Franz Rosenzweig : the other side of the West -- Dissimilation -- Hegel taken literally -- Utopia and redemption -- Walter Benjamin : the three models of history -- Metaphors of origin : ideas, names, stars -- The esthetic model -- The angel of history -- Gershem Scholem : the secret history -- The paradoxes of messianism -- Kafka, Freud, and the crisis of tradition -- Language and secularization.

Dans la philosophic d'Emmanuel Lévinas (Totalité et Infini, 1961; Autrement qu'être, 1974) l'idée de la priorité absolue de l'éthique sur le savoir se traduit par la place centrale accordée à la notion de justice. Dans les rapports de personne à personne, l'exigence de justice est fondée sur l'idée de la non-réciprocité de la relation éthique. La priorité de l'autre sur le Moi se traduit par une conception de la justice comme don. D'un autre côté, la réalité économique, sociale et politique (...) du monde postule l'institution d'une justice objective, commandée par la figure du tiers comme l'autre de l'autre. Cependant, une société qui reposerait sur le seul principe de l'équilibre entre les intérêts égoïstes de chacun de ses membres n'instituerait qu'une égalité purement formelle, qui mènerait nécessairement à la lutte permanente de tous contre tous. D'où une critique fondamentale (quoiqu'implicite) de la théorie contractualiste de la justice. Ces différents principes sont illustrés concrètement par les commentaires de certains passages du Talmud que Levinas développe dans les Quatre lectures talmudiques (1968), Du sacné au saint (1977) et L'au-delà du verset (1982). /// Na filosofia de Emmanuel Levinas, particularmente na sua expressdo mais significativa em Totalité et Infini (1961) e Autrement qu'être (1974), a ideia da prioridade absoluta da itica sobre o saber traduz-se na centralidade da noção de justiça. Nas relações de pessoa a pessoa, a exigência de justiça está fundada sobre a ideia da não-reciprocidade da relação ética. A prioridade do outro sobre o Eu traduz-se por uma concepção da justiça como dom. Por outro lado, a realidade económica, social e política do mundo postula a instituição duma justiça objectiva, determinada pela ftgura do terceiro como outro do outro. No entanto, uma sociedade que repousasse apenas sobre o princípio do equilíbrio entre os interesses egoístas de cada um dos seus membros não instituiria senão uma igualdade puramente formal, a qual conduziria necessariamente à luta permanente de todos contra todos. Daí a crítica fundamental de Levinas (ainda que implícita) da teoria contratualista da justiça. O artigo ilustra estes diferentes princípios de forma concreta mediante o recurso que faz aos comentários de Levinas sobre determinadas passagens do Talmude, tal como é o caso em Quatre lectures talmudiques (1968), Du sacré au saint (1977) et L'au-delà du verset (1982). (shrink)

I The Sabbath The Sabbath, the sabbatical year, and the jubilee are all fundamental Biblical commandments which have in common the fact that they structure time according to the same original rhythm of six units of work followed by a unit of rest. In fact, here it is a question of one and the same principle applied successively to three temporal cycles: the succession of days, the succession of years, and the succession of epochs. The Sabbath, the basic temporal unit, (...) confers its particular cadence to the passing of days, which would otherwise be amorphous and which, if left to themselves, would all resemble each other. The sabbatical year interrupts the course of years and institutes a festive exception in which the earth and its inhabitants are delivered from the habitual servitude which governs their relations. The jubilee comes at the end of a historical period and inaugurates a new historical period. However, in contrast to the Sabbath and the shmita, which occur at the beginning of the seventh moment of the cycle, the jubilee begins at the start of the fiftieth year and not of the forty-ninth. From the point of view of the succession of historical epochs then, the jubilee marks not the end of a cycle but already the beginning of the following one. While the Sabbath and the shmita come in a way to fulfil and to crown the unity of time, the jubilee inaugurates a new phase, which is unknown with respect to the one that precedes it. (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage réunit les conférences que Stéphane Mosès a prononcées en janvier 2006, en tant que titulaire de la chaire de méta-physique Étienne-Gilson, à l'Institut catholique de Paris. Connu dès 1982, après la publication de son magistral ouvrage Système et révélation chez Franz Rosenzweig, préfacé par Emmanuel Levinas, son nom sera définitivement associé à l'auteur de L'Étoile de la Rédemption. Aussi bien fut-il un commentateur assidu des grands moments de la pensée juive moderne et contemporaine ou de (...) la philosophie allemande, y associant une incessante méditation de la Bible et du Talmud. C'est en examinant les différents types de relations aux textes pratiquées par les divers penseurs juifs, qu'il théorise progressivement une distinction, centralement exploitée ici, qui concerne la longue trajectoire de la pensée juive moderne depuis Moses Mendelssohn, entre " modernité normative " et " modernité critique ". (shrink)

