It has been more than 20 years since the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on the admissibility of scientific expert witness testimony in legal proceedings. It is time, perhaps, to look back at the history of Daubert decisions to determine whether it and its progeny have lived up to their collective promises to keep bad science out of the courtroom, while allowing in good, especially where the mind and brain sciences are concerned.In this (...) essay, I argue that, although the decision in Daubert describes a general test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, it has not been applied consistently to data and conclusions drawn from the behavioral sciences.... (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued against a biological understanding of the innate in favor of a narrowly psychological notion. On the other hand, Ariew ((1996). Innateness and canalization. Philosophy of Science, 63, S19-S27. (1999). Innateness is canalization: in defense of a developmental account of innateness. In V. Hardcastle (Ed.), Where biology meets psychology: Philosophical essays (pp. 117-138). Cambridge, MA: MIT.) has developed a novel substantial account of innateness based on developmental biology: canalization. The governing thought (...) of this paper is that the notion of the innate, as it re-emerged with the work of Chomsky, is a general notion that applies equally to all biological traits. On this basis, the paper recommends canalization as a promising candidate account of the notion of the innate. (shrink)

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank Yates (...) and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Priming and Narrative Habits in the Phenomenological InterviewReflections on a Study of Tourette SyndromeThe author reports no conflicts of interest.In "Dimensions, Not Types: On the Phenomenology of Premonitory Urges in Tourette Syndrome," Lisa Curtis-Wendlandt and Jack Reynolds provide new insights into some of the experiences characteristic of Tourette syndrome (TS). Their study is an excellent example of applied phenomenology (Burch, 2021), combining philosophy and qualitative research methods to illuminate (...) experiences that have often been mischaracterized in the existing literature. In their study, they focus on what is commonly referred to as a "premonitory urge" (PU): the "anticipatory urge that is often thought to precede the onset of the motor and phonic tics that are part of Tourette Syndrome" (Curtis-Wendlandt & Reynolds, 2024, p. 26). They ask not only whether PU is a necessary feature of TS, but also whether the very concept of PU accurately portrays the experiences and behaviors that it's intended to refer to. They point out that existing scales used to assess PU, for example, seem to implicitly narrow the relevant experiences by assuming that they are a) always negative and b) always internal, or inwardly focused (Curtis-Wendlandt & Reynolds, 2024, 26). Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds question these in-built assumptions about PU, suggesting that they may provide an overly narrow depiction that misses the genuine diversity of experiences that precede the onset of a motor or phonic tic.To explore these phenomena in more detail, they conducted a study intended to elicit fresh descriptions of these experiences. They interviewed 12 teenagers with a diagnosis of TS about their experiences of ticcing and tic suppression. Using the micro-phenomenological method (Petitmengin, 2006), they asked participants to reflect on a specific tic or tic suppression event and to recall the event in detail. Throughout the interview, [End Page 43] they asked open-ended questions about sensory, cognitive, or affective experiences surrounding the event. Through these interviews, they were able to generate rich descriptions of these experiences and investigate how these descriptions differed from standard accounts in the existing literature.Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds provide a detailed account of how they designed their phenomenological study, both philosophically and empirically. However, there is an important aspect of their method that they discuss only in a cursory or implicit way, which is what I want to focus on here. Throughout their study, they were concerned that participants might simply parrot back well-worn medicalized characterizations of PU. Such characterizations risk simplifying or even occluding key aspects of the participants' experiences that might be difficult to reflect upon or describe. However, despite stressing the importance of eliciting fresh descriptions, Curtis-Wendlandt and Reynolds provide only glimpses of how the interviews actually unfolded and what kinds of techniques they used to elicit these descriptions.In my experience, it is quite common to hear phenomenological psychologists and psychiatrists express concern that people may simply repeat common psychiatric or medicalized characterizations of their condition, rather than genuinely reflect upon and describe their first-person experiences. The philosophical assumption is that we all fall back on culturally sedimented language and terminology when describing our experiences. Someone who has spent extended periods of time interacting with psychiatrists and other healthcare professionals, for example, is likely to have picked up common ways of describing their condition—ways that may have helped them receive a diagnosis or obtain treatment. There is nothing inherently wrong with falling into these culturally sedimented characterizations. They facilitate everyday communication through a shared language and terminology. But phenomenologists are often concerned that this kind of culturally sedimented language covers over or obscures the phenomenon or experience they are trying to investigate. For example, if a psychiatrist has often described their patient's depressed mood as "sadness," then that patient may be likely to self-describe their mood as sadness in an interview setting. It might, in fact, be the case that their mood is best described as sadness. But it could also be the case that their mood would be more accurately described as, for instance, a sense of emptiness or feeling deep despair. The challenge is therefore to know whether someone's self-description is... (shrink)

