The literature on thought experiments has been mainly concernedwith thought experiments that are directed at a theory, be it in aconstructive or a destructive manner. This has led somephilosophers to argue that all thought experiments can beformulated as arguments. The aim of this paper is to drawattention to a type of thought experiment that is not directed ata theory, but fulfills a specific function within a theory. Suchthought experiments are referred to as functional thoughtexperiments, and (...) they are routinely used in applied statistics. An example is given from frequentist statistics, where a thoughtexperiment is required to establish the probability space. It isconcluded that (a) not all thought experiments can be formulated asarguments, and (b) the role of thought experiments is more generaland more important to scientific reasoning than has previouslybeen recognized. (shrink)

The ongoing epistemological debate on scientific thought experiments (TEs) revolves, in part, around the now famous Galileo’s falling bodies TE and how it could justify its conclusions. In this paper, I argue that the TE’s function is misrepresented in this a-historical debate. I retrace the history of this TE and show that it constituted the first step in two general “argumentative strategies”, excogitated by Galileo to defend two different theories of free-fall, in 1590’s and then in the 1638. I (...) analyse both argumentative strategies and argue that their function was to eliminate potential causal factors: the TE serving to eliminate absolute weight as a causal factor, while the subsequent arguments served to explore the effect of specific weight, with conflicting conclusions in 1590 and 1638. I will argue thorough the paper that the TE is best grasped when we analyse Galileo’s restriction, in the TE’s scenario and conclusion, to bodies of the same material or specific weight. Finally, I will draw out two implications for the debate on TEs. (shrink)

This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...) This proposal supports a version of motivational internalism that can accommodate a surprising range of actual failures of motivation. I also briefly situate this proposal in the metaethical literature, contrasting it with other hybrid views incorporating elements of cognitivism and expressivism. (shrink)

On the life and works of Bharati, with a selection of his poems translated into French.

The article examines the two forms of Confucianism in postwar Taiwan: the state ideology presented in elementary and secondary textbooks, which emphasizes governmental authority; and the intellectual tradition, with a particular emphasis on meeting the challenge of modern Western values.

ABSTRACT I draw on W.E.B. Du Bois’s political thought to challenge de Shalit’s characterization of the role of the philosopher and the public in political theory. I press three issues to clarify what it would take for a political philosopher to take into consideration what the public thinks: the relation of the method of public reflective equilibrium to history and the empirical sciences; the moral education that results from the public’s participation in philosophical discussions; and how political philosophers should (...) handle the public’s recalcitrant ignorance and hostility in their theories. (shrink)

The reliability of previous findings on two crucial aspects of counterfactual thinking, namely the content of counterfactual modifications and their impact on future performance, has been questioned for the frequent use of tasks characterised by simple causal domains, that restrict participants’ possibility to consider a broad range of modifications. To overcome this limitation, we utilised a new experimental task featuring a complex causal domain to investigate such key aspects. The results indicated that participants tend to generate counterfactuals about elements outside (...) their control, especially when presented with a challenging version of the task (Study 1a) and, to a lesser extent, when they receive negative feedback on their performance (Study 1b). Moreover, despite occasional implementations of actions mentioned in controllable counterfactuals, being engaged in counterfactual thinking did not lead to subsequent performance improvements (Study 2). The implications of these findings for the debate on the function of counterfactual thinking are discussed. (shrink)

The present research explores the role of repetitive thought in developing control deprivation deficits. The two main RT theories lead to diverging predictions. The response style theory suggests that RT in reaction to distress leads to negative effects in terms of emotional and cognitive functioning. However, the theory of Marin and Tesser and its elaboration by Watkins, suggest that the effects of RT depend on its form and that individuals who are not depression-prone usually adopt the constructive form of (...) RT that leads to positive effects. To test which of these predictions is true for control deprivation situation, two experimental studies were conducted. Participants after control deprivation were induced RT or distraction, followed by the measurement of their emotional and cognitive functioning. The results suggest that repetitive thought reduces both emotional and cognitive helplessness deficits and has no effect in no control deprivation condition. This supports the theory of Martin and Tesser and its elaboration by Watkins. (shrink)

This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. (...) This proposal supports a version of motivational internalism that can accommodate a surprising range of actual failures of motivation. I also briefly situate this proposal in the metaethical literature, contrasting it with other hybrid views incorporating elements of cognitivism and expressivism. (shrink)

Se sostiene que los juicios reflexivos suponen un sujeto actuante que se determina por sus funciones discursivas. Para demostrar que hay un sujeto discursivo o narrativo en Arendt es preciso referir a las siguientes cuestiones. En primer lugar, hay una relación directa entre el sujeto político y su espacio de aparición o grado de publicidad. En este sentido, el sujeto no es cualquier sujeto. Es más bien el que tiene la posibilidad u oportunidad de aparecer frente a otros. Esta experiencia (...) conduce a pensar la acción humana en determinada dirección. El juicio reflexivo opera sobre un caso particular que hace posible la aparición del sujeto discursivo orientando la acción. En segundo lugar, el propósito de este análisis consiste en averiguar si es posible o legítimo pensar al discurso como recurso estrictamente narrativo y, en este sentido, indagar sobre la posición de Arendt al respecto: ¿se pueden pensar los juicios reflexivos a partir de lo narrado? Esta pregunta conduce a la conclusión del presente trabajo puesto que la posibilidad de pensar lo narrado a partir de los juicios reflexivos supone un sujeto específico con determinadas características previas que habilitan las categorías de lo visible, invisible, apariencia y realidad. The paper argues that reflective judgments presuppose an agent determined by discursive functions. In order to demonstrate that there is a discursive or narrative subject in Arendt, the following issues are dealt with. First of all, that there is a direct relation between the political subject and its space of emergence or degree of publicity. In this sense, the subject is not just any subject, but rather one who has the possibility of appearing before others. This experience makes it possible to think of human action in a certain way. Reflective judgments operate on particular cases that enable the emergence of a discursive subject that orients action. Secondly, the purpose of this analysis is to find out whether it is possible or legitimate to think discourse as a strictly narrative resource, and to inquire into Arendt's position in this respect: is it possible to think about reflective judgments on the basis of that which is narrated? This question leads to our conclusion, since the possibility of thinking about that which is narrated on the basis of reflective judgments presupposes a specific subject with certain prior characteristics that enable the categories of the visible, of the invisible, and of appearance and reality. (shrink)

