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Profile: Michael Veber (East Carolina University)
  1. Michael Veber (2014). Knowledge with and Without Belief. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
    This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some recent epistemological debates. These (...)
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  2. Michael Veber (2014). The Coercion Argument Against Performance-Enhancing Drugs. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (2):267-277.
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  3. Michael Veber (2013). I Know I Am Not Gettiered. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.
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  4. Michael Veber (2013). The Argument From Abomination. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1185-1196.
    The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I (...)
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  5. Michael Veber (2012). “People Who Argue Ad Hominem Are Jerks” and Other Self-Fulfilling Fallacies. Argumentation 26 (2):201-212.
    A self-fulfilling fallacy (SFF) is a fallacious argument whose conclusion is that the very fallacy employed is an invalid or otherwise illegitimate inferential procedure. This paper discusses three different ways in which SFF’s might serve to justify their conclusions. SFF’s might have probative value as honest and straightforward arguments, they might serve to justify the premise of a meta-argument or, following a point made by Roy Sorensen, they might provide a non-inferential basis for accepting their conclusion. The paper concludes with (...)
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  6. Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.) (2011). What Place for the A Priori? Open Court.
    The book gives a diverse and even-handed treatment of the topic without attempting to resolve the matter.
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  7. Michael Veber (2010). How to Fake Munchausen's Syndrome. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):565-574.
  8. Michael Veber (2010). The Epistemology of Belief – Hamid Vahid. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):871-873.
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  9. Michael Veber (2009). Reply on Behalf of Joe. Sophia 48 (4):461-465.
    This is a reply to W. Paul Franks’ critique (‘Why a Believer Could Believe that God Answers Prayers’) of my recent paper in Sophia (2007). I argue that Franks’ Plantinga-inspired criticism fails because it turns on the dubious assumption that the efficacy of prayer could provide evidence for the existence of God.
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  10. Michael Veber (2008). How to Derive a 'Not' From an 'Is': A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths. Metaphysica 9 (1):79-91.
    Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. The case of negative truths leads some philosophers to postulate negative states of affairs or to give up on truthmaker maximalism. This paper defends a version of the incompatibility view of negative truths. Negative truths can be made true by positive facts, and thus, truthmaker maximalism can be maintained without postulating negative states of affairs.
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  11. Michael Veber (2007). Why Even a Believer Should Not Believe That God Answers Prayers. Sophia 46 (2):177-187.
    Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
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  12. Michael Veber (2006). Not Too Proud to Beg (the Question): Why Inferentialism Cannot Account for the a Priori. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):113-131.
    The inferentialist account of the a priori says that basic logical beliefs can be justified by way of rule circular inference. I argue that this account of the a priori fails to skirt the charge of begging the question, that the reasons offered in support of it are weak and that it makes justifying logical beliefs too easy. I also argue that recent modifications to inferentialism spell doom for it as a general theory of a priori justification.
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  13. Michael Veber (2004). Contextualism and Semantic Ascent. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):261-272.
    Some object that contextualism makes knowledge elusive in the sense that it comes and goes as the standards for knowledge change. Contextualists have attempted to handle this objection by semantic ascent. Some of the recent refinements that contextualism has undergone create serious problems for this move. Either it makes contextualism unassertible or it makes refuting the skeptic too easy.
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  14. Michael Veber (2004). Virtual Child Pornography. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (1):75-90.
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  15. Michael Veber (2004). What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557 - 569.
    Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not-p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading.
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