Aims: The aims of the study were to explore expert opinion on the distinction between “research” and “audit”, and to determine the need for review by a National Health Service (NHS) Research Ethics Committee (REC). Background: Under current guidelines only “research” projects within the NHS require REC approval. Concerns have been expressed over difficulties in distinguishing between research and other types of project, and no existing guidelines appear to have been validated. The implications of this confusion include unnecessary REC applications, (...) and crucially, the potential for ethically unsound projects to escape review. Methods: A three-stage Delphi method was chosen to explore expert opinion and develop consensus. Stage 1 comprised ten semi-structured interviews gathering opinion on distinguishing between types of project and how to determine need for ethical review. Stages 2 and 3 were questionnaires, asking 24 “experts” to rate levels of ethical concern and types of project for a series of questions. Anonymised responses from stage 2 were fed back in stage 3. The final responses were analysed for consensus. Results: Of 46 questions, consensus was achieved for 14 (30.4%) for level of ethical concern and for 15 (32.6%) for type of project. Conclusions: Several ideas proved discriminatory for classifying the type of project and assessing level of ethical concern, and they can be used to develop an algorithm to determine need for ethical review. There was little relationship between assessment of the level of ethical concern and classification of the project. There was inconsistency in defining and classifying studies as something other than “research” or “audit”. (shrink)

Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others or making sense of one’s experiences. It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than the healthy. This paper claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory (...) factors for epistemic injustice in psychiatric patients are outlined: global and specific. Some suggestions are made to counteract the effects of these contributory factors, for instance we suggest that physicians should participate in groups where the subjective experience of patients is explored, and learn to become more aware of their own unconscious prejudices towards psychiatric patients. (shrink)

: The Kehre in Heidegger’s thought has been greatly discussed and debated. The introduction of the notion of metontology in 1927 has fruitfully informed this debate since it entails a concern for the ontic domain on the part of Heidegger that is not present in earlier works. The fact that this notion disappears right after being introduced, however, challenges its contribution to this debate. In this paper, I show that the disappearance of metontology does not imply the disappearance of Heidegger’s (...) concern for the ontic, but the opposite. I will begin by presenting Freeman’s view of a tension between the ontic and the ontological in Heidegger’s thought in the mid-to-late 20s that results in the introduction of metontology in 1927. Later on, I will show that McNeill’s explanation of the disappearance of metontology as a consequence of Heidegger’s mid-30s view that the a priori projection of being is a withdrawal of being, allows saying that this disappearance does not entail Heidegger’s sudden lack of concern for the ontic. By considering Heidegger’s analysis of ‘the mathematical’ in Die Frage nach dem Ding, I will finally argue that metontology disappears from Heidegger’s thought because its dependency upon ontology prevents it to account for his increasing concern for the ontic properly. Resumo: A Kehre no pensamento de Heidegger foi amplamente discutida e debatida. A introdução da noção de metontologia, em 1927, informou proveitosamente esse debate, uma vez que implica uma preocupação com o domínio ôntico, por parte de Heidegger, que não está presente em trabalhos anteriores. O fato de essa noção desaparecer logo após ser introduzida, porém, desafia sua contribuição para esse debate. Neste artigo, mostra-se que o desaparecimento da metontologia não significa o desaparecimento da preocupação de Heidegger com o ôntico, mas o contrário. Começa-se apresentando a visão de Freeman de uma tensão entre o ôntico e o ontológico, no pensamento de Heidegger, em meados da década de 1920, que resulta na introdução da metontologia, em 1927. Mais tarde, evidencia-se que a explicação de McNeill para o desaparecimento da metontologia, como consequência da visão de Heidegger, de meados dos anos 30, de que a projeção a priori do ser é uma retirada do ser, permite dizer que esse desaparecimento não acarreta uma repentina falta de preocupação de Heidegger com o ôntico. Ao considerar a análise de Heidegger de “o matemático”, em Die Frage nach dem Ding, finalmente, argumenta-se que a metontologia desaparece do pensamento de Heidegger, porque sua dependência da ontologia a impede de explicar sua crescente preocupação com o ôntico, de maneira adequada. (shrink)

