Although Arendt is usually read as a theorist of participatory democracy, her writings on judgment also offer a way of thinking about the role of citizens who do not actively participate, citizens who are more spectators than actors. The difficulties and ambiguities in her account of judgment especially, the elusiveness of standards of judgment arise from her effort to insure that individuals take full responsibility for their judgments.

Among the astonishing variety of sources mentioned in Martin Jay's new book on lying in politics the reader will find ancient Greek philosophical dialogues, pamphlet controversies between eighteenth-century philosophers, post-structural literary theories and, resting easily among the likes of these, a familiar old joke. “How can you tell when a politician is lying?” Jay asks. “He moves his lips” is the answer my grandfather used to give, and that is the punch-line that Jay recounts here. But my grandfather told the (...) joke as part of a syllogism whose unstated premise was “lying is bad” and whose common-sense conclusion was that politics is corrupt. Jay is not satisfied with that conclusion. His book, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics , puts forward a very different argument: He assumes that politics is worthwhile, suggests that it is unavoidably linked to lying, and concludes that lying must not be as bad as we think it is. There are a host of complications and caveats, so many that one could spend a whole review admiring the virtuosity involved in constructing such a rich pastiche of historical episodes and texts touching on mendacity. But the frisson that the book provokes comes almost entirely from its willingness to flirt with the endorsement of vice, so any serious engagement with it cannot avoid responding in some way to that flirtation. (shrink)

Although Arendt is usually read as a theorist of participatory democracy, her writings on judgment also offer a way of thinking about the role of citizens who do not actively participate, citizens who are more spectators than actors. The difficulties and ambiguities in her account of judgment especially, the elusiveness of standards of judgment arise from her effort to insure that individuals take full responsibility for their judgments.

Benjamin Constant's famous lecture comparing ancient and modern liberty can be better understood if it is read alongside a set of unpublished lectures on ancient religion that he delivered one year earlier. Those lectures suggest that Constant's commitment to modern liberty was based in part on his deep anxieties about religious freedom, and that he valued religious freedom because he thought the "religious sentiment" was an important manifestation of a natural human capacity for self-development. In putting religion and self-development at (...) the heart of his vision, he tried to show that modern liberty could have a positive moral or spiritual purpose beyond merely assuring people freedom from interference in the pursuit of their interests. (shrink)

Lucas Swaine attempts to persuade theocrats of the value of liberty of conscience. But his promotion of principles of conscience for theocratic communities reveals a divided spirit in contemporary liberalism, which is torn between wanting to respect religion as it is and wanting to reform or liberalize it.

Plato and the Mythic Tradition in Political Thought is a really wonderful book, full of thought and richly suggestive. It’s also an ambitious book, daring to reinterpret a book that we all teach an...

Jeffrey Tulis’s The Rhetorical Presidency should not be read as a tale of decline. It is not a call for an “un‐rhetorical” presidency so much as an exploration of the fundamentally uneasy place that popular rhetoric occupies in constitutional governments. Popular rhetoric is one way that executives exercise their prerogative power, and the dilemmas about rhetoric that Tulis exposes arise from a fundamental fact about prerogative power that all presidents must confront: Strong constitutional governments seem almost necessarily to grant their (...) chief executives more discretionary authority than is consistent with the idea of constitutional government. Whatever rhetorical style or strategy a president adopts, he must respond in one way or another to this fact. (shrink)

In his account of how each of us deliberates about what to do, Aristotle remarks that we do not always trust ourselves on important matters and so sometimes take counsel from others. Taking counsel from others is, in some ways, merely an expansion of the internal activity of deliberation; the suggestions come from other people rather than from our ownminds, but the judgment about them remains our own. In other ways, however, taking counsel is quite different from deliberating with oneself. (...) These differences are the subject matter of the art of rhetoric, as Aristotle understands it. The paper compares the political relationship at work in deliberative rhetoric with slavery, which collapses the separateness of persons, and with friendship, which preserves it. And suggests that the importance of anger in Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric can be understood as a reflection on the implications of human separateness. (shrink)

