Before there was the digital divide there was the analog divide– and universal service was the attempt to close that analogdivide. Universal service is becoming ever more complex in terms ofregulatory design as it becomes the digital divide. In order to evaluatethe promise of the next generation Internet with respect to the digitaldivide this work looks backwards as well as forwards in time. Byevaluating why previous universal service mechanisms failed andsucceeded this work identifies specific characteristics ofcommunications systems – in particular (...) in billing and managinguncertainty – and argues that these characteristics underliesuccess or failure in terms of technological ubiquity. Developing a setof characteristics of services rather than a set of services is afundamental break with the tradition of universal service. In fact, theimplications of our proposal is that basic characteristics in theoffering of the service rather than the absolute price are critical toclose the digital divide: certainty of total charge, ability to avoiddeposits or disconnection via best effort service, and payer-basedcontrol of all charges. While all of these principles sound obvious infact none of these hold in the telephony network. Universal service hasevolved from common carriage (serve all with no discrimination) to aright to basic services (100% penetration). Universal service isnow discussed as the digital divide, as the access to information asopposed to services becomes increasingly critical. However, we arediscussing in this paper access to the bits and the network rather thanaccess to the information (or intellectual property) once connected. Theprovision of universal service is seen as a technical problem only in thatthe technology costs money – universal service debates have longbeen the domain of economists. Yet the design of protocols has been thedomain of engineers, the building of systems the corporate domain, andthe discussion of equity the interest of ethicists. The design ofprotocols can define the parameters of the corporate decision-makers,the variables of the economist, and the questions for the ethicist. Thedesign decisions made at the fundamental levels can make communicationsequity more or less likely. In this work I focus on the design ofprotocols for the next generation Internet, protocols which willfundamentally change the best-effort nature of Internet services.Building on the economic and ethnographic work of others I argue thatthe effects of protocols adoption on universal service can be predictedto some degree. By examination of past and current technologies Iexamine a set of technical mechanisms to determine how such mechanismsmight harm or enhance universal service. I define each mechanism (e.g.denial of entry) and offer observations about each particularmechanism''s implicit pricing assumptions. I close with a discussion ofinterest to ethicists and regulators on evaluating communicationsprotocols with respect to universal access. Protocols for developingmultiple qualities of service for packet-switched networks have focusedon economic efficiency (e.g. Mackie-Mason, 1995; Choi, Stahl &Winston, 1997; Shapiro & Varian, 1998), billing to encouragewidespread adoption of network innovations (e.g. Xie & Sirbu, 1985)and billing in a manner consistent with the underlying network (e.g.Clark, 1996). Here we examine a set of protocols which include varyingquality of service mechanisms with respect to the compatibility of theprotocols with universal access. (shrink)

If code is law then standards bodies are governments. This flawed but powerful metaphor suggests the need to examine more closely those standards bodies that are defining standards for the Internet. In this paper we examine the International Telecommunications Union, the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association, the Internet Engineering Task Force, and the World Wide Web Consortium. We compare the organizations on the basis of participation, transparency, authority, openness, security and interoperability. We conclude that the IETF and (...) the W3C are becoming increasingly similar. We also conclude that the classical distinction between standards and implementations is decreasingly useful as standards are embodies in code – itself a form of speech or documentation. Recent Internet standards bodies have flourished in part by discarding or modifying the implementation/standards distinction. We illustrate that no single model is superior on all dimensions. The IETF is not effectively scaling, struggling with its explosive growth with the creation of thousands of working groups. The IETF coordinating body, the Internet Society, addressed growth by reorganization that removed democratic oversight. The W3C, initially the most closed, is becoming responsive to criticism and now includes open code participants. The IEEE SA and ITU have institutional controls appropriate for hardware but too constraining for code. Each organization has much to learn from the others. (shrink)

The best way to protect information is never to release it. Yet even the earliest definition of security recognizes availability as a necessary quality. In this work, we seek to quantify the value of information disclosure for web resource evaluation and discovery. Communal evaluation tools help users share ratings on websites, music, and other online resources. This approach assumes that experiences are self-similar, so that a site one person visits is likely to have been evaluated and thus visited by others. (...) Collaborative search tools aim for discovery as opposed to evaluation. Therefore, they assume participants in a collaborative network have large sets of non-overlapping sites so that an increase in network size corresponds to an increase in web coverage. We quantify the value of information sharing for these closely related but sometimes distinct functions. In this paper, we analyzed a dataset that includes eight weeks of browsing history of 1084 college students that live in the same dormitory. Our experiments showed that for discovery, more sharing monotonically improves results; for evaluation, however, there are decreasing marginal returns for each participant added to the network. The subject population was selected for its homogeneity in order to mimic a collaborative network. (shrink)

