The concern of this paper is to relate the moral philosophy of Hutcheson with a traditional point of view, according to which moral philosophy depends on natural theology. The analysis of this relationship is important because it is a crucial feature of the Hutchesonian moral philosophy. However, this theological outlook does not entirely match his empirical moral epistemology, and this inconsistency allowed David Hume and Adam Smith to throw aside the theological foundation, taking from Hutcheson only the empirical aspects of (...) his epistemology. The intention of this paper is to explain why this theological outlook cannot match a moral epistemology which lacks a metaphysical foundation. (shrink)

ResumenLa teoría según la cual las acciones humanas son eventos causados por otros eventos según leyes de la naturaleza, inspirada en el pensamiento de David Hume, ha predominado en la filosofía de la acción contemporánea. Algunos se han opuesto a dicho planteamiento, proponiendo que la causa última de las acciones humanas es el agente. Entre ellos ha destacado Richard Taylor, quien se inspiró en Thomas Reid, filósofo ilustrado escocés contemporáneo de Hume, cuya noción de la agencia moral tiene una importancia (...) histórica especial, a pesar de encontrarse implícita en la filosofía antigua y medieval, porque distingue con agudeza la noción de agencia de la noción de evento como causa de las acciones morales. Dicha contraposición abre otra discusión: ¿en qué consiste pues la actividad del agente? Tanto Reid en la Ilustración, como Taylor, en la filosofía contemporánea, responden a esta pregunta desde la experiencia, sin fundamentarse en antiguos esquemas metafísicos. Sin embargo, Reid descubre, por inducción experiencial, que la voluntad es una causa metafísica eficiente, por lo cual puede completar el planteamiento de Taylor, quien evita hablar de causas de las acciones por su connotación contemporánea, diciendo que el inicio de las acciones estaría solo en razones y propósitos.Palabras claves: agente; evento; razón; volición; eficiencia. (shrink)

En la tradición ilustrada de Kant y en la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino encontramos los mismos elementos para explicar la experiencia moral: razón práctica del hombre común, ley moral, voluntad, inclinaciones naturales. Pero la relación de estos elementos entre sí varía radicalmente de una tradición a otra, ya que en la tradición kantiana la razón práctica y la ley moral son completamente heterogéneas respecto a las inclinaciones naturales. En la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino, en cambio, la (...) razón práctica que conoce la ley moral es parte de la naturaleza del hombre. En la tradición kantiana la ética se encuentra completamente separada de la antropología, y no se conoce a partir de la experiencia. En la tradición aristotélico-tomista, la ética se conoce a partir de la experiencia y su conocimiento es explicable a partir de ella. Both Kant’s Enlightenment tradition and Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition will usually manage the same elements in order to explain the reality of moral experience, namely: practical reason of the common man, moral law, will, and natural inclinations. Yet the relation existing between these elements certainly varies from one tradition to the other since, within Kantian tradition, practical reason and moral law are completely heterogeneous with regard to natural inclinations. On the contrary, within Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition, the same practical reason that recognizes the moral law is itself an element of human nature as well. Thus, according to Kantian tradition, ethics are totally detached from anthropology, and they are not grasped out of experience. Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition would state that ethics are grasped through experience and, although they are certainly not derived from anthropology, this later would make the grasping of the former explicable. (shrink)

RESUMEN Precisamente en momentos en que el determinismo humeano de la voluntad estaba comenzando a tener fuerza de tradición, surge Thomas Reid con una filosofía de la voluntad libre que tiene los rasgos principales de la tradición clásica anterior a Hume, medieval y tempranamente moderna. Su método inductivo, sin embargo, está tomado de Newton y del sentido común. Desde esta metodología ilustrada, Reid afirma que la voluntad es una facultad metafísica. Ha tenido influencia en la agent-cause theory, que se ha (...) opuesto a la event-cause theory en la teoría de la acción contemporánea, de allí su alto interés histórico. ABSTRACT Precisely, by the time in which humean's will determinism was beginning to have strength of tradition, Thomas Reid arises with a philosophy of free will that had the main features of the pre-Hume classic tradition, medieval and early modern. His inductive method, however, is taken from Newton and from common sense. Since this illustrated methodology, Reid states that will is a metaphysical faculty. It has had influence in agent-cause theory, which has opposed to event-cause theory in contemporary action theory, thence its high historical interest. (shrink)