With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar--but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective. The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We (...) also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment, confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems. (shrink)

"This book is an augmented and updated translation by the author of Theorie des Subjekts: Subjectiviteat und Identiteat zwischen Moderne und Postmoderne, Teubingen, Francke-UTB, 2010 (3rd ed.)"--Title page verso.

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag widmet sich der Entstehung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Die Vorgeschichte zu diesem Prozess beginnt mit Benjamin Constants Religionsphilosophie der 1810–1820er Jahre, in der die lokalen und diachronen Veränderungen des allgemein menschlichen religiösen Gefühls als ein Schlüssel zur Religionsgeschichte verstanden wurden. Nach einer langen Pause wird das Thema des religiösen Gefühls in Albert Révilles liberaltheologischem Projekt wieder aktuell. Ausgehend von Schleiermachers Voraussetzungen hoffte Réville dadurch die Apologetik zu modernisieren wie auch den Weg zum theologischen Inklusivismus zu bahnen. (...) Sein Sohn Jean, ebenfalls Theologe, neutestamentlicher Forscher und Sentimentalist, arbeitete mit dem Vater zusammen an der Institutionalisierung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Albert Réville leitete von 1886 bis zu seinem Tod 1906 die fünfte (religionswissenschaftliche) Sektion der École Pratique des Hautes Études, gleichzeitig war Jean Réville seit 1884 Herausgeber der Fachzeitschrift Revue de l’histoire des religions. Révilles theoretischer Standpunkt wurde von É. Durkheim und seinen Gleichgesinnten H. Hubert und M. Mauss, die die weitere weltanschauliche Säkularisierung förderten, nach 1898 stark kritisiert. Diese Serie von Erwiderungen zeigt die Kluft zwischen der Methodologie der (dem Ursprung nach) evangelischen Religionsgeschichte und der durkheimischen Religionssoziologie. (shrink)

The article discusses a key issue for Russian and international Max Weber Studies: the epistemological possibilities and place of Weberian sociology in modern social theory. Discussion articles by well-known Russian scientists — who sharply criticized the actualizing direction of Weberian studies in general, and the religious, cultural, and sociological orientation in particular — are contrasted with the re-actualization and rethinking of key Weberian themes in the “New Critical Theory” of the influential German sociologist Hartmut Rosa. Such a projection will make (...) it possible, on the one hand, to thematize the axiomatic assertion about the heuristic rather than concrete-content relevance of the classics; on the other hand, it will provide an opportunity to read Weber as a macrosociologist. In the original, criticized, and often rejected sociology of Rosa, Weber appears not only as a predecessor whose mention enhances the relevance of the new theoretical framework, but, above all, as an analyst and diagnostician of early modernity. Weber’s main ideas and theoretical constructions are organically built into Rosa’s methodological framework: analysis-diagnosis-praxis. The analysis of rationalization as a universal historical process of modernity in Weber’s sociology is rethought by Rosa as expansion and acceleration; disenchantment becomes a diagnosis of modernity and is recoded into alienation, while the concept of charisma is transformed into the key concept of resonance. (shrink)

