My purpose in this essay is to locate disabled women within the women's movement as well as the disability movement in India. While foregrounding the existential realities for disabled women in the Indian scene, I underscore the reasons for their absence from the agenda of Indian feminism. I conclude by reflecting on the possibilities of inclusion within Indian feminist thought.

My purpose in this essay is to locate disabled women within the women's movement as well as the disability movement in India. While foregrounding the existential realities for disabled women in the Indian scene, I underscore the reasons for their absence from the agenda of Indian feminism. I conclude by reflecting on the possibilities of inclusion within Indian feminist thought.

Almaatouq et al. propose an “integrative approach” to increase the generalisability and commensurability of experiments. Yet their metascientific approach has one glaring omission (and misinterpretation of) – the role of sample diversity in generalisability. In this commentary, we challenge false notions of subsumed duality between contexts, population, and diversity, and propose modifications to their design space to accommodate sample diversity.

'Anita L. Allen breaks new ground...A stunning indictment of women's status in contemporary society, her book provides vital original scholarly research and insight.' |s-NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN.

The Gricean account of language is at the center of much current work in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Anita Avramides maintains that Grice's paradigm can be used to defend very different conceptions of mind and of meaning. In this clearly argued book she describes Grice's analysis of meaning and proposes two interpretations of it, one reductive and one nonreductive. Much current work in cognitive science assumes that the content of words and thoughts can be (...) explained in naturalistic terms. A leading idea (advanced mainly by Stephen Schiffer and Brian Loar) is that the naturalistic account of content will proceed in two stages: a reduction of the semantic features of word; to the contents of propositional attitudes and then a reduction of the latter to physical or functional notions. The appeal of Grice's work on meaning to this two stage reductionist strategy is that Gricean definitions seem to provide the only way of reducing the semantic to the psychological, a reduction that is required for a naturalistic account of intentionality. While Avramides defends the method of analysis as one suited to the concept of meaning, she rejects a reductive interpretation of the analysis. She argues that any attempt to reduce the semantic to the psychological leads to a mistaken conception of mind. She exposes the assumptions behind the reductive interpretation and offers fresh and original arguments for the antireductionist position. Against the reductive Gricean she defends the idea that there is a deep epistemological symmetry between semantic and propositional attitude notions, a result of which is that semantically characterized linguistic behavior is central to our concept of belief. Anita Avramides is Lecturer in Philosophy at The Queens College, The University of Oxfor. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Ethics consultation has become an integral part of the fabric of U.S. health care delivery. This article summarizes the second edition of the Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. The core knowledge and skills competencies identified in the first edition of Core Competencies have been adopted by various ethics consultation services and education programs, providing evidence of their endorsement as health care ethics consultation (HCEC) standards. This revised report was prompted (...) by thinking in the field that has evolved since the original report. Patients, family members, and health care providers who encounter ethical questions or concerns that ethics consultants could help address deserve access to efficient, effective, and accountable HCEC services. All individuals providing such services should be held to the standards of competence and quality described in the revised report. (shrink)

Today, more corporations disclose information about their environmental performance in response to stakeholder demands of environmental responsibility and accountability. What information do corporations disclose on their websites? This paper investigates the environmental management policies and practices of the 200 largest corporations in the world. Based on a content analysis of the environmental reports of Fortune’s Global 200 companies, this research analyzes the content of corporate environmental disclosures with respect to the following seven areas: environmental planning considerations, top management support to (...) the institutionalization of environmental concerns, environmental structures and organizing specifics, environmental leadership activities, environmental control, external validations or certifications of environmental programs, and forms of corporate environmental disclosures. (shrink)

The essays in this volume present versions of feminism that are explicitly liberal, or versions of liberalism that are explicitly feminist. By bringing together some of the most respected and well-known scholars in mainstream political philosophy today, Amy R. Baehr challenges the reader to reconsider the dominant view that liberalism and feminism are 'incompatible.'.

Anita Chari revives the concept of reification from Marx and the Frankfurt School to spotlight the resistance to neoliberal capitalism now forming at the level of political economy and at the more sensate, experiential level of subjective transformation. Reading art by Oliver Ressler, Zanny Begg, Claire Fontaine, Jason Lazarus, and Mika Rottenberg, as well as the politics of Occupy Wall Street, Chari identifies practices through which artists and activists have challenged neoliberalism's social and political logics, exposing its inherent tensions (...) and contradictions. (shrink)

