Search results for 'armchair philosophy' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jennifer Nagel & Kaija Mortensen (forthcoming). Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell.score: 162.0
    Once symbolized by a burning armchair, experimental philosophy has in recent years shifted away from its original hostility to traditional methods. Starting with a brief historical review of the experimentalist challenge to traditional philosophical practice, this chapter looks at research undercutting that challenge, and at ways in which experimental work has evolved to complement and strengthen traditional approaches to philosophical questions.
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  2. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley (2009). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.score: 156.0
    Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. (...)
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  3. Brian Talbot (forthcoming). Why so Negative? Evidence Aggregation and Armchair Philosophy. Synthese:1-32.score: 132.0
    This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set (...)
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  4. Timothy Williamson (2005). I *-Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.score: 114.0
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general (...)
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  5. Timothy Williamson (2005). The Presidential Address: Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:1 - 23.score: 114.0
    A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general (...)
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  6. Anthony Bryson & David Alexander (2012). The View From the Armchair: Responding to Kornblith's Alternative to Armchair Philosophy. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):10.score: 96.0
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  7. Timothy Wilkinson (2004). The Presidential Address I—Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1–23.score: 90.0
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  8. C. M. O'H. (1928). Armchair Philosophy. Modern Schoolman 4 (8):137-137.score: 90.0
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  9. Janet Levin (2013). Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism. Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.score: 84.0
    In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then (...)
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  10. Carlo Cellucci (2014). Rethinking Philosophy. Philosophia 42 (2):271-288.score: 84.0
    Can philosophy still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such? In particular, what kind of philosophy can be legitimized in the face of sciences? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions, listing the characteristics philosophy should have to be fruitful and legitimized in the face of sciences. Since the characteristics in question demand that philosophy search for new knowledge and new rules of discovery, a philosophy with such characteristics (...)
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  11. Tom Sorell (2002). Armchair Applied Philosophy and Business Ethics. In Ruth F. Chadwick & Doris Schroeder (eds.), Applied Ethics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge. 1--181.score: 78.0
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  12. Martin Curd (2013). The Future of Philosophy of Science: Armchair Philosophers Need Not Apply. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):159-164.score: 72.0
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  13. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2010). Philosophy in and Out of the Armchair. In T. J. Smiley, Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver (eds.), The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge.score: 72.0
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  14. Martin Curd (2013). The Future of Philosophy of Science: Armchair Philosophers Need Not Apply: Steven French and Juha Saatsi (Eds): The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011, Xii+ 452pp, $190 HB (Book Review). [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):159-164.score: 72.0
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  15. Nikil Mukerji (forthcoming). Intuitions, Experiments, and Armchairs. In Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 72.0
    Some ethicists believe that we should give no weight to low-level intuitions about cases. In this paper, three common arguments for this position are examined and rejected. All have an empirical basis. The first is the argument from disagreement. The second draws on framing effects. And the third employs debunking explanations. The discussion aims to make a substantive methodological point about ethical inquiry, viz. that low-level intuitions are not to be shunned. Above that, however, its aim is to illuminate, by (...)
     