Robert Wokler was one of the world's leading experts on Rousseau and the Enlightenment, but some of his best work was published in the form of widely scattered and difficult-to-find essays. This book collects for the first time a representative selection of his most important essays on Rousseau and the legacy of Enlightenment political thought. These essays concern many of the great themes of the age, including liberty, equality and the origins of revolution. But they also address a number of (...) less prominent debates, including those over cosmopolitanism, the nature and social role of music and the origins of the human sciences in the Enlightenment controversy over the relationship between humans and the great apes. These essays also explore Rousseau's relationships to Rameau, Pufendorf, Voltaire and Marx; reflect on the work of important earlier scholars of the Enlightenment, including Ernst Cassirer and Isaiah Berlin; and examine the influence of the Enlightenment on the twentieth century. One of the central themes of the book is a defense of the Enlightenment against the common charge that it bears responsibility for the Terror of the French Revolution, the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-century and the Holocaust. (shrink)

Written by Thomas Hobbes and first published in 1651, _Leviathan_ is widely considered the greatest work of political philosophy ever composed in the English language. Hobbes's central argument—that human beings are first and foremost concerned with their own fears and desires, and that they must relinquish basic freedoms in order to maintain a peaceful society—has found new adherents and critics in every generation. This new edition, which uses modern text and relies on large-sheet copies from the 1651 Head version, includes (...) interpretive essays by four leading Hobbes scholars: John Dunn, David Dyzenhaus, Elisabeth Ellis, and Bryan Garsten. Taken together with Ian Shapiro’s wide-ranging introduction, they provide fresh and varied interpretations of _Leviathan_ for our time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and JudgmentJames Arnt AuneSaving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. Bryan Garsten. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006. Pp. xii + 276. $45.00, hardcover.Something of what rhetoricians perennially run up against in modern political philosophy is illustrated by a recent article by Jürgen Habermas in Communication Theory. In a searing indictment of contemporary democracy and the mass media, Habermas (...) writes, "Issues of political discourse become assimilated into and absorbed by the modes and contents of entertainment. Besides personalization, the dramatization of events, the simplification of complex matters, and the vivid polarization of conflicts promote civic privatism and a mood of antipolitics" (2006, 422). Any historian of political communication in the Western democracies since the early nineteenth century is bound to be puzzled by this observation, for the emergence of mass democracy in the United States and England, at least, was characterized by intense popular participation in politics, precisely because political campaigns were heavily personalized, dramatized, simplified, and polarized. At the beginning of the article, Habermas praises Aristotle's Politics for its union of normative theorizing and empirical research, forgetting apparently that Aristotle also wrote a normative and empirical Rhetoric.That Habermas distrusts persuasion is obvious, but what is less clear is how the rhetoriphobia he shares with virtually every modern and contemporary philosopher came about. Bryan Garsten's book—the most important work on rhetoric and political philosophy since Ronald Beiner's Political Judgment—makes the startlingly original argument that the anti-rhetorical stance not only is grounded in a suspicion of private judgment, but that it can be traced back to Hobbes's, Rousseau's, and Kant's fear of the persuasive power of post-Reformation religious enthusiasm. Garsten not only provides provocative rereadings of these three fathers of modern liberalism but also extends our understanding of rhetorical and political judgment in Aristotle and Cicero. His analysis of the problems of persuasion and democracy in the twentieth century, while somewhat less satisfying, includes cogent criticisms of Rawls, Habermas, and theorists of deliberative democracy from what might be called a Ciceronian-Madisonian republican stance. [End Page 94]Saving Persuasion began as a doctoral dissertation in Government at Harvard, under the direction of Harvey Mansfield—after Allan Bloom, perhaps the most influential and controversial of the disciples of Leo Strauss. Although Garsten's book displays both the virtues and vices of Straussianism, it would be unfair to dismiss it as a neoconservative manifesto for rhetoric. (An enthusiastic review of the book appeared in the neoconservative Weekly Standard in February 2007, illustrating the curious fact that the Right "gets" rhetoric in ways that liberals and leftists do not (Deneen 2007).) Currently an assistant professor of political science at Yale, Garsten also received an MA from Cambridge in political theory and intellectual history. His book reveals the influence of Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School of political theory, whose insistence on reading political philosophy in its historical context is the antithesis of the Straussian rejection of historicism. Garsten thus combines the Straussian emphasis on close reading with the contextual-rhetorical perspective of Skinner; this unique synthesis enables Garsten to solve some ongoing problems in textual interpretation (especially the relationship between Academic skepticism and Stoic natural law theory in Cicero) while developing interesting causal arguments about the rise of the public sphere in the eighteenth century, the decline of interest in rhetoric by liberal political theorists, and the pathologies of contemporary democratic politics.The book is divided into two main parts, following an introduction in which Garsten lays out his central thesis: "[A] politics of persuasion—in which people try to change one another's minds by appealing not only to reason but also to passions and sometimes even prejudices—is a mode of politics worth defending. Persuasion is worthwhile because it requires us to pay attention to our fellow citizens and to display a certain respect for their points of view and their judgments" (3). Persuasion rightly understood cannot be reduced either to manipulation or pandering. Rather, persuasion is inextricably linked to judgment, a human faculty threatened by modernity. Judgment is "the mental activity of responding to particular situations" by... (shrink)