The effects of climate change are far reaching and widespread. As the issue continues to batter the world, the call for mitigation initiatives is becoming louder. In responding to this call we take a multidisciplinary approach to examining board diversity as an innovative solution in tackling climate change. Utilizing data from 69 fossil fuel organizations, our findings suggest that increasing female representation and foreign culture representation on the board can effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the main contributor to climate change. (...) In part, this is achieved through responsible leadership and innovation. Our contributions reach beyond traditional board diversity literature, where the benefits of diversity are confined primarily to a discussion of corporate social responsibilities. Instead, we depict the benefits of board diversity as a direct lever in mitigating climate change. We propose that this is through the diversified board's enhanced ability to identify stakeholder needs and, subsequently, conceive of more effective and responsibly innovative solutions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There is general agreement that Kant’s thought strongly influenced Heidegger’s. Nevertheless, there is still much work to be done in order to fully appreciate this influence. A central theme to disclose the relation between these authors is the role they give to the transcendental. In this paper I show that Kant’s account of intuition is the focus of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in his Die Frage nach dem Ding, since Heidegger interprets Kant’s treatment of intuition as a delimiting of (...) the modern mathematical tendency to determine everything out of pure reason alone. I argue that this interpretation is at the basis of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori in this work, the aim of which is to take this notion away from the sphere of the objects of mathematical physical science, and place it in the realm of everyday experience. I claim that Heidegger thinks that this move can only be accomplished by removing universality and necessity from Kant’s a priori. Finally, I show that Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s synthetic a priori goes together with and illuminates his understanding of transcendence as das Zwischen, ‘the between us and things’. RESUMO É consenso geral que o pensar de Kant influenciou fortemente o pensar de Heidegger. Porém, há ainda muito trabalho a fazer para se conseguir apreciar essa influência plenamente. Um tema crucial para conseguir expor a relação entre esses dois autores é o rol que ambos dão ao transcendental. Neste artigo, vou mostrar que o tratamento que Kant faz da intuição é o foco da interpretação que Heidegger oferece acerca de Kant em sua obra Die Frage nach dem Ding, dado que Heidegger interpreta o jeito como Kant trabalha a intuição como uma delimitação da tendência matemática moderna a determiná- lo tudo pelo só uso da razão pura. Argumento que essa interpretação está na base da apropriação que Heidegger faz do sintético a priori kantiano nesta obra, cujo fim é tirar essa noção fora da esfera dos objetos da ciência físico- matemática e posicioná-la no reino da experiência cotidiana. Sustento que Heidegger pensa que isto só pode ser alcançado ao eliminar a necessidade e a universalidade do a priori kantiano. Finalmente, mostro que a apropriação que Heidegger faz do sintético a priori kantiano vai junto e ilumina sua compreensão da transcendência como o das Zwischen, ‘o entre nós e as coisas’. (shrink)

Biography of Nguyễn Sinh Sắc (1862-1929), the father of President Ho Chi Minh.

Heidegger’s stance towards representational thinking has been widely discussed and debated. In this paper I show how based on an analysis of the mathematical in modern science in Die Frage nach dem Ding, Heidegger draws up a distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience. I argue that this last type of representations corresponds to his understanding of the way in which representational thinking takes place in modernity, that is, modern representations. Based on an analysis of these two types of (...) representation I claim that in the mid-30s Heidegger realizes that thinking being as the a priori carries a danger, which consists in the fact that being can break its relation with that which is given in ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone, and that this danger is the decisive factor underlying Heidegger’s critical stance towards modern representations. (shrink)

Abstract:Cristina Crichton speaks with Ramón Rodríguez about ethics in Heidegger (Studies) and Heidegger's influence on his own work.

An Innovative Learning Centre within a Faculty of Education provides the forum to study and give lived expression to the rhythmic workings of experience through documenting a Maker Movement Day for practicing educators. Dewey’s commitment to “the idea that there is an intimate and necessary relation between the processes of actual experience and education” is at the heart of our Maker Day.1 The contemporary Maker Movement’s emphasis on studio-based learning attends to the experiences of meaning making from within the experiences (...) themselves.2 The rootedness of this thinking across time and traditions can be traced to many interested in revealing the experiential terrain.. (shrink)

Works of Tran Duc Thao, a Vietnamese philosopher.

Theravada Buddhist teachings and philosophies, and the cause and effect of human deeds.

1. P'it'agorasŭ Hakp'a ŭi ŭmangnon kwa ujuron -- 2. Arisŭt'ok'ŭsenusŭ ŭi kyŏnghŏm kwahakchŏk ŭmak iron -- 3. P'ŭllat'on-P'it'agorasŭjŏk chŏnt'ong -- 4. Kŭndae roŭi ihaeng -- 5. K'ep'ŭllŏ ŭi ŭmakchŏk ujuron -- 6. Sirhŏm kwahak kwa ŭmak ŭi hamnihwa -- 7. Nyut'ŏn ŭi ŭmakchŏk yubi -- Maejŭmmal : Nyut'ŏn ihu.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an open access, dynamic reference work designed to organize professional philosophers so that they can write, edit, and maintain a reference work in philosophy that is responsive to new research. From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up to date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they (...) are made public. (shrink)

"Mediante otras acciones, otras ideas y otras maneras de vivir, disidencia es la posibilidad humana de no ser parte ni formar parte del sistema de valores, representaciones y relaciones al que se estaba destinado o que aparece ineluctable. Desvío de lo preasignado, de lo que debía pensarse o creerse, del curso biográfico, filosófico o político que debía seguirse, disidir es romper con lo impuesto y con las imposturas para una exploración sin garantías de lo que aún no sabemos. Toda religión, (...) grupo político o escuela filosófica -toda sociedad, en fin- aloja, latente o en acto, el movimiento de la disidencia, de la no aceptación y la fractura en el centro de lo que busca mantenerse ortodoxo. La de Spinoza fue una vida filosófica disidente, aunque no una "filosofía de la deserción". Desertor es quien abandona, el que se aparta, el que abjura de su lugar -sus dos remisiones fundamentales son la guerra y la escuela- y de sus funciones o tareas. Desierto es lo abandonado, el territorio que es desertado por completo. La de Spinoza no es una filosofía de la deserción sino de la disidencia porque su ruptura no abandona el lugar ni escamotea el trabajo sobre él; si rompe, es para iniciar, explorar y generar de otro modo. Se tratará de una ruptura que no es autónoma de la pregunta que interroga sobre cómo vivir-juntos." --Contratapa. (shrink)

В издании подробно исследуется философское наследие четырех учителей дигамбарской ветви джайнизма.

Издание содержит: Музыка моя; XIX век. Россия. первые опыты философствования о музыке; XIX век. Россия. Четыре имени в метафизике музыки; XX век. Мордовия. Бахтинские и яушевские страницы и др.