Review of New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Brady; and New Waves in Truth, edited by Cory D. Wright and Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen.

In this paper I explore Phyllis Rooney’s 2003 chapter, “Feminist Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology: An Uneasy Alliance,” taking guidance from her critique of naturalized epistemology in pursuing my own analysis of another uneasy alliance: that between feminist epistemology and social epistemology. Investigating some of the background assumptions at work in prominent conceptions of social epistemology, I consider recent analyses of "epistemic bubbles" to ask how closely such analyses are aligned with ongoing research in feminist epistemology. I argue that critical feminist (...) insights in political philosophy are called for here, especially those that focus on multiple politically salient relationships and also emphasize practices of personal transformation as inseparably bound up with broader movements for social transformation. Insofar as feminist epistemology continues to carry another world in its heart, I argue that it will continue to rest uneasily with any effort to align it with—let alone subsume it within—the still emerging field of social epistemology. (shrink)

Child moral agency is dismissed in many historical and contemporary accounts based on children's supposed lack or marginal possession of agency-bearing capacities, including reason, deliberation, and judgment, amongst others. Given its prominence in the philosophical canon, I call this the traditional view of child agency. Recent advancements in moral developmental psychology challenge the traditional view, pointing toward the possession of relevant capacities and competencies for moral and responsible agency in early and middle childhood. I argue that both views—traditional and developmental—underdetermine (...) our practices of holding children responsible in our common interactions. For one, we face significant epistemic barriers in accurately assessing children’s agential status qua possession of responsibility-bearing capacities and competencies. Second, overreliance on assessments of individualistic capacities emphasizes an atomistic view of agency at the expense of relational views that are of particular relevance for children as uniquely developing persons. Our practices of holding children responsible and the values that guide these practices in the context of supportive relationships are central to both supporting current and drawing out future responsible agency in childhood and, importantly, provide us with a path to regard children as participants in our moral communities, as opposed to mere agents-in-waiting. (shrink)

Disagreement has garnered attention in a variety of academic disciplines, but its counterpart agreement is deserving of much more attention than it has received. This paper begins by reviewing some of the existing literature directly discussing agreement. Inspired by these conversations, I then provide a typology of basic types of agreement followed by a more general discussion of its nature. The aim of the paper is to provide conceptual clarifications and a framework for discussing and analyzing agreement wherever it may (...) be found. (shrink)

One branch of bioethics assumes that mainly agents of the state are responsible for public health. Following Susan Sherwin’s relational ethics, we suggest moving away from a “state-centered” approach toward a more thoroughly relational approach. Indeed, certain agents must be reconstituted in and through shifting relations with others, complicating discussions of responsibility for public health. Drawing on two case studies—the health politics and activism of the Black Panther Party and the work of the Common Ground Collective in post-Katrina New Orleans—we (...) argue for the need to attend more carefully to the limitations of states and state-driven public health programs. (shrink)

Recent research has highlighted the character and importance of the study of agreement. This paper, paralleling work on the more familiar concept of deep disagreement, will provide a first articulation of the character and implications of deep agreements, that is, agreements so deep that disagreement cannot overcome them. To do so, I start by outlining the main features of deep disagreement. I then provide a brief characterization of agreement in general to ground the discussion of the unique characteristics of deep (...) agreements and compare them to deep disagreements. After distinguishing the concept from other more familiar ones, I then point to a few of the major social and theoretical issues the existence of deep agreements poses before concluding with some remarks pointing to valuable areas for future research. (shrink)

Using Canada as a case study, this article argues that regulating biotechnology and nanotechnology is made unnecessarily complex and inherently unstable because of a failure to consult the public early and of-ten enough. Furthermore, it is argued that future regulators (and promoters) of nanotechnology may learn valuable lessons from the mistakes made in regulating biotechnology.

