It is common for drug trials to exclude older people, usually over 65 or 70. Many of the drugs which are successfully tested are then registered and become available either on prescription or over the counter. Healthcare professionals are left in a bind: either they do not prescribe the medications to those in the excluded age groups because of the lack of age-relevant data, or they prescribe, off-label, despite the lack of systematic collection of age-relevant data. Alternatively, if the pharmaceutical (...) is available without prescription, older people may be buying without any inkling or warning that the drug was never tried on people of their own age. Either way, our older fellow citizens are not getting the same ethical treatment as younger adults. Compounding the questionable ethics involved is the fact that as age increases, the ratio of women to men increases. Amplified by the fact that women consume more pharmaceuticals than do men, the discrimination takes on a distinctly sexist slant as well as an ageist one.Two other groups often excluded from trials are (a) minors and (b) pregnant or lactating women. But the rationale for their exclusion is different from that for the exclusion of seniors. A major reason for these two groups’ exclusion is the legal incapacity of the young to consent and the concomitant flow-on liability for injuries and damages to the youngsters. The potential exposure to later legal claims may be a strong motivating force for pharmaceutical companies to exclude from their trials people without legal capacity to consent. But the third group of people, seniors, is excluded by reference to their seniority not their inability to give informed consent. While the other two exclusions can be explained in terms of moral, social and legal conventions, seniority alone is based on two practical concerns: firstly, whether seniors are likely to die before the end of the trial, and secondly, the compounding effects of the so-called diseases of old age. Together, these concerns are thought to justify seniority exclusion in the interests of clean science. This paper explores some of the ethical issues, the implicit ageism and sexism in the exclusion of seniors. The discussion considers the ethical consequences of the exclusion, where seniors are either taking drugs in the absence of evidence-based trials on their age groups, or are denied drugs because they are untried on the age groups. (shrink)

Over the last dozen years, the writings of Richard Taruskin have transformed the debate about "early music" and "authenticity." Text and Act collects for the first time the most important of Taruskin's essays and reviews from this period, many of which now classics in the field. Taking a wide-ranging cultural view of the phenomenon, he shows that the movement, far from reviving ancient traditions, in fact represents the only truly modern style of performance being offered today. He goes on to (...) contend that the movement is therefore far more valuable and even authentic than the historical verisimilitude for which it ostensibly strives could ever be. These essays cast fresh light on many aspects of contemporary music-making and music-thinking, mixing lighthearted debunking with impassioned argumentation. Taruskin ranges from theoretical speculation to practical criticism, and covers a repertory spanning from Bach to Stravinsky. Including a newly written introduction, Text and Act collects the very best of one of our most incisive musical thinkers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What have natural aesthetics and environmentalism in common? Not much if the former deals with nature as if it were an artwork or a gallery of art objects, or if the latter grounds the protection of nature in consequentialist terms. Suppose, however, one adopts a non-consequentialist environmentalism which, further, stakes out a primary view of nature as terrain rather than as habitat; i.e., a view which is not biocentric (life-centred), let alone anthropocentric. This environmentalism is rooted in the belief (...) that we are prima facie bound not to interfere in any of the world undefined by culture whether or not it supports life. There is a reason forbidding us from strip-mining the far side of the moon, say, even though no habitat is thereby destroyed, nor is there any blight creating visual offence to those immediately affected. To furnish the reason for such an ‘acentric’environmentalism, one needs a natural aesthetic. Why? By elimination, because the stock appeals grounding any moral stance—to rights or interests or happiness or autonomy—are unavailable. The ‘subject’of an acentric environmentalism is insensate. But an ‘acentric’aesthetic seems even more curious than its environmentalist dependent. It would entail an aesthetic viewpoint indifferent to human scale and perspective, the very factors which underwrite any cultural aesthetic. So, is such an aesthetic possible? The barest glimpse of how it might look concludes this paper. (shrink)

In the following paper, I will be operating within the framework of moral concepts set out by R. M. Hare in his Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason . Using this framework, I shall attempt to show that if we claim that certain attitudes we have toward animals are moral, then the application of the consequences of these principles leads us into a rather bizarre, if not outlandish, position, which few would accept as prima facie moral; and if we (...) adopt what can be accepted as a truly moral position with respect to animals, this will turn out to be indistinguishable in kind, if not in degree, from our morality with respect to humans. (shrink)