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  16. Joel Walmsley (2003). Theres Room in the Lab for an Armchair Report on the Philosophy and Neuroscience Conference Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 17-20, October 2002. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):89-93.score: 72.0
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  17. Ernest Sosa (2007). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.score: 54.0
    The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy. This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair intuitions as used in philosophy.
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  18. Steven W. Horst (2007). Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that (...)
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  19. Krist Vaesen, Martin Peterson & Bart Van Bezooijen (2013). The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions. Metaphilosophy 44 (5):559-578.score: 54.0
    Armchair philosophers have questioned the significance of recent work in experimental philosophy by pointing out that experiments have been conducted on laypeople and undergraduate students. To challenge a practice that relies on expert intuitions, so the armchair objection goes, one needs to demonstrate that expert intuitions rather than those of ordinary people are sensitive to contingent facts such as cultural, linguistic, socio-economic, or educational background. This article does exactly that. Based on two empirical studies on populations of (...)
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  20. Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.score: 48.0
    Practitioners of the new ‘experimental philosophy’ have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, ‘armchair’ style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions.
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  21. Ernest Sosa (2011). Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions? Mind and Language 26 (4):453-467.score: 48.0
    This paper takes up the critique of armchair philosophy drawn by some experimental philosophers from survey results. It also takes up a more recent development with increased methodological sophistication. The argument based on disagreement among respondents suggests a much more serious problem for armchair philosophy and puts in question the standing of our would-be discipline.
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  22. Joachim Horvath (2010). How (Not) to React to Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):447-480.score: 48.0
    In this paper, I am going to offer a reconstruction of a challenge to intuition-based armchair philosophy that has been put forward by experimental philosophers of a restrictionist stripe, which I will call the 'master argument'. I will then discuss a number of popular objections to this argument and explain why they either fail to cast doubt on its first, empirical premise or do not go deep enough to make for a lasting rebuttal. Next, I will consider two (...)
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  23. Joseph Shieber (2010). On the Nature of Thought Experiments and a Core Motivation of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):547-564.score: 48.0
    In this paper I discuss some underlying motivations common to most strands of experimental philosophy, noting that most forms of experimental philosophy have a commitment to the claim that certain empirical evidence concerning the level of agreement on intuitive judgments across cultures, ethnic groups or socioeconomic strata impugns the role that intuitions play in traditional “armchairphilosophy. I then develop an argument to suggest that, even if one were to grant the truth of the data adduced (...)
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  24. Martin Davies, In the Armchair, Down and Out.score: 48.0
    Sitting in the philosopher’s armchair, I am not engaged in any detailed empirical investigation of the world. But, as I pursue philosophy’s distinctive armchair methodology, I sometimes come upon arguments that appear to disclose requirements for thought. According to some of these arguments, being a thinking person requires having the right kind of history, or having the right kind of cognitive architecture. According to other arguments, being able to think about particular topics requires being a member of (...)
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  25. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias (2008). Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):39-58.score: 48.0
    First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of “experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to (...)
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  26. William A. Rottschaefer (2009). Moral Agency and Moral Learning: Transforming Metaethics From a First to a Second Philosophy Enterprise. Behavior and Philosophy 37:195 - 216.score: 48.0
    Arguably, one of the most exciting recent advances in moral philosophy is the ongoing scientific naturalization of normative ethics and metaethics, in particular moral psychology. A relatively neglected area in these improvements that is centrally important for developing a scientifically based naturalistic metaethics concerns the nature and acquisition of successful moral agency. In this paper I lay out two examples of how empirically based findings help us to understand and explain some cases of successful moral agency. These are research (...)
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  27. Janet Levin (2009). Experimental Philosophy. Analysis 69 (4):761-769.score: 42.0
    Levin argues that the results of the most methodologically sound and philosophically relevant studies discussed in this volume [Experimental Philosophy] could have been obtained from the armchair, and thus that experimental philosophy may not present a serious challenge to the traditional methods of analytic philosophy.
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  28. Jonathan Ichikawa, Who Needs Intuitions?score: 42.0
    A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. What bearing does the rejection of the centrality of intuition in armchair philosophy have on experimentalist critiques of the latter? I distinguish two very different kinds of experimentalist critique: one critique requires the centrality of intuition; the other does not.
     
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  29. Massimo Pigliucci (2007). Darwinism & Philosophy. [REVIEW] Quarterly Review of Biology 82 (1):33-35.score: 42.0
    The relationship between science and philosophy has always been a complex one, almost as much as the one that either discipline has with religion. Of course, science historically originated as a branch of philosophy, but ever since the split became per- manent during the 17th and 18th centuries, sci- entists have felt increasingly contemptuous of “armchair speculation,” and philosophers have progressively been fearful of cultural colonization on the part of science. It would be hard to find a (...)
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  30. Giuseppina D'Oro (2012). Between the Old Metaphysics and the New Empiricism: Collingwood's Defence of the Autonomy of Philosophy. Ratio 25 (1):34-50.score: 42.0
    Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a (...)
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  31. Reuben Hersh (1997). What is Mathematics, Really? Oxford University Press.score: 42.0
    Platonism is the most pervasive philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, it can be argued that an inarticulate, half-conscious Platonism is nearly universal among mathematicians. The basic idea is that mathematical entities exist outside space and time, outside thought and matter, in an abstract realm. In the more eloquent words of Edward Everett, a distinguished nineteenth-century American scholar, "in pure mathematics we contemplate absolute truths which existed in the divine mind before the morning stars sang together, and which will continue to (...)
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  32. Benjamin Hale (ed.) (2008). Philosophy Looks at Chess. Open Court Press.score: 42.0
    This book offers a collection of contemporary essays that explore philosophical themes at work in chess. This collection includes essays on the nature of a game, the appropriateness of chess as a metaphor for life, and even deigns to query whether Garry Kasparov might—just might—be a cyborg. In twelve unique essays, contributed by philosophers with a broad range of expertise in chess, this book poses both serious and playful questions about this centuries-old pastime. -/- Perhaps more interestingly, philosophers have often (...)
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  33. Matthew C. Haug (ed.) (2013). Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge.score: 42.0
    What methodology should philosophers follow? Should they rely on methods that can be conducted from the armchair? Or should they leave the armchair and turn to the methods of the natural sciences, such as experiments in the laboratory? Or is this opposition itself a false one? Arguments about philosophical methodology are raging in the wake of a number of often conflicting currents, such as the growth of experimental philosophy, the resurgence of interest in metaphysical questions, and the (...)
     