The HRAF databases, eHRAF World Cultures and eHRAF Archaeology, each containing large corpora of curated text subject-indexed at the paragraph-level by anthropologists, were designed to facilitate rapid retrieval of information. The texts describe social and cultural life in past and present societies around the world. As of the spring of 2018, eHRAF contains almost three million indexed “paragraph” units from over 8000 documents describing over 400 societies and archaeological traditions. This chapter first discusses concrete problems of scale resulting from large (...) numbers of complex elements retrieved by any given search. Second, we discuss potential and partial solutions that resolve these problems to advance research, whether based on specific hypotheses, classification or identifying and evaluating embedded patterns of relationships. Third, we discuss new kinds of research possibilities that can be further advanced, have not yet been successfully attempted, or have not even been considered using anthropological data because of scale and complexity of achieving a result. (shrink)

In this chapter I offer a critique of the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction and propose an alternative approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navigating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in the context of climate change: so-called “natural” disasters wreaking havoc on communities—flooding homes, collapsing infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and livelihoods. What happens when philosophical reflection begins (...) here—in places where the institutions and practices that have emerged over the last century seem incapable of addressing the problems communities face now, and where people find themselves turning to one another for the sake of their own survival? (shrink)

Although education in the responsible conduct of research is considered necessary, evidence bearing on the effectiveness of these programs in improving research ethics has indicated that, although some programs are successful, many fail. Accordingly, there is a need for systematic evaluation of ethics education programs. In the present effort, we examine procedures for evaluation of ethics education programs from a multilevel perspective: examining both within-program evaluation and cross-program evaluation. With regard to within-program evaluation, we note requisite designs and measures for (...) conducting systematic program evaluation have been developed and multiple measures should be applied in program evaluation. With regard to cross-program evaluation, we argue that a meta-analytic framework should be employed where analyses are used to identify best practices in ethics education. The implications of this multilevel approach for improving responsible conduct of research educational programs are discussed. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that the epistemology of mathematics must be different from the epistemology of science because their objects are different in kind, i.e. metaphysically different. In this chapter, I want to suggest that some careful work must be done before we can take the distinction between physical and mathematical objects for granted. This distinction has traditionally been drawn by making reference to location, causal powers, detectability in principle, and change in properties. By analysing the ontology of theoretical physics, (...) I wish to show that some physical objects, like quantum particles as they are described by D. Bohm, are as much mathematical as physical, for they do not seem to be located in space and time, and they are as incomplete as mathematical objects. The upshot of this discussion is to address those who are realists about physical objects and anti‐realists about mathematical objects, and, more importantly, to suggest that mathematical realists should not assume that a realist epistemology should be radically different from ordinary scientific epistemology. (shrink)

Public philosophy is diverse in orientation, methodology, and practice. This chapter addresses challenges to supporting and sustaining public philosophy initiatives as professional philosophers. It also addresses institutional challenges that public philosophers face as they develop, lead, and expand public‐facing projects. Many of us discovered philosophy through a public philosophy program or resource, in a K–12 classroom, or through the philosophically minded mentorship of someone who took our questioning seriously. Far from a supererogatory good, public engagement is necessary for sustaining the (...) practice of philosophy both inside and outside the academy. The chapter considers strategies for sustaining public philosophy in and beyond the academy. It focuses on two key areas: reframing evaluation and organizational collaboration. (shrink)

There is near universal recognition that human participant protection is both morally and practically essential for all forms of research involving humans. Yet most of the discourse around human participant protection has focussed on norms—rules, regulations and governance arrangements—rather than on the actual effectiveness of these norms in achieving their ends—protecting participants from undue risk and ensuring respectful treatment as well as advancing the generation of useful knowledge. In recent years there has been increasing advocacy for evidence-based human participant protection (...) that would be grounded on the careful investigation of the effects of research on human participants. We offer an analysis of evidence-based protection and then focus on Canadian examples of research on evidence-based protection. We consider the prospects for such research being put into practice in Canada. Finally we connect our remarks to the theme of “the changing landscape of human participant protection.”. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has a rich history; yet, its application in health ethics has been minimal compared to other major ethical frameworks. Even more, its application to health policy and population-level questions has been almost nonexistent. A new concept in moral theology, structures of virtue, provides impetus for ethicists to consider how virtue ethics can be a valuable addition to existing frameworks in public health ethics. This article offers a basic overview of virtue ethics and its value for analysis of social (...) structures in public health. It does so by explaining how virtue can be seen not only in the process of public health—the promotion of habituated behavior—but also in the content of public health—values such as temperance, fortitude and prudence. It concludes with two extended applications of virtue ethics: vaccination policy and healthy eating. (shrink)

