Edmund Husserl is regarded as the founder of transcendental phenomenology, one of the major traditions to emerge in twentieth-century philosophy. In this book Andrea Staiti unearths and examines the deep theoretical links between Husserl's phenomenology and the philosophical debates of his time, showing how his thought developed in response to the conflicting demands of Neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy. Drawing on the work of thinkers including Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel, as well as Husserl's writings on the natural (...) and human sciences that are not available in English translation, Staiti illuminates a crucial chapter in the history of twentieth-century philosophy and enriches our understanding of Husserl's thought. His book will interest scholars and students of Husserl, phenomenology, and twentieth-century philosophy more generally. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Claude Romano’s recent characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of Cartesianism. Contra Romano, Husserl is not committed to the view that since individual things in the world are dubitable, then the world as a whole is dubitable. On the contrary, for Husserl doubt is a merely transitional phenomenon which can only characterize a temporary span of experience. Similarly, illusion is not a mode of experience in its own right but a retrospective way of characterizing (...) a span of experience. Therefore, Husserl cannot be plausibly characterized as either a disjunctivist or a conjunctivist. The common premise of both theories – namely, that perception and illusion are two classes of conscious acts standing on equal footing – is phenomenologically unsound. I propose to call Husserl’s theory a hermeneutical theory of perception, i.e., one that interprets perception as a temporal and self-correcting process. In the last part of the paper I argue that Husserl’s positive appraisal of Cartesian doubt is only pedagogical in nature. Husserl does not take Cartesian doubt to be practicable, but the attempt to doubt universally has the positive effect of revealing transcendental subjectivity as the subject matter of phenomenology. (shrink)

In this paper I present and assess a controversy between Edmund Husserl and Heinrich Rickert on the nature of judgment, in order to bring to light the originality of Husserl's proposal concerning this important issue. In the first section I provide some context for Rickert's theory of judgment by sketching a reconstruction of nineteenth century logical theory and then proceed to introduce Rickert's view. I suggest that nineteenth century logic is characterized by a criticism of the traditional view that sees (...) categorial judgment as the essential form of judgment and the uniting and separating of ideas as sufficient for the constitution of a judgment. Hume inaugurates this criticism, but it finds its most mature expression in the work of Lotze, Brentano, and Rickert. Rickert, in particular, sees simple affirmation and negation of the transcendent value of truth as the essence of judgment. In the second section I present Husserl's criticism of Rickert. Husserl's criticism revolves around the distinction between simple judgments and the higher-order affirmative or negative stance we can adopt with respect to previously articulated simple judgments. Simple judgments register the mereological relation holding among something and one of its properties, and they do not entail an affirmative or negative stance. Their function is to constitute states of affairs drawing on concrete perceptual situations. Higher-order affirmation or negation occurs when we set out to revisit a foregoing simple judgment in order to confirm or disconfirm the veridicality of its proposed state of affairs. In the third part I suggest a diagnosis of the origin of the mistake in earlier theories. Simple judgments are easy to conflate with non-simple, higher-order judgmental stances because they have the same logical value and they cannot be seen without the aid of genuinely phenomenological reflection. In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl's analysis amounts to a vindication of categorial judgment in its traditional form ‘S is P’, which continues to maintain a phenomenological legitimacy even in the wake of Frege's canonical dismissal of subject and predicate. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s fundamental concept of “attitude”. I first explore Husserl’s account with respect to the three faculties of intellect, will, and emotivity [Gemüt], which also define the three basic kinds of attitude. The attitude assumed by the subject plays at this level the important role of articulating and unifying, according to an overall direction, various underlying moments of a complex act. I then focus on the specific intellectual, viz. cognitive attitudes and highlight (...) the difference between the naturalistic attitude (which characterizes the natural sciences) and the personalistic attitude (which characterizes the human sciences). I then consider the notion of the natural attitude and argue that the personalistic attitude represents the systematic core of it. The natural attitude may be defined as the human attitude, i.e., as the attitude in which subjects posit themselves exclusively as human subjects belonging to the world , which is itself unceasingly posited as being. In the final part of the paper I explore the function of the phenomenological reduction insofar as it opens up a possibility of self-understanding that breaks with the natural, human self-apprehension and discloses subjectivity in its transcendental dimension. This opens up a radically new attitude, the phenomenological, which should not be confused with a first-person perspective within the framework of the natural attitude. (shrink)

