The paper deals with the art of cross-examination or probe (peirastiké) wich is, according to Aristotle, a part of dialectic and aims at revealing falle pretensions to knowledge. A detailed discussion of the relevant passages from the Sophistical Refutations shows that "peirastic" argumenta were not easily distinguishablc forro the arguments used by the sophists against the scientists in order to undermine their reputation. It is also shows that the difficulty of telling dialectic from sophistry is a theme Aristotle inherits frorn (...) Plato's Sophist. (shrink)

In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a fallacious argument.

The paper examines Posterior Analytics II 11, 94a20-36 and makes three points. (1) The confusing formula ‘given what things, is it necessary for this to be’ [τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι] at a21-22 introduces material cause, not syllogistic necessity. (2) When biological material necessitation is the only causal factor, Aristotle is reluctant to formalize it in syllogistic terms, and this helps to explain why, in II 11, he turns to geometry in order to illustrate a kind of material cause that (...) can be expressed as the middle term of an explanatory syllogism. (3) If geometrical proof is viewed as a complex construction built on simpler constructions, it can in effect be described as a case of purely material constitution. (shrink)

The list of katēgoriai presented at the start of Top. I 9 was traditionally interpreted as a version of the canonical Aristotelian list of categories, and as largely equivalent to the list we find in Categories 4. Accordingly, its first item, the ‘what it is’, was identified with the category of substance. This interpretation has been challenged by several scholars, all sharing the view that the ‘what it is’ in Top. I 9 cannot be substance, since it collects items belonging (...) to all Aristotelian categories (e. g. human being, colour, length). Rather, they say, it is a manner of predication – i. e. essential predication – and can only determine an ontologically miscellaneous class of items. Against this family of proposals, I argue afresh that the traditional interpretation is almost entirely correct. To this purpose, I take advantage of the distinction between kinds of predicate and kinds of predication. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper (...) maintains that Aristotle resorts to this distinction because he thinks that, as long as it is conceived as a factual relation, logical consequence cannot exist independently of the facts expressed by the premisses and the conclusion. As a corollary, the necessity of such a consequence relation always requires the necessity of these facts. Aristotle holds this factual conception of logical consequence responsible for the puzzle, since it cannot account for valid syllogisms with contingent or false premisses. The alternative conception of necessity is then introduced by him in order to make good this deficiency. The distinction between the necessity of being and the necessity of saying was revived by the Oxford logician E. W. B. Joseph, and taken over by Frank Ramsey in his seminal Truth and Probability, but has not received attention from recent interpreters of Aristotle's logic. This paper, however, argues that, in spite of its intrinsic interest, the distinction bore no significant fruit in Aristotle's logical doctrine. (shrink)

Aristotle's Organon received sedulous attention throughout late antiquity. This is reflected in the surviving corpus of commentaries written, in different exegetical and didactic styles, by peripatetic and Platonic authors. Does this collection constitute a single tradition? Beatrix Freibert is confident that the answer to this difficult question is yes, and sets out to explain the differences and vindicate the connectedness of what she takes to be a unified intellectual construction. She insists that, despite the many peculiarities, all commentators participate in (...) a progressive effort to discern the purpose of the Organon, and, with its purpose, understand its unity and achieve some fundamental exegetical... (shrink)

Review of Jonathan Barnes, Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Les réfutations sophistiques ont joui, au cours du Moyen Âge, d’une considération peut-être même supérieure à leurs mérites, mais par un juste retour des choses, elles ont été presque complètement négligées pendant l’époque contemporaine. Cet ouvrage — dont l’analyse avait été plus l’occupation préliminaire des médiévistes que l’intérêt central des aristotélisants — est maintenant l’objet d’une excellente étude par Louis-André Dorion, une étude qui réintroduit cet ouvrage «dans le courant de la recherche», fournissant une introduction tant historique que systématique, une (...) traduction fidèle et lisible à la fois et un commentaire constitué de quatre cent quatre-vingtune notes qui abordent des problèmes philosophiques, linguistiques, logiques et philologiques avec une compétence admirable. L’introduction traite de plusieurs questions qui nécessitaient une mise au point: l’origine et la signification du titre, la place originale des RS parmi les œuvres logiques d’Aristote, la chronologie, le contexte historique et culturel, la division du texte des RS, les problèmes liés à la taxinomie des paralogismes, les dettes d’Aristote à l’égard de Platon, etc. (shrink)

