In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in Spheres I that Heidegger presented, in Being and Time, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of (...) class='Hi'>Being and Time), and taking into account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time. (shrink)

A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work.

(2005). Being and Time and Brouwer's Intuitionism. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 181-186.

A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work.

A new, definitive translation of Heidegger's most important work.

Being and time : introduction -- What is metaphysics? -- On the essence of truth -- The origin of the work of art -- Letter on humanism -- Modern science, metaphysics, and mathematics -- The question concerning technology -- Building dwelling thinking -- What calls for thinking? -- The way to language -- The end of philosophy and the task of thinking.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit by Martin HeideggerP. Christopher SmithMartin Heidegger. Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xix + 487. Paper, $18.95.A new English translation of Heidegger’s best book, Sein und Zeit has been eagerly anticipated ever since the appearance of the Macquarrie/Robinson translation (...) in 1962.1 For anyone with an ear for German would find that, in turning Heidegger’s visceral prose into wooden terminology, this first pathbreaking and very scholarly translation failed completely to render the startling and wholly untraditional diction of this work, a diction that rocked a staid and stifling academia and that in lectures preceding the book’s publication had therefore attracted students in droves, among them Leo Strauss, Hanna Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Herbert Marcuse, and Hans Jonas. At long last, a new translation, Joan Stambaugh’s, is here, but, unfortunately, it is no better in this crucial regard, and it is not as scholarly either. (Macquarrie/Robinson do provide many detailed and useful accounts of their choices of translation.) Indeed, the new translation often seems to be a mere revision of the old and falls into much of the old translation’s terminological uprooting of Heidegger’s sometimes thick but always earthy language. Here are three examples.In S we find this rendering of Heidegger’s preliminary account of the phenomenological method he will apply in “laying out” our “factual” human existence “there” “in the world” of our cooperative taking care of life’s tasks:This “a priori” of the interpretation of Da-sein is not a structure which is pieced together, but rather a structure which is primordially and constantly whole. It grants various perspectives on the factors which constitute it. These factors are to be kept constantly in view, bearing in mind the preceding whole of this structure.(S 37)In M/R this same passage is translated, somewhat more readably and accurately, as:In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something ‘a priori’; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. If affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.(M/R 65) [End Page 148]We note, first, how many of the M/R translations are taken over by S: “not a structure... pieced together,” which mistranslates “keine zusammengestückte Bestimmtheit” (SZ 41) or “not a determination arrived at bit by bit,” and “[structure]... primordial(ly) and constant(ly) (a) whole” for “eine ursprünglich und ständig ganze Struktur,” in which the English “primordial” turns the rather ordinary “ursprünglich” or “originally” into a technical term. Indeed, this phrase might best be rendered in more usual English along the lines of “This structure, assumed a priori... is originally, and continues to be, a whole.” For the point, lost in S but preserved in M/R with their “however,” is precisely that even though Dasein has been determined ahead of time to have the basic structure of a whole, we can still elucidate different sides of it phenomenologically by “throwing them into relief” (compare Heideger’s “phänomenal abzuheben”). In S, Heidegger’s pivotal “phänomenal” is lost altogether.Here, next, is how S renders Heidegger’s account of the call of conscience, which calls us back from our having lost ourselves in pressed busyness and vain chattering, at just that moment when these lose all their significance for us and go dead:The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces Da-sein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself.(S 252–53).And here is the M/R translation:The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does... (shrink)

_A new, definitive translation of Heidegger's most important work._.

