In _Knowing God_, Ismail Lala investigates the nature of God and whether we can truly know Him according to the influential mystic, Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, and his disciple, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī.

This paper discusses the contribution of a prolific author and an Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and his hermeneutical approach to the Qur’an. The article argues that Abu Zayd is a Muslim reformer of the twentieth century through his takwil. His hermeneutical concept is questioning the “an-nash ” tradition of the Qur’an and the transformation of Arab culture from oral to text-oriented culture in the earliest history of the Qur’an. He differentiates between tanzil to takwil. This article further argues (...) that Abu Zayd’s hermeneutical concept should be understood from the history of revelation which speaks to a particular community and respond to a particular situation. Thus, the Qur’an itself is a living phenomenon and open for interpretation, rather than a closed corpus. (shrink)

This paper discussed the life background of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and the hermeneutical method used to the interpretation of the Qur’an. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd was among productive Muslim scientists. He wrote over twenty-nine works from 1964 to 1999. His works included books and articles. Nasr’sthought was a product of his educational background and religious thought. An interesting discussion of Nasr’s thought was the conceptual discourse. In the historical trajectory of the Arabic world, the text had a crucial position, (...) especially when we saw the development of Islamic literature from pre-Islamic to the Islamic era. The oral tradition was deeply rooted. The text was ultimately believed to have a major influence in the formation of civilization through a hermeneutical approach, developed by modernists such as Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, which became an attempt to develop an approaching understanding the Qur’an which had been widely opposed among Muslims. Because there was a very basic difference between hermeneutics on the other hand, and tafsir-takwil on the other hand, so it is considered inappropriate to be used to study the Qur’an. Therefore, this paper will discuss the concept of the hermeneutical method of the Qur’an by Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd as a repertoire of Islamic studies. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

The matter of creation is a topic on which the humanity focuses for many centuries. In our opinion, the elements which make this matter important could be evaluated within three categories: The ontological query of the human being arising from the necessity of “knowing”, the obligation of placing the being on the basis of epistemology in terms of the commonality of the quality of being, and creation being the commencement date of universe and human being. Throughout the history, some distinct (...) views related to commencement have been bandied about. In this respect, some theologians and philosophers have determined not only two distinct entities, namely God and the Universe but also two realms of existence which, qualitatively and existentially, have different structures. Philosophers and theologians have searched for the affinities of these two entities. In generally speaking, some of the theologians adopted creating out of nothing (ex nihilo); on the other hand, some others adopted emanation theory. Although the aforesaid two creation explanations are considered to be incompatible with each other; İbn Sînâ (Avicenna) who adopted emanation theory in terms of explaining the creation is claimed that he used the notion of ibdâ‘ (creation) in the meaning of “creating out of nothing” (ex nihilo). In this sense, we face the question whether we could talk about creating out of nothing for İbn Sînâ as a significant problematic to be answered. We, in this paper, aim at discussing the possibility of associating the emanation with ex nihilo. In this respect, taking the criticisms brought by İbn Sînâ, we will make evaluations with reference to the general philosophy of İbn Sînâ. In particular, Kemâlpaşazâde (d. 940/1534) who argued that the notion of“Creation’” was misunderstood by people before shall be our focus. Because Kemalpaşazâde's analysis of the events leading up to his speech reveals a third point of view. In other words, Kemalpaşazâde suggests a new and original approach between philosophical and theological debates. In this article, we are to evaluate the claims in question and present our own solution. (shrink)

Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Rabbi Eliyahu Touger, 18 vols.

We consider a chain of metabolic reactions catalyzed by enzymes, of reversible Michaelis-Menten type with full dynamics, i.e. not reduced with any quasi-steady state approximations. We study the corresponding dynamical system and show its global stability if the equilibrium exists. If the system is open, the equilibrium may not exist. The main tool is monotone systems theory. Finally we study the implications of these results for the study of coupled genetic-metabolic systems.

Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is regarded as one of the foremost mystical thinkers in Islam. This paper explores the ways in which he and his followers distinguish between the reality of Muḥammad (_al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya_) or the light of Muḥammad (_al-nūr al-Muḥammadī_), as the metaphysical reality of Muḥammad, and his metahistorical manifestation as Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh. In his metaphysical reality, Muḥammad is the manifestation of the _qur’ān_, which ‘brings together’ the divine and His creation. Muḥammad’s metaphysical reality, as (...) the primary recipient of the divine outpouring, enables further differentiations of the divine to emerge in the form of the universe, and establishes his connection to the divine. Yet the Qur’an is also temporal in terms of being an historical act of revelation. Likewise, Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh, in terms of his physical reality, was temporally circumscribed. It is in these ways, argues Ibn ‘Arabī and his acolytes, that Muḥammad, as reality and personality, brings together the divine and the temporal, in the same manner as the _qur’ān_/Qur’an respectively. (shrink)

This book explores the religious experiences of two notable figures who endured severe trials under authoritarian regimes: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960) within the Islamic tradition, and Aleksander Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) within the Russian Orthodox Christian tradition. Against the tumultuous backdrop of the twentieth century’s spiritual, social, political, and intellectual upheavals, both Nursi and Solzhenitsyn grappled with immense hardships because of their beliefs. Despite immense tribulations, both individuals demonstrated unwavering faith and resilience in the face of adversity, continuing their scholarly and literary (...) activities. The current study centers on the dichotomy of spiritual confinement and expansiveness, illustrating how people can experience spiritual distress even without physical restraints. It explores the historical and conceptual aspects of imprisonment within Christian and Muslim perspectives, explores the reasons for Nursi and Solzhenitsyn's incarceration, examines their coping mechanisms in the face of hardship, and underscores the role of faith and spirituality. The author integrates personal experiences, particularly his own incarceration during the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish staged coup attempt, within the context of the narratives of Nursi and Solzhenitsyn. The book addresses court proceedings, release, departure from Turkey, and resettlement in Australia. Throughout, the author draws parallels between their own observations and those of Nursi and Solzhenitsyn, contributing to the broader discourse on individual spirituality and collective consciousness. The book offers insights into spiritual resilience in the face of adversity, utilizing the lives of these figures to illuminate shared human experiences. A unique collation of personal narration and scholarly reflection, it is relevant to academics and students in history, political science, sociology, Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, and to social scientists researching the phenomenon of exile and prison in different countries across the world. It also speaks to the work of activists and policymakers in human rights. (shrink)

Modern philosophy; philosophical terms; scienctific terms; Turkish language; Turkey; history.

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.

My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue (...) of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism. (shrink)

This study aims to investigate the experiences and problems of foreign nationals in Turkey, concerning microaggressions. Thus, it was aimed to find out which types of microaggressions -and at what frequency- are experienced by people who come to Turkey for different reasons like education, pursuit of a better life or escaping from war. The study was conducted in five different cities of Turkey. Students from primary school to university, teachers, parents and doctors took part in the study. The participants were (...) asked the single question “Do you ever experience deliberate or undeliberate insults, whether verbal or behavioral, targeting your ethnic identity and diversity in Turkey?” The results of the study show that microaggression is a very serious problem in Turkey. It can be gathered from the findings that Turkish people are not as tolerant to foreign people as they used to be. Behaviors that make people of foreign origin feel like second-class citizens and alienated take place quite often. Foreigners are usually connected with negative occurrences and they are reminded that they are not welcome in this country. These people are also accused of causing many misfortunes in the country. The study also exhibits that foreign nationals suffer greatly from prejudices about their cultures and they become the target of explicit and direct insults particularly regarding their race. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

This study explores the ways in which trust deficit undermines anti-corruption initiatives in a context with systemic corruption. Anti-corruption measures as panacea to systemic corruption are not new, but their effectiveness is debatable. Whilst understanding the causal relationship between corruption and trust remains germane to fighting corruption, a growing number of recent studies advocate better context sensitivity in developing anti-corruption initiatives. Consistent with this, we unpack the perceptions of a significant section of the population in which corruption is rampant to (...) identify factors that could enhance trust in the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Using commentaries from Nigerian Netizens on two critical corruption incidents that are significant to corporations, we uncover poignant narratives of perception of incompetence, dishonesty and confusion that undermine the anti-corruption measures in the context. We argue that donors, international organisations and businesses must encourage and support beneficiaries’ governments to secure and sustain trust in the anti-corruption initiatives as a condition for better results. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.

How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...) insist that perceptual experiences provide epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs about the external world as we pre-reflectively take it to be, then one should find a way of avoiding Cartesianism. Here are the two main aims of this paper: firstly, identify the premise that is doing the heavy-lifting work in the Cartesian thinking; and, secondly, formulate an adequate way of denying that premise. The adequacy I claim for my formulation of a way of denying the premise will roughly amount to this: the way I offer is not as susceptible to Cartesian traps as other apparently available ways of denying the premise are. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.

In “A well-founded solution to the generality problem,” Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief’s being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from (...) the unavoidability claim. The third one is what I call the basing solution claim: An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this paper, I will argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument (...) from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...) in Klein’s works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.

