In part through correcting mistranslations of key passages in the "de logica" part of his "de corpore," hobbes is shown to have held a theory in which the intention to communicate enters into the definition of signification; and in which speech requires, In addition, (1) socially agreed-Upon correlations between kinds of utterances and kinds of things, And (2) an interrelationship of such utterances (or 'words') in what hobbes calls 'contexture'. It is shown that hobbes did not hold that for a (...) linguistic expression to have meaning is for it to stand for something, Or that what an expression means is what it stands for--Positions commonly, And mistakenly, Attributed to him. (shrink)

In this essay, I have rejected the inductive interpretation of the paradigm of contextual implication (to say “p”; is to imply that one believes that ) and proposed in its stead an explicatory model according to which a speaker in making a statement contextually implies whatever one is entitled to infer on the basis of the presumption that his act of stating is normal. In developing this model, I show how contextual implication depends on three distinct matters: a stating context, (...) presumptions of normality, and rules for the correct use of expressions. (shrink)

Henrich, Dieter: Theorieformen moderner Kunsttheorie. ISer, Wolfgang: Interpretationsperspektiven moderner Kunsttheorie. GAdamer, Hans G.: Zur Fragwurdigkeit des asthetischen BewuSStseins. INgarden, Roman: Prinzipien einer erkenntnistheoretischen Betrachtung der asthetischen Erfahrung.. KUhn, Helmut: Die Ontogenese der Kunst. ARnheim, Rudolf: Gestaltpsychologie und kunstlerische Form. [ubersetzt von Jurgen Schlaeger]. GOmbrich, Ernst H.: Norm und Form. KUhns, Richard: Psychoanalytische Theorie als Kunstphilosophie. [ubersetzt von Dieter Henrich]. GEhlen, Arnold: uber einige Kategorien des entlasteten, zumal des asthetischen Verhaltens. SImmel, Georg: Soziologische Asthetik. LUkács, Georg: Kunst und objektive Wahrheit. ADorno, (...) Theodor W.: ErpreSSte Versohnung. ZU Georg Lukács: "Wider den miSSverstandenen Realismus. MEad, George H.: Asthetische Erfahrung. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. MOrris, Charles W.: Asthetik und Zeichentheorie. [ubersetzt von Roland Posner]. RItchie, Benbow: Die formale Struktur des asthetischen Gegenstands. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. CReed-Hungerland, Isabel: uber die Ausdruckskraft ikonischer Zeichen. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. ECo, Umberto: Die asthetische Botschaft. [ubersetzt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Autor von Jurgen Trabant]. MOles, Abraham A.: Informationelle Poetik - Strukturen der poetischen Nachricht - Empfindungsebenen. [ubersetzt von Hans Ronge]. CAvell, Stanley: Welt durch die Kamera gesehen. [ubersetzt von Lore Iser]. KAplan, Abraham: Referenz in der Kunst. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. ZIff, Paul: Was es heiSSt zu definieren, was ein Kunstwerk ist. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. URmson, James O.: Darstellung auf der Buhne. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. GOodman, Nelson: Kunst und Erkenntnis. [ubersetzt von Jens Schlaeger]. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead has never gone out of print, but for a time he was decidedly out of fashion in the English-speaking world. In a splendid work that serves as both introduction and erudite commentary, Isabelle Stengersâe"one of todayâe(tm)s leading philosophers of scienceâe"goes straight to the beating heart of Whiteheadâe(tm)s thought. The product of thirty yearsâe(tm) engagement with the mathematician-philosopherâe(tm)s entire canon, this volume establishes Whitehead as a daring thinker on par with Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Michel Foucault. Reading (...) the texts in broadly chronological order while highlighting major works, Stengers deftly unpacks Whiteheadâe(tm)s often complicated language, explaining the seismic shifts in his thinking and showing how he called into question all that philosophers had considered settled after Descartes and Kant. She demonstrates that the implications of Whiteheadâe(tm)s philosophical theories and specialized knowledge of the various sciences come yoked with his innovative, revisionist take on God. Whiteheadâe(tm)s God exists within a specific epistemological realm created by a radically complex and often highly mathematical language. âeoeTo think with Whitehead today,âe Stengers writes, âeoemeans to sign on in advance to an adventure that will leave none of the terms we normally use as they were.âe. (shrink)