This paper argues against the priority of temporality over spatiality, which Heidegger defends in Being and Time . The argument, however, does not follow the turn in Heidegger's philosophy and his later retrieval of the spatial but is developed as a delimitation—that is, as an internal critique and reconstruction—undertaken within the transcendental framework of his early thinking. This delimitation proposes a demonstration of the fundamental role of spatializing, defined as dissemination, in the constitution of human Being-in-the-world. A (...) rethinking of human Being-there in terms of the co-originality of spatiality and temporality permits a revisiting of the question of the transcendental and makes it possible to pursue the overcoming of a philosophy of the subject that, critics often point out, Heidegger unsuccessfully sought to transgress in his early work. (shrink)

In Being and Time Heidegger gives an account of the distinctive features of human existence, in an attempt to answer the question of the meaning of being. He finds that underlying all of these features is what he calls 'original time'. In this clear and straightforward introduction to the text, Paul Gorner takes the reader through the work, examining its detail and explaining the sometimes difficult language which Heidegger uses. The topics which he covers include (...) class='Hi'>being-in-the-world, being-with, thrownness and projection, truth, authenticity, time and being, and historicity. His book makes Being and Time accessible to students in a way that conveys the essence of Heidegger's project and remains true to what is distinctive about his thinking. (shrink)

_A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work._.

In Sein und Zeit, the Dasein, thrown in the world by Geworfenheit and relaunched by Entwurf (projection) into the future, experiences itself as a “Self”. This exercise of existence cannot escape the critique of solipsism. However, paragraph 29 — about the existentiale of Befindlichkeit — opens an access way to the Other, which later will be ceaselessly explored by Heidegger, after having found the Stimmungen of the Greek beginning in Holderlin’s poetry and the Grund Stimmungen of “the night of the (...) gods” and of the forgetfulness of being of our time. Not until the fifties and the mystical experience of the fourfold (das Geviert) will Heidegger find the possibility of transmuting the experience of the Other from a πόλεμος into a being-in-harmony (stimmen). This unique path of affectivity, asserted in paragraph 29 of Sein und Zeit, will enable Heidegger to reach an essential way of working out the question of Otherness, that only right now we may be starting to understand. (shrink)

Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays provides a variety of recent studies of Heidegger's most important work. Twelve prominent scholars, representing diverse nationalities, generations, and interpretive approaches deal with general methodological and ontological questions, particular issues in Heidegger's text, and the relation between Being and Time and Heidegger's later thought. All of the essays presented in this volume were never before available in an English-language anthology. Two of the essays have never before been published in any (...) language ; three of the essays have never been published in English before, and two of the essays provide previews of works in progress by major scholars. (shrink)

A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work.

At the beginning of his remarks, Harries quotes my statement that in Heidegger's works there is an "unclarity as to the relation between a basic study of human existence in the world and strict ontology." By "strict ontology" here, I mean the clarification of the meaning of being, as Heidegger calls it, or in my terminology the attempt to discover what things really are in the world, as opposed to our varying human versions. I maintain that the relation between (...) a basic study of human existence and strict ontology, in this sense, is treated in one way in Sein und Zeit, and in a very different way in the Letter on Humanism and the later writings. Shortly before 1947 there was a basic shift, or "turning", in Heidegger's thought. This revealed the "unclarity" about which I am speaking. According to Harries, there is no unclarity here, but only two different stages in a continuous "development". As I see it, there is a real discontinuity, or "turning." But as Harries puts it, "Heidegger does not reverse his position... there is, however, development." This is the first issue between us. (shrink)

This book explores the relationship between being and time —between ontology and history— in the context of both Christian theology and philosophical inquiry. Each chapter tests the limits of this thematic vis-à-vis a variety of sources — ancient, modern and contemporary.