The interpretation of the terms 'information' and 'ethics' is often culturally situated. A common understanding is contingent to facilitating dialogue concerning the novel ethical issues we face during computer-mediated interactions. Developing a nuanced understanding of information ethics is critical at a point when the number of information and communication technology -enabled interactions may soon exceed traditional human interactions. Utilitarianism and deontology, the two major schools of ethics are based in a western perspective. We contribute to the existing discourse on information (...) ethics by arguing for the inclusion of Gandhian notions of non-violence and confrontation. These are particularly relevant to cyberspace, which does not always lend itself to coercion due to legal, political and economic limitations. We address the applicability of ahimsa, satyagraha, and swaraj to cyberspace. We discuss a Gandhian approach to system design. Finally, we use case studies to illuminate the application of Gandhian notions as well as their limitations. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to address the question of whethercomputer source code is speech protected by the First Amendmentto the United States Constitution or whether it is merelyfunctional, a ``machine'', designed to fulfill a set task andtherefore bereft of protection. The answer to this question is acomplex one. Unlike all other forms of ``speech'' computer sourcecode holds a unique place in the law: it can be copyrighted, likea book and it can be patented like a machine or process.Case (...) law, intellectual property law and encryption exportregulations all reflect this contradictory dichotomy. (shrink)

Résumé André Gorz n’avait pas seulement une conception politique de l’écologie qui nous relie à l’histoire et aux luttes sociales, il proposait une véritable alternative écologiste au service de l’autonomie individuelle. S’il a pu paraître trahir son camp plusieurs fois, c’était à chaque fois pour y être plus fidèle malgré tout. Sa critique de l’aliénation du travail l’a mené à vouloir sortir du productivisme salarial grâce au revenu garanti et des « cercles de coopération », avant peut-être le règne (...) de la gratuité dans l’économie immatérielle... (shrink)

In Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, Douglas Portmore introduces a novel position regarding the actualist securitism – a position he argues is theoretically superior to the standard views in both the actualist and possibilist camps. After distinguishing the two camps through an examination of the original Procrastinate case, I present Portmore's securitism and its implications regarding his modified Procrastinate case. I level two serious objections against securitism: that it implausibly implies that morality is radically more demanding for the virtuous (...) than it is for the vicious and that it fails to recognize moral vice in a wide range of cases. I close by arguing that a possibilist variant of Portmore's securitist view is impervious to such objections and thus appears theoretically superior to the actualist version Portmore promotes. (shrink)

In what is quite possibly the most famous passage of the De revolutionibus, Copernicus implies that nobody could ever place this supreme flaming torch that is the Sun in another or better place than that from which it can illuminate everything simultaneously, namely the centre of this extremely beautiful temple that is our world. Considering the fact that he leaves an interrogatory twist to this argument of convenience, and since he makes this statement without any justification as it seems entirely (...) evident to him, certain Copernicans choose to illustrate this by means of an analogy: if indeed the Sun must be positioned thus, it is because the most appropriate place for the torch intended to illuminate the room is at its centre, and not in one of its corners. Despite the heliosophy of the Renaissance having been shared by both geocentrists and Copernicans alike, this "torch" argument does not appear to have achieved much success: rarely adopted by the Copernican camp, it was even contested by some of them; as for the geocentrists, it held no appeal for them whatsoever. Did this argument of convenience therefore not benefit from the self-evidence attributed to it by Copernicus, and from, in his wake, it's continued support by a good many commentators? As is often the case when it comes to the history of thought, the pseudo-obviousness of this argument is merely the fruit of a blatant anachronism: presenting heliocentrism as the cosmological system that finally grants the Sun its worthy centrality by placing it in the centre of the room and not in a corner, is to ignore the fact that this star of the day already enjoyed, in geocentrism, a centrality esteemed to be perfectly in keeping with both its dignity and its inherent illuminative function. Having lost their grasp on this worldview that no longer belonged to them, the Copernicans thus put forward an argument which, for the geocentrists, is worthless. Yet they could have argued the objective superiority of their centrality over that accorded to the Sun by geocentrism: while the latter is only numerical, on a purely planetary scale, and frankly fictitious, the former is thoroughly spatial, of cosmic proportions and, at least on first approximation, very real. In order to produce arguments of convenience that could carry their own weight, the protagonists of the new cosmology would have benefited from getting to know the world vision of their adversaries a little better instead of addressing them from their own point of view; similarly, instead of treating as an obvious fact that which is only evident to one of the two parties present, historians of scientific thought would also be well advised to have a better understanding of the world vision of those who history now considers as the losers! (shrink)

