Henry E. Allison presents a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . Allison pays special attention to the structure of the work and its historical and intellectual context. He argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy.

SummaryThis paper is divided into two parts. The first sketches an interpretation of the thing in itself, the noumenon and the transcendental object which clarifies the connection between these conceptions and shows that each has a “critical” function. This is accomplished by linking them with transcendental reflection. It is shown that such reflection requires the distinction between two ways of considering an object and that “noumenon” and “transcendental object” characterize alternative descriptions of an object considered as it is in itself. (...) The second part deals with the problem of affection. Although the theory of “transcendental” or “double affection” is rejected, it is argued that affection, like objects, can be considered from two points of view . Thus, while there is no distinct event entitled “transcendental affection”, there is a transcendental consideration of affection. Moreover since such a consideration involves analytic judgments about how the affecting object must be thought, the appeal to categories such as causality does not violate “critical” structures. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the notion of spontaneity to characterize both the ordinary epistemic activity of the understanding and the kind of causal activity required for transcendentally free agency. In spite of the obvious differences between these two conceptions of spontaneity, at one time Kant virtually identified them, since he licensed the inference from the spontaneity of thought manifest in apperception to the transcendental freedom of the thinker. By the mid-1700s, however, he abandoned that view, affirming (...) instead a sharp distinction between “logical freedom,” which pertains to acts of thought, and “transcendental freedom,” which supposedly pertains to acts of will. This distinction, if not the precise language in which it was originally expressed, remained an integral part of the “critical” philosophy. Moreover, although the topic of freedom is not discussed in the Paralogisms, Kant there insists on the illegitimacy of the attempt to derive any synthetic knowledge regarding the nature of the “thing which thinks” from the ‘I think’. (shrink)

At the end of T 1.4.2, after examining the skeptical arguments against the claims of both reason and sense perception and affirming the futility of the familiar philosophical responses to them, Hume reflects that.

SummaryThe paper is concerned with the connection between Kant's conception of transcendental schematism and his analysis of the conditions of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. After dealing with some of the standard objections to Kant's theory, I argue that transcendental schemata must be construed as pure intuitions. I then point out that the Principles of Pure Understanding are a set of synthetic a priori judgments which assert the function of the various schemata as necessary conditions of the possibility (...) of experience, and that each of these judgments involves the relation of a pure concept to pure intuition . Finally, I argue that the connection between a category and its schema must itself be both synthetic and a priori. It therefore requires a “deduction”, which Kant himself does not provide, but which I endeavor, in part, to provide for him. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the vahdity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues that Kant's (...) procedure in the B-Deduction of beginning with an abstract analysis of a discursive understanding, independentiy of its relation to the specifically human forms of sensibility, requires him to regard the principle as analytic and that this explains the difference from the A-Deduction. By appealing to the model of a deduction in Kant's moral theory and the two step in one proof structure of the B-Deduction, the third part argues that the analyticity thesis is in fact compatible with the goal of the Deduction. (shrink)

In her reply to Gershom Scholem’s criticism of Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Hannah Arendt writes.

SummaryThis paper attempts to develop an interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism which is based upon his critique of transcendental realism. It is argued that given Kant's transcendental distinction, all non‐ or pre‐critical philosophies, even Berkeleian phenomenalism are transcendentally realistic. This paradoxical result is used as the basis for an analysis of Kant's resolution of the mathematical antinomies, wherein this resolution is seen both as an “indirect proof” of transcendental idealism and as a refutation of transcendental realism. Finally, it is claimed (...) that Kant's idealism, at least insofar as it is established by means of a refutation of transcendental realism, is methodological rather than metaphysical, viz. it involves a claim about how the sensible world is to be considered in transcendental reflection, not a claim about the “real nature” of this world.RésuméCet article essaye de développer une interprétation de l'idéalisme transcendental de Kant, interprétation basée sur sa critique du réalisme transcendental. L'auteur montre que, si l'on accepte la distinction transcendentale de Kant, toutes les philosophies non critiques et précritiques sont transcendentalement réalistes, y compris le phénoménalisme de Berkeley. A partir de ce résultat paradoxal, il analyse la manière dont Kant résoud les antinomies mathématiques: cette résolution apparaît à la fois comme preuve indirecte de l'idéalisme transcendental et comme une réfutation du réalisme transcendental. L'auteur est finalement d'avis que l'idéalisme de Kant, du moins lorsqu'il est justifié par une réfutation du réalisme transcendental, est plus méthodologique que métaphysique, c'est‐à‐dire qu'il déclare comment le monde sensible doit être considéré dans la réflexion transcendentale et non quelle est la véritable nature de ce monde.ZusammenfassungEs wird versucht, eine Interpretation von Kants transzendentalem Idealismus zu entwickeln, die auf seiner Kritik am transzendentalen Realismus — verstanden als derjenige Standpunkt, der systematisch Erscheinung und Ding an sich verwechselt — beruht. Es wird argumentiert, dass — einmal Kants transzendentale Unterscheidung angenommen — aile früheren, vorkritischen Systeme der Philosophie einschliesslich Berkeleys Phänomenalismus transzendental realistisch sind. Dieses paradoxale Ergebnis wird als Basis für eine Analyse von Kants Auflösung der mathematischen Antinomien verwendet, wobei dièse Auflösung sowohl als ein indirekter Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus als auch als eine Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realismus gedeutet wird. Es wird schliesslich nahegelegt, dass Kants Idealismus, sofern wenigstens als er sich auf Widerlegung des transzendentalen Realismus abstützt, mehr ein rnethodologischer als ein metaphysischer Idealismus ist. Er statuiert eher über die Art, wie die Sinneswelt in einer transzendentalen Reflexion betrachtet werden soll, als über die Frage, wie die Welt wirklich beschaffen sei. (shrink)