A brief account of the work of Giorgio Agamben and its relation to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy.

Explore 2,500 years of Western philosophy, from the ancient Greeks to modern thinkers, with this ultimate guide’s stunning and simple approach to some of history’s biggest ideas. This essential guide to philosophy includes thoughts on our modern society, exploring science and democracy, and posing the question: where do we go from here? Easy-to-understand text is accompanied by works of art and artifacts from history, as the big ideas and important thinkers are introduced through time. Famous quotes are highlighted, and the (...) sidebars discuss other ideas or key works to include extra context around the theories and people. Celebrate the world's most revolutionary concepts and understand how these ideas continue to shape our world. Develop your own perspectives and explore relevant issues such as modern logic and religion with this wonderfully comprehensive illustrated guide. In a world of evolving ideas, The Story of Philosophy is a fantastic resource to revisit again and again. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Immanuel Kant's account of the moral wrongness of contempt in the Metaphysics of Morals provides important resources for our understanding of the nature of moral subjectivity. Although Kant typically emphasizes the subject's position as autonomous addressor of the moral law, his remarks on contempt bring into relief a dynamic relationship at the heart of practical subjectivity between the addressor and addressee positions. After tracing the development of reflection concerning the addressor and addressee positions in (...) early modern philosophy, beginning with Francisco Suarez and Samuel Pufendorf, I articulate and defend what I take to be a Kantian conception of the relation between those positions. More specifically, I argue that to be a moral subject at all is necessarily to position oneself as the addressor of the moral law, but that one must at the same time maintain oneself in the addressee position, resisting the full conversion to the addressor position that autonomy seems to demand. (shrink)

Fifteen dialogues drawn from the highly acclaimed BBC series review the tenets and theories of moral philosophy, poliitcal philosophy, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science.

The investigator seeks guidance related to a planned recruitment strategy of requiring participants to live within close proximity to the study site for the 32-week Phase II study examining the saf...

1 Introduction p. 3 2 Scientific Method--the Traditional View and Popper's View p. 13 3 The Criterion of Demarcation between what is and what is not Science p. 32 4 Popper's Evolutionism and his theory of World 3 p. 55 5 Objective Knowledge p. 65 6 The Open Society p. 75 7 The Enemies of the Open Society p. 90 Postscript p. 114 Bibliography p. 117.

And he unflinchingly confronts the Wagner whose paranoia, egocentricity, and anti-Semitism are as repugnant as his achievements are glorious."--Jacket.