New paradigms in the psychology of reasoning have included a consideration for general contextual factors that may impact on the reasoning process, including individuals’ goals and motivations. We suggest that emotions are one such important contextual factor that influences reasoning. The classic literature on thinking and reasoning has typically ignored the possible influence of emotion, except to consider it a source of disruption. We review findings from studies where participants were asked to reason about personally relevant emotional experiences such as (...) sexual abuse, war, and terrorist attacks. While some findings are consistent with the view that incidental emotions have a deleterious effect on reasoning, a number of findings also suggest a beneficial impact of emotion. For instance, veterans reasoned more logically about combat-related syllogisms than structurally identical syllogisms with neutral contents; victims of sexual abuse reporting more negative emotions following the events also reasoned more logically on abuse-related contents, relative to neutral contents. This may be associated with integral emotions, when the affective reaction is relevant to the semantic contents reasoned about. We propose that the positive impact of integral emotions on reasoning can be explained by increased utility of problem content and increased utility of reasoning. (shrink)

Biobanks correspond to different situations: research and technological development, medical diagnosis or therapeutic activities. Their status is not clearly defined. We aimed to investigate human biobanking in Europe, particularly in relation to organisational, economic and ethical issues in various national contexts. Data from a survey in six EU countries were collected as part of a European Research Project examining human and non-human biobanking. A total of 147 institutions concerned with biobanking of human samples and data were investigated by questionnaires and (...) interviews. Most institutions surveyed belong to the public or private non-profit-making sectors, which have a key role in biobanking. This activity is increasing in all countries because few samples are discarded and genetic research is proliferating. Collections vary in size, many being small and only a few very large. Their purpose is often research, or research and healthcare, mostly in the context of disease studies. A specific budget is very rarely allocated to biobanking and costs are not often evaluated. Samples are usually provided free of charge and gifts and exchanges are the common rule. Good practice guidelines are generally followed and quality controls are performed but quality procedures are not always clearly explained. Associated data are usually computerised. Biobankers generally favour centralisation of data rather than of samples. Legal and ethical harmonisation within Europe is considered likely to facilitate international collaboration. We propose a series of recommendations and suggestions arising from the EUROGENBANK project. (shrink)

How can a collective pay attention virtuously? Imagine a group of scientists. It matters what topics they pay attention to, that is, which topics they draw to the foreground and take to be relevant, and which they leave in the background. It also matters which aspects of an investigated phenomenon they foreground, and which aspects they leave unnoticed in the background. If we want to understand not only how individuals pay attention of this kind virtuously, but also collectives, we first (...) need a framework to understand virtuous collective agency. A result of this article will be that virtuous collective action depends on the collective being institutionalized. At the same time, we have to think of the constituents of the collective in terms of practical identities (as opposed to individuals). This is what enables us to understand how a collective can acquire the stability required for virtue, and how we don’t end up with a summative account of group virtue, respectively. It will be argued that collectives only have the required stability in their actions when their commitments are habitualized in the form of institutionalized procedures. An Aristotelian understanding of virtue distinguishes between commitment, inclination, and action. Only when a subject’s inclination is fully lined up with her commitment, do we arrive at the required stability (of character) for virtuous action. In the case of individuals, to build up an appropriate inclination consists in an inscribing of the commitment into the feelings and body of the subject. If a commitment is fully ‘embodied’ in this sense, it has formed the individual’s inclination accordingly. How can one make sense of this in the case of collective subjects? This article tries to show that for collectives, the embodiment of commitment (the forming of the fitting inclinations) consists in creating policies, procedures, and rules that stabilize the acting according to the commitment, irrespective of the motivation of each individual involved in the collective. Hence, embodiment of commitment, in the case of collectives, is institutionalization. The article then explores what this requirement of institutionalization means for collective attention. The illustration will draw on a distinction between focused and open-minded attention. It will be shown that for either case – focused and open-minded – in order for a collective to pay attention virtuously, it needs to have its commitments institutionalized. (shrink)

