Having as starting point Nietzsche's controversy with Pascal, this paper intends to demonstrate to what extent, and by what means, he is involved in a constant debate with Christianity. As the previous research of the author has demonstrated, Nietzsche occupied himself all his life with the figure of Jesus, who never ceased both to fascinate and to irritate him. Pascal, on the other hand, took as central point of his reflection Jesus' salvific mediation. The confrontation of the two ways of (...) thinking, thus, will contribute to the mutual clarification of their positions. The paper sheds a special light on both the moral and non-moral option of the two thinkers, who precisely in the radicality of their thinking show traits of a certain similitude, although in the prosecution of their objectives each one represents diametriccally opposed worlds. Nietzsche, in fact, debated intensely not only with Pascal's Christian character but also with his apology of the Christian faith. To Nietzsche the apologist of Christianity became, as such, vulnerable to the temptation of denying Man, Nature and History. His admirable faith in Christ, to which equally belong non-moral moments, remains, according to Nietzsche, within the horizon of moral ontology. The article shows, in other words, to what extent, after all, Pascal anticipated much more than he himself dared to understand. /// Tomando como ponto de partida a sua controvérsia com Pascal, o presente artigo pretende demonstrar até que ponto, e por que meios, Nietzsche se debateu com o cristianismo. Como as investigações do autor tinham já demonstrado, Nietzsche ocupou-se durante toda a sua vida com a figura de Jesus, figura esta que nunca deixou tanto de o fascinar como de o irritar. Pascal, por outro lado, tomou como ponto central da sua reflexão a mediação salvifica de Jesus. Deste modo, o confronto dos dois modos de pensar não poderá deixar de contribuir para uma clarificação mútua das duas posições. O artigo projecta uma luz especial tanto sobre a opção moral como não moral dos dois pensadores, os quais justamente na radicalidade do seu pensamento demonstram possuír traços de uma certa similitude, muito embora na prosecucao dos seus objectivos represente cada um mundos diametralmente opostos. – Nietzsche, na realidade, debateu-se intensamente não só com o carácter cristão da pessoa de Pascal, mas também com a sua intensa apologia da fé cristã. Para Nietzsche, o apologeta do cristianismo tornou-se, enquanto tal, vulnerável à tentação de negar o Homem, a Natureza e a História. A sua admirável fé em Cristo, a que igualmente pertencem momentos não-morais, permanece segundo Nietzsche dentro do horizonte da ontologia moral. O artigo mostra, por outras palavras, até que ponto, no final de contas, Pascal antecipou muito mais do que ele próprio foi capaz de ousar compreender. /// An seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Pascal läßt sich studieren, wie sehr und mit welcher Methode Nietzsche sich am Christentum abarbeitete. Da er sich lebenslang mit Jesus befaßte (dazu die Forschungen des Autors U. W.) und sich immer neu auf die Spur seiner faszinierenden wie irritierenden Lebensgestalt begab, da andererseits Pascal zentral die Heilsmittlerschaft Jesu reflektierte, verspricht die Konfrontation beider Denkweisen eine bisher meist unterschätzte Erhellung der einen wie der anderen Position. Ein besonderes Licht fällt dabei auf die moralische bzw. nichtmoralische Option der beiden Denker, die in der Radikalität ihres Denkens verwandte Züge zeigen, zugleich aber in der Durchführung diametral verschiedene Welten repräsentieren. – Nietzsche hat sich sowohl auf die Person Pascals in ihrer Christlichkeit als auch auf seine Apologie des christlichen Glaubens intensiv eingelassen. Der Apologet des Christentums sei durch eben dieses zur Verneinung von Mensch, Natur und Geschichte verfuhrt worden. Sein staunen machender Glaube an Christus, dem auch nichtmoralische Momente eignen, verbleibe im Horizont der moralischen Ontologie. Pascal habe mehr davon geahnt, als er sich selbst einzugestehen wagte. (shrink)

This article argues that the causal loops that occur in some time-travel scenarios and in certain solutions of the theory of relativity are no more mysterious than the infinitely descending causal chains familiar from Newtonian mechanics.

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the (...) claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its manifestation. (shrink)

Historical development of Muslim leaders organization in Burma.

Tom 1. Lekt︠s︡ii. Vospominanii︠a︡ -- t. 2. Filosofskai︠a︡ ontologii︠a︡ -- t. 3. Filosofskai︠a︡ ontologii︠a︡ segodni︠a︡; Nauchnye statʹi.

There’s a possibly more interesting general question: does technology transform and extend the mind and our mental powers? In a widely discussed 1998 paper titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mind and cognition can extend outside the head and can include items and processes in the world. In their thought experiment, Otto has alzheimer’s syndrome but does not lose his ability to function because he records information he learns in a notebook that he always carries. (...) Thus, C&C claim, Otto continues to have beliefs. The notebooks function as his memory. C&C propose a "parity principle": a part of the world is part of a cognitive process if it "functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing [it] as part of the cognitive process .... Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head!" (in Menary p. 29, original emphasis). (shrink)