In The Laboratory of the Mind, James Brown considers some of the Kuhn’s thesis in “A Function for Thought Experiment”. I will question one of Brown’s conclusions, namely his interpretation according to which Kuhn maintains that from thought experiments we learn about our conceptual scheme and only derivatively about the world. I arn inclined to think that this particular interpretation does not accurately represent Kuhn’s wording. Accordingly, I will outline some of the issues concerning the relation between ‘learning (...) about the concepts’ and ‘learning about the world’, which is, as Brown states, the field of disagreement between him and Kuhn. And finally, I will consider whether Kuhn’s ‘incommensurability thesis’ is in contradiction with ‘thought experiment thesis’, as Brown seems to imply. (shrink)

How do we acquire thoughts and beliefs about particulars by looking at pictures? One kind of reply essentially compares depiction to perception, holding that picture-perception is a form of remote object-perception. Lopes’s theory that pictures refer by demonstrative identification, and Walton’s transparency theory for photographs, constitute such remote acquaintance theories of depiction. The main purpose of this paper is to defend an alternative conception of pictures, on which they are not suitable for acquainting us with particulars but for acquainting us (...) with certain kinds of properties. This conception is outlined in §4, where it is argued that pictures are useful devices for what Heal has called indexical predication. In §2 and §3, I explain why I believe that remote acquaintance theories are false, and why picture-perception cannot function as a form of extended or remote object-perception. The main reason is that the contents of picture-perceptions do not themselves provide the kind of numerical and contextual information required for singular thought. Picture-reference is instead secured by independent beliefs or linguistic communication about the causal history of pictures as objects. In other words, it is beliefs about the numerical identity of pictures as objects that anchors the reference of the representational contents of pictures. (shrink)

Donald Davidson argues in "Thought and Talk" that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers: linguistic competence requires the possession of intentional concepts and the ability to attribute intentional states to other people. Kristin Andrews (in Philosophical Psychology, 15) has argued that empirical evidence about autism undermines this theoretical claim, for some individuals with autism lack the requisite "theory of mind" skills to be able to interpret, yet are competent speakers. In this paper, Davidson is defended on the (...) grounds that the high-functioning autistic individuals in question have a more robust theory of mind than has been acknowledged, and that this is sufficient for them to be interpreters of other speakers. It is argued, further, that Davidson's theory would remain intact even if one or more autistic speakers lacking a theory of mind were to exist, as he makes conceptual claims about thought and language that are not vulnerable to empirical counterexamples. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental and recurring issues in the social sciences--the relation between language and thought--is examined in this work from a broad and coherent interdisciplinary perspective. Many of the great historical issues are also addressed and newly examined such as: the multifunctionality of language, the role of natural logic in the structuring of linguistic rules, and the place of linguistic disambiguation and repair in particular cultures.

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different (...) not only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different (...) not only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)

This book focuses on the very nature and function of intuitive thought. It presents an up-to-date scientific model on how the non-conscious and intuitive thought processes work in human beings. The model is based on mainstream theorizing on intuition, as well as qualitative meta-analysis of the empirical data available in the research literature. It combines recent work in the fields of philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and positive psychology. While systematic research in intuition is relatively new, there is (...) an abundance of positions advocating more or less imaginative ideas of what intuition is about, ranging from quantum mechanical phenomena to new age ideologies. Research in the past few decades, in particular by proponents of the dual processing theory of thought such as Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Evans, offers powerful tools to address and evaluate the question of intuition without the need to resort to spiritual entities. Within the framework of the dual processing theory, backed up by findings in positive psychology, intuition turns out to be the capacity to carry out complex cognitive operations within a specific domain of operations familiar to the agent. (shrink)

The book does not address speculations about the neurophysiological/brain bases of consciousness, arguing that these are premature, and it is highly critical of ...

Thoughts and other mental states are defined by their role in a functional system. Since it is easier to determine when we have knowledge than when reasoning has occurred, Gilbert Harman attempts to answer the latter question by seeing what assumptions about reasoning would best account for when we have knowledge and when not. He describes induction as inference to the best explanation, or more precisely as a modification of beliefs that seeks to minimize change and maximize explanatory coherence. (...) Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This volume of Ned Block's writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem -- a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. One paper on this topic considers the upshot for the mind-body problem of the possibility of a robot that is functionally like us but physically different -- as is Commander Data of _Star Trek's_ second generation. The papers (...) on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett's theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness, as well as such empirical matters as "How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness," and an argument that there are distinct neural correlates for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black's argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider "mental paint" as well as the "Inverted Earth" thought experiment -- a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them. _Consciousness, Function, and Representation_, bringing together papers that have appeared primarily in journals and conference proceedings, can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness. (shrink)

Cleansing inductions reduce the impact of negative and positive reactions, whereas connection manipulations magnify them. We suggest that grounded procedures can produce these effects by affecting the perceived validity of thoughts. In accord with the self-validation theory, we also note the importance of considering how moderators, such as the meaning of the action and the timing of inductions, affect outcomes.