Perhaps the ultimate significance of Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy lies in its attempted reconciliation of the transcendental, logical orientation of continental rationalism with the humanistic, psychological approach of British empiricism. With the rationalists, Kant distinguished sharply between questions concerning the causes and origins of our knowledge and questions about its limits and objective validity. Thus, a rigorous critique of psychologism, i.e. of any attempt to explain, or explain away the validity of either our cognitive or moral principles by means (...) of an analysis of their basis in human nature or their genesis in human experience, is one of the most characteristic traits of the Kantian philosophy. Yet this transcendental, logical investigation of the nature and limits of knowledge, and of the fundamental principles of morality leads Kant back to the human subject, in whose cognitive faculties he finds the a priori principles of human knowledge and in whose autonomy he finds the basis of the categorical imperative. This gives rise to a paradoxical conception of man as on the one hand, together with the rest of creation, a part of nature, subject to its laws, and on the other hand, in his capacity as knower and actor, a rational being who not only transcends nature in the sense that he is not completely determined by its laws, but who is actually the author of these laws. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper is divided into two parts. The first sketches an interpretation of the thing in itself, the noumenon and the transcendental object which clarifies the connection between these conceptions and shows that each has a “critical” function. This is accomplished by linking them with transcendental reflection. It is shown that such reflection requires the distinction between two ways of considering an object and that “noumenon” and “transcendental object” characterize alternative descriptions of an object considered as it is in itself. (...) The second part deals with the problem of affection. Although the theory of “transcendental” or “double affection” is rejected, it is argued that affection, like objects, can be considered from two points of view. Thus, while there is no distinct event entitled “transcendental affection”, there is a transcendental consideration of affection. Moreover since such a consideration involves analytic judgments about how the affecting object must be thought, the appeal to categories such as causality does not violate “critical” structures. (shrink)