After the demise of German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism flourished as the defining philosophical movement of Continental Europe from the 1860s until the Weimar Republic. This collection of new essays by distinguished scholars offers a fresh examination of the many and enduring contributions that Neo-Kantianism has made to a diverse range of philosophical subjects. The essays discuss classical figures and themes, including the Marburg and Southwestern Schools, Cohen, Cassirer, Rickert, and Natorp's psychology. In addition they examine lesser-known topics, including the Neo-Kantian influence (...) on theory of law, Husserlian phenomenology, Simmel's study of Rembrandt, Cassirer's philosophy of science, Cohen's philosophy of religion in relation to Rawls and Habermas, and Rickert's theory of number. This rich exploration of a major philosophical movement will interest scholars and upper-level students of Kant, twentieth-century philosophy, continental philosophy, sociology, and psychology. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl’s analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate Überschau in the context of self-determination and highlight the difference between the unthematic pre-givenness of life in the phenomenon of (...) self-awareness and the actual, i.e. thematic givenness of life in acts of Überschau. Second, I contextualize Husserl’s discovery of Überschau in his analyses of ethical life and the possibility of a universal epoché. I argue that for Husserl the very possibility of ethical life and of phenomenology itself rest on the totalizing apprehension of one’s life rendered possible by Überschau. In the third section I spell out the essential characteristics of Überschau by contrasting this peculiar kind of consciousness with reproductive forms of consciousness such as recollection and expectation, which otherwise might be easily conflated with Überschau. In section four I reply to a possible objection to the very possibility of Überschau based on the consideration of the infinitely open stream of time-consciousness. I argue that the possibility of Überschau is tightly connected with the egological nature of consciousness as understood by Husserl. The ego does not coincide with its own conscious acts and thus enjoys a special vantage point on the totality of its own life. To conclude, I advance a speculative suggestion about the phenomenological origin of Überschau in the structure of self-awareness. This opens up a variety of possible lines of research that would connect Husserl with philosophers such as Augustine or Heidegger who are more immediately associated with the issue of personal life and its unity or lack thereof. (shrink)

This is the first complete critical commentary of Husserl s seminal work Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Leading international scholars offer a close reading, examining arguments and phenomenological descriptions, connecting them to Husserl s earlier and later works, and engaging important secondary sources. The book will be invaluable reading for scholars and students of phenomenology and 20th century philosophy.".

In this article I argue that new light can be shed on the analytic/Continental divide by looking at the controversy on the nature of philosophy in late 19th-century/early-20th-century Germany. The controversy is between those thinkers who understand philosophy primarily as a worldview [ Weltanschauung] and those who insist that it should be understood as a science [ Wissenschaft]. The positions of the two main representatives of the two camps, Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, are presented and assessed. Their mutual disagreement (...) on what philosophy ought to be reflects in a striking way some of the major tensions existing between the analytic and the Continental camps today. At the end of the article I formulate a historical hypothesis about how the Wissenschaft/Weltanschauung controversy petrified into the analytic/Continental divide. (shrink)

In this article I argue that new light can be shed on the analytic/Continental divide by looking at the controversy on the nature of philosophy in late 19th-century/early-20th-century Germany. The controversy is between those thinkers who understand philosophy primarily as a worldview [Weltanschauung] and those who insist that it should be understood as a science [Wissenschaft]. The positions of the two main representatives of the two camps, Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, are presented and assessed. Their mutual disagreement on what (...) philosophy ought to be reflects in a striking way some of the major tensions existing between the analytic and the Continental camps today. At the end of the article I formulate a historical hypothesis about how the Wissenschaft/Weltanschauung controversy petrified into the analytic/Continental divide. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses Sebastian Luft’s recent interpretation of Husserl’s late phenomenology. Luft argues that Husserl envisioned a hermeneutic phenomenology of the cultural world, thereby articulating a project that can be considered complementary with Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. Three of Luft’s claims, in particular, are assessed and criticized: the Cartesian Husserl and the life-world Husserl pursue two separate agendas; Husserl’s genetic phenomenology is fundamentally compatible with Paul Natorp’s project of a reconstructive psychology; Husserl’s late work is oriented towards (...) hermeneutical understanding of the world of culture. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Jaspers’ theory of worldviews with regard to the contemporary problem of naturalism. In particular, I consider the frequent characterization of naturalism as a worldview. First, I situate Jaspers’ conception of worldviews in the context of the philosophical debate of his time. I then turn to Jaspers’ distinction between substantial worldviews and derivative shapes of worldviews and present his construal of naturalism as a derivative shape of what he calls the sensory- spatial Weltbild. I then argue (...) that contemporary naturalism still fits Jaspers’ description and can thus be considered a derivative shape, rather than a genuine worldview in its own right. I draw on some writings by Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Dilthey to further substantiate my claim. I conclude by arguing that if naturalism wishes to present itself as a worldview it should orient itself toward our human experience of nature. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the primacy of the present in Husserl’s philosophy is not an unquestioned ballast inherited from the tradition of metaphysics but rather a genuinely phenomenological discovery. First, I explore the present of things and argue that the phenomenological primacy of the present in this domain should be understood in terms of what Husserl calls “affection.” Strictly speaking originary affection and associative syntheses (as the most basic phenomena for the givenness of things) can only take place (...) in the present or starting from the present. Second, I consider the present in the egological sphere and analyze its primacy for both the transcendental and the personal ego. Finally, I move to the experience of the other and argue that only the perception of the other’s body in the present gives rise to an authentic empathic experience as the experience of the other’s governing in his own body. (shrink)

