New Proposals for New Questions Nuevas propuestas para nuevas cuestiones In six sections, the volume deals with different questions of political philosophy. The first section focuses on democratic theories, the second on conceptual debates, discussing topics such as collective rights, the terrorist phenomenon, Libertarianism and conceptions of freedom. In a third section on contemporary debates, perspectives on sovereignity and legitimacy as well as discourse theory versus political liberalism are discussed. The volume also features essays on democracy and law, and (...) in a section entitled oJudicial construction of democracyo papers on constitutional reviews by judges in the Netherlands as well as the construction of democracy in the context of Latin-American democracies. Finally, in the last section the volume deals with the European Constitutional Treatise, analysing the arguments and examining the legitimacy crisis and the main objections displayed against this treatise. Contents I. On Democratic theory / Teoria de la democracia: Eerik Lagerspetz: The Problem of the Common Good in Democratic Theory Sergiy Maksymov: The Kantian Project of the Law Governed Society and New Democracies II. Conceptual debates / Debates conceptuales: Martin Blanchard: Recognition and the Case of Indigenous Reparations: A Habermasian Critique of Habermas Bronik Matwijkiw: The failed Model of Terrorism Susumu Morimura: The Libertarian View of Human Nature Jonathan E. Soeharno: Freedom as Second Nature. Exploring the value of Hegel's concept of Autonomous Personality for Global institutional theory Hashimoto Tsutomu: On the Concept of Positive and Negative Liberty III. Contemporary debates / Debates contemporaneos: Terhi Kiiskinen: Sovereignty Revisited: On Inalienable Constitutional Power Luiz B. Leite Araujo: A Decade of Debate: Discourse Theory versus Political Liberalism IV. Democracy and law / Democracia y derecho: Kenneth E. Himma: Does it really mather whether a Judicial Decision is morally Legitimate? The practical implications of Judicial Illegitimacy in a otherwise Legitimate State Carl Lebeck: Commitments, Rules and the limits of Constitutionalism Oliver W. Lembcke: Exception Rules? Freedom and the Order in a State of Exception Bart van Klink: Does Necessity knows no Laws? Application of Law in a State of Exception Costanza Margiotta: Ideas and Values of the oLegalo State Jiri Priban: Constitution-Making. Morality and Legal Symbolism: on Identity, Temporality and Differentiation of the legal, political and moral Systems V. Judicial construction of democracy / Construccion judicial de la democracia: Maurice Adams: Judging the Constitution: the Third Way. Some reflections on the introduction of Constitutional Review by Judges in The Netherlands Larry Alexander: What is the Problem of Judicial Review? Roberto Corona Copado: Las reglas del juego democratico. La Suprema Corte de Justicia de Mexico en la solucion de controversias entre organos del poder politico desde 1995 Jose de J. Ibarra Cardenas: La construccion judicial de la Democracia en Iberoamerica VI. Deliberation on European constitutional norm / Deliberacion sobre la nueva constitucion europea: Olaf Tans: Deliberating European Constitucional Norms. An Analysis of arguments Carla M. Zoethout: The Court and the Charter or Who Guards the Court of Justice of the EU under the new Constitution?. (shrink)

jild 1. Majmūʻah-i maqālāt-i iraʼah shudah -- jild 2. Majmūʻah-i maqālāt-i rasīdah.

The question of the role of science in the development of our society, and the role of the social sciences in particular, loomed large in the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. This was a consequence of the tasks posed by the present stage of the building of communism. The proceedings and decisions of the Congress emphasized the rapid advance of science, its increasing influence upon all aspects of the material and intellectual life of society, and the need (...) to assure high rates of scientific and technological progress on the basis of the growth of all branches of knowledge and the extensive introduction of the achievements of science into industry. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress, considerable attention was given to the social sciences, upon which the party is now placing even greater responsibility. "The elaboration of important problems in economics and politics, philosophy and sociology, history and law, and in other social sciences, in close association with the practical work of the building of communism," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is a most important task for Soviet scholars." Further, he emphasized: "The development of the social sciences and the introduction of their recommendations in practice play no less important a role than the employment of the achievements of the natural sciences in the sphere of material production and the development of the intellectual life of the people" . These statements call for thorough consideration. (shrink)

The Soviet people and our Party have, with unprecedented creative inspiration, set about the practical execution of the historic decisions of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party - the Congress of the builders of communism.