Paru en URSS au moment de la perestroïka (1989), sous le titre Cela pèse jusqu'à aujourd'hui, ce recueil prend place dans une collection de qualité, qui a publié notamment des textes de V.Chalamov, connu pour ses Récits de Kolyma. Il regroupe quatorze témoignages de femmes qui ont été détenues dans les prisons et les camps soviétiques entre 1922 et 1965. Certes, ce n'est pas la première fois que le public français peut lire des souvenirs d'ex-prisonnières, mais ce volume vaut d'abord (...) p... (shrink)

L'archéologie, par la documentation considérable qu'elle apporte sur l'expérience de la guerre et la réalité de la violence, renouvelle notre compréhension des conflits, depuis la Préhistoire jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Son approche anthropologique a en effet libéré la recherche des contraintes de l'histoire militaire et stratégique, les violences du XXe siècle conduisant la discipline vers de nouveaux enjeux liés à l'expertise médico-légale, à la récupération de la mémoire historique et au droit. Guerres et combats ne sont plus uniquement relatés par les archives (...) des vainqueurs, mais étudiés par l'archéologue en prenant en compte l'ensemble des documents mis au jour : champs de bataille, dépôts d'armes, restes humains, garnisons, camps de prisonniers ou d'internement... La propagande est déconstruite, images et objets sont contextualisés, le cadre économique et social du conflit est restitué, la réalité de la violence collective est analysée. Et les morts peuvent sortir de leur anonymat. Dans cet ouvrage, qui propose une grande variété d'éclairages sur les violences et les guerres, l'archéologie apparaît ainsi à la fois comme la science de la mémoire matérielle des hommes et comme un instrument au service de la longue histoire du savoir, des techniques et de la diversité culturelle qui fait la richesse de l'humanité. (shrink)

L’article s’attache à poser et définir le problème de la pertinence de la théorie de l’accointance de Russell pour le débat contemporain sur la conscience phénoménale, ainsi qu’à en entreprendre l’examen. Il avance deux hypothèses principales. La première est que, d’un point de vue théorique, ce problème recouvre principalement la question de savoir s’il convient de défendre une conception intentionnaliste de la nature de la conscience phénoménale. La seconde est qu’une partie importante du débat contemporain, correspondant au camp de (...) ceux qui se réclament d’une approche non représentationaliste de la conscience phénoménale et qui est illustré de façon centrale par le travail du philosophe Ned Block, répondent négativement à une telle question et reconnaissent donc du même coup, quoique de manière principalement implicite, que ce qui est en fait pertinent dans la théorie de l’accointance russellienne c’est que son auteur en soit venu à la rejeter en 1919. (shrink)

Not only did André Gorz have a political conception of ecology that links it to history and social struggles, he also proposed a full-fledged ecological alternative at the service of individual autonomy. Though he may have appeared a traitor to his own camp on several occasions, it was always to remain faithful over the long run. His critique of the alienation of labor led him to look for an exit from salaried productivism in the forms of guaranteed income and (...) « cooperation circles » – perhaps as a prelude to the free interchange of the immaterial economy. (shrink)