Some interpreters associate Smith with the Stoics. My aim in this paper is to discuss this position in relation with one principal aspect of this view, adopted by most of these authors, according to which the Smith’s concept of self-love is narrowly linked to the Stoic notion of oikeiosis. I intend here to demonstrate that Smithian self-love, as seen through the lens of the Stoics themselves, is instead supportive of an Epicurean interpretation of Smith, taken from Mandeville, in spite of (...) his Stoic narrative and his apparent rejection of the system of the author of the Fable of Bees. So it is possible to classify Smith as a ‘voluntarist’ in contrast to the ‘realism’ predominant in his time. (shrink)

El concepto de autonomía moral ilustrado, que persiste en nuestros días, ha considerado a la obediencia como una conducta ciega e irracional, olvidando el carácter virtuoso que tuvo en el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino, que asume el de Aristóteles. En este artículo se discute esa concepción ilustrada, demostrando el carácter racional de dicha virtud, que ha sido a rmado por destacados autores contemporáneos, tales como Gadamer, Weil y Bochenski, como también por aquellos que en nuestra época reconocen la necesidad (...) del binomio autoridad– obediencia para el desarrollo del autogobierno de la persona, tales como MacIntyre, o por Murdoch quien se re ere a las virtudes que lo facilitan. (shrink)

I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...) ascription at the sub-personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub-personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub-personal level of brain mechanism nor present in 'sub-persons', e.g. some, if not all, non-human animals. (shrink)

Este artigo busca desenvolver a ideia de pop’filosofia, noção presente em Deleuze, como base para uma pop’educação. Buscaremos ferramentas de leitura presentes em Deleuze, Espinosa, Nietzsche, Paulo Freire e Manoel de Barros para com elas tematizarmos as relações de ensino e aprendizado a partir do cinema.

O trabalho apresenta os resultados de um estudo realizado em torno do tema da qualidade nas políticas educacionais para a educação básica. Destaca o significado do termo em documentos exarados pelo MEC nesta primeira década de século e o compara com os resultados educacionais alcançados por um conjunto de municípios catarinenses no tocante às suas metas de qualidade. Realça que o cenário desafiador que se impõe aos municípios pesquisados traduz-se tanto no encargo pelo alcance das metas nacionais do IDEB, diretamente (...) implicado na melhoria do desempenho dos estudantes na Prova Brasil, quanto na devida atenção a outros referenciais orientadores das ações voltadas à construção da qualidade social da educação, dentre eles projeto político-pedagógico e as diferenças sociais. Conclui apontando a necessidade de acompanhamento atendo das condições que consubstanciariam a qualidade social almejada, em um contexto de crescente tendência ao uso de informações majoritariamente quantitativas na formulação de políticas educacionais. (shrink)

I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub‐personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub‐personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...) ascription at the sub‐personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub‐personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub‐personal level of brain mechanism nor present in ‘sub‐persons’, e.g. some, if not all, non‐human animals. (shrink)

Confucianism has been historically intertwined with authoritarianism in general and monarchy in specific. Various contemporary attempts to reconcile Confucianism with democracy have yielded controversial results mostly due to the theoretical tension between the authoritarian character of the former and the liberal one of the latter. This article seeks to develop an alternative route to Confucian democracy by drawing from Huang Zongxi’s 黃宗羲 Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. In this well-known work, Huang argues for a form of (...) limited government that is built upon laws, political protection of academic freedom, good institutional designs, and separation of governmental powers. While these features seem to qualify Huang only as a defective liberal, this article argues that they are in much coherence with the insights of republicanism concerning good governance. This article will argue that the republican themes embodied in Waiting for the Dawn can justify and support a particular form of Confucian republican democracy. (shrink)

The following article evaluates two common arguments for preterist interpretations of Mark 13:24-27, collectively dubbed the ‘time-text’ argument. These two arguments support symbolic and/or historicised interpretations. Our thesis is that the first argument is unsound and the second commits the informal fallacy of false dilemma. Owing to these problems, the arguments and preterist interpretations should be rejected in favour of more plausible futurist interpretations.