Reasoning Practically deals with a classical philosophical topic, the link between thought and action--how we think about what we do or ought to do, and how we move from thinking to doing. The essays by such renowned contributors as Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, Cass R. Sunstein, Seyla Benhabib, and Gerald Dworkin, cover a range of issues raised when we link reason and practice. This collection connects state-of-the-art philosophical work with concrete issues in social life and political practice, making (...) it of interest not only to philosophers, but to political theorists, legal scholars, and any researcher interested in the practical application of reason. (shrink)

The relationship between law and morality is a topic which receives special importance and attention, especially in "liberal democracies" in which the law is supposed to regulate highly pluralized and fragmented societies. Under conditions of plurality of values, many social forces and legal theories require a certain kind of neutrality from the legal system, a means of compatibility of the many "world views" and "moral systems" that are present within the same social space. Such a conciliating commitment sounds particularly relevant (...) in times of the doctrinal ubiquity of ideas such as "peace based on human rights". This was the title of the 28th World Congress of the IVR in Lisbon, with the special workshop "Law and Morals" on which this book is based. It is divided into four parts: "Law and Practical Reason", "Conceptual Approaches on Law and Morals", "Legal versus Moral Normativity", and "Morals and Legal Positivism". (shrink)

The texts of the papers on the philosophy of science read at the Zürich Congress of 1954. The papers vary widely, in scope, quality, approach, doctrinal basis, and subject matter, but the collection as a whole, if a bit bewildering, provides a good survey of the ways in which the philosophy of science is now being practiced and conceived.--V. C. C.

This book's aims are to determine the importance of legal philosophy in legal education and in addition to develop alternative methods for teaching law in general and the philosophy of law in particular. In this context, the individual essays in this volume discuss the alternatives and tendencies in the quest for an adequate model of teaching and learning jurisprudence. Common to all of them is a commitment to the necessary integration of theoretical and practical knowledge, of traditional case (...) and lecture methods with non-traditional models such as cinema, drama, and literature, and of the dominant legal perspective with alternative approaches utilizing information technologies such as computers and the internet. Effective teaching and learning must favor critical and strategic thinking, dialectical and dialogical inquiry or research, problem-solving, role-playing, and skill-developing over mere rote memorization of existing rules and standard answers. (shrink)

Many schools of Indian philosophy stress the importance of knowledge on the path to liberation, but what kind of knowledge is meant? Is it the kind of knowledge that can be had through philosophical thinking, through a path of intellectual inquiry? In this presentation I will sketch the position of Niścaldās, a late Advaita Vedāntin whose magnum opus, The Ocean of Inquiry, though not well known today, was once referred to by Vivekananda as having “more influence in India than (...) any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries.” For Niścaldās, the central practice on the path to liberation is inquiry, an intellectual process of raising and removing doubts which, I argue, is closely related to the dialectical method employed throughout Indian philos­ophy. The practice of inquiry presupposes a high level of moral and spiritual qualifications, but once these qualifications are met, philosophical thinking itself becomes, for Niścaldās, a spiritual practice. This practice is the chief means for bridging the gap between purely theoretical awareness and a deeper, liberating knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, (...) showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)

