimulating insights by experts in linguistics and philosophy. The authors begin by reassessing the definition of four theoretical concepts: saturation, free pragmatic enrichment, completion and expansion. They go on to confront disciplines that have addressed similar issues but that have not necessarily been in close contact, and then turn to questions related (...) to reported speech, modality, indirect requests and prosody. Chapters investigate lexical pragmatics and lexical semantics and other interactions involving experimental pragmatics, construction grammar, clinical linguistics, and the distinction between mental and linguistic content. The authors bridge the gap between different disciplines, subdisciplines and methodologies, supporting cross-fertilization of ideas and indicating the empirical studies that are needed to test current theoretical concepts and push the theory further. Readers will find overviews of the ways in which concepts are defined, empirical data with which they are illustrated and explorations of the theoretical frameworks in which concepts are couched. This exciting exchange of ideas has its origins in the editors’ workshop series on the theme ‘The semantics/pragmatics interface: linguistic, logical and philosophical perspectives’, held at the University of Lille 3 in 2012-13. Scholars of linguistics, logic and philosophy and those interested in the research benefits of crossing disciplines will find this work both accessible and thought-provoking, especially those with an interest in pragmatic theory or semantics. (shrink)

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Excerpt from Nietzsche: Versuch Einer Mythologie Die Legende in solchem entkirchlichten Sinne ist die leb endigste Form geschichtlicher Überlieferung. Ihre primitivste wie ihre end gültigste, ihre älteste zugleich und ihre tiefste. Sie allein verknupft wirklich, als ein jederzeit Wirkendes, Urzeit und Heute; sie nur vera bindet den Heiligen und das Volk, den Helden und den Bauern; Prophet und Nachwelt finden sich nur hier. Und einzig in der Form der Legende überdauert die Persönlichkeit, auch die am schärfsten umrissene, am deutlichsten vom (...) historischen Wissen umzirkelte, als wirkende und fortzeugende Macht die Zeiten. (denn auch das \verk ist ja Personlichkeit und unterliegt den Gesetzen der Le; gende.) Nur als Bild, als Gestalt, nur als Mythos also lebt sie, nicht als Kenntnis und Erkenntnis eines Gewesenen. Keine Philologie, keine analytische Methode vermag das Bild zu formen, noch seine, einem innern Gesetz und Eigenantrieb gehorchenden Wandlungen zu verhindern oder zu beschleunigen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The only English translation of a crucial interpretation of Nietzsche.

In response to and as an elaboration on Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle’s Socrates Tenured, I wish to recognize the notion of practical philosophers as both public intellectuals and as those who may find refuge in the academy in order to shed the pretense of expertise, on the one hand, and the esoteric engagement with topics irrelevant to the affairs of contemporary culture, on the other.

What responsibility do the Manhattan Project scientists have for the atomic devastation of Hiroshima? Krupps scientists for the crematoriums at Auschwitz? Is there no way to revisit the ideals of science once devoted to creating a more reasonable and open society free from prejudices? Disturbing questions like these are at the heart of this sobering exploration of scientific and intellectual responsibility.

It is often claimed that states enjoy, as a consequence of their sovereign status, the right to control the passage of outsiders through their territory and that they have a discretion to admit or to refuse to admit outsiders, whether those outsiders be tourists, business travelers, would-be economic migrants, or even refugees. Or, to be more exact, such limitations on that right to control are derived from the agreement of states to treaties and conventions, agreement which they could have withheld (...) and could yet revoke. As a statement of the legal position this is not completely uncontroversial,1 but my aim in this paper is not to make a contribution to international law or law at all. Rather, my concern is with political philosophy and with the issue of whether.. (shrink)

Rousseau's _Social Contract _is a benchmark in political philosophy and has influenced moral and political thought since its publication. _Rousseau and the Social Contract _introduces and assesses: *Rousseau's life and the background of the _Social Contract _*The ideas and arguments of the _Social Contract _*Rousseau's continuing importance to politics and philosophy _Rousseau and the Social Contract _will be essential reading for all students of philosophy and politics, and anyone coming to Rousseau for the first time.

Selected and edited with comparative notes and analytical index by Raphael. The British Moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries form a remarkable tradition of continuous philosophical debate, reaching its high point in the ethical writings of Hume. Many of the works included in this collection are unavailable in modern editions, and those that are available can be seen to better advantage here, in the context of their historical development. This new selection differs appreciable from its predecessor, Selby-Bigge's British (...) Moralists, in the choice of authors and excerpts, in extending the scope of the authors included, and in adding comparative notes. The analytical index enables the reader to trace influences and locate notable arguments and positions. (shrink)

Karl Popper has had an extraordinary influence on scientific and social thought.

The ERN-Ne of the event-related potential indicates error monitoring. Even though enlarged ERN-Ne amplitudes have often been related to higher anxiety scores, a recent meta-analysis provided very small effect sizes for the association of trait-anxiety with the ERN-Ne. Conditions modulating this association were investigated in the present study: The generality of the trait-anxiety factor, gender, and experimental conditions, i.e., worry induction and error aversiveness. Participants completed a flanker task. Worries were induced before the task by giving participants a bogus feedback (...) claiming their responses were slower than the average responses of participants, whereas other participants got the feedback that they responded as fast as other participants. Aversiveness of errors was varied by playing sinus tones after too slow responses in one part of the task and aversive screams after too slow responses in another part. Increased ERN-Ne amplitudes of response time errors occurred for individuals higher on trait-anxiety in the condition with induced worries and screams. A multiple group model for women and men indicated that women are more sensitive to conditions altering the association of trait-anxiety with the ERN-Ne. (shrink)

Father Raphael C. McCarthy Doctor of Philosophy of London University and Professor of Experimental Psychology at St. Louis University, contributes this paper as a general estimate of the influence which one man has exerted upon the vast and complex network of scientific world thought. We also acknowledge our indebtedness for this paper to Mr. William J. Miller of the School of Philosophy, who prepared it for those pages.