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues (...) raised in the ‘preliminary methodological remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science. (shrink)

This text seeks to situate Being and Time in the line of the ancient philosophical tradition of care for self (epiméleia heautou). After a brief description of the main features of this tradition as portrayed by Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot, the author presents the elements of Being in Time in favour and those against such a link. Her hypothesis appears to encounter a major objection in the explicit refusal of Heidegger to speak of Selbstsorge. But (...) an attentive examination of the meaning of this reserve (the rejection of selfhood as a transparent and introspective relationship of the soul to itself) makes it in reality possible to show Heidegger to be one of the most consequent philosophers in the tradition of care for the soul. Indeed, by highlighting the constitutive link between selfhood and care, Heidegger shows the very condition of possibility of the tradition of care for the soul: that the self is not given as a thing, but may contribute to its own transformation through a specific form of care. (shrink)

On Heidegger's Being and Time is an outstanding exploration of Heidegger's most important work by two major philosophers. Simon Critchley argues that we must see Being and Time as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his theories of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the phenomenological concept of the a priori. This leads to a reappraisal and defense of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. In contrast, Reiner Schürmann urges us to read Heidegger 'backward', arguing that his later work is (...) the key to unravelling Being and Time . Through a close reading of Being and Time Schürmann demonstrates that this work is ultimately aporetic because the notion of Being elaborated in his later work is already at play within it. This is the first time that Schürmann's renowned lectures on Heidegger have been published. The book concludes with Critchley's reinterpretation of the importance of authenticity in Being and Time . Arguing for what he calls an 'originary inauthenticity', Critchley proposes a relational understanding of the key concepts of the second part of Being and Time : death, conscience and temporality. (shrink)

This article discusses what could be called “the adventure of translating” Sein und Zeit in Spanish. It argues that every translation is an adventure, and particularly the translation of a philosophical text. A translation does not literally reproduce into another language what an author or philosopher affirms. The question is instead to express it in the most accurate form with the resources of the translator’s language, in such a way that the text may sound as if it was written in (...) the language to which it is to be translated. This article refers to the very long route that the author had to go over in order to make Sein und Zeit “speak” a good and clear Spanish. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects (...) of the self. Building on this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

In Division One of Being and Time Heidegger presents a novel categorization of what there is, and an original account of the project of ontology and consequently of the nature and genesis of those ontological categories. He officially recognizes two categories of Being: Zuhandensein and Vorhandensein. Vorhandene things are roughly the objective, person-independent, causally interacting subjects of natural scientific inquiry. Zuhandene things are those which a neo-Kantian would describe as having been imbued with human values and significances. (...) In addition to these categories, there is human Being, or Dasein, in whose structure the origins of the two thing-ish categories are to be found. This essay concerns itself with three of Heidegger’s conceptual innovations: his conceiving of ontology in terms of self-adjudicating anthropological categories, as summed up in the slogan that “fundamental ontology is the regional ontology of Dasein,” his corresponding anti-traditional assertion of the ontological priority of the domain of the Zuhandensein to that of the Vorhandensein, which latter is seen as rooted in or precipitated out of that more basic world of human significances, and the non-Cartesian account of awareness and classificatory consciousness as social and practical. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects (...) of the self. Building on this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I tried to make sense of the view that the facts that constitute reality—the facts about what there is, and what properties things instantiate—are temporary facts.

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects (...) of the self. Building on this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

This paper argues for an interpretation of what Heidegger means by 'angst' in Being and Time that begins from the methodological role angst is supposed to play in Division I as that which disrupts falling. It argues that angst is a distinctive kind of ontological insight.

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects (...) of the self. Building on this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

Being and Time, by Martin Heidegger, has had a direct impact on philosophers, artists, writers, and filmmakers. This guide takes readers through the book, section by section, idea by idea. It provides a much-needed and jargon-free introduction to this key text.

In 2018 On My Own Publications was published as volume 82 of Heidegger’s collected works. Its content includes roughly 400 pages in which Heidegger himself reflects on Being and Time. A central theme in these pages, and the one to which this article is devoted, is Heidegger’s criticism of the way that the question of Being (Seinsfrage) is conceived there as the question of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnisfrage). More specifically, the author aims to demonstrate the (...) importance of these criticisms – which include matters of both style and content – for understanding Being and Time itself and the general development of Heidegger’s thought. Though many critics already seized on what they took to be the inadequacy of starting with the understanding of Being, we can now see in detail how Heidegger himself conceived its inadequacy and how he specifically sought to address it in his later thought. (shrink)