This article presents an analytical overview of the critical modernisation features of Socialism with Chinese characteristics doctrine in the new era, which was proposed at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The authors reconstructed and systematically represented the central philosophical and political principles of the doctrine of Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the context of the fundamental principles of Chinese Marxism. The authors also analysed and presented in a systematic form the essence and basic theoretical principles (...) of the concept of Socialism with Chinese characteristics following Xi Jinping's works and reports. The study includes a comparative analysis that concludes with the critical features of the modern concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These features embrace the need for constant modernisation of the very doctrine of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the state management system, as well as social and cultural practices, which are possible through the implementation of innovations and the integration of modern philosophical thought with traditional Chinese philosophy and culture. The article concludes that the main feature of the modernisation of Socialism with Chinese characteristics at the current stage reveals in the development and implementation of a system of creative practices at the level of everyday culture, high-tech sectors of social production and the practice of intercultural communication within the framework of China's Belt and Road Initiative. In the discussion, the authors argue that implementing creative practices and creative industries could become an effective tool for developing China's Belt and Road Initiative in European countries and improving mutual understanding in the intercultural communication practices between China, European countries, and Ukraine. (shrink)

Echoing Richard Rorty’s earlier Consequences of Pragmatism, this collection begins with an essay on “Phenomenology in America: 1964-1984,” and concludes with a “Response to Rorty, or Is Phenomenology Edifying?” In between, the differences in the philosophical habits and practice of Anglo-American and Euro-American philosophers are examined and a reformulated, non-foundational phenomenology is sketched as a new direction responsive to the current situation in American philosophy. Don Ihde considers perception, technics, and contemporary Continental thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Hans (...) Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault, Ortega y Gassett, and Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)

This paper approaches the old question of what, if anything, we should do with our moral practice if we believe that moral nihilism is true and that there are no objective moral facts. Four responses to nihilism are discussed: abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism and propagandism. They are all found to have their respective problems. Most of these problems stem from the complexity and variability of our actual moral practices which are curiously overlooked in previous discussions of this issue. These problems, (...) however, point towards a solution. By combining some of the elements from the four discussed views, a fifth response to nihilism, that retains their virtues without their drawbacks, is proposed. This response I call ‘negotiationism’ and I defend it as the hitherto best answer to the question of how to deal with our moral practice in case we think nihilism is true. (shrink)

When I am asked “What are you doing?”, I answer e.g. “I am making coffee”. Anscombe called the knowledge that this kind of answer involves “practical knowledge”. Practical knowledge is knowledge not involving observation and inference. In this presentation I would like to apply this concept to the collectiveaction of many persons. Given that we are playing soccer if someone comes here and asks “What are you doing now?”, we can answer immediately “We are playing soccer”. I would like to (...) claim that the above answer “We are playing soccer” is ‘our’ knowledge of ‘our’ intentional action and the subject of this intention is ‘we’ and there is a collective intention and the subject of knowledge of this intentional action is also ‘we’ and this is collective knowledge, i.e. common knowledge. We anticipate the following objection against this claim: Who utters “We are playing soccer” is an individual and who answers is not “we” but an individual person and she is describing “our” action. I reply to this objection. Furthermore I consider the background knowledge of ‘our’ practical knowledge and try to extend the concept of ‘practical knowledge’. (shrink)

The logical form of an inductive step figures as a deductive fallacy: concluding the antecedent from affirming a conditional and its consequent. In the sphere of practical rationality, however, where concerned with the presuppositions of action and the interactions between beliefs and desires, certain schemata have been proposed that express rational demands on agents who desire things to happen in the world. In this context, if agent A desires to φ and believes that ψ brings about φ, then, A is (...) rationally expected to desire to ψ. But it is equally rational to expect that A’s desire to φ presupposes her belief that a certain state of affairs obtains where φ is a possibility. It then follows that assuming a desire to φ and a belief that ψ brings about φ, we can derive an logical form that approximates that of the above inductive step: the beliefs that φ is possible and that ψ brings about φ entail the belief that ψ is possible. It remains an open question whether this conclusion adequately supports the rationality of the exact inductive schema. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, (...) showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)

Unlike majority of classical and contemporary Indian philosophers, Gandhi was a practical philosopher, an experimentalist and a laboratiorian who developed practical instruments and carried out experiments for the existing life problems without bothering to build a consistent structure of philosophy. For this very reason there seems an ambiguity to call Gandhi as a philosopher. However, it seems to me that Gandhi was a practical philosopher who laid a pragmatic approach and method to his new insights for social and political (...) action of national movement and the reconstruction of modern India without disturbing the social equilibrium.Gandhi exercised such tremendous skill in cooperative participation of our national movement and is rudely regarded as the “Father of pridely Nation”. As he is too skillfully organized his ideals in building a nation he rightfully ascertained as philosopher in the light of Homer’s (the Greek poet) definition to a philosopher. The same practical method is extended to the aspect of religion by Gandhi. (shrink)