Razón, poesía, historia.--La cuestión del estoicismo español.--El querer.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Shakespeare’s Troilus and CressidaW. R. EltonIn Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida there occurs a particular pattern of parallels with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics regarding ethical-legal questions surrounding an action: issues of the role of the voluntary or the involuntary, of volition and choice, of choice and virtue, and of virtue and habitual action. 1Aristotle’s EN was familiar to Elizabethan higher education and was reprinted in translation in (...) numerous editions, with commentaries, in the sixteenth century. 2 Twice Shakespeare alludes to Aristotle by name: first, recalling his ethics, in Taming of the Shrew (I.i.32)—cf. I.i.18–20 on [End Page 331]Virtue and that part of philosophy... that treats of happiness By virtue specially to be achiev’d,and second, in Troilus (II.ii.166–67) on Aristotle and “moral philosophy.” 3Opening EN, III, Aristotle distinguishes those actions that are “voluntary” from those that are “involuntary,” remarking the necessity to determine their limits. Such a course, he adds, is “useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments” (1109 b 32–34). What Aristotle examines, in effect, is the procedure of determining culpability for an act. 4Under what circumstances and to what extent is one responsible for his action? In addition to the voluntary and the involuntary, there are such act-related dualisms as volition and choice, choice and virtue, and virtue and habitual practice. Such ethical-legal issues are appropriate to a play whose war-plot turns on an abductor’s culpability for an action and the subsequent issue of prescriptive possession—the Grecian claim to Helen against her Trojan possessors. 5The VoluntaryIn Troilus Aristotle’s voluntary-involuntary distinctions seem exemplified. 6 A passage (I.iii.354–56), previously glossed by the present writer, suggests a [End Page 332] parallel EN instance of the voluntary. 7 Aristotle defines the voluntary as “that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself “ (1111 a 23–24). In Troilus Nestor, recalling the agent’s responsibility for acts, explains:Limbes are in his instruments, In no lesse working, then are Swords and Bowes Directiue by the Limbes(I.iii.368–70).These lines occur in Troilus, Folio (1623), and are omitted, along with other relatively specialized lines, from Quarto (1609): 8 according to Aristotle, “the movement of the limbs instrumental to the action originates in the agent himself, and when this is so it is in a man’s own power to act or not to act.” 9 Where EN has “limbs... are the instruments,” F Troilus has “Limbes are in his instruments” (cf. Walker ed., I.iii.354).Limbs are instruments of the agent’s responsibility, as are the swords and bows employed by those limbs. Such a passage in Troilus on the responsibility and voluntariness of acts could have been recognizable to an academic (especially legal) audience and, as rehearsed by the ancient Nestor, might have drawn reminiscent response.The InvoluntaryIf Nestor (I.iii.354–56) had been voice of the voluntary, the combat-withdrawn Achilles is arbitrator of the involuntary. Responding to Thersites’ “I serve here voluntary,” Achilles adjudicates, “Your last service was sufferance, ‘twas not voluntary. No man is beaten voluntary. Ajax was here the voluntary, and you as under an impress” (II.i.94–97). Mocking Thersites’s “service,” including being beaten, Achilles argues this could not be “voluntary.” His “no man is beaten voluntary” echoes Aristotle’s own familiar terms, denying that a man can be wronged or injured voluntarily. In his commentary on EN John Case [End Page 333] gives the assurance that “No one voluntarily suffers injury..., no one voluntarily and maliciously harms himself: therefore no one willingly suffers injury.” 10In such instances as those above, Troilus (II.i.94–97) recalls basic legal procedure, including determination of the degree of responsibility for an action. What is the minimum requirement of the law before a man can be held accountable? “Those things... are thought involuntary,” says Aristotle, “which take place under compulsion... and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle... (shrink)