With increasing influence of illiberalism, freedom should not be considered or interpreted lightly. Post-truth contexts provide grounds for alt-right movements to capture and pervert notions of freedom of speech, making universities battlefields of politicised emotions and expressions. In societies facing these pressures around the world, academic freedom has never been challenged as much as it is today. As Peters and colleagues note, conceptualisations of ‘facts’ and ‘evidences’ are politically, socially, and epistemically reconstructed in post-truth contexts. At the same time, with (...) intelligence commodified, reified or marginalised, freedom of speech and of mobility can entail fights for entitlements, or escapes from local responsibilities. The decline and corruptions of democratic free speech and academic freedom, or the absence of forces to defend them, are thus serious challenges. These challenges grow as the competition of ideas, sometimes under the rubric of academic freedom, often implies the power struggle and questioning of statuses in the so-called ‘marketplace of ideas’. Competition as a value invoked in some conceptualisations of freedom, becomes more important than human dignity, which was originally supposed to expand and strengthen under democratic conceptions of freedom in higher education. What had been happening to freedoms, of speech, teaching, and learning, across different subject positions and cultures of higher education, remains largely underexplored, as alt-right movements, neoliberalism and illiberalism, and post-truthism values and orientations expand. (shrink)

Moral conflicts are the situations which emerge as a response to deal with conflicting obligations or duties. An interesting case arises when an agent thinks that two obligations A and B are equally important, but yet fails to choose one obligation over the other. Despite the fact that the systematic study and the resolution of moral conflicts finds prominence in our linguistic discourse, standard deontic logic when used to represent moral conflicts, implies the impossibility of moral conflicts. This presents a (...) conundrum for appropriate logic to address these moral conflicts. We frequently believe that there is a close connection between tolerating inconsistencies and conflicting moral obligations. In paraconsistent logics, we tolerate inconsistencies by treating them to be both true and false. In this paper, we analyze Graham Priest’s paraconsistent logic LP, and extend our examination to the deontic extension of LP known as DLP. We illustrate our work, with a classic example from the famous Indian epic Mahabharata, where the protagonist Arjuna faces a moral conflict in the battlefield of Kurukshetra. The paper aims to avoid deontic explosion and allows to accommodate Arjuna’s moral conflict in paraconsistent deontic logics. Our analysis is expected to provide novel tools towards the logical representation of moral conflicts and to shed some light on the context-sensitive paraconsistent deontic logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Opining the articuli fidei:Thomas Aquinas on the Heretic’s Assent to the Articles of FaithM. V. DoughertyTHOMAS AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT of the infused virtue (habitus) of faith presupposes that some intrinsically intelligible truths are beyond the range of the natural cognitive abilities of human beings. The possession of the virtue of faith allows the believer to transcend certain natural epistemic limitations so that he can assent to truths that are necessary (...) for salvation. Consonant with the Catholic theological tradition, Aquinas refers to such truths as the articles of faith (articuli fidei), and stock examples include propositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.1In light of the many and well-known texts from the Corpus Thomisticum that highlight the disproportion or incommensurability between the articles of faith and the natural cognitive abilities of human beings, it would not be unreasonable for one to assume that faith is required to assent to such articles of faith [End Page 1] in this life. Such an interpretive assumption could be expressed as:A1: A human being can assent to the articles of faith in this life if and only if the human being is fortified with the infused virtue of faith.One might be led to ascribe A1 to Aquinas when one considers that he criticizes the Pelagians precisely for maintaining that the assent to matters of faith is caused by nothing other than free will.2 Still further, one might think that strong evidence for A1 is Aquinas’s claim that “free will does not suffice for believing, since those things that are of faith are above reason.”3I argue, however, that A1’s identification of the virtue of faith as a necessary condition for the assent to the articles of faith does not adequately reflect Aquinas’s position, despite the many texts that may suggest such a view.4 That Aquinas does not endorse A1 can be made evident by examining his largely overlooked account of the epistemic state of the heretic (haereticus). To be sure, most commentators who explore the Thomistic treatment of heresy focus on the psychology of error underlying the heretic’s denial of one or more of the articles of faith.5 In the present paper I take an alternate path, however, focusing on those epistemic