The approach to the question of philosophical practice has been dominated by a subordination of practice to theory corresponding in general to a representational conception of philosophy. Methods of diagrammatic reasoning developed within philosophical semiotics provide a more effective approach. Inparticular, Peirce’s system of existential graphs exemplifies how diagrammatic reasoning is able formally to express the processes through which philosophical dialogue and cooperation actually take place and to link such processes to the methods and practices arising in (...) other disciplines and traditions, including those of science, politics, art, religion and technological production. (shrink)

The twentieth century may be considered the ultimate expression of Western ideals and philosophy: “civilized” man’s attempt to dominate “uncivilized” peoples and nature. The twenty-first century soberingly proclaims the shortsightedness and ultimate unsustainability of this philosophy. This paper shows the limitations of the modern Western worldview, and the practical applicability of ideas to be found in Asian philosophies.

This book reports on cutting-edge research concerning social practices. Merging perspectives from various disciplines, including philosophy, biology, psychology and cognitive science, and economy, it discusses theoretical aspects of social behavior along with models to investigate them, and presenting key case studies as well. Further, it describes concepts related to habits, routines, and rituals and examines important features of human action, such as intentionality and choice, exploring the influence of specific social practices in different situations. Based on a workshop held (...) on April 2022 at the World Congress on Universal Logic (UNILOG 22), in Crete, and including additional invited chapters, the book offers fresh insights into the fields of social practice and the cognitive, computational, and philosophical tools to understand them. (shrink)

Moral philosophers working today on concrete moral issues seem to assume certain views that are opposite to those of their predecessors; chief among these is that morality has an objective basis, that it is not just the result of subjective reactions, but comprises a body of beliefs acquired through some kind of perception of certain traits of reality. However, the reasons for thinking that people who discuss substantive moral issues are committed to moral objectivism are either not very clear or (...) not entirely convincing. In what follows I shall examine the reasons given by John Mackie for considering that the use of first-level moral language—the language frequently used in the discussion of concrete moral problems—commits the user to moral objectivism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the nature of philosophy and its practices in Africa in the face of development challenges facing the continent. Philosophy in African has been seen as a tool for the search for meaning and a means for assuaging our existential predicaments. But central to the temper of recent philosophy inAfrica is the search for praxis, which somewhat limits philosophy to only a means of assuaging existential predicaments. This quest for praxis is destroying some (...) aspects of philosophy, which are equally important, that is analysis and theorizing. This is a major problem because the philosophy that emerges out of the urgency for praxis, without consideration for analysis and theory, is bereft of that rigorous criticality which arises from a thoroughgoing analysis and theorizing. This paper using the philosophical tools of analysis and criticism is asking for a return to rigorous philosophy through the analysis of concepts and theorizing. This paper submits that it is only through the process of analysis and theorizing that concepts are better understood and then placed at the service of developmentinitiatives in Africa, such that a model of integral development will emerge. A model based on certain considerations for context, culture and history. (shrink)

The 20th century may be considered the ultimate expression of Western ideals and philosophy: "civilized" humanity's attempt to dominate "uncivilized" peoples and nature. The 21st century soberingly proclaims the shortsightedness and ultimate unsustainability of this philosophy. This paper shows the limitations of a modern Western world-view, and the practical applicability of ideas to be found in Asian philosophies. In outline, the contrast may be portrayed by the following overgeneralizations: From a linear to a cyclical world view; from divine (...) salvation to karmic necessity; from human dominion over nature to human place within nature; from the perfectibility of humanity and the world through science; from atomistic mechanistic individualism to organic interdependence; from competition to cooperation; from glorification of wealth to respect for humanhood; from absolute cultural values to necessary common values. Each of these attitudes is examined in light of what we now know about the world in the 21st century, as Asian philosophy is found applicable to address future problems. (shrink)