If one were to prioritise the most important contributions of John Wesley, within that list would be the contribution of his Doctrine of Christian Perfection. The development of this doctrine was a life-long project for Wesley, who always held the core belief that the telos of perfection was love for God and one's neighbour. Wesley's Doctrine of Christian Perfection found its most comprehensive outline in his 1743 manuscript, A Plain Account of Christian Perfection. This article will argue that Wesley's ethics, (...) as found in his teaching and the work of the Methodist movement, are built on the view that the life of the Christian should be a journey of an ever-growing love for God and love for neighbour. This article will explore Thoughts upon Slavery as a critical text in the Wesley corpus to see how the Doctrine of Christian Perfection influenced Wesley's thoughts on slavery. Finally, this article offers a way of doing Wesleyan ethics today. Wesleyan ethics are communally understood in that all holiness is social holiness, and Wesleyan ethics have as their primary concern Wesley's charge to do no harm, do good, and stay in love with God. (shrink)

Respect for patients’ autonomy has taken a central place in the practice of medicine. Received wisdom holds that respect for autonomy allows overriding a patient’s treatment preferences only if the patient has been found to lack capacity. This understanding of respect for autonomy requires a dichotomous approach to assessing capacity, whereby a patient must be found either to have full capacity to make some particular treatment decision or must be found to lack capacity to make that decision. However, clinical reality (...) is more complicated, and, in borderline cases, different physicians may arrive at disparate judgments of capacity. In such cases, when capacity-determination protocols fail to achieve consensus, physicians would benefit from guidance regarding the clinical decision-making process necessary to elucidate the most ethically sound course of action. This article considers one such case and argues that, in a limited number of cases, respect for autonomy may require overriding a patient’s stated treatment preference when a capacity determination is equivocal, even though the patient has not clearly demonstrated a lack of capacity. (shrink)

One of the strongest motivations for being an anti‐realist with regard to mathematics is the difficulty in formulating a plausible realist epistemology, given that there seems to be a lack of ties between the mathematical apparatus and observation. In this chapter, I discuss a few puzzles that the mathematical realist has to solve in order to formulate an acceptable epistemology, and I hint at the direction in which one might hope to find the solution to these puzzles. One of the (...) puzzles, that was first clearly formulated by Paul Benacerraf, is that since mathematical objects are supposed to be causally inert entities existing outside of space and time, it is hard to see how we can ever get in contact with them, i.e. how we can ever gain knowledge of them or refer to them. A second puzzle concerns the incompleteness of mathematical entities that has it, that we have no conceivable evidence and so no answers to questions of whether the objects that one mathematical theory discusses are identical to those that another theory treats. Realists can reject the presuppositions of both these puzzles. The first presupposes that there must be some sort of direct or indirect interaction between us and the objects of our knowledge. The second assumes that there is always a fact of the matter as to whether the objects of one theory are the same or distinct, as those of another. In later chapters, I will try to undermine both of these presuppositions. (shrink)