L'objet principal de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intituléRéfutations sophistiquesest la théorie de la réfutation apparente, c'est-à-dire de l'argumentation qui, se développant dans le cadre d'un échange dialectique, masque quelque erreur. Aristote propose une taxinomie des réfutations apparentes d'après laquelle elles se rangent en deux groupes: celles qui relèvent du langage et celles qui n'en relèvent pas. Dans le premier groupe tombent six types de réfutation, l'homonymie, l'amphibolie, la liaison, la séparation, la forme de l'expression et l'accent; dans le deuxième l'accident, la conséquence, (...) l'ignorance de la réfutation, la fausse cause, l'interrogation multiple, la pétition de principe et la confusion de l'absolu et du relatif. Il s'agit de la fameuse table des treize paralogismes oufallaciœque la tradition a consacrée. Dans le cadre de ces treize types de sophisme le texte d'Aristote nous offre la discussion de maints exemples parmi lesquels certains étonnent pour leur difficulté, d'autres pour leur trivialité. (shrink)

Le traité aristotélicien intitulé Les réfutations sophistiques (RS), un ouvrage indépendant mais rangé comme dernier livre des Topiques, classifie les argumentations trompeuses et discute leur « résolution », c’est-à-dire l’explication de l’erreur qu’elles cachent. Il s’agit d’un travail encore peu étudié en dépit des intéressants aperçus qu’il fournit sur la philosophie du langage et de la logique d’Aristote. Le volume de Myriam Hecquet nous offre une nouvelle édition critique, avec introduc...

Ancient Philosophy Today, Volume 3, Issue 1, Page 126-132, April, 2021.

This Companion provides a comprehensive guide to ancient logic. The first part charts its chronological development, focussing especially on the Greek tradition, and discusses its two main systems: Aristotle's logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. The second part explores the key concepts at the heart of the ancient logical systems: truth, definition, terms, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, modality and fallacy. The systematic discussion of these concepts allows the reader to engage with some specific logical and exegetical issues and (...) to appreciate their transformations across different philosophical traditions. The intersections between logic, mathematics and rhetoric are also explored. The third part of the volume discusses the reception and influence of ancient logic in the history of philosophy and its significance for philosophy in our own times. Comprehensive coverage, chapters by leading international scholars and a critical overview of the recent literature in the field will make this volume essential for students and scholars of ancient logic. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive introduction to the two great logical systems of antiquity, Aristotelian logic and Stoic logic. Although advanced undergraduate and graduate students are the intended primary readership, classical and philosophy scholars with non-specialist interests in the subject will find the fresh approach useful and stimulating. A conscious effort has been made to create a fruitful dialogue between the Aristotelian and Stoic systems both in terms of theoretical content and in terms of methodological issues and approaches. In all sections (...) emphasis is placed on broader questions concerning the distinctive nature of ancient logic, its relation with modern logic and the study of the history of logic, and the methodological difficulties posed by the reconstruction, analysis and assessment of ancient views, both in themselves and in the light of modern logic. (shrink)

Le but de cet ouvrage est de montrer la teneur philosophique unitaire de la pensée critique de Diderot par delà le caractère éclaté et dispersé de son œuvre. Diderot philosophe est présenté comme un penseur critique et systématique, c'est-à-dire un philosophe dont la réflexion, d'une part, s'inscrit dans le cadre du courant de pensée moderne qui vise à dépasser les perspectives du « premier regard géomètre de la raison », celui de Descartes, de Malebranche et des post-cartésiens. D'autre part, elle (...) atteint un « second regard critique », plus profond, jeté sur le monde de la nature et surtout, sur lui-même (une philosophie de l'aperception : Spinoza, Wolff, les Moralistes anglais et Kant), qui se rattache intimement à un matérialisme biologique tout à fait original, issu de la confrontation de Diderot avec les naturalistes et les médecins de son temps. C'est ce matérialisme élaboré dans l'usine encyclopédique qui met en cause la notion clé d'« individualité naturelle » (jouée en couplet avec une « communauté du désir ») - néologisme dont Le Neveu de Rameau et Le Rêve de D'Alembert développeront les tenants et les aboutissants philosophiques -, et qui témoigne de la nouveauté d'approche propre à cette philosophie, à l'intérieur de la pensée des Lumières européennes. Avec Diderot, c'est une nouvelle figure historique de la philosophie elle-même - celle de la subjectivité individuelle complexe, uni-totalité de penser-sentir-agir - qui monte sur la scène de la modernité, comme étant la substance première, incontournable et insaisissable, de la pensée critique de nos jours. (shrink)