The theme of this world conference, “Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life,” evokes some of the central ideas in the works of the Chinese philosopher, Zhuangzi and the American pragmatic philosopher, John Dewey. As different as these two thinkers are, each regarded a particular mode of philosophical inquiry to be detrimental to the process of living, and in its place, each recommended a more natural and sustainable method of philosophy, one consistent with life-processes and responsive to the (...) demands of changing circumstances and problematic situations. This paper argues that the proposals of Zhuangzi and Dewey, while undeniably different, are similar in important respects. By reading them together, one might better understand and more clearly draw out their lessons for philosophy itself. Using Zhuangzi’s famous story of “Cook Ding” as a point of departure, a new way of thinking about the role of “reflective knowing” will be articulated; and drawing from Dewey and the pragmatic tradition, a new alignment for philosophy and its function will be proposed along lines suggested in the work of Zhuangzi. (shrink)

The subject matter of this essay is Peter of John Olivi’s (ca.1248–98) conception of reason from the viewpoint of human action.

The 13th International Kant Congress was held on August 6-9, 2019 in Oslo, Norway. The main tasks of this review are to analyse the central theme of the Congress, “The Court of Reason”, the related spheres of philosophical inquiry such as metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology, as well as to reveal the main approaches and development trends of transcendental philosophy in “theoretical” and “practical” fields and modern Kant studies, notably transcendental philosophy of language and consciousness. The solution of these (...) tasks will make it possible to raise the question of the prospects of Kantian transcendentalism in relation to the pressing problems of our time and to chart the paths of such development. (shrink)

The papers in this collection present a diversity of views on the epistemology of religious belief. There is a diversity of views about the intelligibility of particular religious beliefs: for example, about the reality of God's existence and of miracles. There is further disagreement concerning the reasonableness of religious belief itself. Some contributors argue that locating grounds for believing in God is still a fruitful undertaking. Both issues raise the problem of the philosopher's position vis-a-vis religious belief. Are philosophers in (...) a privileged position to determine either the reasonableness or the intelligibility of religious belief? Or is philosophy, properly understood, a descriptive task? The papers in this collection present a diversity of views on this issue, too. Drawing on the works of Kierkegaard, a few of the contributors argue that philosophical description cannot be neatly divorced from religious persuasion. Whatever their views on these issues, however, the contributors accept that philosophical discussion cannot proceed very far without attention to what religious believers say about their beliefs and the practices in which they take part. (shrink)

In verse nine of the Vigrahavyavartani, Nagarjuna gives a defense of his skepticism by insisting that he makes no proposition concerning the nature of reality. B. K. Matilal has argued that this position is not an untenable one for a skeptic to hold, using as an explanatory model Searle’s distinction between a propositional and an illocutionary negation. The argument runs that Nagarjuna does not refute rival philosophical positions by simply refuting whatever positive claims those positions might make, but rather he (...) refuses the very act of making an assertion. From this kind of illocutionary negation, however, a certain paradoxicality arises: for in the negating the act of assertion, the skeptic is barred from asserting his or her own position, for under this condition, if he or she asserts that position, it is falsified! I want to argue that there are certain senses in which it seems that Nagarjuna’s resorting to the illocution we find in the Vigrahavyavartani may not have been necessary for the maintenance of his skeptical position, for he has recourse to prasanga counter-arguments which can always offset the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers whom he confronts. There are also places in the Karika itself, where certain pramanas seem to be employed, that give one the impression that this kind of skepticism and the pramanas are only inimical to one another insofar as the latter may lead to the metaphysical, essentialist extremes criticized by the Buddhists. Nagarjuna’s illocution in this light seems an attempt to radicalize his difference from a developing Nyaya extensionalist theory of the pramanas, a theory in which the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas are closer than anywhere else. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the attempt to develop practice dependence as a middle path between cosmopolitanism and social liberalism ultimately fails. In particular, I contend that the only type of practice dependence that can coherently be defended collapses into cosmopolitanism. I trace the origin of practice dependence theory from Cohen and Sabel’s work through Sangiovanni and Valentini. After discussing the various different types of practice dependence, I argue that the only type of practice (...) dependence that stands up to scrutiny is functionalism, but that if functionalism is true, it commits us to cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Some decisions can be made employing closed systems of practical reasoning. Other decisions require open systems of practical reasoning. These kinds of practical reasoning differ epistemically. Closed systems of practical reasoning can rely on thinking with a basis that is epistemically robust. Open systems of practical reasoning must also allow for thinking with a basis that is epistemically slight. In making moral and prudential decisions about what we are to make of our lives, we use open systems of practical reasoning (...) that proceed by precept. Precepts are generalizations for use as premises in practical reasoning that may only be indirectly tied to empirical evidence. Intelligent selection of precepts may come from education in the arts and sciences. The twin towers of a liberal education offer the best hope for judgment in the practical reasoning that may help us to make the moral and prudential decisions that are our concern. (shrink)