In this paper, I take a fresh look at Husserl's key distinction between objectifying and non‐objectifying acts, which roughly amounts to a distinction between presentational and evaluative experiences. My goal is to provide a clear and unified reconstruction of Husserl's argument for the thesis that non‐objectifying acts are necessarily founded in objectifying acts, a thesis that is highly controversial in and beyond Husserlian scholarship. In the first section, I reconstruct Husserl's view in the Logical Investigations, according to which only objectifying (...) acts establish an independent intentional relation to their objects, and argue that it is justified by the positing function of objectifying acts. In the second section, I address two problematic interpretations of this view and, after criticizing them, I present what I take to be Husserl's core argument for his position. In the third section, I turn to the revision of the view of the Logical Investigations that Husserl proposes in the wake of his transcendental turn, especially in Ideas I and II. On Husserl's revised view, all acts are objectifying, including emotional acts [Gemütsakte]. This revision has led scholars to consider Husserl's view aporetic. I propose an alternative interpretation that dispels the purported aporia. I conclude with some remarks on the costs and benefits of my reading, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of Husserl's view in general. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Husserl and Mathematics by Mirja HartimoAndrea StaitiMirja Hartimo. Husserl and Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 214. Hardback, $99.99.Mirja Hartimo has written the first book-length study of Husserl's evolving views on mathematics that takes his intellectual context into full consideration. Most importantly, Hartimo's historically informed approach to the topic benefits from her extensive knowledge of Husserl's library. Throughout the book, she provides references to texts and articles (...) that Husserl read, marked, and annotated, although regrettably, very few of these sources are quoted explicitly in his published works. The overall picture that emerges from Hartimo's book shows that Husserl continued to read and engage with mathematics throughout his career, and, even though extensive discussions of mathematical issues are not frequent in his later works, some of the ideas he develops, for instance, in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, can be read against the backdrop of the developments of mathematics in his time.Chapter 1 sets the method for the rest of the book. Hartimo emphasizes the importance of a methodological device that takes center stage in Husserl's work from the 1920s onward: Besinnung. Hartimo claims that Besinnung is a method to reactivate the "goals and purposes" (21) that originally motivated scientists engaging in a particular line of research. According to Husserl, as specialized research progresses and becomes standard practice, such original goals and purposes might be blurred by other concerns. When applied to mathematics, Besinnung thus amounts to a reflection "on what mathematicians should do, on what the genuine goal of their activities should be" (21–22). Hartimo argues that this kind of approach to mathematics comes close to Penelope Maddy's naturalism, which takes its departure from what mathematicians are actually doing and then proceeds to inquire into the ontological status of mathematical objects and theories. Hartimo identifies particularly in David Hilbert, a colleague of Husserl's at Göttingen, a vivid embodiment of what Husserl considered to be exemplary work oriented toward the ideal goal of mathematics.In chapters 2 and 3, Hartimo expands upon Husserl's conception of what the true goal of mathematics should be. She does so, first, by addressing the classical topic of Husserl's psychologism in his first (and only) work entirely devoted to mathematics, The Philosophy of Arithmetic, and Frege's well-known critical review of it. In Hartimo's rendition, Husserl criticizes Frege for his attempt to provide formal definitions of basic notions, such as equality. For Husserl, such basic notions are intuitively available and require no definition—rather, they should be put to work to clarify vague notions. Frege, in return, attacks what he takes to be Husserl's wishy-washy psychological account of numbers, which revolves around the concrete act of collecting items and abstracting from their specific contents. Ultimately, Hartimo argues, Husserl takes Frege's criticism to heart and in his later Prolegomena no longer pursues a psychological foundation of number, but rather emphasizes the distinction between the subjective and the objective sides of mathematics, with philosophers studying the former and mathematicians focusing on the latter. While Hartimo's verdict on the philosophical yield of the debate is in line with the standard interpretation of Frege's review as prompting Husserl's antipsychologistic turn, she makes a remark that might be worthy of further discussion: "While for Husserl the debate was about logicism, Frege shifts the debate to be about psychologism and here commentators have followed Frege's example" (50). It would be interesting to imagine what a Fregean reply to Husserl's view about the uselessness of formal definitions for basic notions like equality might look like. In any case, Hartimo's reconstruction makes it clear that, however motivated, Husserl's rejection of psychologism does not amount to an acceptance of logicism.In chapter 3, Hartimo puts forward two of her central claims: (1) Husserl was a structuralist about mathematics; and (2) for Husserl, the goal of modern mathematics is encapsulated in the concept of definiteness. According to (1), mathematics is about the formal structures of systems, which can be isolated and compared. Definiteness, in turn, is the property of systems... (shrink)