La búsqueda por tener igualdad efectiva entre hombres y mujeres, es interés público del Perú. Un mecanismo válido para construir relaciones equitativas y de igualdad social; especialmente en, el acceso y oportunidad de la educación superior, en expansión por la demanda de los jóvenes en seguir una carrera universitaria con recursos propios o con la oferta de becas por el estado. Ante un ámbito local y nacional de poblaciones vulnerables y diferentes, que supone contar con las mismas opciones y participación (...) de todos y todas. Es por ello, el texto examina criterios de género, interculturalidad, incluyendo opiniones de los becarios. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Aesthetic protectionists think nature worth preserving and protecting from harm on aesthetic rather than moral grounds. Their outlook can be compared with the drive to shelter and sustain artworks. As such, protectionists seem rather like curators. However, this kind of attention to natural objects leads to a minimisation of the significance of the naturalness of those objects. This raises questions about the protectionist's real regard for nature. By examining what in nature is aesthetically worthy of protection, and then asking (...) how far one is entitled to go in one's protective mission, it transpires that protectionists have no special stake in sustaining the independence of nature. Indeed, its independence often conspires against their aims. Since that very independence is essential to the natural, protectionism is exposed as having no intrinsic regard for nature. (shrink)

Doctor/patient sexual contact has become a focal ethical issue of the 1990s. Guidelines or codes of ethics have been issued by various Medical Boards, prohibiting or regulating such conduct In some jurisdictions in Australia and elsewhere, such conduct has been deemed an offence under certain conditions. Mandatory reporting provisions may also apply. A clear profile of offending doctors and their areas of specialisation is emerging from various studies. The patient profile is less clear. The potential for harm to both the (...) patient and the offending doctor is an issue of concern, as is the apparently ineffective role of education in changing some doctor’s behaviour. The issue of sexual contact with former patients remains a grey area. (shrink)

This paper explores ethical challenges encountered when conducting research about, and telling, the stories of individuals who had died before the research began. Cases were explored where individuals who lived alone had died alone at home and where their bodies had been undiscovered for an extended period. The ethical review process had not had anything significant to say about the deceased ‘participants’. As social researchers we considered whether it was ethical to involve deceased people in research when they had no (...) opportunity to decline, and we were concerned about how to report such research. The idea that the dead can be harmed did not help our decision-making processes, but the notion of the dead having limited human rights conferred upon them was useful and aided us in clarifying how to conduct our research and disseminate our findings. (shrink)

Most music we hear comes to us via a recording medium on which sound has been stored. Such remoteness of music heard from music made has become so commonplace it is rarely considered. _Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study_ considers the implications of this separation for live musical performance and music-making. Rather than examining the composition or perception of music as most philosophical accounts of music do, Stan Godlovitch takes up the problem of how the tradition of active music playing (...) and performing has been challenged by technology and what problems this poses for philosophical aesthetics. Where does does the value of musical performance lie? Is human performance of music a mere transfer medium? Is the performance of music more expressive than recorded music? Musical Performance poses questions such as these to develop a fascinating account of music today. musicians - but via some recording medium on which sound has been stored. (shrink)

Some environmental views characterise the human abuse of nature as an offence against nature itself. What conception of nature would best fit that characterisation? To focus upon such a conception, aesthetic offences against nature are examined and distinguished at the outset from moral offences. Aesthetic offences are divided into those internal to our cultural outlook and external to it. The external outlook, conceiving nature as a thing wholly apart from us, is shown to be necessary to any view of nature (...) being offended against. Central to the external outlook is a conception of nature as the victim of offence without ever being itself an offending agent. Best fitting this is the notion of nature as primordially innocent. Given this metaphorical extension, the awkward consequence arises that any human use of nature constitutes thereby an abuse of it from the external standpoint. (shrink)

In this work, Godlovitch explores aspects of the value of nature other than as a resource to satisfy our material interests. A recurring theme is that nature's non-instrumental value thus conceived must be understood as involving a distinctively inextricable complex of both aesthetic and moral considerations. This distinguishes such value from the sorts typified by the moral worth of human beings and the aesthetic worth of cultural artifacts. He asks such questions as: Is there any relation between an aesthetic (...) appreciation of nature and the reasonably well-established traditions of aesthetics of art and culture? Can an aesthetics of nature play any practical role in environmental protection? Godlovitch argues that we are encouraged, if not compelled, toward a conception of value in its own right whether we try to forge either a natural aesthetic or an environmental ethic. (shrink)

Current assumptions and values with respect to management training for women are examined. A number of suggestions for change are made. The thrust of the changes will move us toward ensuring that education for women does not remain education for frustration, that is, education which gives women the desire for change in a world that remains the same.Many women have paid their dues, even a premium, for a chance at a top position, only to find a glass ceiling between them (...) and their goal. The glass ceiling is not simply a barrier for an individual, based on the person's inability to handle a higher-level job. Rather, the glass ceiling applies to women as a group who are kept from advancing higher because they are women. (Morrison, White and Velsor, 1987, p. 13). (shrink)