Messianism is an integral component of Abrahamic faiths. Yet the emergence of the Messiah is counterbalanced by the Antichrist. Apocalyptic visions of the future in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam...

How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which pragmatic justification (...) for believing a proposition is related to the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the received view might make to my objection.Epistemik gerekçelendirmeyi diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerden nasıl ayırmalıyız? Hâkim görüş diyebileceğimiz bir fikre göre, epistemik gerekçelendirme “doğruya varma” diyebileceğimiz bilişsel hedefe diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerin olamayacağı şekilde yakın bir biçimde irtibatlıdır. Bu yazıda, hâkim görüşün yanlış olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu iddiam, bazı olası durumlarda pragmatik gerekçelendirmenin de doğruya varma hedefiyle olan irtibatının epistemik gerekçelendirmenin o hedefle kurduğu iddia edilen irtibatın aynısı olduğunu gösteren bir düşünce deneyine dayanıyor. Yazı, hâkim görüşün sunduğum itiraza karşı geliştirebileceği iki yanıtın kısa bir değerlendirmesi ile sonlanıyor. (shrink)

Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, The Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory. Edited and translated by Devin J. Stewart. Library of Arabic Literature. New York: New York University Press, 2015. Pp. xxxviii + 405. $40.

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...) “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

Kadim bir dil olan Arapça, İslamiyet’in gelişiyle birlikte kutsal bir kitap olan Kur’an-ı Kerim’in dili olmuş, günümüze kadar varlığını ve önemini korumuştur. Anadili Arapça olmayanlara bu dilin öğretilmesi için farklı coğrafya ve farklı dönemlerde medreselerde veya devletin resmi eğitim kurumlarında Arapça dersleri verilmiştir. Verilen Arapça eğitimlerinde nahiv ve sarf temelli bir eğitim uygulanmıştır. Gramere dayalı bu dil eğitimi İlahiyat veya İslami İlimler fakültelerinde verilen eğitimlerle daha ileri bir seviyeye taşınmaya çalışılmıştır. İlahiyat veya İslami İlimler fakültelerinde verilen Arapça eğitimleri temelde dört (...) beceriyi kazandırma odaklı hazırlanmıştır. Ancak gramer odaklı verilmeye çalışılan Arapça eğitimlerinde hedeflenen başarı elde edilememektedir. Bu araştırmanın konusu, İlahiyat veya İslami İlimler fakültelerinde okutulan Arapça hazırlık eğitiminin değerlendirilmesi ve bu eğitimin kalitesinin arttırılması için yapılması gerekenlerdir. Bu doğrultuda bu çalışmada Bitlis Eren Üniversitesi İslami İlimler Fakültesi %30 Zorunlu Arapça Hazırlık Sınıflarının 2018-2019 Eğitim ve Öğretim Yılında aldıkları Arapça eğitimi model alınmıştır. Hazırlık Sınıflarında Arapça eğitimi alan 90 öğrenciye 33 sorudan oluşan anket uygulanmıştır. Anket sonuçları değerlendirilmiş ve verilen Arapça eğitiminin kalitesi ortaya konulmuştur. Elde edilen sonuçlardan hareketle, verilen eğitimde eksik ve hatalı durumlar tespit edilerek, eğitimin daha kaliteli bir düzeye ulaştırılması için önerilerde bulunulmuştur. Giriş bölümünde İlahiyat veya İslami İlimler fakültelerindeki Arapça eğitimi hakkında bilgiler verilmiştir. Sonrasında çalışmanın amacı, önemi, sınırlılıkları, problemi ve örneklem ortaya konulmuştur. Fakültede uygulanan Arapça hazırlık eğitimi hakkında bilgiler verilmiş ve uygulanan anket çalışmaya eklenmiştir. Son olarak bulgular ve yorumlar verilerek çalışma sonuç ve öneriler ile sonlandırılmıştır. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s critique of idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsificationism, to metaphysics, epistemology, and social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous, and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and holism, the (...) notion that social wholes are organic structures that amount to more than the individuals constituting them. Historicism and holism have become the philosophical underpinnings of closed societies throughout history, such as the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Therefore, with a practical leaning, Popper actually takes aim at these pernicious consequences of idealism while criticizing it. In this study, idealism and the contours of Popper’s philosophy are examined, and then Popper’s metaphysical, epistemological, social, and political critiques against idealism are investigated. Keywords: Karl Popper, idealism, historicism, holism, falsificationism. (shrink)