In our culture, intelligence, emotions and embodied intuitions continue to be seen as separate categories. The body is regarded as a medium of identity as well as social and sexual appeal, but neglected as the ground of embodied existence and silent knowledge, or the full understanding of the human condition. Prevailing educational and pedagogic practices also still separate the mental and intellectual capacities from emotions and the senses, and the multifarious dimensions of human embodiment.

Introduction -- Image in contemporary culture -- Language, thought and image -- The many faces of the image -- The anatomy of the poetic image -- The architectural image.

This paper discusses how the association learning principle works for supporting acquisition of basic spelling and reading skills using digital game-based learning environment with the Finland-based GraphoLearn technology. This program has been designed and validated to work with early readers of different alphabetic writing systems using repetition and reinforcing connections between spoken and written units. Initially GL was developed and found effective in training children at risk of reading disorders in Finland. Today GL training has been shown to support learning (...) decoding skills among children independent of whether they face difficulties resulting from educational, social, or biological reasons. (shrink)

This article surveys recent developments in the epistemology of modality.

This book explores the shared experiential ground of cinema, art, and architecture. Pallasmaa carefully examines how the classic directors Alfred Hitchcock, Stanley Kubrick, Michelangelo Antonioni, and Andrei Tarkovsky used architectural imagery to create emotional states in their movies. He also explores the startling similarities between the landscapes of painting and those of movies.

DNA polymerase epsilon is a mammalian polymerase that has a tightly associated 3′→5′ exonuclease activity. Because of this readily detectable exonuclease activity, the enzyme has been regarded as a form of DNA polymerase delta, an enzyme which, together with DNA polymerase alpha, is in all probability required for the replication of chromosomal DNA. Recently, it was discovered that DNA polymerase epsilon is both catalytically and structurally distinct from DNA polymerase delta. The most striking difference between the two DNA polymerases is (...) that processive DNA synthesis by DNA polymerase delta is dependent on proliferating cell nuclear antigen (PCNA), a replication factor, while DNA polymerase epsilon is inherently processive. DNA polymerase epsilon is required at least for the repair synthesis of UV‐damaged DNA. DNA polymerases are highly conserved in eukaryotic cells. Mammalian DNA polymerases alpha, delta and epsilon are counterparts of yeast DNA polymerases I, III and II, respectively. Like DNA polymerases I and III, DNA polymerase II is also essential for the viability of cells, which suggests that DNA polymerase II (and epsilon) may play a role in DNA replication. (shrink)

This paper presents a new system of logic, LF, that is intended to be used as the foundation of the formalization of science. That is, deductive validity according to LF is to be used as the criterion for assessing what follows from the verdicts, hypotheses, or conjectures of any science. In work currently in progress, we argue for the unique suitability of LF for the formalization of logic, mathematics, syntax, and semantics. The present document specifies the language and rules of (...) LF, lays out some notational conventions, and states some basic technical facts about the system. (shrink)

This book presents a contribution to the neglected branch of history of morals in a time when virtue has been lost, and moral disorder or vacuum has ensued. The study covers a very long period from Homer and Hesiod until the twelfth century of the Common Era.

This collection of essays discusses a central feature of European philosophy: the idea of a universal active power as the ultimate world-explanation.

The epistemology of modality has focused on metaphysical modality and, more recently, counterfactual conditionals. Knowledge of kinds of modality that are not metaphysical has so far gone largely unexplored. Yet other theoretically interesting kinds of modality, such as nomic, practical, and ‘easy’ possibility, are no less puzzling epistemologically. Could Clinton easily have won the 2016 presidential election—was it an easy possibility? Given that she didn’t in fact win the election, how, if at all, can we know whether she easily could (...) have? This paper investigates the epistemology of the broad category of ‘objective’ modality, of which metaphysical modality is a special, limiting case. It argues that the same cognitive mechanisms that are capable of producing knowledge of metaphysical modality are also capable of producing knowledge of all other objective modalities. This conclusion can be used to explain the roles of counterfactual reasoning and the imagination in the epistemology of objective modality. (shrink)

What does God do with the “holes” or “troumatisms” that comprise the limits of our existence, that “original solitude” whereby we are confronted with the impending annihilation of all sense? Are we left enclosed in it or does God accompany us there? This essay considers to what extent Christ’s descent on Holy Saturday takes part in the extra-phenomenal “impossibility of possibility” of this original solitude. Such a consideration requires distinguishing between that “underworld” Christ descends to on the Second Day from (...) the sin that is the proper domain of “hell.” Christ descending to the underworld marks God entering our finitude so it may be transformed (Holy Saturday) rather than our faults so that we may be resurrected (Last Judgment). Philosophically, Holy Saturday, as the ab-sense and non-sense residing between Crucifixion (Good Friday) and Resurrection (Easter Sunday), exemplifies the extra-phenomenal in which nothing is manifested (phenomenology) nor signified (hermeneutics). This intermediate realm is then one in which God comes to meet us at the limit of our own finitude. (shrink)

This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which (...) does not face these problems: Williamson’s (2007: ch. 5) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, we also find a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw. (shrink)

The idea of active power played central role in the 17th Century philosophy and science. The idea is as follows: if not prevented, bodies necessarily do certain things in virtue of their power. This kind of thought naturally arose from what might properly be called the law of persistence, according to which moving bodies continue their motion unchanged if no new external force intervenes.1 What bodies do in virtue of their power was called actions, and in terms of actions such (...) things as resistance, pressure and affections were explained. What is this active power? One of the main aims of philosophers in the 17th and 18th Centuries was to find a good answer to this question. (shrink)