A major obstacle to the political revival of Confucianism has been its tension with the rule of law. Systemic features of Confucianism such as social hierarchy (and the corresponding social inequal...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PEIRGE'S MARGINALIA IN W. T. HARRIS' Hegel's Logic Among the most eminent philosophers of nineteenth-century America were William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) and Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914 ). The former, by his establishment in 1867 of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, furnished a starting point for American philosophical maturity. The latter, who contributed to that iournal, has been considered America's greatest logician. It may therefore be (...) of interest to examine Peirce's marginalia in the first edition of Harris' chief work, Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1890). Discovered by the present writer on a New York book-stall, in a cheaply priced, coverless, and water-stained copy, and now in his possession, it bears imprinted on the reverse of the title page: "Harvard University: Philos. Dept. Library. Gift of Mrs. Charles S. Peirce. June 28, 1915." Shortly after Peirce, in depressed circumstances, died on April 19, 1914, the Harvard Philosophy Department acquired from his wife the manuscripts that were published in the Collected Papers.1 Harris' Hegel's Logic, which presumably accompanied that transaction, contains several marginal annotations, mostly in faded ink, in a neat, small hand, similar to that reproduced in the frontispiece to Volume IV of Peirce's Collected Papers. Recalling a notable philosophical conjunction, the markings also reveal aspects of Peirce's character and confirm his complex attitude toward Hegel, crucial to the development of his philosophy. Peirce's shifting view and persistent concern regarding Hegel may be traced in some other remarks. For example, in a letter to Harris dated January 1, 1868, he says, "I admit there is music in the logic of Hegel, but that is all I discover there. ''2 In another letter to Harris, dated May 13, 1868, he indicates his ambivalence: "But as I should draw the line... I should come on the same side as Hegel, because I am idealistic. I do not 1eel very much opposed to Hegel, though I think his main point.s tin his own estimate of importance) are wrong. ''s About 1890, Peirce declared, "I reiect his philosophy in toto, ''~ and about 1896, he accused Hegel of reaching "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next!'-5 Yet, in 1903, he acclaimed Hegel "in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived. ''6 And, in the very same year, reviewing another treatment of Hegel's logic, and including a reference to Harris' t Eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss,and Arthur Burks (Vols.I-VIII; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). 2,.C.S. Peirce to W. T. Harris." ed. WallaceNethery, The Personalist,XLIII (19fi2),37. I am indebted to Dr. Nethery for his kindness in letting me see these letters in advanceof publication. sIbid.,40. 4Collected Papers,I, 193. 5 Ibid., I, 246. eIbid., I, 277. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 83 treatise, Peirce flatly remarks: "But all these Hegelians--Harris, XVallace, Hibben, Everett, etc.--who dog the steps of their master in almost textual comments, are profoundly unfaithful to the spirit of his philosophy... the Logik now condemns itself. ''7 A constant feature in Peirce's negative attitude toward Hegel concerns the latter's failure to equip himself scientifically to deal with a subject the American considered basically scientific. For instance, about 1899, Peirce writes: Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism~ a misfortune for "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science: Although Peirce adds, "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume, ''9 and his dialectic parallels Hegel's, he attempts to escape the Hegelian subjectivism by an "objective logic" and by avoiding Hegel's supposed mathematical ignorance. "Most of what is true in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PEIRGE'S MARGINALIA IN W. T. HARRIS' Hegel's Logic Among the most eminent philosophers of nineteenth-century America were William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) and Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914 ). The former, by his establishment in 1867 of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, furnished a starting point for American philosophical maturity. The latter, who contributed to that iournal, has been considered America's greatest logician. It may therefore be (...) of interest to examine Peirce's marginalia in the first edition of Harris' chief work, Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1890). Discovered by the present writer on a New York book-stall, in a cheaply priced, coverless, and water-stained copy, and now in his possession, it bears imprinted on the reverse of the title page: "Harvard University: Philos. Dept. Library. Gift of Mrs. Charles S. Peirce. June 28, 1915." Shortly after Peirce, in depressed circumstances, died on April 19, 1914, the Harvard Philosophy Department acquired from his wife the manuscripts that were published in the Collected Papers.1 Harris' Hegel's Logic, which presumably accompanied that transaction, contains several marginal annotations, mostly in faded ink, in a neat, small hand, similar to that reproduced in the frontispiece to Volume IV of Peirce's Collected Papers. Recalling a notable philosophical conjunction, the markings also reveal aspects of Peirce's character and confirm his complex attitude toward Hegel, crucial to the development of his philosophy. Peirce's shifting view and persistent concern regarding Hegel may be traced in some other remarks. For example, in a letter to Harris dated January 1, 1868, he says, "I admit there is music in the logic of Hegel, but that is all I discover there. ''2 In another letter to Harris, dated May 13, 1868, he indicates his ambivalence: "But as I should draw the line... I should come on the same side as Hegel, because I am idealistic. I do not 1eel very much opposed to Hegel, though I think his main point.s tin his own estimate of importance) are wrong. ''s About 1890, Peirce declared, "I reiect his philosophy in toto, ''~ and about 1896, he accused Hegel of reaching "each category from the last preceding by virtually calling 'next!'-5 Yet, in 1903, he acclaimed Hegel "in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived. ''6 And, in the very same year, reviewing another treatment of Hegel's logic, and including a reference to Harris' t Eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss,and Arthur Burks (Vols.I-VIII; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). 2,.C.S. Peirce to W. T. Harris." ed. WallaceNethery, The Personalist,XLIII (19fi2),37. I am indebted to Dr. Nethery for his kindness in letting me see these letters in advanceof publication. sIbid.,40. 4Collected Papers,I, 193. 5 Ibid., I, 246. eIbid., I, 277. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 83 treatise, Peirce flatly remarks: "But all these Hegelians--Harris, XVallace, Hibben, Everett, etc.--who dog the steps of their master in almost textual comments, are profoundly unfaithful to the spirit of his philosophy... the Logik now condemns itself. ''7 A constant feature in Peirce's negative attitude toward Hegel concerns the latter's failure to equip himself scientifically to deal with a subject the American considered basically scientific. For instance, about 1899, Peirce writes: Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism~ a misfortune for "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science: Although Peirce adds, "My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume, ''9 and his dialectic parallels Hegel's, he attempts to escape the Hegelian subjectivism by an "objective logic" and by avoiding Hegel's supposed mathematical ignorance. "Most of what is true in... (shrink)