In correspondence with Mersenne in 1629, Descartes discusses a construction involving a cylinder and what Descartes calls a “helice.” Mancosu has argued that by “helice” Descartes was referring to a cylindrical helix. The editors of Mersenne’s correspondence (Vol. II), and Henk Bos, have independently argued that, on the con- trary, by “helice” Descartes was referring to the Archimedean spiral. We argue that identifying the helice with the cylindrical helix makes better sense of the text. In the process we take a (...) careful look at constructions of the cylindrical helix available to Descartes and relate them to his criteria for excluding mechanical curves from geometry. Résumé Dans sa correspondance avec Mersenne en 1629, Descartes discute d’une construction qui fait intervenir un cylindre et ce que Descartes appelle une “hélice”. Mancosu a argumenté que Descartes faisait référence à une hélice cylindrique. Les éditeurs de la Correspondance de Mersenne (vol. 2), et Henk Bos, ont indépendamment affirmé que, au contraire, par “hélice” Descartes faisait référence à la spirale d’Archimède. Nous affirmons qu’identifier l’hélice avec l’hélice cylindrique est plus cohérent avec le texte. Dans le même temps nous examinons soigneusement les constructions de l’hélice cylindrique que Descartes avait à disposition et nous les mettons en relation avec son critère d’exclusion des courbes mécaniques de la géométrie. (shrink)

Antoine Arnauld, dit le Grand Arnauld, théologien janséniste, grammairien et logicien, a bien servi la philosophie : interlocuteur de Descartes ; correspondant de Leibniz, éditeur des Pensées de Pascal, il est l'un de ceux qui ont le plus contribué à légitimer le cartésianisme. Foucault et Chomsky se sont intéressés à sa Logique ou art de penser et à sa Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port Royal, nées de la controverse qui a opposé Jansénistes, jésuites et Curie romaine au XVIIe siècle. (...) Sa théorie des idées, construite en opposition à celle de Malebranche, constitue une étape importante dans la constitution du problème de l'idéalité - qui trouvera son aboutissement chez Kant. Plusieurs raisons, par conséquent, de revenir sur une œuvre méconnue. On commence par rappeler le contexte dans lequel le jansénisme est né ; on situe ensuite Arnauld relativement à Descartes, au cartésianisme et à la philosophie en général ; on précise sa doctrine, principalement sa conception de l'homme déchu ; on détaille également sa morale. Après quoi, on restitue les grands thèmes de sa Logique et de sa Grammaire. On examine enfin la théorie des idées d'Arnauld et on fait le point sur son retour dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

La contribution s’articule en trois sections. Dans la première on esquisse une reconstruction panoramique du profil global de la « pensée nouvelle » rosenzweigienne. Cette dernière s’avère être marquée par l’intrigue indénouable de deux éléments constitutifs, c’est‑à-dire, l’élément spéculatif et l’élément événementiel. Dans la deuxième section on montre comme Rosenzweig pense cette intrigue selon le chiffre emblématique de la compréhension biblique du miracle, qui articule ce dernier dans les deux moments synergiques de la prophétie et de l’ accomplissement. La « (...) pensée nouvelle » se déploie en effet en une sorte de prophétie purement spéculative, qui trouve toutefois son accomplissement dans l’ événement d’une révélation, qui tranche décidément sur la spéculation, tout en y trouvant son incontournable ancrage rationnel. Dans la troisième section on montre que cet événement de révélation connaît sa figure primordiale, selon le penseur, dans la langue parlée quotidiennement par les hommes, comprise comme le cadeau matinal que le Créateur fait à ses créatures. (shrink)

Automne 1876: Nietzsche, jeune professeur de philologie à Bâle, brillant élève de Ritschl, part pour Sorrente, invité par son amie Malwida von Meysenbug. C'est son premier voyage dans le Sud : une découverte qui va changer sa vie et le cours de sa philosophie. C'en est fini des tentatives de renouveler la culture allemande au nom de la cause wagnérienne ; l'auteur de La Naissance de la tragédie (1872) commence sa mue. Paolo D'Iorio dresse la carte de cette métamorphose (...) : lectures et discussions, promenades, explorations des environs avec son ami Paul Rée et l'étudiant Albert Brenner ; il fait revivre cette sociabilité joyeuse et confiante qui fertilise l'élan créateur de Nietzsche. C'est à Sorrente que Nietzsche entreprend la rédaction de Choses humaines, trop humaines, dédié à Voltaire. Cette oeuvre, la première sous forme d'aphorismes, inaugure sa philosophie de la maturité. La rupture avec Wagner qu'il verra alors pour la dernière fois, est intellectuellement consommée bien qu'encore cachée. A la suite de ce voyage, Nietzsche abandonnera sa chaire bâloise et entamera une existence de philosophe sous le signe du Midi entre la Suisse, la France et l'Italie. (shrink)