This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.

This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.

Philosophy of science is the object of metaphilosophical investigations. Metaphilosophy is the philosophy of philosophy. Philosophy is an archetypical thinking of being or an experience-of-being. History of Greek-European tradition of philosophy has three archetypes of thinking: objectivity, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity. They are three archetypical contexts of interpretations of the concept of a philosophy of science too. Is philosophy of science part of philosophy? Is philosophy ofscience part of epistemology? What are methods (...) of philosophy of science? These questions are the topics of metaphilosophy. The topic of a scientific fact is a focal point of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Is a scientific fact a fallible knowledge? The nature of a scientific fact is discussed in keeping with to the opposition of fallibilism and infallibilism. If fallibilism is universal quality of knowledge then there is a problem: is a scientific fact a fallible knowledge too? We are understanding and make clear the nature of a scientific fact by correlation of facts with: (1) data and evidence; (2) languages and theories; (3) methods of empirical investigations; (4) values, norms, and conventions of scientific investigations. Philosophy of science communicates with philosophy ofeconomics as the contemporary branch of philosophy. Its problems arise from the relationship of philosophy and philosophy of science with economics and practice. (shrink)

Rethinking philosophy of history we see that the main concepts must be revised or specified especially and. It’s very important to use adequate notions. The world history is an integral process having dialectically contradictory tendencies. Humanism is an objective tendency of the world history but the alienated tendency prevails in the epoch of globalization. Collisions between civilizations are outcomes of the alienated capitalist world system. Many problems both in practice and in theory are connected with a fortune of (...) humanism and a problem of mutual understanding between representatives of different cultures is among them. So philosophy of history must be revised in humanistic way and we must do our best to put the humanistic tendency into practice. (shrink)

In his study “On the Concept of Irony” Kierkegaard characterizes irony several times as pedagogue. This alludes to Galatians 3,24f., according to which the law has been a pedagogue (‘Zuchtmeister’ in the relevant German translation, Luther 1984) in relation to Christian faith, and alludes further to the three uses of thelaw in Protestantism. Presented on this background the pedagogue becomes an important figure for the interpretation of irony and its negative dialectics in philosophy, religion and art. Drawing attention to (...) the pedagogue in the emphatic sense might be helpful for a reading of Kierkegaard’s writings (both the pseudonymic and the edifying works) as well as for a genealogy of negative dialectics with all its modern and contemporary actualizations, e.g. in Adorno’saesthetical theory or in Danto’s considerations concerning art and philosophy after Duchamp. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively (...) speaking, in “the world taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