Depuis le XIXe siècle, on lit Montesquieu comme le théoricien du libéralisme politique, l'héritier de Locke et des penseurs du droit naturel, le chantre de la modernité post-révolutionnaire. Jean Goldzink montre ici avec brio combien cette lecture est discutable: l'essentiel de la gloire de notre plus fameux théoricien politique serait dû à un « blanchiment d'idées » involontaire, opéré dans les camps idéologiques les plus opposés. En proposant une relecture de De l'esprit des lois et des oeuvres des lecteurs (...) français les plus marquants de cet ouvrage fondateur - de Voltaire à Rousseau, en passant par de Maistre, Constant, Comte et d'autres -, Jean Goldzink rappelle que Montesquieu refuse avec la dernière énergie de penser avec Locke, et que tout son projet consiste au contraire à fonder une science politique sans droits naturels attachés à la personne humaine, autrement dit sans la visée universelle qu'implique le jusnaturalisme moderne. Sa méthode et ses objectifs lui interdisent de concevoir une déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen ou une quelconque républicanisation de la liberté par l'élection d'un parlement. De cette remise en cause d'un dogme quasi unanime depuis deux siècles, il ressort aussi qu'il faut questionner la pertinence de l'emploi inconsidéré du terme « libéralisme » en histoire des idées, compte tenu de sa propension vorace à tout avaler, au mépris des moments, des projets et des rudes saveurs d'origine. Jean Goldzink a enseigné la littérature française à l'ENS de Saint-Cloud/Fontenay/Lyon de 1967 à 2002, et l'histoire des idées politiques à Sciences Po Paris de 2003 à 2009. Il a publié une douzaine d'ouvrages sur les Lumières, dont deux sur Montesquieu. (shrink)

Dieu contre Darwin! Cette opposition, volontairement simplificatrice et provocatrice, n'a en fait guère de sens. Création et Évolution ne se situent pas sur un même plan de connaissance. D'un côté, Les sciences universelles cherchent à décrire, dans un langage rigoureux, la mécanique des origines et de l'évolution de l'Univers, de la vie et de l'homme. De l'autre, philosophies et religions offrent des buts et un autre type de recherche, celui du sens de la vie de chacun. Nous montrons que les (...) Écritures ne sont pas des livres de science, mais exclusivement religieux. La raison peut être L'alliée des deux camps. L'ouverture d'esprit aussi... Encore un livre sur le créationnisme? Pour la première fois, ce livre propose une analyse comparative détaillée de ce que disent les trois religions du Livre au sujet de la question des origines, mises en regard des traditions historiques et des connaissances scientifiques les plus actuelles. Les croyants peuvent considérer que la science décrit La mécanique choisie par le Créateur pour réaliser Sa Création! Il ne peut donc être question de la rejeter... Grâce à un chapitre de questions-réponses, il constitue aussi un guide pour comprendre rapidement et précisément la valeur des arguments en présence. Il donne aux enseignants des réponses aux questions posées par leurs élèves. Ce livre très complet, qui prône le dialogue, permettra au lecteur de se faire une idée des enjeux scientifiques, religieux, politiques, philosophiques et historiques et de choisir sa voie, vers les lumières ou l'obscurantisme. (shrink)

N’a-t-on pas jusqu’à l’excès opposé l’exégèse allégorique d’Alexandrie à l’exégèse historico-littérale des Antiochiens ? Si l’on se réfère au débat des années 50 autour du « sens spirituel » des Écritures, ne peut-on pas penser que l’on a été tenté de le plaquer sur les auteurs anciens, enrôlés pour la circonstance dans l’un ou l’autre camp ? Il vaut donc la peine de rouvrir sans passion le dossier. En réalité, la contestation de l’exégèse spirituelle d’Origène, reprise à l’époque moderne, (...) est fort ancienne : elle se rattache au débat, plus ancien encore, autour de l’allégorie des poèmes homériques et des mythes grecs. Mais précisément le texte biblique peut-il être traité comme les fables des Grecs ? Les exégètes d’Antioche le nient énergiquement. Pourtant, s’ils refusent de faire de l’allégorie une méthode d’exégèse, ils ne renoncent pas, sous certaines conditions, à dépasser la lettre du texte et son sens historique. Ce sens supérieur ou spirituel qu’Origène découvre par l’allégorie – quel que soit du reste le mot qu’il utilise -, les exégètes d’Antioche cherchent à l’atteindre grâce à l’explication dite typologique. Il s’agira donc ici de préciser la frontière entre ces deux modes d’explication.Was not the opposition between the allegorical exegesis of the School of Alexandria and the historic-literary analysis of the School of Antioch pushed to the extreme? If we think back to the 1950s debate about the “spiritual meaning or sense” of the Scriptures, might we not discern there a temptation to project this debate back onto the ancient authors, forced to fit into one camp or the other? It is thus quite worthwhile to open up this file again in a more dispassionate way. In fact, the arguments against Origen’s spiritual exegesis, taken up in modern times, is very old and is connected with the even older debate about the allegorical nature of the Homeric poems and Greek myths. However, is it possible to deal with the Biblical text in the same way as with the Greek fables? The Antioch exegetes denied this vehemently. Still, although they refused to take allegory as a method of exegesis, they did not renounce – in some circumstances – looking beyond the letter of the text and its historical meaning. This superior or spiritual meaning which Origen discovered through allegory – whatever might be the term he utilized – was sought for by the Antioch School through the so-called typological explanation. (shrink)