On Heidegger's Being and Time is an outstanding exploration of Heidegger's most important work by two major philosophers. Simon Critchley argues that we must see Being and Time as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his theories of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the phenomenological concept of the a priori. This leads to a reappraisal and defense of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. In contrast, Reiner Schürmann urges us to read Heidegger 'backward', arguing that his later work is (...) the key to unravelling Being and Time . Through a close reading of Being and Time Schürmann demonstrates that this work is ultimately aporetic because the notion of Being elaborated in his later work is already at play within it. This is the first time that Schürmann's renowned lectures on Heidegger have been published. The book concludes with Critchley's reinterpretation of the importance of authenticity in Being and Time . Arguing for what he calls an 'originary inauthenticity', Critchley proposes a relational understanding of the key concepts of the second part of Being and Time : death, conscience and temporality. (shrink)

In This Paper, I Identify a Problem, which the project that I will refer to as the ‘Being and Time Project’ (or ‘BTP’ for short) aimed to solve; this is the project within which Heidegger reinterpreted his early thought—and which he unsuccessfully attempted to bring to fruition—in, roughly speaking, the years 1925–28. The problem in question presents several faces: viewed from one angle, it concerns the unity of the concept of “Being in general,” from another, the integrity (...) of the notion of “Dasein,” and from another, the possibility of the perspective from which the philosopher does her work. The solution that the BTP would have offered turns on the claim that time is “the possible horizon for any understanding .. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) challenged earlier thinking about the basic structures of human being, our involvement in practical affairs, and our understanding of history, time, and being. Blitz clarifies Heidegger’s discussions, offers alternative analyses of phenomena central to Heidegger’s argument, and examines the connection between Heidegger’s position in Being and Time and his support of Nazism. As Blitz explains in his new afterword, “When I began to study Martin Heidegger nearly fifty (...) years ago, my goal was to explore the meaning of Being and Time for political philosophy. I wished to discover what it might offer for clarifying the grounds on which the basic concepts and alternatives of political philosophy rest. Would a close reading of it help us understand the questions of justice, freedom, the common good, natural rights, virtue, human happiness, and the philosophic life? These questions are as important today as they were then.” Although Blitz often questions and criticizes Heidegger’s views, he presents them with scrupulous care and clarity. Specialists and students in the areas of political theory, phenomenology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy will find Heidegger’s Being and Time & the Possibility of Political Philosophy an invaluable resource. (shrink)

This first article is part of a two-article series labeled Parts I and II. In Part I, we will attempt a close reading of Division Two of Heidegger’s greatest work, Being and Time (1927). We will execute a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V; those sections cover ‘primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the (...) ‘equiprimordiality of the unity of the ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 378), ‘the whitherings and horizontal schemas,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/Bewegtheit and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/Bewegung (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from Being and Time, itself, requires a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger’s attempted ‘destruction’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. We want to set up the possibility of reengaging Heidegger on a cryptic moment in the 1962 English translators’ footnote on the ‘swoon’ and ‘clairvoyance’ (Heidegger 1962, 436) that immediately precedes Heidegger’s great articulation of the ‘moment of vision for its time’ and the possibility of an ‘authentic understanding of fate, which is historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 437). In Part I, we will resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in Being and Time. This first article constitutes Part I, which then sets up Part II to appear in a second article. In the second article, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel’s The Science of Logic (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction of the term ‘quadruplicity’ (Hegel 2010, 746), which comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work. (shrink)

In this article, the author narrates the story of the second English translation of Being and time. In the first part, the author describes both the personal history and the general cultural situation which led to the necessity of a new translation of Sein und Zeit. In the second part of the essay, the author discusses some of the Heideggerian terms as Da-sein, Wiederholung, Verfallen, Geworfenheit, Befindlichkeit, focusing on the meaning and the central role of temporality in the (...) project of existential analytic. (shrink)