Some knowledge — most infamously, the Nazi experiments on human subjects — has been acquired by means which cannot be morally condoned however beneficial the knowledge may be. Yet, given that we now have such knowledge, it seems morally questionable to forbid its use where we know it can benefit us. Although a strong utilitarian case exists for deploying such information and although any pragmatic, humane person would use it where it could improve a situation, residual moral qualms remain which (...) are neither the expression of sentimentality nor squeamishness. Given the evil source of the knowledge, can we avoid the charge that we are tied to the evil, and even respectful of the experimenters, by wilfully benefiting from the work? I explore a few arguments meant to remove the moral qualms and show them all to be wanting. However, because we in fact regularly and routinely benefit in countless ways from many systematic evils of the distant past without qualms, we seem to be inconsistently selective when it concerns certain evils. This inconsistency can be explained, if not justified, by appeal to a principle of decent delay which allows us after a time to ignore the origins of our present benefits and so make moral fadeout acceptable. This principle itself is grounded in our natural and increasing forgetfulness of events as they recede in time, an adaptive mechanism which allows us both to carry on our lives in relative decency and yet to maintain a fitting sensitivity to newer, closer evils which affect more immediately our relations with others and our sense of moral integrity. (shrink)

In the present article we consider general anesthesia as a means of exploring questions regarding unconscious influence. The primary questions addressed in the research are whether surgical patients who are under adequate general anesthesia unconsciously perceive auditory information and whether they can benefit from such information. In addition, we consider the relevance of individual hypnotic ability for perceptual processing in this context. Ninety-six adult patients, undergoing elective abdominal hysterectomy, were randomly allocated to one of four tape-recorded conditions: therapeutic suggestions, melodies, (...) suggestions-plus-melodies, or silence. Double-blind conditions were satisfied in every respect. Patients received a standardized, but typical, "balanced" anesthetic, and level of anesthesia was adequately monitored. Following surgery, all patients received their analgesic medication from a patient-controlled device. Patients who were played therapeutic suggestions used a significantly smaller dose of morphine than patients who were not played suggestions. Although hypnotic ability was not significantly associated with therapeutic outcome, high but not low hypnotizable patients accurately guessed whether they were played suggestions. No compelling evidence for memory of melodies was obtained. (shrink)

This paper is underpinned by an epistemological question: What are the types and ways of knowing that can be entailed in reflective leadership in its fullest sense? The question is explored through a mapping exercise which outlines a geography of reflective leadership in terms of three variables: type of knowledge, problem focus, and mode of learning (incorporating the notion of embodied learning). Particular attention is given to recognising within the terrain of reflective leadership the epistemic credentials of spiritual learning and (...) experiential awareness of spirituality. This paper was given the award of best paper at the Philosophy of Management Conference, University of Oxford, 11th–14th July 2008. (shrink)

Two broad metaphysical perspectives deriving from Parmenides and Heraclitus have implications for our notion of sustainability. The Parmenidian defends a deepseated orderliness and permanence in things, while the Heraclitian finds only chance and change. Two further outlooks, the nomic and the prudential, present differing accounts of our place in the world. While the nomic outlook accepts nothing privileged about the human perspective or even life itself, the prudential outlook is obviously welfare-centered. It is argued that nomic views, whether Parmenidian or (...) Heraclitian, fail to provide any rationale for sustainability measures or concerns. The only such rationale comes from Parmenidian prudentialism, which, I argue, can operate only if it disowns at its peril the nomic point of view and couches sustainability entirely under the rubric of maximizing certain preferred opportunities drawn from collective self-love. But doing so merely evades rather than answers the tension imposed by the nomic Heraclitian for whom nothing lasts and nothing human counts specially in the measure. The liabilities of Parmenidian prudentialism are examined and found to be too great for any consistent notion of sustainability to bear. (shrink)

