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  1. Michael V. Antony (2003). Book Review of Jeffrey Foss, Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution". [REVIEW] Philosophia 31 (1-2).
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  2. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely (...)
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  3. Henk Bij de Weg, Explaining Consciousness and the Duality of Method.
    In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...)
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  4. Vladimir Breskin (2013). Homo igneous: Феномен Языка для курящих и некурящих. NB: Философские Исследования 12:228 - 247.
    The goal of this study is to build the contours of the hypothesis, which defines the essence of language as a part of the human physiology, describes the language as the receptor activity based on common biological principles and functions of senses. The study tries to identify the physiological borders of the organ and the causes, which led to the organ development in the general evolution of human. -/- Исследование обозначает контуры гипотезы, определяющей сущность языка как части физиологии человека, характеризуя (...)
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  5. Andrew Brook (2005). Making Consciousness Safe for Neuroscience. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. 397.
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  6. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  7. Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.) (1997). Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
  8. Reena Cheruvalath & Baiju (2001). Can Consciousness Be Explained? Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):222-226.
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  9. Patricia S. Churchland (1998). What Should We Expect From a Theory of Consciousness? In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. 19-32.
    Within the domain of philosophy, it is not unusual to hear the claim that most questions about the nature of consciousness are essentially and absolutely beyond the scope of science, no matter how science may develop in the twenty-first century. Some things, it is pointed out, we shall never _ever_ understand, and consciousness is one of them (Vendler 1994, Swinburne 1994, McGinn 1989, Nagel 1994, Warner 1994). One line of reasoning assumes that consciousness is the manifestation of a distinctly nonphysical (...)
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  10. Paul M. Churchland (1996). The Rediscovery of Light. Journal of Philosophy 93 (5):211-28.
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  11. Austen Clark, How to Respond to Philosophers on Raw Feels.
    I address this talk to anyone who believes in the possibility of an informative empirical science about sensory qualities. Potentially this is a large audience. By "sensory quality" I mean those qualities manifest in various sensory experiences: color, taste, smell, touch, pain, and so on. We should include sensory modalities humans do not share, such as electro-reception in fish, echolocation in bats, or the skylight compass in birds. Those pursuing empirical science about this large domain might pursue it in the (...)
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  12. Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Is Thomas Reid a Mysterian? Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):449-466.
    : Some critics find that Thomas Reid thinks the mind especially problematic, "hid in impenetrable darkness". I disagree. Reid does not hold that mind, more than body, resists explanation by the new science. The physical sciences have made great progress because they were transformed by the Newtonian revolution, and the key transformation was to stop looking for causes. Reid's harsh words are a call for methodological reform, consonant with his lifelong pursuit of a science of mind and also with his (...)
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  13. Allin Cottrell (1995). Tertium Datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's Consciousness Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103.
    Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the (...)
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  14. Tristan Cunha, Defining Consciousness.
    The purpose of the paper is to present a possible definition of consciousness. The definition will try to encompass the different aspects of consciousness as we experience it, and provide a concrete framework for thinking about consciousness. It is based on a hypothesis for how we experience the world and our thoughts (the two parts of consciousness). The key idea is that "thoughts" can be considered or defined as "predicting what I would say to myself." .
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  15. Craig DeLancey (2007). Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information. Erkenntnis 66 (3):329-352.
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  16. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  17. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable. John Benjamins.
    In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that..
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  18. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  19. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  20. John Dilworth (2008). Imaginative Versus Analytical Experiences of Wines. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Wine and Philosophy. Blackwell.
    The highly enjoyable experiences associated with drinking good wines have been widely misunderstood. It is common to regard wine appreciation as an analytical or quasi-scientific kind of activity, in which wine experts carefully distinguish the precise sensory qualities of each wine, and then pass on their accumulated factual knowledge to less experienced wine enthusiasts. However, this model of wine appreciation is seriously defective. One good way to show its defects is to provide a better and more fundamental scientific account of (...)
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  21. Brian D. Earp (2012). I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
    Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers' (1995) assertion that there is a "hard problem of consciousness" worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I (...)
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  22. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Actual Consciousness by Ted Honderich. [REVIEW] Analysis.
  23. Andreas Elpidorou, Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  24. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  25. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Alva Noë: Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (1):155-159.
  26. Steven Ericsson-Zenith (forthcoming). Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension. Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering.
    At its core this book is concerned with logic and computation with respect to the mathematical characterization of sentient biophysical structure and its behavior. -/- Three related theories are presented: The first of these provides an explanation of how sentient individuals come to be in the world. The second describes how these individuals operate. And the third proposes a method for reasoning about the behavior of individuals in groups. -/- These theories are based upon a new explanation of experience in (...)
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  27. Markus I. Eronen (2014). Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument. Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):571-582.
    Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the (...)
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  28. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2012). Mind as a Nested Operational Architectonics of the Brain. Physics of Life Reviews 9 (1):49-50.