In this article, I establish first the critical role of conscience in Heidegger's Being and Time . As the call of care, conscience attests to the authenticity of Da-sein as it discloses and "accomplishes" Da-sein as the being it is delivered over to be. Heidegger's interpretation of conscience also epitomizes the central aporias of Being and Time , which, with a view to revoking the Western metaphysical tradition, ultimately recalls it. At the heart of such (...) aporias is the hermeneutic circle in the attestation of conscience, whose voice only "reaches him who wants to be brought back." While the language of conscience and attestation was put away in Heidegger's later writings, I argue that the question concerning conscience is a leading question that will continue to guide us to build our way back and forth. (shrink)

Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays provides a variety of recent studies of Heidegger's most important work. Twelve prominent scholars, representing diverse nationalities, generations, and interpretive approaches deal with general methodological and ontological questions, particular issues in Heidegger's text, and the relation between Being and Time and Heidegger's later thought. All of the essays presented in this volume were never before available in an English-language anthology. Two of the essays have never before been published in any (...) language ; three of the essays have never been published in English before , and two of the essays provide previews of works in progress by major scholars. (shrink)

Being and Time’s emphasis on practical activities has attracted much attention as an approach to meaning not modelled exclusively on language. However, understanding this emphasis is made more difficult by Heidegger’s notion of Rede, which he routinely characterizes as both language-like and basic to all disclosure. This paper assesses whether this notion can be both interpreted coherently and reconciled with Heidegger’s emphasis on intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. It begins by identifying two functions of Articulacy – the demonstrative and articulatory (...) – and a potential source of incoherence in Heidegger’s analysis. Having reviewed some standard approaches to Heideggerian Articulacy, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of predicative judgements implies that language can be linked with different kinds of content. This allows Heidegger’s analysis to be read coherently, provided Articulacy is understood as having distinct purposive and predicative modes. The final section shows how this reading preserves a close connection between Articulacy and language while accommodating intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. (shrink)

This book, ten years in the making, is the first factual and conceptual history of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927), a key twentieth-century text whose background until now has been conspicuously absent. Through painstaking investigation of European archives and private correspondence, Theodore Kisiel provides an unbroken account of the philosopher's early development and progress toward his masterwork. Beginning with Heidegger's 1915 dissertation, Kisiel explores the philosopher's religious conversion during the bleak war years, the hermeneutic breakthrough in the (...) war-emergency semester of 1919, the evolution of attitudes toward his phenomenological mentor, Edmund Husserl, and the shifting orientations of the three drafts of Being and Time. Discussing Heidegger's little-known reading of Aristotle, as well as his last-minute turn to Kant and to existentialist terminology, Kisiel offers a wealth of narrative detail and documentary evidence that will be an invaluable factual resource for years to come. A major event for philosophers and Heidegger specialists, the publication of Kisiel's book allows us to jettison the stale view of Being and Time as a great book "frozen in time" and instead to appreciate the erratic starts, finite high points, and tentative conclusions of what remains a challenging philosophical "path.". (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a critical analysis of one of the most provocative aspects of Heidegger’s unfinished confrontation with Aristotle’s thinking. Over the course of his lifelong engagement with Aristotle’s texts, Heidegger rarely failed to notice the constitutive ambiguity of the ancient Greek philosopher’s position within the history of being. On the one hand, Aristotle appeared to be the founder of the Western metaphysical tradition of ontotheology, whereby God was understood as the supreme principle and being of (...) all beings. But on the other hand, there were traces or echoes of a more originary thinking in Aristotle’s texts that, according to Heidegger, could be developed for the sake of another beginning. In this essay, I draw on this constitutive ambiguity by focusing on Heidegger’s partial translation of Metaphysics Λ 6, where Aristotle most explicitly discusses the being (οὐσία) of the unmoved being. Using Heidegger’s translation as an aid, I argue that Aristotle’s account of the unmoved being in Metaphysics Λ 6 is perhaps best understood as of- fering an enigmatic description of the origin of movement and time as an act of pure temporalizing (reine Zeitigung), which is how Heidegger translates the notion of ἐνέργεια. In the conclusion of this essay, I suggest that the temporal account of being and time as pure temporalizing offers a possible way to reappropriate Aristotle’s thinking in a phenomenological context. (shrink)