This volume provides an integrated and wide-ranging set of primary-source readings on the relationship between moral values and economic activity, as articulated by some of the leading figures in Western civilization.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Enthusiastical Concerns of Dr. Henry More: Religious Meaning and the Psychology of Delusion by Daniel C. FoukeAllison P. CoudertDaniel C. Fouke. The Enthusiastical Concerns of Dr. Henry More: Religious Meaning and the Psychology of Delusion. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997. Pp. xi + 257. Cloth, $93.75.In this detailed examination of Henry More’s psychological explanation of enthusiasm, Daniel C. Fouke persuasively argues that previous discussions of (...) seventeenth-century attitudes toward enthusiasm have been marred by misplaced attempts to categorize them in terms of “rationalism,” “empiricism,” and the “new science.” As he says, “a central problem in every account is that anti-enthusiasts and their targets simply refuse to ally themselves according to commitments which, to our eye, should sort them into well-defined genealogies, neat schools, and clear enmities. Clear battle-lines fail to emerge, and any portrait of the typical ‘enthusiast’ never gets so far as a bare outline” (122). The ample evidence he offers to support this point appears in the three main sections of his book, in which he analyzes More’s attack on two types of scientific “enthusiasm,” alchemy, represented by Thomas Vaughan, and the mechanical philosophy, and on the religious and political enthusiasm of radical sects, represented primarily by the Quakers.Fouke points out how similar More’s own views are in many respects to the enthusiasts he excoriates, and he illustrates how tendentious and often unfair his criticisms are. For example, More viciously attacks Thomas Vaughan for his vitalistic, organic view of the natural world when he himself holds similar views. And he later attacks the mechanical philosophers for rejecting the kind of vitalism he had earlier attacked in Vaughan, while chiding them for ignoring the sympathetic effects he had detected with such repugnance in Vaughan.The same inconsistencies and misrepresentations hold true of More’s attack on the Quakers. He criticizes them for relying on the “Inner Light,” when he himself had used the same expression and adhered to the same conviction that religion was a matter of inner experience not outward observance.In both his attack on scientific and religious enthusiasm, More descends, as Fouke amply shows, to a level of ad hominem vituperation at odds with his professed tolerance and good manners. By attributing all enthusiasm to physical disorders, which, in More’s view, arise primarily from carnality and lust, More effectively stigmatized and even demonized his opponents (since the devil was masterful at using physical disorders for his nefarious purposes).What accounts for More’s harshness and inconsistencies? Fouke argues, again persuasively, that one must view More’s attacks on enthusiasm in the context of the political and religious upheavals of the time and in terms of his own metaphysical and cultural outlook. As Fouke points out, all attacks on enthusiasm involved the larger issue of authority. Where should one look for guidance—to the State, the Church, the individual? More was a traditionalist, who deplored the political and religious anarchy of the Civil Wars and Interregnum. But although he was a political conservative and traditionalist, he too had been influenced by religious radicals and believed that an individual’s religion must be heartfelt and not a matter of ritual compliance. In essence More’s attack on enthusiasm was basically an attempt to legitimize his own theology, anthropology, and natural philosophy in the name of an indisputable, higher, religious [End Page 467] authority. The irony of More’s position was that in vilifying enthusiasm and attributing it to insanity, More’s writings became a useful resource in the armory of the deists, materialists and atheists, who were his real targets.Fouke is especially interested in analyzing what he describes as the “poetic source” of More’s attack on enthusiasm. As he says at the beginning of his book:I will argue that More and his “enthusiastical” opponents were offering competing ideals of religious meaning which they expressed by singling out particular kinds of experience as types of religious and moral cognition. I will also show that they differed in their account of the “crisis” experience which provides entry to the spiritual life, grounding this experience in competing theoretical, narrative, and poetical contexts. I will... (shrink)

Henri Bergson is primarily known for his work on time, memory, and creativity. His equally innovative interventions into politics and religion have, however, been neglected or dismissed until now. In the first book in English dedicated to Bergson as a political thinker, leading Bergson scholars illuminate his positions on core concerns within political philosophy: the significance of emotion in moral judgment, the relationship between biology and society, and the entanglement of politics and religion. Ranging across Bergson's writings but drawing mainly (...) on his last book, _The Two Sources of Morality and Religion_, the contributors consider Bergson's relevance to contemporary discussions of human rights, democratic pluralism, and environmental ethics. _Contributors._ Keith Ansell-Pearson, G. William Barnard, Claire Colebrook, Hisashi Fujita, Suzanne Guerlac, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Frédéric Keck, Leonard Lawlor, Alexandre Lefebvre, Paola Marrati, John Mullarkey, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Carl Power, Philippe Soulez, Jim Urpeth, Melanie White, Frédéric Worms. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Gegensatz zu Beck und Allison, die dem Gefühl der Achtung eine mehr psychologische oder pädagogische Rolle zuschreiben, wird zu zeigen versucht, dass dieses ebenfalls eine wichtige systematische Funktion zu erfüllen hat: als Triebfeder artikuliert es den heiklen Übergang von der noumenalen zu den phänomenalen Sphäre. In dieser Weise wird erst erklärt, wie es überhaupt möglich ist, dass das Sittengesetz einen Einfluss auf menschliche Handlungen haben kann. Kants System wird dabei im strengen Sinne als Dualismus betrachtete – ein charakteristischer Zug, (...) der nicht durch Interpretationen der Art wie die Zwei‐Aspekten‐Lehre verwischt werden sollte. (shrink)

Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s First Analogy is among the most intriguing in the literature. Its virtues are considerable, but no previous discussion has done full justice to them. Nor has any previous discussion systematically explored the most important challenges to which it seems subject. This paper does both. Early sections provide a more thorough exegesis than is otherwise available and provide stronger textual backing than does Allison himself. Later sections turn to problems, most of which have not been (...) raised by others. These problems, while serious, do not necessarily rule out the interpretation of Allison. (shrink)

Review of Henry E. Allison's "An Introduction the Philosophy of Spinoza".