Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question ‘What problem is the General Will designed to solve?’ I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question ‘What problem is the General Will designed to solve?’ I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent numbers bear on an agent's duties, and how numbers should relate to social policy. In the first half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and (...) investigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing there, if there is no obvious duty on individuals to save the greater number. My proposal is that it is not the bare numbers themselves which explain our intuitions in such cases, but rather considerations of the extent to which each of us can make a reasonable claim on others. In short, I argue: numbers don't count, people do. (shrink)

In this review essay, I fijirst analyze the main tenets of Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good and, in particular, his claim that the goodness of state of afffairs may not be transitive. I examine one of the key examples of the book, and how it is intended to underwrite this claim. Next I describe the diffference between the threat of non-transitivity and the idea of incommensurability. I also consider the plausibility of what Temkin calls the Essentially Comparative View, and explore (...) possible responses to examples of seeming non-transitivity. I also raise some doubts regarding Temkin’s interpretation of ‘the separateness of persons’ and Rawls’ complaints against utilitarians. Finally, I envisage whether Temkin’s theoretical perspective helps us understand practical dilemmas that organizations such as the World Health Organization face. (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of the role that the idea of fraternity plays in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Many commentators, G.A. Cohen for example, have taken as their target the role of fraternity in understanding the difference principle. The article highlights the neglected connection between Rawls’s principle of fraternity and the role of sentiments in A Theory of Justice. I focus, in particular, on the third part of A Theory of Justice, which has received less attention in (...) the secondary literature. The main idea put forward is that, contrary to what his egalitarian critics contend, the Rawlsian conception of fraternity constitutes the most plausible version of this political ideal: one which is properly egalitarian. (shrink)

Institutions, if unjust, ought to be reformed or even abolished. This radical Rawlsian thought leads to the question of whether the family ought to be abolished, given its negative impact on the very possibility of delivering equality of life chances. In this article, we address questions regarding the justice of the family, and of marriage, and reflect on rights, equality, and the provision of social goods by institutions. There is a temptation to justify our social institutions in terms which highlight (...) their universal accessibility and benefits. But we may best understand the claim of some of our most important institutions where we recognize that they are forms of social good which may legitimately benefit some without having to benefit all. Their abolition is unjustified where there is sufficient value in them given our collective needs that it is unreasonable for some to refuse the means to maintain and promote these goods. (shrink)

La position originelle a une élégance et un attrait qui vont au-delà de la plupart des figures philosophiques. Il s’agit peut-être de l’aspect de la théorie rawlsienne qui ait le plus fasciné les lecteurs de Théorie de la justice. Bien que très étudiée, réinterprétée et critiquée, la position originelle est souvent présentée de façon erronée. En particulier, la méthode de raisonnement de John Rawls derrière le voile d’ignorance est souvent comprise comme si les conclusions qu’elle induit se situaient dans le (...) seul cadre du choix rationnel. Il y a donc différentes interprétations de la position originelle, correspondant à des perspectives plus ou moins proches d’une perspective éthique dans le cadre du choix rationnel, que ce soit le conséquentialisme ou l’utilitarisme. Mon but dans cet article est de clarifier le but de la position originelle rawlsienne. J’explique la différence entre une interprétation qui part du choix rationnel et des préférences des individus pour définir ce qui est exigé par la justice distributive et une interprétation qui met au contraire l’accent sur la justification raisonnable. Je montre que même si nous renonçons à l’ambition d’arriver à des principes de justice dans la seule perspective du choix rationnel, nous devons retenir plutôt qu’abandonner la position originelle. Je conclus en montrant que la principale différence entre l’utilitarisme et la théorie rawlsienne réside non dans la distribution que ces deux théories recommandent, mais dans la stratégie de justification qu’elles adoptent. (shrink)

This article explores the justice of the family. From the perspective of justice, the family causes serious concerns, for it causes severe inequalities between individuals. Several justice theorists remark that by its mere existence the family impedes the access to equality of life chances. The paper examines whether this means that justice requires the abolition of the family. It asks whether everyone, and, in particular, the worst off, would prefer the family to a generalized well-run orphanage. This thought-experiment is used (...) to inquire which value, if any, is such that (a) it would be menaced by the abolition of the family, and (b) in a just society, it would to prioritized over the principle of equality of life chances. (shrink)