The recent re-evaluation of Schelling’s work has blossomed interest and research into a number of Schelling’s core ideas. Amongst these Schelling’s analysis of God, the creative act and human freedom have been amongst the most explored. Much less explored has been his theory of temporality, a theory which not only underpins but is essential to understanding properly these other insights. It is the goal of this essay to correct that oversight by offering some initial remarks concerning Schelling’s theory of temporality, (...) a topic which is rarely explicitly addressed within his work. This it does by analysing closely the passages within his oeuvre wherein the topic is most explicitly treated and by addressing the ontological theory implied therein. (shrink)

During the 1920s Heidegger gave no less than twelve seminars and lecture courses devoted either exclusively or in large part to the reading of Aristotle's texts. Seven of these, especially the smaller seminars for advanced students, have not been published and apparently will never be included in the Gesamtausgabe. My focus here is on the very first of these. Billed as a reading of Aristotle's De Anima, much of it was devoted to Aristotle's Metaphysics. This decision not to separate Aristotle's (...) “psychology” from his “ontology” is a key move of the seminar that anticipates the project of Being and Time. This and many other ways in which Heidegger's early reading of De Anima anticipates the key moves of the later book constitute one of the reasons for its importance. Another is that the seminar allows us to see what gets suppressed in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, most significantly, the phenomenon of life itself in favor of an eventual focus on the being of human life or Dasein. This early seminar thus enables us not only to better understand Heidegger's project, but also to raise some fundamental questions concerning it. (shrink)

The most obvious cases of ego-involvement in conscious life are those which Husserl calls conscious acts or cogitationes.[2] They are the most obvious cases because they are the ones in which the ego explicitly involves himself in some way ; they exhibit the character of being engaged in by the ego or having been engaged in by him. This ego-quality or character belongs demonstrably to every conscious process in which the ego engages or lives. In the ego's conscious life, (...) the life to which his, her, or its acts belong, there also occur mental or intentive processes in which the ego does not or did not engage, and these Husserl calls passive or non-actional processes as contrasted with the active or actional processes characterized by egoengagement. (shrink)

The ideas of Martin Heidegger, one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, have had a profound influence on work in literary theory and aesthetics, as well as on mainstream philosophy. This book offers a clear and concise guide to Heidegger's notoriously complex writings, while giving special attention to his major work Being and Time. Richard McDonough adds historical context by exploring Heidegger's intellectual roots in German idealism and ancient Greek philosophy, and introduces readers to the (...) key themes in Heidegger's work including Dasein, Existenz, time, conscience, death, and phenomenology. This book, which also considers Heidegger's controversial ethics and politics, would make an excellent text for both introductory and advanced undergraduate courses on existentialism, phenomenology, continental philosophy, and Heidegger himself. (shrink)

In Heidegger's "Being and Time", the author locates the main themes of Heidegger's seminal work within their historical context and, in the process, familiarizes the reader with the terminology and background information relevant to understanding Heidegger's text. This study of what is arguably the greatest philosophical text of the century takes the ontological view of Heidegger's work. Here the author presents a precise formulation of the genuine problem of the meaning of Being, an explanation of the fact (...) that Being is for us problematic and should be so, and a precise determination and articulation of the mode of Being of man (using the hermeneutical and transcendental analytic of Dasein). Contents: I. The Preparatory Fundamental nalysis of Dasein II. Dasein and Temporality. Bibliography. Index. Co-published with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. (shrink)