N’a-t-on pas jusqu’à l’excès opposé l’exégèse allégorique d’Alexandrie à l’exégèse historico-littérale des Antiochiens ? Si l’on se réfère au débat des années 50 autour du « sens spirituel » des Écritures, ne peut-on pas penser que l’on a été tenté de le plaquer sur les auteurs anciens, enrôlés pour la circonstance dans l’un ou l’autre camp ? Il vaut donc la peine de rouvrir sans passion le dossier. En réalité, la contestation de l’exégèse spirituelle d’Origène, reprise à l’époque moderne, (...) est fort ancienne : elle se rattache au débat, plus ancien encore, autour de l’allégorie des poèmes homériques et des mythes grecs. Mais précisément le texte biblique peut-il être traité comme les fables des Grecs ? Les exégètes d’Antioche le nient énergiquement. Pourtant, s’ils refusent de faire de l’allégorie une méthode d’exégèse, ils ne renoncent pas, sous certaines conditions, à dépasser la lettre du texte et son sens historique. Ce sens supérieur ou spirituel qu’Origène découvre par l’allégorie – quel que soit du reste le mot qu’il utilise -, les exégètes d’Antioche cherchent à l’atteindre grâce à l’explication dite typologique. Il s’agira donc ici de préciser la frontière entre ces deux modes d’explication.Was not the opposition between the allegorical exegesis of the School of Alexandria and the historic-literary analysis of the School of Antioch pushed to the extreme? If we think back to the 1950s debate about the “spiritual meaning or sense” of the Scriptures, might we not discern there a temptation to project this debate back onto the ancient authors, forced to fit into one camp or the other? It is thus quite worthwhile to open up this file again in a more dispassionate way. In fact, the arguments against Origen’s spiritual exegesis, taken up in modern times, is very old and is connected with the even older debate about the allegorical nature of the Homeric poems and Greek myths. However, is it possible to deal with the Biblical text in the same way as with the Greek fables? The Antioch exegetes denied this vehemently. Still, although they refused to take allegory as a method of exegesis, they did not renounce – in some circumstances – looking beyond the letter of the text and its historical meaning. This superior or spiritual meaning which Origen discovered through allegory – whatever might be the term he utilized – was sought for by the Antioch School through the so-called typological explanation. (shrink)

Le vingtième siècle aura été le siècle de la démesure. La démesure de la politique avec des guerres mondiales, des déportations et des camps d'extermination, qui a culminé avec deux bombes atomiques larguées sur des populations civiles. La démesure de l'homme, ensuite, puisque ces crimes ont été commis au nom d'idéologies abstraites qui, pour sauver l'humanité, ont sacrifié sans remords les hommes réels. La démesure du monde, enfin, avec une science prométhéenne qui a tenté de percer les secrets de l'univers, (...) une technique déchaînée qui a cherché à asservir la nature et une économie mondialisée dont les échanges ont imposé le prix des choses au détriment de la dignité des hommes. Nietzsche avait clairement établi le diagnostic : "La mesure nous est étrangère, reconnaissons-le; notre démangeaison, c'est justement la démangeaison de l'infini, de l'immense. " Le sens de la démesure semble être une fatalité, aussi n'est-il pas étonnant que, déjà chez les Grecs, dans le mythe, la tragédie, la physique, l'éthique ou la politique, il se situe au coeur de la réflexion. Au travers de la tentation de la raison d'abolir toute limite, de remettre en cause la finitude humaine, la démesure témoigne du tragique de notre condition. Les Grecs, et c'est l'enseignement de ce livre, se sont attachés à la comprendre pour la convertir en cette mesure qui permet de redonner un sens à notre existence. (shrink)