John Rawls is regarded as the most important political philosopher of the twentieth century. His seminal work, _A Theory of Justice_, transformed the study of political philosophy and shaped the political thought of a generation. _Rawls on Justice_ demystifies this difficult text by introducing and assessing: Rawls’ life and the background to his philosophy The key concepts of _A Theory of Justice_, including the ‘orginal position’, the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the two principles of justice Rawls’ continuing importance to contemporary (...) philosophy and influence on political thought Ideal for those coming to Rawls for the first time, _Rawls on Justice_ is an invaluable guide for students of philosophy, political thought, economics and law. (shrink)

In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent numbers bear on an agent's duties, and how numbers should relate to social policy. In the first half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and (...) investigate how if at all numbers can have a bearing there, if there is no obvious duty on individuals to save the greater number. My proposal is that it is not the bare numbers themselves (or even the ratio of claimants on either side of the dilemma) which explain our intuitions in such cases, but rather considerations of the extent to which each of us can make a reasonable claim on others. In short, I argue: numbers don't count, people do. (shrink)

How can certain cultural goods (for example, museums, ice rinks, opera, the study of humanities) make a claim on our joint resources when there are other urgent needs to be met? Most of us resist the claim that one should sacrifice such cultural goods in the face of urgent needs and their priority as a concern for social justice. At the same time, in refusing the consequence, we are not inclined to think cultural goods more important than the urgent needs (...) of other human beings. What, then, justifies our resistance? (shrink)

[ Samuel Scheffler] Some egalitarian liberals have proposed a division of moral labour between social institutions and individual agents, but the division-of-labour metaphor has been understood in different ways. This paper aims to disentangle some of these different understandings, with an eye to clarifying the appeal of the egalitarian-liberal project and the challenges that it faces. The idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values. It is not an (...) apology for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness. /// [Véronique Munoz-Dardé] Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality. (shrink)

Is the principal concern of political philosophy the source of political authority? And, if so, can this source be located in individual consent? In this article I draw on Rousseau to answer the second question negatively; and in rejecting that answer, why we might answer the first question in the negative as well. We should be concerned with questions of legitimacy rather than with the source of authority and political obligation. Our principal concern, that is, should be with the question (...) how well political institutions meet the needs of individuals. I pursue these issues in the context of interpreting Rousseau's distinctive contribution to political thought. I start out by asking the question 'What problem is the General Will designed to solve?' I argue that Rousseau's challenge to Hobbes represents a crucial step in the move from the source of authority and political obligation to a focus on legitimacy. (shrink)

L’article établit un contraste entre deux conceptions de la justice distributive (toutes deux libérales et égalitariennes), en vertu de leur attitude respective à l’égard des choix et de la responsabilité. Un premier type de théories établit la distribution des ressources en fonction de la distinction entre choix des agents et circonstances dans lesquelles ces choix s’opèrent : quiconque est responsable en vertu de ses choix de son manque de ressource est considéré avoir renoncé au droit à une compensation. Or cette (...) théorie part d’une conception erronée de la notion de responsabilité. Les considérations légitimes de réciprocité qui la sous-tendent doivent être envisagées dans le contexte d’une doctrine reposant également sur la notion de responsabilité, mais qui part d’une division des responsabilités entre institutions et individus. Cette seconde conception est développée dans le contexte de la distinction établie par Thomas Scanlon entre responsabilité attributive et responsabilité substantielle. Nous demandons ensuite si les principes de justice fondamentaux dont les institutions sont responsables devraient accorder la priorité à l’égalité équitable des chances et concluons en analysant les effets de la remarque de Rawls selon laquelle l’égalité des chances ne peut être réalisée sans abolir la famille. (shrink)

Book description:* Contributions from leading scholars in the field * Timely and important contribution to the moral and political debate about the status of children * Hot Topic The book contains contributions from thirteen distinguished moral and political philosophers on the subject of children. These are new essays and are devoted to a subject that until recently has not been extensively discussed by philosophers. Too often philosophers restrict themselves to the consideration only of the relations between adults. Yet the topic (...) of children is an important one for moral and political philosophy. Recent years have seen an increased concern with the needs and interests of young people. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which accords a wide range of fundamental rights to children was adopted in 1989 and many states have subsequently ratified the Convention. In this context it is timely and appropriate to ask various questions. If children do not have rights what exactly is their moral status? If they do have rights do they have all the rights that adults have? What rights if any do parents have over children and what is their justification? What duties do parents have towards their own children and towards others in society? How should we educate those who will be the future citizens and workers of our society? What values and what dispositions of character is it appropriate to instil in children? Is the family an obstacle to the realisation of full social justice? Can we in pursuit of justice contemplate the abolition of the family? The book covers the themes of children's rights, parental rights and duties, the family and justice, and civic education. (shrink)

Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler 's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status (...) of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality. (shrink)

author. University Professor in the School of Law, Columbia University. (From July 2006, Professor of Law, New York University.) Earlier versions of this Essay were presented at the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London, at a law faculty workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at a constitutional law conference at Harvard Law School. I am particularly grateful to Ronald Dworkin, Ruth Gavison, and Seana Shiffrin for their formal comments on those occasions and also to (...) James Allan, Aharon Barak, Richard Bellamy, Aileen Cavanagh, Arthur Chaskalson, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, Andrew Geddis, Stephen Guest, Ian Haney-Lopez, Alon Harel, David Heyd, Sam Issacharoff, Elena Kagan, Kenneth Keith, Michael Klarman, John Manning, Andrei Marmor, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, John Morley, Matthew Palmer, Richard Pildes, Joseph Raz, Carol Sanger, David Wiggins, and Jo Wolff for their suggestions and criticisms. Hundreds of others have argued with me about this issue over the years: This Essay is dedicated to all of them, collegially and with thanks. (shrink)

[Samuel Scheffler] Some egalitarian liberals have proposed a division of moral labour between social institutions and individual agents, but the division-of-labour metaphor has been understood in different ways. This paper aims to disentangle some of these different understandings, with an eye to clarifying the appeal of the egalitarian-liberal project and the challenges that it faces. The idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values. It is not an apology (...) for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness. /// [Véronique Munoz-Dardé] Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality. (shrink)

Section II of this article originated as a commentary on Véronique Munoz-Dardé’s “The Distribution of Numbers and the Comprehensiveness of Reasons.” I have delivered subsequent versions of this article at the University of Reading, UCLA, the University of Bristol, the University of Leeds, and the University of Oxford, and thank all who commented on those occasions. I am also grateful to G. A. Cohen, Iwao Hirose, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Alex Voorhoeve, and the Editors of Philosophy (...) & Public Affairs for their written comments. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's 'liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each 'nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the 'legitimacy' of social (...) arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social (...) arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social (...) arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)

This article discusses many issues raised by Munoz-Dardé, Katz, Ross, and Kagan. In doing this, I accept many of their claims, but reject others. I contend that the Essentially Comparative View can make genuine comparisons, deny that a contractualist approach helps with my book’s puzzles, and grant that my book’s central results are difficult to comprehend. I note important differences between economists’s impossibility results and my own, but accept that they may illuminate each other, using Sen’s Paradox of (...) the Paretian Liberal to illustrate this. I consider my work’s implications for the Sorites Paradox, as well as famous deontological cases. I also significantly reassess the Narrow Person-Affecting View, and some of my responses to Parfit and Broome. Finally, I stress my book’s many arguments challenging the Axioms of Transitivity, the high costs of retaining such axioms, and the importance of not prematurely choosing between highly plausible views that are inconsistent. (shrink)

Discussion of the “problem of numbers” in morality has focused almost exclusively on the moral significance of numbers in whom-to-rescue cases: when you can save either of two groups of people, but not both, does the number of people in each group matter morally? I suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to the moral significance of numbers in other types of case. According to common-sense morality, numbers make a difference in cases, like the famous Trolley Case, where we must (...) choose whether to kill a person (or persons) as a side effect of saving a greater number. I argue that recognition of the role of numbers in killing cases forces us to reassess purported solutions to the problem of numbers. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

En este artículo se propone el concepto antipsiquiatría intercultural a partir del análisis de una práctica de cuidados comunitarios en la que exiliados peul, mauritanos, residiendo en situación «administrativa irregular» en Bruselas, proporcionan alojamiento y acompañamiento a personas belgas con padecimiento mental/relacional, en el marco de una asociación militante de la corriente antipsiquiátrica, mientras son asesorados en su petición de asilo. A la luz de este estudio de caso, se desarrolla y discute la propuesta de David Cooper relativa a la (...) creación de comunidades de cuidados. En ellas, se abole la división entre saberes expertos y profanos, y se evidencia el vínculo entre las relaciones sociales lesivas y la génesis del padecimiento, politizando aquello denominado por las psicotecnologías como locura. Para este propósito, se parte del cuestionamiento del concepto de normalidad, planteado por Cooper, descentrando su locus de enunciación cultural, así como la matriz etnocéntrica de su propuesta antipsiquiátrica, desde la coproducción de narrativas y prácticas interculturales sobre la salud y la enfermedad. Se realizan algunas aportaciones a la propuesta de la antipsiquiatría a partir de los conceptos de autoatención y nomadismo terapéutico. Se finaliza con algunas sugerencias provisionales para una posible identificación y/o coproducción social de otras prácticas antipsiquiátricas de tipo intercultural. (shrink)