Participation of the Public in Science: Towards a New Kind of Scientific Practice Participation of the public in science has been the object of an increasing number of social and political philosophical studies, but there is still hardly any epistemological study of the topic. While it has been objected that involvement of the public is a threat to the integrity of science, the apparent indifference of philosophers of science seems to testify to its lack of relevance to conceptions of scientific (...) activity. I argue both that it is not a threat to science and that it is relevant to philosophy of science by showing that it constitutes a new kind of epistemic practice. Two main objections to the idea that the involvement of non-scientists, with their situated perspective and contextual values, can form an epistemic practice will be addressed: the first bears on the epistemic potentialities of the cooperation between scientist and non-scientists; the second on the possibility that this cooperation takes the form of a practice. (shrink)

This book promotes the research of present-day women working in ancient and medieval philosophy, with more than 60 women having contributed in some way to the volume in a fruitful collaboration. It contains 22 papers organized into ten distinct parts spanning the sixth century BCE to the fifteenth century CE. Each part has the same structure: it features, first, a paper which sets up the discussion, and then, one or two responses that open new perspectives and engage in further reflections. (...) Our authors’ contributions address pivotal moments and players in the history of philosophy: women philosophers in antiquity, Cleobulina of Rhodes, Plato, Lucretius, Bardaisan of Edessa, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry, Peter Abelard, Robert Kilwardby, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Isotta Nogarola. The result is a thought-provoking collection of papers that will be of interest to historians of philosophy from all horizons. Far from being an isolated effort, this book is a contribution to the ever-growing number of initiatives which endeavour to showcase the work of women in philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Iris Marion Young provides a substantially new model of responsibility that provides a way out of the standard debate regarding whether and the extent to which individuals have responsibilities for justice. This debate, best represented in an exchange of essays between G.A. Cohen and Thomas Pogge, hinges on the causal efficacy of the bearers of responsibility for justice. By distinguishing herself from both Cohen’s individualism and Pogge’s institutionalism, Young provides an enhanced way to conceptualize (...) the responsibilities that individuals have towards justice in a nonideal world in which they have limited causal impact. (shrink)

Iris Marion Young has written a compelling account of individuals’ normative responsibilities for structural justice. While I agree with much of Young’s account, in this article I argue that there is an underexplored aspect of Young’s account regarding the link between individuals’ shared responsibility for justice and the normative demand that individuals engage in collective action towards just structural reform. I argue that Young has neglected an important aspect of individual responsibility for justice that links the aforementioned responsibilities together—namely, the (...) responsibility to organize. Recognizing this responsibility is crucial for understanding the real work of structural justice efforts in the nonideal world. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that care ethics faces a fundamental challenge in addressing structural vulnerabilities. I argue that one of its main strengths – its focus on alleviating individuals’ material needs – also generates a weakness regarding one of its other key aims – namely, respecting the voice of the concrete other. As a result, I will argue that a full application of care ethics in response to structural vulnerabilities must moderate or supplement its focus on material needs.

In this paper, I work within Ruth Marcus’s account of the source of moral dilemmas and articulate the implications of her theory for collective responsibility. As an extension to Marcus’s work, I explore what her account means for the moral emotions and responsibilities of those complicit in perpetuating unjust systems of a non-ideal world from which moral dilemmas arise. This move necessitates shifting away from the primacy of control. That one is born into unjust systems one had no hand in (...) establishing does not excuse one from responsibility to mend them. Similarly, even if one’s personal contribution in the perpetuation of unjust systems is negligible – the injustices would continue whether one participated or not, and one’s resistance would do little-to-nothing – one nevertheless retains responsibility. This expanded sense of responsibility necessitates a specialized sort of moral emotion – one that, like agent-regret or tragic-remorse, transcends the criterion of agentic control, but nevertheless can be classified neither as agent-regret nor tragic-remorse. (shrink)

Technological change is widely studied in economic discourse, dominated by an “industrial perspective” in which scientific and engineering advances are categorized by, and analyzed in the context of, industrial classifications. The present study compares this perspective with the alternative approach of studying the effects of scientific advances onproducts (goods and services) in the context of the functions those products serve. Using a function-based classification scheme, data on the economic effects of scientific advances are developed from articles appearing in business journals. (...) These data present a different picture of evolutionary economic change, which may shed additional light on its causality. (shrink)