The aim of Pyrrhonism is deceptively simple: to achieve a state of ataraxia, of tranquility and relief from perturbation. But what is the extent of the ataraxia envisioned? Must the Skeptic admit a hard distinction between disturbances apparently related to belief and there­fore subject to suspension of judgement, and extra-doxastic disturbanc­es that are beyond the scope of the Skeptical method? In this paper I examine passages from Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism that indicate that such a distinction may not stand up (...) to Skeptical scrutiny and that the Skepti­cal method does not only apply to “philosophical” speculative dogma or to “intellectual” perturbation, contra Barnes’s claim that the person who perceives the fewest anomalies may make “the perfect Pyrrhonist”. But I also, following Massie’s critique of unwarranted causal inferences regarding the relation between equipollence and ataraxia, distinguish cases where tarache presents itself as anomalous and thus lends itself to inquiry from cases where it presents itself with an appar­ent cause and does not provoke inquiry. Thus, though an apparently extra-doxastic disturbance may actually be rooted in unconsciously-held dogma, the Skeptic cannot demarcate a special class of potentially doxastic disturbances without employing a dogmatic psychology of her own. She must instead suspend judgment regarding the entire scope of her method, entertaining the possibility that any disturbance could be relieved through the Skeptical method. In the process, ataraxia is divested of definite parameters and the Skeptical method becomes effectively endless. (shrink)

In addition to his large‐scale system of metaphysics, Schopenhauer produced many essays, and it was eventually these that made his name and drew attention to his philosophy. The biggest collection of them is called Parerga and Paralipomena. They are of help in understanding the philosophy, because they often contain bolder, more clear‐cut statements of the same points. They are written in an aphoristic style and are the source of many epigrams. For a long time they were more widely read than (...) the philosophy itself. (shrink)

Dylan Thomas made his name with one particular poem, ‘The Force that Through the Green Fuse Drives the Flower’, which he wrote and published in his teens. Not only the theme but also the imagery in detail is too close to certain passages in Schopenhauer for a coincidence to be likely. It is more probable that there was some influence. This is made more likely by the fact that there are good reasons to believe that the young Thomas had read (...) a book called Thomas Hardy's Universe, by Ernest Brennecke, which contains many quotations from Schopenhauer, including, in its first chapter, the one closest to Thomas's poem. (shrink)

Hoe kan de behoefte om 'hartstochtelijk uitdrukking te geven' aan de geestesgesteldheid die teweeggebracht is door het lezen van een wijsgerige verhandeling tegelijkertijd de aanzet vormen tot een eenvoudig muzikaal concept, of zelfs, zoals Wagner zelf stelt, 'mijn minst gecompliceerde muzikale conceptie'? Magee analyseert dit probleem waarmee hij geconfronteerd wordt naar aanleiding van de opera Tristan en Isolde.

Empirical reality presents itself to us as experience, and this can take only such forms as can be mediated by whatever equipment we possess, including our own bodies. Thus there has to be a detailed correlation between our powers of apprehension and reality as we perceive it. So subject and object are interdependent: neither could exist as we apprehend them if the other did not also exist. Pure subject without an object and pure object without a subject are both metaphysical (...) concepts, to which nothing could correspond in the empirical world. (shrink)

Schopenhauer was the first, and to the end the greatest philosophical influence on Nietzsche, who said it was Schopenhauer who had turned him into a philosopher. For many years the young Nietzsche was a thoroughgoing Schopenhauerian; but then he rebelled against this influence, attacked it and tried to overthrow it. Other substantial intellectual figures of the nineteenth century who were significantly influenced by Schopenhauer include the historian Jacob Burckhardt, author of The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy; Hans Vaihinger, author (...) of The Philosophy of ‘As If’; Edward von Hartmann, author of The Philosophy of the Unconscious; and Sigmund Freud. (shrink)

Schopenhauer wrote candidly about sex at a time when almost nobody did. He saw consideration of it as the means of reproduction whereby human beings come into existence as inescapable for metaphysics, indeed for serious thinking. He conjectured that homosexual impulses were implanted by nature in adolescent and elderly males because, although they have sexual urges and can procreate, it is undesirable that they should do so, and therefore the urge is diverted. This, he thinks, is why homosexual activity has (...) been widespread in all known societies. The manner in which he writes about it suggests that he had felt homosexual impulses himself but had not given way to them. (shrink)