A finales de los años setenta, Foucault percibió que la implantación de una forma nueva de gubernamentalidad, de signo neoliberal conllevaba una reconfiguración de la subjetividad, dando forma a un nuevo tipo de homo economicus, el empresario de sí mismo. Los cambios producidos en la economía global y, particularmente, en la organización del trabajo, según el principio de flexibilidad, alienta la extensión de una individualidad emprendedora. Sin embargo, la defensa de este modelo humano suele ocultar una realidad laboral precarizada e (...) incierta, que dificulta la elaboración de una biografía personal consistente y el seguimiento de líneas de actuación socialmente responsables. (shrink)

Historical discourses in cinema have generally given rise to cinematographic genres. In Chilean fiction films, however, a different scope is necessary to study its discourses. This essay proposes that it is possible to recognize three main aesthetic strategies by which Chilean fiction films use historical discourse in order to produce certain “verisimilitude effects”: contextual comment, hegemonic or counterhegemonic reinforcement, and narrative subordination.

En el presente ensayo, abordaremos desde una perspectiva crítica la teorización sobre lo abyecto con el fin de aproximarnos a un análisis de las sociedades contemporáneas. En primer lugar, presentaremos una breve introducción en la que se perfilarán los orígenes psicoanalíticos y la influencia de estos en la comprensión de esta categoría, así como la fuerte carga política que ella arrastra desde sus inicios. En segundo lugar, se ofrecerán tres posibles criterios de satisfacción que pueden ayudar al espectador a identificar (...) cuándo se da lo abyecto en el ámbito artístico. Finalmente, se indagará en torno a las repercusiones políticas y éticas que dicha categoría tiene en las sociedades post industriales avanzadas en la actualidad. (shrink)

This article analyzes the financial performance and managerial abilities of a sample of US and European socially responsible (SR) mutual funds. The period analyzed commences from January 1994 and concludes in January 2013 and yields 18 US and 89 European green funds. The results obtained for green fund managers are compared with those achieved for conventional and other forms of SR mutual fund managers. We control for the mutual fund investment objective (distinguishing between domestic and global portfolios) and for the (...) effect of crisis market periods. For US SR funds, partitioning the data into crisis and normal periods reveals that SR funds obtain statistically insignificant performance in crisis periods but underperform relative to the market in normal periods. Furthermore, the findings indicate that green funds do not perform worse than other forms of SR mutual funds. For European SR funds partitioning the data into crisis and normal periods reveals that SR funds obtain statistically insignificant performance irrespective of market conditions. Similar to the US findings, green Europe SR funds do not perform worse than other forms of SR mutual funds. Managerial abilities are not evident in the findings though unsuccessful timing of the market is revealed for both Europe and US global green funds. When analyzing managerial abilities in crisis and non-crisis market periods, US green fund managers achieve better results in crisis market periods and the opposite occurs for green fund managers in European market. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se analiza el concepto del perdón en contraste con los presupuestos y limitaciones de una política del perdón en sociedades en conflicto, en las que el perdón se reduce al mero cálculo político, la víctima deja de ser parte activa del proceso de reconciliación y el perdón corre el riesgo de convertirse en un instrumento de garantía oficial de impunidad. Dicho análisis es posible gracias a la reconstrucción de la dimensión éticoexistencial del perdón como correctivo de (...) la dimensión política. Así, con la vinculación de estas dos dimensiones se busca (1) resaltar el aporte de un concepto más amplio del perdón que, (2) lo libere de su tratamiento exclusivamente político y jurídico. (shrink)

This article offers a review of the chapter dedicated by Strawson to the concept of a person in Individuals. Characteristics given to the concept of person by Strawson are criticized by Bernard Williams. What I set out to show is that this criticism can be answered by reviewing: a) how Strawson understands that the concept of a person is primitive, b) what are the implications of affirming the primitiveness of such concept, and, mainly c) what this philosopher understands by referring.

En este artículo se defiende la siguiente tesis: Wittgenstein “exorciza” los argumentos escépticos mostrando una concepción alternativa del lenguaje y del conocimiento que ha dado en caracterizarse como naturalismo y quietismo. Y se ofrece un deslinde entre los planteamientos quietistas y naturalistas wittgensteinianos y el naturalismo propio del empirismo mínimo de McDowell. A diferencia de este último, la propuesta wittgensteiniana nos ofrece la posibilidad de rechazar el reto escéptico.