Despite an ever-growing scholarly interest in the work of Edmund Husserl and in the history of the phenomenological movement, much of the contemporaneous scholarly context surrounding Husserl's work remains shrouded in darkness. While much has been written about the critiques of Husserl's work associated with Heidegger, Levinas, and Sartre, comparatively little is known of the debates that Husserl was directly involved in. The present volume addresses this gap in scholarship by presenting a comprehensive selection of contemporaneous responses to Husserl's work. (...) Ranging in date from 1906 to 1917, these texts bookend Husserl's landmark Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. The selection encompasses essays that Husserl responded to directly in the Ideas I, as well as a number of the critical and sympathetic essays that appeared in the wake of its publication. Significantly, the present volume also includes Husserl's subsequent responses to his critics. All of the texts included have been translated into English for the first time, introducing the reader to a wide range of long-neglected material that is highly relevant to contemporary debates regarding the meaning and possibility of phenomenology. (shrink)

In this paper I present Heinrich Rickert’s account of the difference between theoretical and ethical values as an insightful strategy to accommodate constructivist and realistic intuitions in metae...

Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen-Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen-Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit reconnaître et qui (...) ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité. Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen-Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considérations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité individuelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique. (shrink)

Cet article présente la philosophie des sciences de Max Frischeisen-Köhler, conçue comme une réponse critique aux néo-kantiens. Frischeisen-Köhler tire son enseignement à la fois de son professeur Wilhelm Dilthey et d’Edmund Husserl. Dans les quatre premières parties j’examine la critique que Frischeisen-Köhler adresse au néo-kantisme de l’École de Marbourg et à celui de l’École de Baden. Cette critique défend l’idée que la réalité joue un rôle dans la cognition en tant qu’élément totalement indépendant que la cognition doit reconnaître et qui (...) ne peut jamais se développer en dehors de sa propre légalité. Dans la cinquième section, je m’attache à la phénoménologie de Frischeisen-Köhler. Sa thèse principale est que la réalité est expérimentée comme telle dans l’action, de sorte que notre conscience de la réalité ne provient pas de considérations théoriques sur les causes hypothétiques de nos sensations, mais de nos activités dans le monde en tant qu’agents. La science part de cette expérience pré-scientifique de la réalité. Je conclus par une critique de la distinction que Frischeisen-Köhler établit entre conscience en général et subjectivité individuelle d’un point de vue phénoménologique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 277 - 295 In this paper I argue that in Husserl’s _Ideas I_ there is a seeming contradiction between the characterization of pure consciousness as the _residue_ of the performance of the phenomenological reduction and the claim that in the natural attitude consciousness is taken to be an entity is the world. This creates a puzzle regarding the positional status of consciousness in the natural attitude. After reviewing some possible options to solve this (...) puzzle in the existing literature, I claim that the positional status of conscious experiences in the natural attitude is best characterized as _unsettled_. The act that _settles_ the positional status of conscious experiences is reflection. In reflection, experiences are posited as beings, either in a psychological or in a phenomenological key. I conclude by arguing that the problem of positing is of paramount importance to understand correctly Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is _voraussetzungslos_. (shrink)

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Fisette and Riccardo Martinelli have put together the most comprehensive, ambitious, and engaging collection of essays on the philosophy of Carl Stumpf to date. The volume is impressive in both scope and depth. It covers every single aspect of Stumpf's contribution to philosophy, including issues in the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, (...) epistemology, phenomenology, aesthetics, philosophy of language, and the theory of feelings. It draws on an extensive array of Stumpf's writings, both published and unpublished, and it even features a selection of archival materials, notably, the transcription of a lecture on metaphysics from the late 1880s and some correspondence between Stumpf and Brentano. Some might suspect that we should simply ‘catalogue [Stumpf's] work... (shrink)