Le problème du temps chez Michel Henry n’a pas encore fait l’objet d’une étude séparée. Le rejet abrupt de cette question chez l’auteur n’a certainement pas favorisé l’intérêt des critiques pour ce sujet. Dans un premier temps, en 1963 dans L’Essence de la manifestation , Michel Henry considère le problème du temps (à travers le filtre du Kantbuch de Heidegger) comme étant le « même » que celui de la récepti­vité, soit en le renvoyant à l’auto-affection. Celle-ci étant comprise (...) comme opposée ou, mieux encore, comme « étrangère » au kantisme, en tant qu’elle est affection pathétique de soi à soi. Puis, en 2000, dans Incarnation , Michel Henry conteste au « flux temporel » des Leçons pour une conscience intime du temps de Husserl la volonté néantisante du moment présent, tout en l’utilisant subrepticement dans des moments clés de son argumentation ; il lui oppose le sens de l’ « apparaître » s’auto-fondant. Enfin, nous proposons de reprendre les concepts henryens d’ « effort » et de « pouvoir-toucher », présents dans la deuxième partie d’ Incarnation , pour penser une « origine de l’espacement » préalable à la pensée de la tempora­lité ek-statique comme à celle de l’espace. (shrink)

La philosophie contemporaine et la phénoménologie du corps, en visant à rendre le corps plus multiple, plus habité par l'altérité y compris technique (J. Derrida, J.-L. Nancy), ont fait évoluer profondément le problème du lien entre "l'âme" et le corps ; et cela au-delà des contours de la problématique marquée par les recherches cognitives du XXe siècle, qui ont pourtant donné une accélération remarquable à l'étude des rapports entre le cerveau et la machine corporelle. Ces perspectives ont introduit dans (...) le cadre de l'ancien débat, d'origine cartésienne, des variantes liées surtout à l'art, l'écriture et la pensée environnementale. L'Orient et l'Occident se retrouvent ainsi confrontés à un corps aux multiples "décors", qui le spécifient, l'entourent, l'enrichissent, etc. Le Mind Body Problem d'ordre simplement épistémologique, suivant la tradition jusqu'à la seconde moitié du siècle dernier, s'est changé en problème culturel, cognitif, écologique qui récupère de façon critique la notion générale de "vie", de "contexte phénoménologique de vie", d'existence également. Ce volume, issu d'un Colloque organisé par le Collège International de Philosophie, a voulu reconsidérer les tenants et aboutissants de ce changement, pour le développement d'une perspective de philosophie du corps impliquant une multitude d'intersections trans-et multidisciplinaires et trans- et multiculturelles : entre esthétique, arts du spectacle, phénoménologie, écologie, histoire de l'art et de la pensée de l'art, pensée orientale, nouvelles sciences cognitives, Cultural Studies. (shrink)

Recent crises in Europe and beyond have renewed a longstanding debate on the status and treatment of refugees. Hannah Arendt famously questioned the limits of universalistic human rights discourse based on the widespread phenomena of statelessness and displacement that emerged during and after World War II. In this paper, we analyze recent patterns of inclusion and exclusion of refugees in Italy through the lens of Arendtian narrative and theorizing. We consider three cases of interaction between families, schools, and other public (...) institutions in light of the shifting normative framework before and during the war in Ukraine. Two major insights emerge from this analysis. From a pedagogical point of view, the most promising educational practices with refugees are those centered on enabling their agency and corresponding experiences of "natality". From an ethical-political perspective, these practices highlight a latent tension between the universalistic scope of human rights enshrined in the human rights declarations and their structural dependence on the particular norms and procedures enacted by nation states. The understanding and teaching of human rights within our political communities is inseparable from the practices that engage with refugees. In this sense, our practices of inclusion and exclusion affect the understanding of national borders as a barrier or threshold with other political communities, but also the interpretation of our own ethical-political principles. (shrink)