The Buddhist Jātaka tells the tale of a hare lounging under a palm tree who becomes convinced the Earth is coming to an end when a ripe bael fruit falls on its head. Soon all the hares are running; other animals join them, forming a stampede of deer, boar, elk, buffalo, wild oxen, rhinoceros, tigers and elephants, loudly proclaiming the earth is ending.1 In the American retelling, the hare is ‘chicken little,’ and the exaggerated fear is that the sky is (...) falling. The story offers a cautionary tale for considering the trend towards calamity thinking in artificial intelligence (AI). A growing chorus of tech leaders has warned that AI poses existential risk (X-Risk) that could result in the extinction of the human species, the collapse of civilisation, or a colossal decline in human potential and culture. In 2014, Hawking told the Washington Post that AI, ‘could spell the end of the human race’.2 Musk has repeatedly warned about AI’s perils, calling AI, ‘more dangerous than nukes’, recommending colonising Mars to ensure ‘a bolt-hole if AI goes rogue and turns on humanity’,3 and donating 10 million dollars to the Future of Life Institute to jumpstart research on AI’s X-Risk. Gates has stated, ‘I am in the camp…concerned about super intelligence…I agree with … Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned’.4 Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has fretted that technologies OpenAI was building could endanger humanity—‘even destroying the world as we know it’.5 This paper offers a critical appraisal of the rise of calamity thinking in the scholarly AI ethics literature. It cautions against viewing X-Risk in isolation and highlights ethical considerations sidelined when X-Risk takes centre stage. Section I introduces a working definition of X-Risk, considers its likelihood and …. (shrink)

Although an elusive concept, "camp" can be found in most forms of artistic expression, revealing itself through an aesthetic of deliberate stylization. Fashion is one of the most overt and enduring conduits of the camp aesthetic. As a site for the playful dynamics between high art and popular culture, fashion both embraces and expresses such camp modes of enactment as irony, humor, parody, pastiche, artifice, theatricality, and exaggeration. Drawing from Susan Sontag's seminal essay "Notes on 'camp,'" (...) the book explores how fashion designers have used their metier as a vehicle to engage with the camp aesthetic in compelling, humorous, and sometimes incongruous ways. As a sartorial manifestation of the camp sensibility, this thought-provoking publication contributes new theoretical and conceptual insights into the camp canon through texts and images. Stunning new photography by Johnny Dufort highlights works by such fashion designers as Virgil Abloh, Thom Browne, Jean-Charles de Castelbajac, John Galliano, Jean Paul Gaultier, Marc Jacobs, Karl Lagerfeld, Alessandro Michele, Franco Moschino, Miuccia Prada, Richard Quinn, Yves Saint Laurent, Elsa Schiaparelli, Jeremy Scott, Anna Sui, Gianni Versace, and Vivienne Westwood. (shrink)

2016 marks the 50 th Anniversary of the publication of Jean Améry’s collection of essays dealing with his experiences at Auschwitz entitled Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten. Translated into English as At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By A Survivor On Auschwitz And Its Realities, Améry’s collection immediately set a standard for philosophical accounts of the camps that even today remains unchanged. More uncompromising than the texts of Wiesenthal, Levi, Borowski, and Wiesel, Améry’s collection philosophically explores the (...) extreme limit of the survivor’s experience in the camps as well as the ensuing trauma of living in its wake. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is an undisputed giant of twentieth-century philosophy. His intellectual writings popularizing existentialism combined with his creative and artistic flair have made him a legend of French thought. His tumultuous personal life - so inextricably bound up with his philosophical thinking - is a fascinating tale of love and lust, drug abuse, high profile fallings-out and political and cultural rebellion. This substantial and meticulously researched biography is accessible, fast-paced, often amusing and at times deeply moving. Existentialism and Excess (...) covers all the main events of Sartre's remarkable seventy-five-year life from his early years as a precocious brat devouring his grandfather's library, through his time as a brilliant student in Paris, his wilderness years as a provincial teacher-writer experimenting with mescaline, his World War II adventures as a POW and member of the resistance, his post-war politicization, his immense amphetamine fueled feats of writing productivity, his harem of women, his many travels and his final decline into blindness and old age. Along the way there are countless intriguing anecdotes, some amusing, some tragic, some controversial: his loathing of crustaceans and his belief that he was being pursued by a giant lobster, his escape from a POW camp, the bombing of his apartment, his influence on the May 1968 uprising and his many love affairs. Cox deftly moves from these episodes to discussing his intellectual development, his famous feuds with Aron, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty, his encounters with other giant figures of his day: Roosevelt, Hemingway, Heidegger, John Huston, Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, Khrushchev and Tito, and, above all, his long, complex and creative relationship with Simone de Beauvoir. Existentialism and Excess also gives serious consideration to Sartre's ideas and many philosophical works, novels, stories, plays and biographies, revealing their intimate connection with his personal life. Cox has written an entertaining, thought-provoking and compulsive book, much like the man himself. (shrink)

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las víctimas (...) inocentes de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

Entre herméneutique et grammatologie, entre Gadamer et Derrida, il y aurait une profonde incompatibilité. Insurmontable? Les deux camps ont au moins en commun de réfléchir sur les conditions de possibilité du discours philosophique.Mais, en définitive, il faudrait dépasser ces deux approches au profit d'une nouvelle époque de la philosophie s'obligeant à approfondir le sens de la différence et à "retrouver à nouveaux frais la question de l'essence".