    The target paper of Dr. Feinberg is a testimony to an admirable scholarship and deep thoughtfulness. This paper develops a general theoretical framework of nested hierarchy in the brain that allows production of mind with consciousness. The difference between non-nested and nested hierarchies is the following. In a non-nested hierarchy the entities at higher levels of the hierarchy are physically independent from the entities at lower levels and there is strong constraint of higher upon lower levels. In a nested hierarchy, (...)
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  29. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2010). Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time. Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):195-249.
    Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system – the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain’s activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in (...)
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  30. Joerg Fingerhut (2012). The Body and the Experience of Presence. In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter. 8--167.
    We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1 – 3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and (...)
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  31. James Garvey (1997). What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know? Analysis 57 (3):196-201.
    Exactly what is McGinn saying when he claims that we cannot solve the mind-body problem? Just what is cognitively closed to us? The text suggests at least four possibilities. I work through each them in some detail, and I come to two principal conclusions. First, by McGinn's own understanding of the mind-body problem, he needs to show that we are cognitively closed to how brains generate consciousness, but he argues for something else, that we are cognitively closed to the brain (...)
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  32. Brie Gertler (2009). The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness: Critical Review of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2006). Noûs 43 (2):378-393.
    The plain man thinks that material objects must certainly exist, since they are evident to the senses. Whatever else may be doubted, it is certain that anything you can bump into must be real; this is the plain man’s metaphysic. This is all very well, but the physicist comes along and shows that you never bump into anything: even when you run your hand along a stone wall, you do not really touch it. When you think you touch a thing, (...)
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  33. Lorna Green, Some Radical New Ideas About Consciousness 2012 - Consciousness and the Cosmos: A New Copernican Reolution, Part 1 Science, Consciousness and the Universe.
    Some Radical New Ideas About Consciousness Consciousness and the Cosmos: A New Copernican Revolution Consciousness is our new frontier in modern science. Most scientists believe that it can be accomodated, explained, by existing scientific principles. I say that it cannot. That it calls all existing scientific principles into question. That consciousness is to modern science just exactly what light was to classical physics: All of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of Reality have to change. And I go on, in (...)
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  34. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1996). The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):7-13.
    In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise. In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me, arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is (...)
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  35. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1993). The Naturalists Versus the Skeptics: The Debate Over a Scientific Understanding of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):27-50.
    There are three basic skeptical arguments against developing a scientific theory of consciousness: theory cannot capture a first person perspective; consciousness is causally inert with respect to explaining cognition; and the notion "consciousness" is too vague to be a natural kind term. Although I am sympathetic to naturalists' counter-arguments, I also believe that most of the accounts given so far of how explaining consciousness would fit into science are incorrect. In this essay, I indicate errors my colleagues on both sides (...)
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  36. Germund Hesslow (1996). Will Neuroscience Explain Consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 171 (7-8):29-39.
  37. Steven Horst (2005). Modeling, Localization and the Explanation of Phenomenal Properties: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences at the Beginning of the Millennium. Synthese 147 (3):477-513.
    Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of.
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  38. Nicholas Humphrey (2002). Thinking About Feeling. In G. Richard (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
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  39. Jerome Iglowitz, Consciousness: A Simpler Approach to the Mind-Brain Problem.
    No explicit model of consciousness has ever been presented. This paper defines the beginnings of such a model based in mathematicians' "implicit definition" as compounded with virtual reality. Dennett's "color phi" argument suggests the necessary extension to fit real minds. I conclude that the mind is wholly intentional and virtual.
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  40. Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  41. Claus Janew (2014). Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness: From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 5 (4):351-391.
    Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its (...)
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  42. Claus Janew (2011). How Consciousness Creates Reality. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):48-77.
    We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts is (...)
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  43. Claus Janew (2011). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):78-86.
    This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every (...)
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  44. Robert H. Kettell, A Model Of Consciousness.
    It has been difficult to define human consciousness because of its many differing qualities and because of various views people have of consciousness. It is proposed that these multiple vantage points be united into a single three-dimensional model utilizing breadth, time and depth. This model could provide a more comprehensive definition of consciousness and encourage an exploration of the interplay of consciousness’ many features. Such a model may also help answer some of the many questions that the concept of consciousness (...)
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  45. Robert Kirk (1995). How is Consciousness Possible? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. 391--408.
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  46. Stan Klein (forthcoming). The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...)
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  47. M. Moskopp Kurthen (1995). On the Prospects of a Naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. 107--122.
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  48. Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  49. Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  50. Georgi Lazarov, Materialism and the Problem of Consciousness: The Aesthesionomic Approach.
    The topic of the essay is the “explanatory gap” between, on one side, descriptions of conscious states from 1st person perspective, termed as phenomenal consciousness; and on the other side, the descriptions of conscious states in representational theories of mind, from 3rd person perspective, termed as access consciousness. The main source of the explanatory gap between P-consciousness and A-consciousness is the methodology of functionalism, accepted in almost contemporary representational theories. I argue for the following: The principles of materialist ontology, accepted (...)
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