Focusing on philosophy’s roles in problem solving, this essay proposes a philosophy curriculum for a university “universalized” according to a Cuban model. This model arises from Fidel Castro Ruz’s “dream” that the Cuban nation itself should become a university for its people. The paper’s immediate stimulus was aVenezuelan paper on rural universalized universities at the Havana conference on university education, Universidad 2008. What should be the place of philosophy in a university curriculum for rural students? In the (...) idiom of Richard Rorty, philosophy is the collection of stories we tell ourselves for guidance through life. Philosophy’s critical function is to generate new stories when old ones fail to solve the problems that gave birth to them. The essay’s three parts address three levels of generality in philosophical reflection. The most general philosophical theories, such as Marxism or pragmatism, offer wholesale guidelines for life. More specific theories direct the practices of narrow subjects, such as physics, psychology, or economics. The most specific theories focus on the nexus of theoryand practice in solving life’s most concrete problems. The essay advocates a philosophy curriculum that contrasts students’ current philosophies with alternatives from the history of thought. Students absorb philosophies from the cultures in which they are raised. When students understand the accidental nature of their guiding thoughts, they are motivated to reflect critically on historical alternatives. When students study how to solve their problems using more specific disciplines like the arts and sciences, the history of the philosophies of those subjects will help them understand their freedom to choose among alternative solutions. When students reflect on the daily problems they must solve, attention to the connections of theory and practice can amplify their range of choices. (shrink)

In this essay, I shall both inquire into the relationship between democracy and education in general and concentr ate on education in philosophy for children in the Turkish cultural context. I argue that education in philosophy for children is useful for teaching the acquisition of knowledge from the information provided, for questioning of rules in different contexts, and for the analysis of facts encountered in daily life. Ethical attitudes can neither be derived from the information provided about the (...) moral rules, nor do they result from a practice of unquestioning obedience. However, during a classroom discussion children can learn to make moral evaluations by taking into account basic rights and values. My experience as a teacher in philosophy for children, which I gained during my time working in childcare institutes, has enabled me to observe the positive effects of this program on children who were awakened to consciousness of their rights by means of it. (shrink)

Purpose - The aim of this paper is to search for values and ethics embedded in the philosophy of the Gita, and to explore if these can be applied to management, to solve a contemporary problem, identified and defined as -- The Problem: Which philosophy, if any, is complete and adequate in itself to be applied in the areas of values and ethics to management, such that it can transform the individual and reform the society, leading to economic (...) prosperity? Approach - The approach is a conceptual one, where philosophy as historically, contemporarily and popularly applied to management in the form of applied values and ethics, is examined, arguing a case for the Gita, as a solution. Findings - The Gita is found to be a poorna philosophy which is complete and adequate in itself, passes the tests of Perenniality, Completeness, Adequacy and Practicality, and can be applied to management, using the values and ethics embedded in it, to solve the Problem, proposing the solution as -- The Solution: Conform Transform Reform. (shrink)

I defend the practical value of teaching undergraduate philosophy courses in the Internet. Three important objectives of philosophical education can be achieved as effectively by electronic means as in the classroom. First, information about the philosophical tradition can be conveyed by hypertext documents on the World-Wide Web. Second, philosophical dialogue can be conducted through participation in an electronic forum. Third, close supervision of student writing can be achieved by means of e-mail submission of written assignments. In each case, I (...) argue that the electronic method offers significant advantages to student learning. (shrink)

The essence of the Man self-reflection has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental. The Materialistic monism consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered by the (...) Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments.Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular, separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with itsown distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus this unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy, including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition. (shrink)

In The Apology and elsewhere, Socrates defends a vision of the philosopher as “gadfly”, an interrogator and social critic intimately connected to his or her particular community. In this paper, I examine the relevance of this model of the philosopher for the contemporary world, a world characterized by migration, transience, and dislocation. Specifically, I argue that current trends in professional philosophy, including the twilight of tenure-track employment and the increasing reliance on temporary forms of employment, make it difficult for (...) philosophers develop community attachments, and therefore to discharge Socrates’ practical task. Beyond even such current trends, I argue that the professionalization of philosophy in general is not conducive to the Socratic model of philosophizing. In shedding some light of these arguments, I end by contrasting the Socratic model of philosophy with a more contemporary image provided by Deleuze and Guattari: the image of the nomad. I argue that this model of the philosopher retains the possibility of critique essential to the Socratic model, but also addresses the transient conditions that many of us find ourselves in today. (shrink)