The neglect of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the twentieth century led to his becoming associated in people's minds with his neat‐contemporaries, the Idealist philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, when in fact he was a radically different sort of philosopher from them. Unlike them, he absorbed the empiricist tradition into his work and saw the enterprise on which he was engaged as having been launched by Locke. He hated the Idealists and their writings, regarding them as a poisonous influence. In this he (...) went too far, for their work had merits that he failed to appreciate and more in common with his own than he realized. (shrink)

Outstanding among the many creative artists on whom Schopenhauer exercised influence was the opera composer Richard Wagner, who, rarely for a composer, was an intellectual and studied Schopenhauer's philosophy seriously. He was already composing operas in accordance with a published theory of his own, which involved treating all its constituent elements as of equal importance. Schopenhauer persuaded him to accept not only hitherto rejected metaphysical ideas but also the supremacy of music over the other arts. In response, Wagner composed works (...) such as Tristan and Isolde and Parsifal whose libretti are pervaded with Schopenhauer's ideas and whose music dominates the opera. Although the first of these Schopenhauerian works, Tristan and Isolde, was published in 1859, and therefore before Schopenhauer's death in 1860, it is virtually certain that he never knew of its existence. (shrink)

Schopenhauer's chief mistake derived from his acceptance of Newtonian science and lay in his belief that the empirical world must be deterministic. This deprived his assumptions of any basis for moral judgements in this world, and led to inner contradictions in his ethics: it means that we are not free to reject the world, as he believes we should; and in any case, if we did, that would constitute a rejection of compassion, which he is not in favour of. There (...) is also a contradiction in his theory of music: if music is the direct voice of the metaphysical will, and the metaphysical will is inherently evil, there should be something nightmarish about music, yet Schopenhauer considers it uniquely marvellous. There are other errors in his philosophy too: for instance, he underestimates the importance of history. But, as Voltaire said, it is the privilege of a great genius to make great mistakes. (shrink)

Until I was five I shared a bed with my sister, 3½ years older than me. After our parents had switched out the light we would chatter away in the darkness until we fell asleep. But I could never afterwards remember falling asleep. It was always the same: one moment I was talking to my sister in the dark, and the next I was waking up in a sunlit room having been asleep all night. Yet every night there must have (...) come a time when I stopped talking and settled down to sleep. It was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience that, and never remembered it. (shrink)

Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. The Logical Positivists, who believed that only the phenomenal existed, took this as the paradigm for their philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, moved away from it and proposed a new and different analysis in his book (...) Philosophical Investigations, and this became the most influential text in linguistic philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies, each of which influenced a whole generation that remained largely oblivious of its Schopenhauerian origins. (shrink)

Schopenhauer has influenced the work of more, and more distinguished, creative writers than any philosopher since his day, more even than Marx. This is especially true among novelists: Tolstoy, Turgenev, Zola, Maupassant, Proust, Hardy, Conrad, and Thomas Mann must be included. He also influenced short‐story writers such as Maugham and Borges, poets such as Rilke and Eliot, and dramatists such as Pirandello and Beckett. They were attracted, variously, by his psychological insight, his understanding of unconscious motivation, his disenchanted view of (...) human beings, and his non‐religious view of the cosmos, as well as by his teachings about the arts and the fact that he was himself a great prose writer. (shrink)

This chapter is a brief biography of Schopenhauer that provides the background for the presentation of his work that is to follow. Schopenhauer grew up knowing many eminent people, including Goethe, and wrote his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, while still in his twenties, yet his work was neglected until he reached his mid‐sixties. He sank into pessimism, isolation, and misanthropy for most of his adult life. But in his last six years he became internationally famous.

For some 35 years after the publication of his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer was virtually ignored. Then the mood of pessimism brought about across Europe by the failure of the revolutions of 1848 created a climate of opinion favourable to him. After the 1850s, he enjoyed a reputation as one of the ‘great’ philosophers. But in the twentieth century, his work fell into neglect once again. Now a revival of interest is taking place.

Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the empirical world fall under one or more of four forms of explanation: scientific, mathematical, logical, and motivational. Since all meaningful empirical concepts are derived from experience, and no valid deductive argument can add to the content of its own premises, the only fully satisfactory empirical knowledge is provided by (...) direct perception. (shrink)