acts whereby the heretic gets its [End Page 2] right, so to speak, by correctly assenting to some of the articles of faith. Aquinas maintains that the heretic does not possess the infused virtue of faith yet still assents to all the articles of faith except for the one or more articles that he denies. Bereft of faith, the heretic “holds those things that are of faith by another mode than through faith.”6 This seemingly anomalous epistemic condition deserves consideration.7I. Intellects without FaithThe heretic appears to be cognitively privileged, since without faith he assents to the things that are of faith, seemingly overcoming without divine assistance the aforementioned disproportion between the limited range of reason and the articles of faith. Aquinas is aware of the apparent difficulty; in the Summa theologiae he defuses the rather unusual objection that heretics appear to have greater cognitive capacities than the faithful, since heretics routinely and unassistedly assent to those higher truths without possessing the virtue of faith.8 Aquinas concludes that the heretic holds the articles of faith by opinion (opinio), not faith.What makes one a heretic? Frequently Aquinas identifies obstinacy (pertinacia, instantia) as a necessary condition for heresy.9 The cause of heresy is at times identified with pride [End Page 3] (superbia).10 On Aquinas’s account, heresy is a species of unbelief (infidelitas) and every heretic is a schismatic.11 But the heretic does get many things right. If one were to deny all of the articles of faith, one would not qualify as a heretic, but would simply be a nonbeliever or an apostate. So, apart from the denial of an article (or a few articles) that specifies heretics as the distinct kind of heretic they happen to be, heretics for the most part succeed in assenting to most—but not all—of the articles of faith.Although the... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to propose a method for analyzing the ideo­logical content of video games while taking into account the agency of the players. The interactivity of video games as a medium has been attracting the attention of researchers for many years, raising, in particular, the ques­tion of how this unique property serves to broadcast certain ideologies. The ability of games to make ideological statements was discussed by Bogost, Frasca, Aarseth, and many other pioneers of game studies. (...) Video games were analyzed both in the context of older media forms that promoted certain ideas through plots, visuals, and other traditional means, and as unique types of objects that can make statements through rules. I aim to introduce the player — as a subject who is able to transform and conceptual­ize the game based on their own cultural background — to this discussion. Using James Gibson’s theory of affordances, I want to acknowledge the player’s freedom of interpretation, the potential to assign one or another ideology to the game in each playthrough. On the one hand, the player acts as a consumer of content; on the other hand, they are a co-author who will use the tools offered by the video game to produce their own state­ments, to be interpreted independently. This leaves the final decision about the ideology of the game to the consumer; thus, game studies need an ap­proach that allows the analysis of the ideological content of specific games. It is especially important in the light of more and more games prioritizing player freedom and not providing any clear plot or even victory conditions. Of course, research can still proclaim, and rightfully so, that the specific rules in such games bear traces of certain ideological systems — capitalism or secularism, for example. But individual players could undermine such interpretations both at the level of reading the game as a “text”, and at the level of interactive actions inspired by those readings. (shrink)

The article considers Max Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership and historical examples of plebiscitary democracy. It is argued that there is no clear distinction between plebiscitary democracy and dictatorship inWeber’s writings. As Stefan Breuer demonstrates, such a distinction allows us to broaden the application of Weberian concepts. Plebiscitary elements can be seen in the political life of non-Western states, which have been discussed from the multiple modernities perspective. However, while that perspective develops the Weberian sociological tradition, its representatives mostly do (...) not use the concept of plebiscitary leadership. Thus, Shmuel Eisenstadt draws primarily on Weber’s sociology of religion in his analysis of different types of modernity. Specifically, Eisenstadt considers the impact of civilizational legacies on political processes in India and Latin America. Peter Wagner discusses the relevance of Weber’s rationalization thesis and theory of capitalism rather than the concepts of Weberian political sociology. In his study of democratization in Brazil and South Africa, Wagner emphasizes the progressive character of political changes but does not consider the possibility of a reversal of these processes. The article argues that the contemporary reconstruction of Weber’s model of plebiscitary leadership can complement the analyses of democratization in non-Western societies from the multiple modernities perspective. (shrink)