En novembre 2002, a eu lieu, à l'Université de Liège, une rencontre entre chercheurs d'horizons divers autour du Cap des Tempêtes de Lucien François, publié dans cette même collection. Le droit sans la justice? Aux yeux d'Augustin et de la tradition du droit naturel en général, il est impossible d'abstraire l'un de l'autre sans donner raison au fameux pirate répliquant à Alexandre le Grand : " Parce que j'opère avec un petit navire, on m'appelle brigand ; toi, parce que tu (...) opères avec une grande flotte, Empereur! ". Que répondent à cette objection les théoriciens positivistes qui séparent quant à eux droit et justice? Comment rendent-ils compte, sans la justice, de la différence entre un Etat et une troupe de brigands, une arrestation et un rapt, une extorsion et un impôt? L'un des plus réputés d'entre eux, N. Bobbio, parlait de cette question comme du " cap des Tempêtes " que ne peut éviter d'affronter tout positivisme juridique. Le cap des Tempêtes. Essai de microscopie du droit est précisément le titre que L. François, Professeur émérite à l'Université de Liège, a donné à son dernier ouvrage. Il s'agit sans doute d'une des tentatives les plus radicales pour approcher le phénomène juridique en dehors de tout présupposé moral, selon une perspective " microscopique " originale qui met le même soin à analyser une file d'attente, un racket, ou l'organisation complexe de ce que nous appelons " l'État ". Quelles sont les conséquences philosophiques de cette approche microscopique du droit? Sur quels présupposés repose-t-elle? Y a-t-il une anthropologie, voire une ontologie, qui la sous-tendent? Et in fine, est-il réellement possible de concevoir le droit en faisant abstraction de tout principe, du moins de tout horizon, de justice? (shrink)

Port du foulard ou de la burqa, interdits alimentaires, boycotts de certains cours à l’école, créationnisme, refus de se faire soigner par un médecin de sexe opposé, mariages arrangés ou forcés, crimes d’honneur ; fatwas lancées contre des écrivains ou des caricaturistes blasphémateurs ; compétition mémorielle entre diasporas victimisées ; conflits interreligieux ou interethniques importés, actions terroristes anti-occidentales… Ce sont quelques-uns des symptômes les plus connus (ou les plus...

L’article confronte la théorie de l’exploitation de Marx (qui envisage le capitalisme sous le prisme de la contradiction entre le capital et le travail) et la théorie de la destruction de Polanyi (qui l’envisage, lui, sous le prisme de la contradiction entre le marché autorégulé et la société toute entière). Plus profondément, il s’agit de savoir quelle place il faut accorder, aujourd’hui, aux luttes autour du soin (care), de la préservation ou de la réparation des « relations conditionnantes » aux (...) autruis humains et non humains qui composent notre milieu de vie. L’hypothèse développée ici, à partir des travaux de Nancy Fraser, est de penser les catégories de soin et de souci comme des conditions de l’émancipation. Autrement dit, il ne suffit pas de faire droit aux luttes féministes, « culturelles » ou écologistes à côté des luttes sociales, mais de repérer, derrière toute lutte sociale-économique, ces luttes dont le but est la préservation de sphères non-économiques d’existence. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology has shown systematic differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases. In light of these findings on (...) cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and that paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual (...) community. Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)

In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to (...) make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest. (shrink)

We have recently presented evidence for cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address (...) our concerns. (shrink)

The article presents some of the results of public opinion polls that were carried out as a part of a panel poll, organized by the «Institut Universitaire de Sondage d'Opinion Publique» and covering 1.500 belgian voters.The article specifically deals with the following items - the meaning of the votes shift between 1971 and 1974 ;- the moment at which voting decisions crystallized in the 10-3-74 elections;- the way in which the political climate was perceived, and the predominant cares voters had (...) before the elections;- the impact of certain attitudes on votes shifting: an analysis of these processes. (shrink)

This article tries to confront the answers to certain questions in the opinion poll with the analysis of class conflict in our types of societies.It is wrong to say that people have modified the image they have of society, or that they would not consider it in terms of division and conflict any langer : conflicts are rather well perceived by public-opinion ; their aggravation is felt by many.According to the results of the poll, public opinion holds it that positions (...) in the professional authority structure tend to be no longer identical with positions in the authority structure in society as a whole. This distinction goes together with a diminution of the importance of the professional role. While quite well perceiving authority conflicts, the public seems to try to keep at some «distance» from these conflicts.According to their electorate's structure, political «families» express images of society either rather in terms of division and coercion, or more in terms of integration. (shrink)

The first part of this article deals with the problem of fidelity to the father's party allegiance.Socialization by the parents seems to be more effective in catholic and socialist families than in liberal families ; it may be intimitaly related to a socialization of a religious or a laicist nature.Socialization by the parents was more effective in the past; younger people show a tendency to be less influenced by it.Socialization by the parents is more effective when the ideological context tends (...) in the same direction.The second part of the article deals with the problem of voting homogeneity with couples. Results lead to the conclusion that the large uniformity of political behaviour within couples expresses two tendencies : the fact that in most cases one marries within the ideological «family». One belongs to and the fact that marriage exerts a socialization which is essentially influencing non-catholics. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (...) (Weinberg et al. 2001). In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.

A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of maturation, we asked (...) a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today’s younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Tracés. Revue de Sciences humaines, n° 4, 2003. Nous remercions Édouard Gardella de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Pour un cheminement vers la notion de « self » (Goffman) Là où l'âme prétend s'unifier, là où le Moi s'invente une identité ou une cohérence, le généalogiste part à la recherche du commencement – des commencements innombrables […]. Suivre la filière complexe de la provenance, […] c'est découvrir qu'à la racine de ce que (...) nous connaissons et de ce que nous sommes, (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

In a recent paper, Joshua Knobe (2019) offers a startling account of the metaphilosophical implications of findings in experimental philosophy. We argue that Knobe’s account is seriously mistaken, and that it is based on a radically misleading portrait of recent work in experimental philosophy and cultural psychology.

Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action (...) cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, defl ationary interpretation of these experimental fi ndings, ‘ the trade-off hypothesis ’ , and I present several new experimental fi ndings that support this interpretation. (shrink)

This article develops a new, general account of replication. I argue that a replication is an experiment that resamples the experimental components of an ori...

: While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide any evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments.

In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. However, no consensus has emerged. In this article, I argue that this is no accident. I propose a dilemma showing that the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless. The notion of life at stake in this project is either the folk concept of life or a scientific concept. In the former case, empirical evidence shows that (...) life cannot be defined. In the latter case, I argue that, although defining life may be possible, it is pointless. I conclude that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings.

Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...) deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. (shrink)

Le thlicien d'identittique d'Averrotudie par les penseurs latins du XIIIe siveloppe avec exigence en vue de sauvegarder le caractritcessaire qu'identifie la pens personnelle de l'optre latin du XIIIe si le discernement d'Averrotique et l'a confirmre rigoureusement personnel de 1'intellection humaine.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue Sociologie du travail, vol. 59 - n° 3 | Juillet-Septembre 2017. Nous remercions Edouard Gardella de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Dans les travaux sociologiques problématisant la pauvreté comme une relation d'assistance, il est courant d'analyser les aidants et/ou les aidés. Il est plus rare d'observer leur interdépendance, en considérant de manière systématique les pratiques par lesquelles chacun tient compte des effets de son action sur l'autre — (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martı´ (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalin- 10 guistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within (...) and across cultures has not been established. (shrink)