Dibujar el pensamiento de Seneca es dibujar su figura viva, trazar el esquema de su persona. Seneca es un mediador que para alzarse sobre nosotros necesita de nuestra necesidad, pues solo apoyado en nuestra indigencia tiene sentido. Maria Zambrano lleva a cabo un lucido estudio de la figura y significacion del pensador cordobes y presenta una seleccion de sus escritos.

Spectroscopy is a scientific topic at the interface between Chemistry and Physics, which is taught at high school level in relation with its fundamental applications in Analytical Chemistry. In the first part of the paper, the topic of spectroscopy is analyzed having in mind the well-known Johnstone’s triangle of chemistry education, putting in evidence the way spectroscopy is usually taught at the three levels of chemical knowledge: macroscopic/phenomenological, sub-microscopic/molecular and symbolic ones. Among these three levels, following Johnstone’s recommendations the macroscopic (...) one is the most useful for high school students who learn spectroscopy for the first time. Starting from these premises, in the second part of the paper, we propose a didactic sequence which is inspired by the historical evolution of spectroscopic instruments from the first spectroscopes invented by Gustav Kirchhoff and Robert Bunsen in 1860 to the UV–vis spectrophotometers which became common since the 1960s. The idea behind our research is to analyze the conceptual advancements through the history of spectroscopy and to identify the key episodes/experiments and spectroscopic instruments. For each of them, a didactic activity, typically an experiment, is then proposed underlining the relevant aspects from the chemistry education point of view. The present paper is the occasion to reflect on the potentialities of an historical approach combined with a laboratorial one, and to discuss the role of historical instruments and related technological improvements to teach spectroscopy. (shrink)

Imagine a student reading Odysseus’ Cretan tale at Odyssey 19.172–84. When faced by a string of unfamiliar names – in addition to ‘native Cretans’, there are Achaeans, Cydonians and Dorians, as well as the individuals Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus and the speaker, Aethon (Odysseus in disguise) –, they use their digital edition to find out more about each of these people and their places of origin. A personal name opens an online encyclopaedia entry, while clicking on a place launches an emerging (...) world beyond the single text – an online atlas that provides information about the place's toponymy, form and exact location as well as links to other resources (textual and archaeological, ancient and modern) about this place, including those to which our student has contributed. The year? 2023 (Figure 1).1. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that the argument for fatalism based on the relativity of simultaneity fails. The original proponents of the argument called the thesis in terms of ‘determinism’, but Levin refers to it as ‘relativistic fatalism’. Relativistic fatalism is a view supported by the alleged dependence of the property of being future on an arbitrary choice of some coordinate system. First I will try to explain the classic argument, attributed to it a dialectic that justified to call (...) it in the same terms as Levin did. Subsequently, I will refuse the relativistic fatalism using many strategies to deal with it. (shrink)