The karma-rebirth doctrine is one of the core doctrines of the Buddhist worldview. Some forms of Western Buddhism emphasize doctrinal study and meditation practice over traditional Buddhist elements that have their foundation in the karma-rebirth doctrine, such as merit-making practices and other forms of ritual. Conversely, the worldwide Gelugpa Tibetan Buddhist Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (FPMT) encourages its affiliates to perform traditional ritual such as chanting and pujas to make merit for oneself and others, in addition (...) to attending teachings and developing a regular meditation practice. During their exploration of the FPMT's activities, participants undergo a process of experimental validation of the teachings and practices, in which they come to accept doctrinal notions in one of two ways: the notion's capacity to validate and give meaning to personal experience, or to lend conceptual support to the newly acquired framework of ideas. Utilizing data obtained from fieldwork undertaken between 2003 and 2006 at Vajrayana Institute (VI), an FPMT centre in Sydney, Australia, I illustrate the way in which the karma-rebirth doctrine supports those aspects of the belief-system more capable of experiential validation through their capacity to frame and give meaning to personal experience. The acceptance of notions such as karma, rebirth and merit-making involves an interpretive shift from previously held notions about cause and effect and the nature of this-worldly existence, toward a Buddhist appreciation of these concepts. (shrink)

This book evaluates traditional musical performance and asks where its unique value lies.

When I first began to study philosophy I was introduced to the discipline in that magically traditional way by being assured that what lay before me was the love of wisdom. Why this had any adolescent appeal still puzzles me, but, like many others, I joined in as spectator to and occasionally as a removed participant in all the rough and tumble of a Socratic sparring match in the Athenian marketplace. There was some talk of wisdom, to be sure, which (...) seemed to link it with a humble admission of ignorance or a pitch against yielding to temptation, but neither was ever deeply revealing. I waited for more. My next encounter a few years later turned up little more than the surname of an English disciple of Wittgenstein. Somehow the trail had gone to brush, despite the apparent health and energy of philosophy. (shrink)

Changes over time in many large scale human practices such as science and technology seem best understood in terms of progress. Further, regarding such practices as slavery, we seem to have moved on and for the better, that is, to have progressed morally. But moral progress seems something different from other forms of progress. If possible at all, in what can it consist? Progress is understood as falling into three distinguishable categories; namely, progress as mere change, as change culminating in (...) some end‐state, and as change involving improvement or betterment. While scientific or economic progress seem of the last sort, moral progress is best understood as a hybrid of culminative change and improvement, a variety of progress labelled millenarian. Though there is an end towards which moral progress must tend, we do not know what it is. Further, moral progress must occupy a special superordinate and regulatory role regarding other progressive practices; that is, for moral progress to be possible, other progressive practices must come under the aegis of increasingly stringent moral regulation. This paper elaborates a model of moral progress, speculates upon signs of its presence, considers various relativist objections, and makes an exhortative plea for the need to have such a notion as a condition of the very possibility of moral progress. (shrink)

What is philosophy about? Has it a content all its own? A method? This paper examines a few responses to these questions. At the extremes are the Proper Content and the No Content views. The former identifies philosophy with a delimited set of core issues. The latter, abandoning any proper subject-matter for philosophy, identifies it with a core modus operandi. Neither of these is especially compelling. More dynamically conceived is the Vanishing Content view which sees philosophy as continually and inevitably (...) abandoning its business to newly emerging sciences, acting largely as an exploratory initiator of inquiry which is ultimately eliminable. Though promising, this view underrates the resilience and adaptability of philosophy, especially its current drive to forge alliances with and ultimately amalgamate itself into newer areas of study. This tendency is explored via the Partners-for-Progress view, which foresees philosophy becoming dependently indistinguishable from the theoretical wings of various autonomous disciplines. Finally, I examine the Family Inheritance view, which suggests that philosophy cannot merely vanish into the sciences because of idiosyncrasies in its very institutions which are self-sustaining and, more than most, deeply beholden to its own past which it keeps ever present. (shrink)

Two broad metaphysical perspectives deriving from Parmenides and Heraclitus have implications for our notion of sustainability. The Parmenidian defends a deepseated orderliness and permanence in things, while the Heraclitian finds only chance and change. Two further outlooks, the nomic (or the big-picture scientific) and the prudential, present differing accounts of our place in the world. While the nomic outlook accepts nothing privileged about the human perspective or even life itself, the prudential outlook is obviously welfare-centered. It is argued that nomic (...) views, whether Parmenidian or Heraclitian, fail to provide any rationale for sustainability measures or concerns. The only such rationale comes from Parmenidian prudentialism, which, I argue, can operate only if it disowns at its peril the nomic point of view and couches sustainability entirely under the rubric of maximizing certain preferred opportunities drawn from collective self-love. But doing so merely evades rather than answers the tension imposed by the nomic Heraclitian for whom nothing lasts and nothing human counts specially in the measure. The liabilities of Parmenidian prudentialism are examined and found to be too great for any consistent notion of sustainability to bear. (shrink)