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  34. Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (eds.) (2012). Experimental Philosophy and its Critics. Routledge.score: 42.0
    Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental (...) is brought yet another step forward by engaging some of its most renowned proponents and critics in a lively and controversial debate. In addition to that, the volume also contains original experimental research on personal identity and philosophical temperament, as well as state-of-the-art essays on central metaphilosophical issues, like thought experiments, the nature of intuitions, or the status of philosophical expertise. -/- This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Psychology. (shrink)
     
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  35. Yuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.score: 36.0
    Many philosophers accept a view according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007: ch. 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: (i) it is consistent with a wide (...)
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  36. Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Experimentalist Pressure Against Traditional Methodology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):743 - 765.score: 36.0
    According to some critics, traditional armchair philosophical methodology relies in an illicit way on intuitions. But the particular structure of the critique is not often carefully articulated?a significant omission, since some of the critics? arguments for skepticism about philosophy threaten to generalize to skepticism in general. More recently, some experimentalist critics have attempted to articulate a critique that is especially tailored to affect traditional methods, without generalizing too widely. Such critiques are more reasonable, and more worthy of serious (...)
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  37. Alvin I. Goldman (1993). Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science. Westview Press.score: 36.0
    One of the most fruitful interdisciplinary boundaries in contemporary scholarship is that between philosophy and cognitive science. Now that solid empirical results about the activities of the human mind are available, it is no longer necessary for philosophers to practice armchair psychology.In this short, accessible, and entertaining book, Alvin Goldman presents a masterly survey of recent work in cognitive science that has particular relevance to philosophy. Besides providing a valuable review of the most suggestive work in cognitive (...)
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  38. Julian Baggini (2006). The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten: 100 Experiments for the Armchair Philosopher. Plume.score: 36.0
    Both entertaining and startling, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten offers one hundred philosophical puzzles that stimulate thought on a host of moral, social, and personal dilemmas. Taking examples from sources as diverse as Plato and Steven Spielberg, author Julian Baggini presents abstract philosophical issues in concrete terms, suggesting possible solutions while encouraging readers to draw their own conclusions: Lively, clever, and thought-provoking, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten is a portable feast for the mind that is sure (...)
     
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  39. Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly & Stephen Stich (2009). Moral Judgment. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.score: 30.0
    Questions regarding the nature of moral judgment loom large in moral philosophy. Perhaps the most basic of these questions asks how, exactly, moral judgments and moral rules are to be defined; what features distinguish them from other sorts of rules and judgments? A related question concerns the extent to which emotion and reason guide moral judgment. Are moral judgments made mainly on the basis of reason, or are they primarily the products of emotion? As an example of the former (...)
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  40. Heather Dyke (2007). Words, Pictures and Ontology: A Commentary on John Heil's From an Ontological Point of View. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 6:31-41.score: 30.0
    The title of John Heil’s book From an Ontological Point of View is, of course, an adaptation of the title of Quine’s influential collection of essays From a Logical Point of View, published fifty years earlier in 1953. Quine’s book marked the beginning of a sea change in philosophy, away from ordinary language, armchair philosophising involving introspective examination of concepts, towards a more rigorous, analytical and scientific approach to answering philosophical questions. Heil’s book will, I think, mark the (...)
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  41. Graham Harman (2011). The Problem with Metzinger. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 7 (1):7-36.score: 30.0
    This article provides a critical treatment of the ontology underlying Thomas Metzinger’s Being No One. Metzinger asserts that interdisciplinary empirical work must replace ‘armchair’ a priori intuitions into the nature of reality; nonetheless, his own position is riddled with unquestioned a priori assumptions. His central claim that ‘no one has or has ever had a self’ is meant to have an ominous and futuristic ring, but merely repeats a familiar philosophical approach to individuals, which are undermined by reducing them (...)
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  42. Thomas A. Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias (2008). Polling as Pedagogy. Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):39-59.score: 30.0
    First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the nascent field of "experimental philosophy," in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons' intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy-independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to (...)
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  43. Kathy Behrendt (2003). Despair, Liberation and Everyday Life: Two Bundle Views of Personal Identity. Richmond Journal of Philosophy 1 (5):32-37.score: 30.0
    Philosophy sometimes has the reputation of dealing with matters outside the realm of ‘everyday life’, and trading in ideas that float free from anything beyond the armchair in which we sit contemplating them. In this paper, I discuss a standard armchair-branch of philosophy – personal identity theory – and the real-life effects it either has had or has apparently failed to have upon two philosophers: David Hume and Derek Parfit. Both arrive at similar and quite radical (...)
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  44. Julian Baggini (2008). The Duck That Won the Lottery: 100 New Experiments for the Armchair Philosopher. Plume.score: 30.0
  45. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.score: 24.0
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which (...)
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  46. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.score: 24.0
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against (...)
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  47. J. David Velleman (2000). From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):349-377.score: 24.0
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming (...)
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  48. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz (2008). The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire. Neuroethics 1 (2):133-144.score: 24.0
    In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has used findings in social psychology to put pressure on the claim that our moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified. More specifically, he has suggested that insofar as our moral intuitions are subject to what psychologists call framing effects, this poses a real problem for moral intuitionism. In this paper, we are going to try to add more fuel to the empirical fire that Sinnott-Armstrong has placed under the feet of the intuitionist. (...)
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  49. Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.score: 24.0
    Recently, a new movement of philosophers, called 'experimental philosophy', has suggested that the philosophers' favored armchair is in flames. In order to assess some of their claims, it is helpful to provide a theoretical background against which we can discuss whether certain facts are, or could be, evidence for or against a certain view about how philosophical intuitions work and how good they are. In this paper, I will be mostly concerned with providing such a theoretical background, and (...)
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