This essay argues for a new, “meta,” level of integrity that is created by the context of structural injustice. The essay will draw from Margaret Walker to bring out a defining social value of integrity, namely, its ability to facilitate reliable response to harms caused by “moral luck.” The essay will then argue that, when bad luck is caused by complex social-structural function, traditional advice for maintaining one's integrity fails to provide adequate guidance; following such advice facilitates unjust social-structural function, (...) and so unreliability in response to harm. The essay will address this problem by arguing that in the context of structural injustice, a “meta-level” meaning of integrity emerges. This new meta-level of integrity, unlike the more traditional first-level integrity, does not instruct an individual to disassociate herself from structural harms; instead, it instructs an individual to manage the way in which she participates in unjust social structures. Meta-level integrity, unlike first-level integrity, does not facilitate an end to structural harm, but it does promote a reliable presence of social-justice movements within unjust structures. (shrink)

This memorial to Latour is not an appraisal of his fifty-year research career but the report of a traveling companion with a story to share about the apparent lack of continuity, the sudden, unapologetic, unprincipled changes of position, with which he surprised or scandalized his colleagues and readers. In the first place, was he a sociologist, an anthropologist, a philosopher? Though he did not make lasting commitments of that kind, he did make deeper ones that did not change—above all, never (...) to explain anything in terms of something more general and, thus, never to accept the position of judge. To follow Latour's problematic changes—sometimes referred to as his “versatility”—demands that we follow the changes of the very terms of the problems that his basic commitment bound him to confront. From the 1980s, when his work dealt with technoscientific progress, to the years of his growing concern with political ecology, and finally to his recognition of the oncoming climate chaos, dizzying leaps were entailed by his resistance to the temptation of judging. Involved in, but never the cause of, various of his leaps, Stengers describes her friend as responding, perforce, to changing times, rather than as behaving like a theorist thinking mainly of his image, reputation, and career. (shrink)

Le scepticisme de Montaigne -- Perturbations dans le genre -- Bouleversement des catégories du masculin et du féminin dans "Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin" -- L'identité en question -- L'homme insoluble -- Les Indiennes, les Indiens et nous -- Le sexe indécis -- Renversement -- Critique sceptique de la rhétorique adressée aux femmes -- Féminité et savoir du corps -- Parodie de la discipline conjugale -- Au sujet de la femme insatiable -- Déplacement et/ou réhabilitation inattendue -- (...) Malheur et bonheur du mariage ou la vie selon son mouvement -- Solitude ou mariage -- Grandeur de la relation conjugale -- Examen sceptique de la gynécocratie -- Satire du patriarcat -- Abandon et transmission du pouvoir -- Restauration de la légitimité du gouvernement féminin -- Réduction à l'absurde -- Réquisitoire contre la chasse aux sorcières -- Vanité de la recherche des causes -- Justice sceptique et clémence -- Vénus, les boiteux et les boiteuses -- Apologie paradoxale -- L'amour de préférence à la guerre -- Trivialité et danger de l'amour -- Éloge de l'amour -- Dernières accolades -- Construction d'une communauté autre -- Un lectorat féminin estimé -- Les femmes dédicataires dans les Essais -- Marie de Gournay, une philosophe féministe autonome, mais fidèle. (shrink)

La technique et la civilisation qu'elle commande sont, à notre époque, un important sujet de réflexion. Depuis quelques années, les sections techniques de l'enseignement du second degré, et des études supérieures, ont, à leur programme, quelques notions de philosophie. Cette mesure répond à une nécessité culturelle. Plus encore, elle satisfait un besoin et un droit des jeunes techniciens. Nul n'échappe aux grandes interrogations concernant la vérité et la certitude, la valeur et le bien, le droit et la justice, l'homme et (...) sa destinée, que la philosophie pose et éclaire. Cet ouvrage se limite à l'essentiel, c'est-à-dire aux questions concernant la connaissance, l'activité de l'homme, l'homme en société et la religion. Un manuel d'initiation simple et accessible pour les élèves, les étudiants mais aussi tous ceux qui, déjà engagés dans la vie professionnelle, souhaitent compléter leur formation philosophique. (shrink)