I present a theory of justification for mathematical beliefs that is both non‐foundationalist, in that it claims that some mathematics must be justified indirectly in terms of its consequences, and holistic, in that it maintains that no claim of theoretical science can be confirmed or refuted in isolation but only as a part of a system of hypotheses. Our evidence for mathematics is ultimately empirical because the mathematics that is part of theoretical science, is, in principle, revisable in light of (...) experience and confirmed by experience. Following Henry Kyburg, I develop this idea by claiming that in science we use combinations of mathematical and scientific principles to develop models that allow us to calculate values that we then compare with the data. ‘Separatists’ objections to holism revolve around the claim that holism fails to respect our intuitions about mathematics, e.g. that mathematics is clearly distinct from science and that mathematical evidence comes from proofs, rather than from experience. My response to these objections is that holism can accommodate these intuitions by appealing to pragmatic rationality that, on the one hand, underwrites the special role of mathematics and bids us to treat it as if it were a priori, and, on the other, justifies, on the grounds of simplicity and success, a local conception of evidence according to which data can confirm specific hypotheses. (shrink)

It is usual to regard mathematical objects as entities that can be identified, characterized, and known in isolation. In this chapter, I propose a contrasting view according to which mathematical entities are structureless points or positions in structures that are not distinguishable or identifiable outside the structure. By analysing the various relations that can hold between patterns, like congruence, equivalence, mutual occurrence, I also account for the incompleteness of mathematical objects, for mathematics turns out to be a conglomeration of theories, (...) each dealing with its own structure and each forgoing identities leading outside its structure. My suggestion that mathematical objects are positions in structures or patterns is not intended as an ontological reduction, but rather as a way of viewing mathematical objects and theories that put the phenomena of multiple reductions and ontological and referential relativity in a clearer light. (shrink)

I present a hypothetical account of how the ancients might have come to introduce mathematical objects in order to describe patterns, and I explain how working with patterns can generate information about the mathematical realm. The ancients might have started using what I call templates, i.e. concrete devices, like blueprints or drawings, to represent how things are shaped or structured, and this could have evolved into representing the abstract patterns that concrete things might fit. In this way, they might have (...) come to believe that written constructions and computations could provide information about the mathematical realm, for by their very nature, patterns should be structurally analogous to their templates and in positing that they are, one simply projects onto structures and features already attributed to templates. By reflecting on systems of dots representing cardinalities, the ancients could generate a body of results that then evolved into a systematic theory of numbers, but the approach fails when there is no direct connection between the computations and the patterns they are supposed to concern, e.g. those concerning trigonometric functions or transfinite ordinal numbers. In these cases, we forge a connection between proofs and patterns by positing that the premises of the proofs state uncontroversial features of the patterns, i.e. the premises constitute implicit definitions of the patterns. I explain how this position does not entail that mathematics is analytic or a priori. (shrink)

If, as I grant, mathematical objects are abstract entities existing outside of space and time, and if the idea of supernaturally grasping abstract entities is scientifically unacceptable, then we need to explain how we can attain mathematical knowledge using our ordinary faculties. I try to meet this challenge through a postulational account of the genesis of our mathematical knowledge, according to which our ancestors introduced mathematical objects by first positing geometric ideals and then postulating abstract mathematical entities. Since positing involves (...) simply introducing a discourse about objects and affirming their existence, positing mathematical objects involves nothing more serious than writing fiction. For this reason, postulational approaches seem better suited for conventionalists; so in the second part of this chapter, I explain how positing in mathematics is different from positing in fiction, and how we can gain knowledge from the former. Finally, I try to make sense of the idea that mathematical postulates are about an independent mathematical reality and that we can refer to that reality through them, by giving an immanent and disquotational account of reference and contrasting it with a transcendent/causal account. (shrink)

The indispensability thesis maintains both that using mathematical terms and assertions is an indispensable part of scientific practice and that this practice commits science to mathematical objects and truths. Anti‐realists have used several methods for attacking this thesis: Hartry Field has tried to show how science can do without mathematics by showing that it is possible to replace analytic mathematical scientific theories with synthetic versions that make no reference to mathematical objects. Phillip Kitcher and Charles Chichara have tried, instead, to (...) maintain the mathematical formalism in science without being committed to mathematical realism, by giving a non‐realist account of mathematical objects. Finally, Geoffrey Hellman devised a modal structuralism that uses modal operators to translate standard mathematical language into a ‘structuralist’ language. In this chapter I discuss these positions and claim that, on the one hand, they have failed to show that science can do without mathematical objects, and on the other, that these approaches to mathematics do not represent an ontic and epistemic gain over standard realism. (shrink)