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is based essentially (...) on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; commit to mutual contracts; keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument. (shrink)

David Lewis [2] suggests that an adequate inductive method should be immodest, i.e. recommend itself as at least as accurate as any of its rivals. On this basis he works out a solution to the intricate problem of choosing among Carnap's λ-methods. Lewis himself points out certain undesirable consequences of his solution. I will argue that the solution breaks down for a more general reason than that indicated by Lewis; like other procedures for estimating degrees of belief I am familiar (...) with, it overlooks the component of lawlikeness of inductive situations. This is not to object to the requirement of immodesty; I only want to draw attention to certain assumptions which Lewis makes in deriving his equations and which seem to be unjustified. (shrink)

Can there be 'narrow' mental content, that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker? This book argues not, and defends instead a thoroughgoing externalism: the entanglement of our minds with the external world runs so deep that no internal component of mentality can easily be cordoned off.

In general, a given object could have been different in certain respects. For example, the Great Pyramid could have been somewhat shorter or taller; the Mona Lisa could have had a somewhat different pattern of colours; an ordinary table could have been made of a somewhat different quantity of wood. But there seem to be limits. It would be odd to suppose that the Great Pyramid could have been thimble-sized; that the Mona Lisa could have had the pattern of colours (...) that actually characterizes The Scream; or that the table could have been made of the very quantity of wood that in fact made some other table. However, there are puzzling arguments that purport to show that so long as an object is capable of being somewhat different in some respect, it is capable of being radically different in that respect. These arguments rely on two tempting thoughts: first, that an object’s capacity for moderate variation is a non-contingent matter, and second, that what is possibly possible is simply possible. This book systematically investigates competing strategies for resolving these puzzles, and defends one of them. Along the way it engages with foundational questions about the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

This important collection focuses on the nature and importance of biodiversity. The concept is clarified and its intrinsic and instrumental value are discussed. Even though the term biodiversity was invented in the 1980s to promote the cause of species conservation, discussions on biological diversity go back to Plato. There are many controversies surrounding biodiversity and a few of them are examined here: What is worthy of protection or restoration and what is the acceptable level of costs? Is it permissible to (...) kill sentient animals to promote native populations? Can species be reintroduced if they have disappeared a long time ago? How should the responsibilities for biodiversity be shared? This book will be of interest to philosophers of science and biologists, but also to anyone interested in conservation and the environment. (shrink)

The concept of being in a position to know is an increasingly popular member of the epistemologist’s toolkit. Some have used it as a basis for an account of propositional justification. Others, following Timothy Williamson, have used it as a vehicle for articulating interesting luminosity and anti-luminosity theses. It is tempting to think that while knowledge itself does not obey any closure principles, being in a position to know does. For example, if one knows both p and ‘If p then (...) q’, but one dies or gets distracted before being able to perform a modus ponens on these items of knowledge and for that reason one does not know q, one is still plausibly in a position to know q. It is also tempting to suppose that, while one does not know all logical truths, one is nevertheless in a position to know every logical truth. Putting these temptations together, we get the view that being in a position to know has a normal modal logic. A recent literature has begun to investigate whether it is a good idea to give in to these twin temptations—in particular the first one. That literature assumes very naturally that one is in a position to know everything one knows and that one is not in a position to know things that one cannot know. It has succeeded in showing that, given the modest closure condition that knowledge is closed under conjunction elimination, being a position to know cannot satisfy the so-called K axiom of normal modal logics. In this paper, we explore the question of the normality of the logic of being in a position to know in a more far-reaching and systematic way. Assuming that being in a position to know entails the possibility of knowing and that knowing entails being in a position to know, we can demonstrate radical failures of normality without assuming any closure principles at all for knowledge. Moreover, the failure of normality cannot be laid at the door of the K axiom for knowledge, since the standard principle NEC of necessitation also fails for being in a position to know. After laying out and explaining our results, we briefly survey the coherent options that remain. (shrink)

Most public discussion has focused on those effects of genetic research that are considered in some way unwanted or unpleasant. For example, there has been much debate concerning the risks and the ethical appropriateness of genetic screening, gene therapy, and agricultural applications based on genetic techniques. It often claimed that genetic research may cause new problems such as genetic discrimination, stigmatization, environmental risks, or mistreatment of animals. Genes and Morality: New Essays adopts a critical attitude toward genetic research, on both (...) a theoretical and a practical level. It presents some of the most important problems in the ethics of genetic engineering, including the questions of genetic health and disease, genetic testing, responsibility for health, patenting non-human and human life, and problems related to the disclosure of genetic information. The aim of the book is to focus on real ethical and conceptual issues. Consider, for instance, the concept of genetic disease. As one of the contributors, Ingmar Pörn, writes, fear of genetic disease, or anxiety, is not itself a disease any more than fear of becoming unemployed is a disease. Alleviating such emotions is not a medical task to be discharged by drug therapy. The book also examines the philosophical foundations of these issues by discussing the most influential bioethical theories of today, including utilitarianism and principlism. (shrink)

This contribution attempts, in the face of the criterion of the fruitful contradiction, to build a bridge between two recent developments in phenomenology: the hyperphenomenology of Bernhard Waldenfels on the one hand, and the extraphenomenology of Emmanuel Falque on the other. In the present article, this confrontation first attempts to prepare the possibility of an in-depth comparison. In this process opened here, we obtain a first transitional figure from a viviparous poetry which, in the light of the hyperphenomenologically and extra-phenomenologically (...) unutterable, places in space a third relat: the hissing hyperhors. (shrink)