Parmi les courants de pensée française de l'après-guerre, le marxisme joua un rôle très important, en imposant les thèmes par rapport auxquels les philosophes se situèrent. Les débats sur le marxisme ne sont pas séparables de l'existence du pays qui prétendait le réaliser dans toutes les sphères de sa vie. La politique comme une action collective en vue de la transformation de la société par les débats et par l'émancipation n'a pas été développée, ni dans les pays qu'on disait socialistes, (...) ni dans les pays dits 'bourgeois'. En même temps, nous pensons que les intellectuels français de gauche dans l'après-guerre ont considérablement contribué au renouveau de la pensée socialiste. Il y avait ceux qui adhéraient au PCF, et d'autres, comme Jean-Paul Sartre, qui devenaient 'compagnons de route'. D'autres intellectuels encore, comme Cornelius Castoriadis et Claude Lefort, voulaient former des groupuscules indépendants en critiquant la politique du PCF stalinien et du PCI trotskiste. La crise du socialisme réel, les luttes anti-bureaucratiques dans les pays d'Europe de l'Est et la découverte de la vérité sur les camps soviétiques, ont provoqué des ruptures de certains de ces intellectuels avec le marxisme. Les changements démocratiques en ont conduit certains à envisager la perspective d'une révolution démocratique au-delà du 'socialisme réel'."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In the September 2000 edition of Computers and Society, Drs. Jean Camp and Y. T. Chien, of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, published a paper titled "The Internet as Public Space: Concepts, Issues and Implications in Public Policy." Now, ten years later, the Internet landscape has changed dramatically.

RESUME Jean-Paul Sartre débute comme dramaturge durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale alors qu'il est prisonnier de guerre en Allemagne, dans un camp de 25.000 détenus. Durant sa captivité, le philosophe écrit une pièce de théâtre réunissant des victimes et leurs bourreaux, des juifs, des prisonniers et des allemands. Bariona est la toute première pièce de Sartre et elle restera une référence pour le théâtre de situations que l'auteur ne cessera de réaliser pendant toute sa vie. Traditionnellement la pensée (...) sartrienne est analysée, dans un premier temps, sous le prisme de la philosophie abstraite et individualiste dont L'être et le néant est l'expression fondamentale, puis, dans un second temps, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à travers le marxisme dont la Critique de la raison dialectique serait le principal ouvrage. L'objectif essentiel de cet article est de mettre à l'épreuve cette idée en analysant les concepts de l'homme seul et de la collectivité dans la première pièce dramaturgique de Sartre. On verra que l'interprétation que divise la pensée de Sartre en deux n'est pas si juste. RESUMO Jean-Paul Sartre estreia como dramaturgo durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, quando é feito prisioneiro de guerra na Alemanha em um campo de concentração com outras 25 mil pessoas. Durante seu cárcere, o filósofo escreve uma peça de teatro reunindo vítimas e seus algozes, judeus e alemães. Bariona é a primeira peça de Sartre e permanecerá a referência do teatro de situações que o autor continuará a perseguir por toda a vida. Tradicionalmente, o pensamento sartriano é considerado, em um primeiro momento, sob o prisma da filosofia abstrata e individualista, que teria na obra O ser e o nada a expressão fundamental; em seguida, em um segundo momento, depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, o é por meio do marxismo, do qual a Crítica da razão dialética seria a obra principal. O objetivo fundamental do presente artigo é o de colocar à prova essa ideia, analisando os conceitos de homem solitário e de coletividade na primeira peça de teatro de Sartre. Veremos que a interpretação que divide o pensamento de Sartre em dois não é, com efeito, justa. (shrink)

Bathos - remarque -- Pt. 1. Le champ de bataille -- Pt. 2. Kant et ses juges -- Pt. 3. Traité de bathologie.