Recent developments in neuroscience have enabled technological advances to modulate cognitive functions of the brain. Despite ethical concerns about cognitive enhancement, both individuals and society as a whole can benefit greatly from these technologies, depending on how we regulate their use. To date, regulatory analyses of neuromodulation technologies have focused on a technology itself – for instance, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulation of a brain stimulation device – rather than the use of a technology, such as the use (...) of a brain stimulation device at work or school. Given that some forms of cognitive enhancement have already started to penetrate the general public’s everyday life, we should begin our discussion on potential regulatory issues regarding their use in various real-world situations. The goal of the article is to fill the gap by providing an analytic framework to examine these regulatory issues. More specifically, it aims to illustrate the issues around respecting autonomy and preventing coercive use of cognitive enhancement. The proposed framework categories the real-world settings where a neuromodulation technology can be used for cognitive enhancement based on two criteria – who is subjected to cognitive enhancement and who imposes cognitive enhancement. Based on this framework, the article analyzes regulatory issues arising out of every combination of subject/imposing party by taking one example case. Focusing on the regulations in the U.S., this analysis shows the current lack of adequate safeguards against the coercive use and calls for more attention from government agencies and researchers to develop sound policies regarding current and potentially more widespread use of cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

Can the government stick us with privacy we don't want? It can, it does, and according to this author, may need to do more of it. Privacy is a foundational good, she argues, a necessary tool in the liberty-lover's kit for a successful life. A nation committed to personal freedom must be prepared to mandate inalienable, liberty-promoting privacies for its people, whether they eagerly embrace them or not. The eight chapters of this book are reflections on public regulation of privacy (...) at home; isolation and confinement for punitive and health reasons; religious modesty attire; erotic nudity; workplace and professional confidentiality; racial privacy; online transactions; social networking; and the collection, use and storage of electronic data. (shrink)

How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part of (...) the book investigates the views of influential contemporary philosophers such as Strawson, Davidson, Nagel and Searle. (shrink)

: The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional "informed desire" tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.

Akabayashi and Slingsby's (2006) article reminds us that the North American emphasis on individualistic autonomy is not universal. As the authors explain, personal identity in Japan is not construc...

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 65-67.

BackgroundAdherence to widely accepted practice standards is a frequently used measure of healthcare quality. In the U.S., the most widely recognized authoritative source of practice standards for ethics consultation (EC) is the second edition of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities’ Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation report.MethodsTo determine the extent to which EC practices in U.S. hospitals adhere to these practice standards, we developed and analyzed 12 evaluative measures from a national survey.ResultsOnly three of the 12 standards achieved (...) over 75% adherence with reported EC practices: allowing anyone involved in a case to request an EC (100%), not requiring an attending physician’s permission to conduct an EC (97.6%), and having at least one person on the ethics consultation service (ECS) with advanced level EC proficiency (79.3%).ConclusionsImplications are discussed for achieving consensus on EC standards as they continue to evolve. (shrink)

Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.

Uncertainty is inherent in new and unexpected viral outbreaks such as the current COVID-19 pandemic. It imposes challenges for health officials in soliciting cooperative behavioural changes based on incomplete information. In this paper, we use evolving mask recommendations in the United States as an example to analyse the ethical importance and practical demonstration of trustworthiness in pandemic messaging and decision-making. We argue that responsible public health interventions in the time of uncertainties requires explicit intersecting ethical considerations both in action and (...) in communication to promote trustworthiness. First, as public health decisions have to be made in the face of incomplete and evolving data, health officials need to exhibit competence while committing to epistemic humility. They can explain the methods used in making and updating mask recommendations as well as explicitly acknowledge the need to incorporate sociocultural and other contextual considerations in translating scientific data into mask recommendations. Second, officials and agencies must uphold and communicate decisional transparency as part of their effort to demonstrate accountability and promote the public’s understanding of the evolving pandemic. Third, especially since both the pandemic and mask recommendations may have disparate impact on different populations, officials should start with the fair implementation of the least restrictive measures that can help reduce harm. (shrink)

Die Forderung nach Transparenz gehört zu den zentralen Schlagworten der politischen Gegenwart. Während Anita Möllering die Transparenz-Forderung im Sinne der Piraten-Partei aber vor allem an die politischen Akteure adressiert und auf demokratische Verfahren bezieht, diskutiert Claus Leggewie insbesondere die Kehrseiten dieser basisdemokratischen Forderung. Zentraler Widerspruch ist aus dieser Perspektive die Fixierung der Piraten-Partei auf den gläsernen Staat, während sich die Benutzer sozialer Medien der Intransparenz ihrer privat-kommerziellen Betreiber kaum kritisch stellen. German The call for transparency is one of the (...) main slogans of the political present. While Anita Möllering, following the agenda of the “Piraten-Partei”, mostly addresses the demand for transparency to political actors and relates it to democratic procedures, Claus Leggewie discusses the downsides of this fundamentally democratic demand. From this point of view, the central conflict concerns the fixation of the “Piraten-Partei” on a transparent state, while the users of social media hardly reflect on the intransparency of its private commercial operators in a critical way. (shrink)