La rhétorique de Valesio se présente comme une théorie globale des discours. Fondé sur la linguistique tout en s'efforçant de la dépasser, se réclamant d'un point de vue matérialiste tout en récusant le matérialisme comme idéologie, prônant la résurgence de la pensée sceptique tout en intégrant a sa démarche une documentation très fouillée, suggérant une réévaluation de la pensée des Sophistes tout en dénonçant les tours de passe-passe et les facilités invérifiables de certains philosophes contemporains, -cet ouvrage stimulant fait (...) de la rhétorique une inspiration pour l'analyse sémiologique des discours. (shrink)

In a recent article, I have explored the historical, mathematical, and philosophical issues related to the new theory of numerosities. The theory of numerosities provides a context in which to assign numerosities to infinite sets of natural numbers in such a way as to preserve the part-whole principle, namely if a set A is properly included in B then the numerosity of A is strictly less than the numerosity of B. Numerosities assignments differ from the standard assignment of size provided (...) by Cantor’s cardinality assignments. In this talk, I generalize some specific worries emerging from the theory of numerosities to a line of thought resulting in what I call a ‘good company’ objection to Hume’s Principle (HP). The talk has four main parts. The first takes a historical look at 19th-century attributions of equality of numbers in terms of one-one correlations and argues that there was no agreement as to how to extend such determinations to infinite sets of objects. This leads to the second part where I show that there are countably infinite many abstraction principles that are ‘good’, in the sense that they share the same virtues of HP and from which we can derive the axioms of second order arithmetic. The third part connects this material to a debate on Finite Hume Principle between Heck and MacBride and states the ‘good company’ objection. Finally, the last part gives a tentative taxonomy of possible neo-logicist responses to the ‘good company’ objection and makes a foray into the relevance of this material for the issue of cross-sortal identifications for abstractions. (shrink)

From Brouwer To Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920s offers the first comprehensive introduction to the most exciting period in the foundation of mathematics in the twentieth century. The 1920s witnessed the seminal foundational work of Hilbert and Bernays in proof theory, Brouwer's refinement of intuitionistic mathematics, and Weyl's predicativist approach to the foundations of analysis. This impressive collection makes available the first English translations of twenty-five central articles by these important contributors and many others. (...) The articles have been translated for the first time from Dutch, French, and German, and the volume is divided into four sections devoted to Brouwer, Weyl, Bernays and Hilbert, and the emergence of intuitionistic logic. Each section opens with an introduction which provides the necessary historical and technical context for understanding the articles. Although most contemporary work in this field takes its start from the groundbreaking contributions of these major figures, a good, scholarly introduction to the area was not available until now. Unique and accessible, From Brouwer To Hilbert will serve as an ideal text for undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mathematics, and will also be an invaluable resource for philosophers, mathematicians, and interested non-specialists. (shrink)

In this article, I draw upon the ‘post-Kantian’ reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has on his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s ‘recognition-theoretic’ approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. First, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion employs a distinctive notion of sacrifice (kenotic sacrifice). Here, sacrifice is conceived as a giving up something of oneself to ‘make room’ for the (...) other. Second, I argue that the idea of kenotic sacrifice plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s account of Christ. Third, I conclude by sketching some of the consequences of Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that the notion of incarnation is conceived by Hegel as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to withdraw and make room for the other. A kenotic reading of the Hegelian notion of the incarnation is also useful in terms of a clarification of the dispute between ‘left Hegelians’ and ‘right Hegelians’ concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

In his third essay on earthquakes, Kant refers to “Pater Bina’s” electric interpretation of seismic phenomena. Although not a distinguished scholar, and maybe for that reason frequently confused with a certain “Father Isidore Binet”, Bina was nevertheless a noteworthy author. A Cassinese benedictine, Andrea Bina was a philosopher interested in sciences just like Kant; he studied Newton, translated Wolff, invented a seismoscope and was appreciated by his contemporaries at home and beyond the Alps. Kant’s laconic quotation, followed by a value (...) judgement regarding only Bina’s “audacity”, raises some questions, including, in primis those about the meaning of his hasty judgment. A plausible well-grounded answer should be looked for in the bio-bibliographical outline of the neglected author and in the perusal of his writings. The analysis of Bina’s Ragionamento sopra le cagioni de’ terremoti (1751) contributes to our knowledge of the eighteenth-century cultural background and helps us understand the degree of knowledge of the seismic phenomena acquired by men who – amidst many difficulties and hindered by the limits of their science – could only rely on secondhand data often imbued with misconceptions. Comparing Bina’s work – although indirectly – with Kant’s Fortgesetzte Betrachtung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erderschütterungen (1756) may help bring to light some convergences, as well as differences, which might be of use in clarifying some peculiarities of the Prussian Naturforscher. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