Toulmin, Hull, Campbell, and Popper have defended an "Evolutionary-Analogy" view of scientific evaluative practice. In this view, competing concepts, theories and methods of inquiry engage in a competitive struggle from which the "best adapted" emerge victorious. Whether applications of this analogy contribute to our understanding of science depends on the importance accorded the disanalogies between natural selection theory and scientific inquiry. Michael Ruse has suggested instead an "Evolutionary-Origins" view of scientific evaluative practices in which scientific inquiry is directed by (...) application of epigenetic rules that have become encoded in homo sapiens in the course of evolutionary adaptation. Among these rules are "formulative theories that are internally consistent," "seek severe tests of theories," and "achieve a consilience of inductions". As a descriptive theory of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is prima facie inconsistent with evidence that human beings often make decisions that violate the "genetically-hard-wired rules." As a normative-prescriptive philosophy of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is limited by the fact that in biological evolution, adaptation to present pressures may be achieved at the expense of a loss of adaptability. (shrink)

At the beginning of the third millennium we are entering a new era. I call it "The Integration/Disintegration Era" because the Integration/ Disintegration Problem is one of the basic problems our world is facing today. Philosophy attempts to work out an integrated view of the universe, of human nature, and of society. The specific philosophical science which has concerned itself with integration/ disintegration, is Integratism. This is the common denominator of different particular problems in the integration /disintegration of the (...) universe, society and personality; and it supplies a possible philosophical solution to the general problem of disintegration. The main concept of integratism is integration [Lat. integer, complete]. My theoretical and empirical study of various aspects of integration/ disintegration problems in modern science and education has led to the formulation of a new, rather systematic and, I believe, quite useful conception of contemporary integratism that contributes not only to the attempt to develop a theory of integration/disintegration processes in various biological and social systems but also to practical problems of developing contemporary integrated educational systems. Further concepts of contemporary integratism are: integrative level, IDon, adaptive disintegration, ADon, disadaptive disintegration, adaptive reintegration, sanosphere, pathosphere, etc. The philosophy of integratism might provide a possible philosophical solution to the general problem of disintegration and in this way assign priority to certain particular problems concerning the disintegration of the world. (shrink)

At the beginning of the third millennium we are entering a new era. I call it "The Integration/Disintegration Era" because the Integration/ Disintegration Problem is one of the basic problems our world is facing today. Philosophy attempts to work out an integrated view of the universe, of human nature, and of society. The specific philosophical science which has concerned itself with integration/ disintegration, is Integratism. This is the common denominator of different particular problems in the integration /disintegration of the (...) universe, society and personality; and it supplies a possible philosophical solution to the general problem of disintegration. The main concept of integratism is integration [Lat. integer, complete]. My theoretical and empirical study of various aspects of integration/ disintegration problems in modern science and education has led to the formulation of a new, rather systematic and, I believe, quite useful conception of contemporary integratism that contributes not only to the attempt to develop a theory of integration/disintegration processes in various biological and social systems but also to practical problems of developing contemporary integrated educational systems. Further concepts of contemporary integratism are: integrative level, IDon, adaptive disintegration, ADon, disadaptive disintegration, adaptive reintegration, sanosphere, pathosphere, etc. The philosophy of integratism might provide a possible philosophical solution to the general problem of disintegration and in this way assign priority to certain particular problems concerning the disintegration of the world. (shrink)

This paper deals with an analysis of philosophy as intellectual therapeutics for educational (pedagogical) activity. Two interrelated issues are examined: (1) philosophy's role in the construction of cognitive attitudes to all systems of education; (2) philosophy's role in the formation of a definite value attitude to education. A great deal of attention is devoted to the problem of educational goals. It is argued that the assumed dichotomy of the social and the individual (which still occurs in our (...) teaching practice and in some philosophical doctrines) in defining educational goals, is itself mistaken. It is shown that pedagogical activity must be based on a general concept of man as a whole substance who organically includes qualities in himself. Our pressing concern with education in the twenty-first century promotes a new subject for pedagogical activity. This presupposes a modern philosophical mind capable of creating an individual with a broad worldview and with pragmatic capabilities. (shrink)