Depuis qu'elles existent, les sciences dites exactes se prétendent différentes des autres savoirs. Comment comprendre cette prétention? Faut-il, à la manière des épistémologues anglo-saxons ou de Karl Popper, tenter d'identifier les critères qui la justifient? Peut-on, suivant le modèle nouveau des études sociales des sciences, y voir une simple croyance? Ce livre propose un dépassement fructueux de l'opposition, apparemment irréconciliable, entre ces deux approches des sciences. Et si la tension entre objectivité scientifique et croyance était justement constitutive des sciences, enjeu (...) des pratiques inventées et réinventées par les scientifiques? Réussir à parler des sciences avec humour, sans en faire un objet de vénération, ni de dénonciation, en restant au plus proche de la passion des scientifiques, tel est ici le pari d'Isabelle Stengers. Mais ce livre ne se limite pas à un discours sur les sciences. Il s'agit bien plutôt de prolonger l'histoire de leur invention. Comment comprendre les liens multiples entre la science et les pouvoirs qui la mobilisent aujourd'hui? Comment concevoir les rapports entre science, expertise et démocratie? La nouveauté de L'invention des sciences modernes est de faire de ces différents problèmes intellectuels, pratiques et politiques les enjeux du processus par où pourrait s'inventer et se renouveler l'identité même des sciences. (shrink)

Prenant comme point de départ la critique nietzschéenne du christianisme, cet ouvrage montre que la pertinence de celle-ci est conjoncturelle, et non point structurelle. Le Dieu chrétien n'est pas réductible au seul Dieu de la moralité : l'Ancien Testament et le Nouveau Testament attestent de la gratuité de l'amour du Dieu de l'Alliance et du Dieu chrétien. S'inscrivant dans la ligne d'une éthique téléologique, la deuxième partie du livre dégage les grandes lignes de l'éthique aristotélicienne et analyse l'articulation opérée par (...) Paul Ricoeur dans Soi-même comme un autre, entre les moments déontologique et téléologique. Le détour par Thomas d'Aquin permet d'introduire la dimension théologale de l'éthique chrétienne. A partir de concepts élaborés par Paul Ricoeur, la troisième partie articule morale, éthique et théologalité. Loi et désir sont pensés en lien avec la Règle d'or. La revalorisation de l'hétéronomie offre alors une perspective nouvelle pour donner sens à la grâce. Les notions d'attestation-conviction, d'imputabilité, de responsabilité et de reconnaissance permettent ensuite de développer l'identité du sujet éthique chrétien. Enfin, l'éthique est pensée selon une dialectique entre agir et désir d'être qui s'ouvre à la dimension ontologique et qui aboutit à une perspective eschatologique. (shrink)

Coletânea de trabalhos de especialistas brasileiros que analisam algumas das obras mais importantes de pensadores marxistas deste século: O espírito da utopia (Bloch), Teoria do agir comunicativo (Habermas), Dialética negativa (Adorno), História e consciência de classe (Lukács), Contrarrevolução e revolta (Marcuse), Eduard Fuchs, o colecionador e o historiador (Walter Benjamin), As ideias fora do lugar (Roberto Schwarz), Marx: Lógica e política (Ruy Fausto) e Trabalho e reflexão (José Arthur Giannotti).

Experimental activity is traditionally identified with testing the empirical implications or numerical simulations of models against data. In critical reaction to the ‘tribunal view’ on experiments, this essay will show the constructive contribution of experimental activity to the processes of modeling and simulating. Based on the analysis of a case in fluid mechanics, it will focus specifically on two aspects. The first is the controversial specification of the conditions in which the data are to be obtained. The second is conceptual (...) clarification, with a redefinition of concepts central to the understanding of the phenomenon and the conditions of its occurrence. (shrink)

Although the mapping between form and meaning is often regarded as arbitrary, there are in fact well-known constraints on words which are the result of functional pressures associated with language use and its acquisition. In particular, languages have been shown to encode meaning distinctions in their sound properties, which may be important for language learning. Here, we investigate the relationship between semantic distance and phonological distance in the large-scale structure of the lexicon. We show evidence in 100 languages from a (...) diverse array of language families that more semantically similar word pairs are also more phonologically similar. This suggests that there is an important statistical trend for lexicons to have semantically similar words be phonologically similar as well, possibly for functional reasons associated with language learning. (shrink)