In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Joshua Rager and Peter Schwartz suggest using opioid treatment agreements as public health monitoring tools to inform patients about “the requirements entailed by undergoing opioid therapy,” rather than as contractual agreements to alter patients’ individual behavior or to benefit them directly. Because Rager and Schwartz's argument presents suspected OTA violations as a justification to stop providing opioids yet does not highlight the broader epistemic and systemic context within which clinicians prescribe these medications, (...) their proposal may perpetuate a climate of distrust and stigmatization without correcting systemic factors that may have placed patients and others at risk in the first place. Given the context of epistemic uncertainty regarding opioid safety and efficacy, insufficient training for opioid prescribers, and inadequate patient education, I propose replacing OTAs, which have a narrow focus on patient behaviors, with opioid treatment plans, which would promote mutual, collaborative, and shared decision-making on the most appropriate pain management program. An OTP can be ethically justified as a tool to prevent and treat iatrogenic addiction under a specific paradigm—one that adopts a default position of professional epistemic humility and holds all collaborative parties accountable in chronic pain management. (shrink)

While disability has emerged as a major theme in academic and political discourses, a perusal of many bioethics textbooks reveals that most editors and philosophers still do not consider disability to be central to developing either critical perspective or social conscience in addressing the core questions in bioethics. This essay explores how disability issues are typically portrayed in bioethics textbooks by looking at the examples of genetic testing and medically assisted death. It explains how incorporation of disability perspectives helps to (...) provide students with opportunities for a fuller understanding of many concepts that are central to moral and political philosophy, such as equality, justice, the good life, moral agency, and autonomy. (shrink)

One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you (...) think. Anita Avramides tackles this fascinating question. (shrink)

In recent decades, the intertwining ideas of self-determination and well-being have received tremendous support in bioethics. Discussions regarding self-determination, or autonomy, often focus on two dimensions—the capacity of the patient and the freedom from external coercion. The practice of obtaining informed consent, for example, has become a standard procedure in therapeutic and research medicine. On the surface, it appears that patients now have more opportunities to exercise their self-determination than ever. Nonetheless, discussions of patient autonomy in the bioethics literature, which (...) focus on individual patients making particular decisions, neglect the social structure within which health-care decisions are made. Looking through the lens of disability and informed by the feminist conception of relational autonomy, this essay argues that the issue of autonomy is much more complex than the individualist model suggests. The social system and the ableist ideology impose various forms of pressure or oppressive power that can affect people’s ability to choose according to their value system. Even if such powers are not directly coercive, they influence potential parents’ decisions indirectly—they structure their alternatives in such a way that certain options are never considered as viable and other decisions must be made. This paper argues that, instead of only focusing on the individual act of decision-making, we need to pay attention to the social structure that frames people’s decision. (shrink)

Liberalism welcomes diversity in substantive ideas of the good but not in the process whereby these ideas are formed. Ideas of the good acquire weight on the presumption that each is a person's own, formed independently. But people differ in their capacities to conceptualize. Some, appropriately characterized as cerebral, are proficient in and profoundly involved with conceptualizing. Others, labeled cognitively disabled, range from individuals with mild limitations to those so unable to express themselves that we cannot be sure whether their (...) behavior is mediated by concepts at all. Constricted cognitive capacities have been thought to prevent participation in the prescribed process for forming personalized ideas of the good. So liberal theory, when formulating principles and practices of justice, often disregards cognitively disabled peoples' perspectives. We put aside metaphysically driven notions about personhood and show how interpersonal processes of “prosthetic” thinking (different from surrogacy) can satisfy liberalism's standards, positioning cognitively disabled individuals as fully participating subjects of justice. (shrink)

How do we acquire knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others? Knowing Other Minds brings together ten original essays that address various questions in philosophy and in empirical cognitive science which arise from our everyday social interaction with other people.

CYNTHIA FLEURY / LYNDA LOTTE. — Anita Erba, vous faites partie des nouveaux courants de la peinture en Israël. La spécificité de votre travail consiste en ce qu’il est au carrefour de l’Orient et de l’Occident. Comment définissez-vous votre travail artistique? Quelle est son évolution interne et comment se traduit-elle par rapport aux supports choisis?ANITA.

It is possible to tease out two questions in connection with the epistemological problem of other minds: (i) How do I know what others think and feel? and (ii) How do I know that others think and feel? Fred Dretske offers a perceptual account of our knowledge of other minds that yields an answer to (i) but not (ii). Quassim Cassam uses Dretske’s perceptual account to show how we can answer both (i) and (ii). In this paper I show how (...) we can use Dretske’s work to understand some work by Stanley Cavell. I suggest that, where Dretske claims that we cannot answer (ii), Cavell holds that (ii) is a question that reflects a misunderstanding of our relations to others. In the place of asking how I can know that others think and feel, Cavell holds that I must acknowledge the other. And at the heart of this acknowledgment is an acceptance of others as separate from me. I must acknowledge the other as an other to me. (shrink)