L’invention de la théorie de l’inconscient, sur fond de Vaterkomplex non liquidé, semble avoir opéré chez Sigmund Freud – « Juif sans Dieu » revendiquant son athéisme –, comme un symptôme (Nom-du-Père) lui ayant garanti une « fidélité hérétique » dans son rapport contrasté au judaïsme. Peut-être bien que L’homme Moïse et la religion monothéiste (1939), œuvre testamentaire mise en chantier dans le contexte de la montée du nazisme en Europe, aurait à sa manière permis au fondateur de la psychanalyse (...) – au terme d’une méditation métapsychologique serrée sur la genèse et le devenir de l’identité juive –, l’esquisse d’une transfiguration par l’exil. (shrink)

Stephane Moses, Sistem si revelatie. Filosofia lui Franz Rosenzweig Bucuresti, Ed. Hasefer, Colectia Judaica, 2003.

The paper is dealing with the foundation of the Division for German Literature and Language at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from the point of view of its first head, Prof. Stéphane Mosès.

The article provides a brief overview on Hans Mayer’s life and work and his several stays in Jerusalem and with Stéphane Mosès.

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 11 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 115-129.

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

This article reflects a conversation between Jan G. van der Watt and Stephan Joubert. The article serves as the introduction to the Special Collection: ‘From timely exegesis to contemporary ecclesiology: Relevant hermeneutics and provocative embodiment of faith in a Corona-defined world – Festschrift for Stephan Joubert, sub-edited by Willem Oliver ’. Following a brief bio-statement as introduction, the following issues are discussed: the collection for the Jerusalem church; relevance of theology for society; social-scientific exegesis; the ancient concept of grace; Bible (...) translation in South Africa; public theology on the electronic platform; biblical examples of leadership and electronic media in religious activities and education.Contribution: This Festschrift represents current trends in biblical scholarship and ecclesial leadership. It contributes to the public discourse in church and society, especially the role of the electronic media in current Fourth Industrial Revolution. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...) account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the “equal weight view” to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and we demonstrate their (...) stability with the help of numerical simulations. (shrink)

In the past decade well-designed research studies have shown that the practice of collaborative philosophical inquiry in schools can have marked cognitive and social benefits. Student academic performance improves, and so too does the social dimension of schooling. These findings are timely, as many countries in Asia and the Pacific are now contemplating introducing Philosophy into their curricula. This paper gives a brief history of collaborative philosophical inquiry before surveying the evidence as to its effectiveness. The evidence is canvassed under (...) two categories: schooling and thinking skills; and schooling, socialisation and values. In both categories there is clear evidence that even short-term teaching of collaborative philosophical inquiry has marked positive effects on students. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research and a final claim that the presently-available research evidence is strong enough to warrant implementing collaborative philosophical inquiry as part of a long-term policy. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to provide a general discussion about the legitimacy of corporate social responsibility. Given that social responsibility projects entail costs, it is not always obvious under what precise conditions managers will have a responsibility to engage in activities primarily designed to promote societal goals.In this paper we discuss four distinct criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of corporate projects for institutionalizing social responsibility.

Wayne Norman and Chris MacDonald launch a strong attack against Triple Bottom Line or 3BL accounting in their article “Gettingto the Bottom of ‘Triple Bottom Line’” (2004). This response suggests that, while limitations to 3BL accounting do exist, the critique of Norman and MacDonald is deeply flawed.

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy and beyond. Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions is widely seen as a turning point in (...) twentieth-century analytic philosophy. And indeed, this volume is occasioned by the fact that the deflationary approach to metaphysics advocated by Carnap in that debate is once again attracting considerable interest and support. Eleven original essays by many of today's leading voices in metametaphysics aim to deepen our understanding of Carnap's contributions to metaontology and to explore how this legacy might be mined for insights into the contemporary debate. (shrink)