This paper investigates the link between informational consequence and credence. I first suggest a natural constraint, namely that informational consequence should preserve certainty: on any rational credence distribution, when the premises of an informational inferences have credence 1, the conclusion also has credence 1. Then I show that the certainty‐preserving constraint leads to triviality. In particular, the following three claims are incompatible: (i) informational consequence is extensionally distinct from classical consequence; (ii) informational inferences preserve certainty; (iii) credences obey (a subset (...) of) classical Bayesian constraints. The proof is straightforward, but the theoretical implications are substantial. Informational theorists need to either give up the idea that credence applies to epistemic discourse, or develop a nonclassical theory of credence and credal update. Moreover, the result also suggests that there is a connection between informational consequence and triviality results, including classical triviality results like Lewis's. (shrink)

The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. (...) But the options are not exclusive. This paper develops a theory of the semantics and assertability of conditionals that is both selectional and informational. The theory vindicates the signature inferences of both selectional and informational theories, including so-called Conditionals Excluded Middle and principles about the interplay between conditionals and ‘might’. It also predicts some interesting and puzzling facts about the assertion of conditionals. (shrink)

This article begins by examining the status of “difference” in representations of perspectivist cosmologies, which are themselves often represented as radically different to Euro-American cosmologi...

About a century ago, Ernst Mach argued that Archimedes’s deduction of the principle of the lever is invalid, since its premises contain the conclusion to be demonstrated. Subsequently, many scholars defended Archimedes, mostly on historical grounds, by raising objections to Mach’s reconstruction of Archimedes’s deduction. In the debate, the Italian philosopher and historian of science Giovanni Vailati stood out. Vailati responded to Mach with an analysis of Archimedes’s deduction which was later quoted and praised by Mach himself. In this paper, (...) my objective is to show that the debate can be further advanced, as Mach indicated, by reframing it in terms of the empirical vs. the logical dimensions of mechanics. In this way, I will suggest, the debate about Archimedes’s deduction can be resolved in Mach’s favour.Keywords: Equilibrium; Experience; Thought experiment; Archimedes; Ernst Mach; Giovanni Vailati. (shrink)

Natural language conditionals seem to be subject to three logical requirements: they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening, they validate so-called Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents, and they allow for the replacement of logically equivalent clauses in antecedent position. Unfortunately, these requirements are jointly inconsistent. Conservative solutions to the puzzle drop Simplification, treating it as a pragmatic inference. I show that pragmatic accounts of Simplification fail, and develop a truthmaker semantics for conditionals that captures all the relevant data. Differently from existing truthmaker semantics, my (...) semantics extends, rather than replaces, standard possible worlds semantics. The main innovation is the notion of a truthmaker in play: this notion is cognitive, rather than metaphysical, and can be defined in a purely syntactic way. (shrink)

Christ as symbol in Kant¿s religion -- Hegel's conception of God -- The reality of religion in Hegel's idealist metaphysics -- Hegel's version of the ontological argument for the existence of God -- The trinity and the I -- The death of God and recognition of the self -- Beyond subjectivism -- The relevance of Hegel's philosophy of religion today.

That words express a conceptual content is uncontroversial. This does not entail that their content should break down neatly into a grammatical part, relevant for language and to be analyzed in linguistic terms, and a conceptual part, relevant for cognition and to be analyzed in psychological terms. Various types of empirical evidence are reviewed, showing that the conceptual content of words cannot be isolated from their linguistic properties, because it is affected and shaped by them. The view of words as (...) labels or containers for a non-linguistic conceptual content stems from a naive disregard of the complex and structured nature of lexical knowledge. On the contrary, knowledge of language is shown not just to organize and categorize conceptual content in a way not reducible to non-linguistic cognition, but also to affect its scope, as the range of verbalized concepts is both limited by abstract templates and expanded by productive word formation. This suggests that lexical knowledge is a distinctively linguistic dimension of conceptualization, and that words do not so much label or package concepts, as provide an inner form for conceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Heinrich Behmann (1891-1970) obtained his Habilitation under David Hilbert in Göttingen in 1921 with a thesis on the decision problem. In his thesis, he solved - independently of Löwenheim and Skolem's earlier work - the decision problem for monadic second-order logic in a framework that combined elements of the algebra of logic and the newer axiomatic approach to logic then being developed in Göttingen. In a talk given in 1921, he outlined this solution, but also presented important programmatic remarks on (...) the significance of the decision problem and of decision procedures more generally. The text of this talk as well as a partial English translation are included. (shrink)