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  1. A Puzzle About Belief Reports.Kent Bach - 2000 - In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier.
    I'd like to present a puzzle about belief reports that's been nagging at me for several years. I've subjected many friends and audiences to various abortive attempts at solving it. Now it's time to get it off my chest and let others try their hand at it.<1>.
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  2. Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  3. Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief.Jonathan Berg - 2012 - De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
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  4. Ultra-Liberal Attitude Reports.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...)
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  5. Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  6. A Note on Belief Reports and Context Dependence.Tadeusz Ciecierski - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):447-464.
    The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that (...)
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  7. How to Be Direct and Innocent: A Criticism of Crimmins and Perry's Theory of Attitude Ascriptions. [REVIEW]Leonard Clapp - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (5):529 - 565.
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  8. Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
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  9. Talk About Beliefs.Mark Crimmins - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
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  10. The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  11. Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports.Cian Dorr - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence. Oxford University Press. pp. 25-66.
    This paper defends the claim that although ‘Superman is Clark Kent and some people who believe that Superman flies do not believe that Clark Kent flies’ is a logically inconsistent sentence, we can still utter this sentence, while speaking literally, without asserting anything false. The key idea is that the context-sensitivity of attitude reports can be - and often is - resolved in different ways within a single sentence.
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  12. Token-Reflexivity and Indirect Discourse.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:37-56.
    According to a Reichenbachian treatment, indexicals are token-reflexive. That is, a truth-conditional contribution is assigned to tokens relative to relational properties which they instantiate. By thinking of the relevant expressions occurring in “ordinary contexts” along these lines, I argue that we can give a more accurate account of their semantic behavior when they occur in indirect contexts. The argument involves the following: (1) A defense of theories of indirect discourse which allows that a reference to modes of presentation associated with (...)
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  13. About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication.Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...)
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  14. The Adicity of 'Believes' and the Hidden Indexical Theory.P. Ludlow - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):97-101.
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  15. Logical Form and the Hidden-Indexical Theory: A Reply to Schiffer.Peter Ludlow - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):102-107.
  16. Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 254-290.
    This paper outlines a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on cognitive and illocutionary products, mental states, and modal products, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
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  17. A Problem for Russellian Theories of Belief.Gary Ostertag - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
    Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says (...)
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  18. A Puzzle About Disbelief.Gary Ostertag - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573 - 593.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
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  19. Replies to the Papers in the Issue "Recanati on Mental Files".François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.
  20. Relational Belief Reports.François Recanati - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.
  21. Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Recanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
  22. Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes. [REVIEW]Esa Saarinen - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):151 - 223.
  23. Points, Complexes, Complex Points, and a Yacht.Nathan Salmon - 2009 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.
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  24. The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription.Jennifer M. Saul - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
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  25. Still an Attitude Problem.Jennifer M. Saul - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
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  26. Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (but Not the Ones You Expect).Stephen Schiffer - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):107-131.
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  27. Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning.Stephen Schiffer - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:89-121.
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  28. Belief Ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
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  29. Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files.Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):393-407.
    Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.883746.
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