The application of mathematics to science and the enormous success that derives from it is, perhaps, the strongest evidence in favour of mathematical realism. Quine and Putnam have taken the indispensability of mathematics in doing science as the main premise in an argument for both the truth of mathematics and the existence of mathematical objects. This argument has been criticized, among other things, for presupposing a realist position with regard to science. In this chapter, I propose a new argument, the (...) pragmatic indispensability argument that avoids the problem by failing to presuppose that our best scientific theories are true. I argue that the justification for doing science also justifies our accepting as true, the mathematics that science uses. (shrink)

Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply (...) a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies. (shrink)

I explore the relation between structuralism and other theses that I have presented in the rest of the book, in particular, my holism, realism about mathematical objects, and the disquotational account of truth. In developing my theory, I have claimed that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the patterns that the various mathematical theories describe are themselves mathematical objects, so I first try to explain what the locution ‘there is no fact of the matter’ means. Next, (...) I discuss the relativity of key structuralist concepts like sub‐pattern and pattern equivalence, and then explore the possibility of formulating structuralist versions of mathematical theories. Even if my holism precludes me from drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and science I do not regard my structuralism as a mathematical theory but rather as a philosophical account of mathematics that tries to achieve a deeper understanding of the epistemology and ontology of mathematics. My structuralism is epistemic rather than ontic because it is not an ontological reduction or a foundation for mathematics but a philosophical view about the nature of its objects. So when it is combined with realism concerning mathematical objects, it need not commit one to the existence of structures. (shrink)

Although Responsible Conduct of Research training is common in the sciences, the effectiveness of RCR training is open to question. Three key factors appear to be particularly important in ensuring the effectiveness of ethics education programs: educational efforts should be tied to day-to-day practices in the field, educational efforts should provide strategies for working through the ethical problems people are likely to encounter in day-to-day practice, and educational efforts should be embedded in a broader program of on-going career development efforts. (...) This article discusses a complex qualitative approach to RCR training development, based on a sensemaking model, which strives to address the afore-mentioned training concerns. Ethnographic observations and prior RCR training served the purpose of collecting information specific to a multi-disciplinary and multi-university research center with the goal of identifying metacognitive reasoning strategies that would facilitate ethical decision-making. The extensive qualitative analyses resulted in the identification of nine metacognitive reasoning strategies on which future RCR training will be developed. The implications of the findings for RCR training in the sciences are discussed. (shrink)

Methods of ethical reasoning in psychiatry -- Psychiatric professional ethics and the social -- Communitarian ethics and the social -- Moral agency in psychiatry -- Involuntary psychiatric treatment -- Psychiatry across cultures -- Neoliberalism -- Psychiatry and popular culture -- Psychiatric ethics in the light of neuroscience -- Reappraisals -- Power and knowledge in psychiatry.

Along with potential benefits to healthcare delivery, machine learning healthcare applications raise a number of ethical concerns. Ethical evaluations of ML-HCAs will need to structure th...

The distinction between mathematical and physical objects has probably played a greater role shaping the philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between observable and theoretical entities has had in defining the philosophy of science. All the major movements in the philosophy of mathematics may be seen as attempts to free mathematics of an abstract ontology or to come to terms with it. The reasons are epistemic. Most philosophers of mathematics believe that the abstractaess of mathematical objects introduces special difficulties in (...) accounting for our ability to know them, to refer to them and even to entertain beliefs about them. These difficulties—supposedly absent even in the case of the most theoretical physical objects—make mathematical objects especially problematic and philosophically unattractive.Few have questioned this epistemic thesis or the ontic distinction it presupposes. LaVerne Shelton (1980) challenged the abstract-concrete distinction some years ago in an unpublished APA address. (shrink)